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Abstract
To the study of the establishment of the European Commission in 1958 and its
administrative structures, a "new" dimension can be said to have been added with material that
has become available with the opening of the Historical Archives of the European
Communities. Through this material one has been able to study from first-hand sources
influences ana aspects of the setting-up of the European Commission which has hopefully cast
new light on this process. An interview with former Secretary-General of the Commission.
Emile Noel, has given first-hand experiences of the work of the early Commission from a
personal source.
From an organisational and administrative perspective, the European Commission has
several characteristics, making it unique, and therefore difficult to classify into any existing
group of organisation, whether of national or multinational type. Already early on these were
questions which led to publications that have been of considerable relevance to students of the
European Commission to this day. The "spill-over" effect of the neofunctionalist theory was
used by Leon N. Lindberg to explain the development from the High Authority of the ECSC
to the Commission of the EEC. and hopefully further on into the future. David Coombes
concentrated more on the administrative structures in an attempt to fit the Commission into
Max Weber's theory on bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the four functions he assigned to the
Commission and its administration have been useful ever since. Jean Siotis dismissed the study
of the Commission and the European Communities as a new phenomenon, claiming it to be an
expression of regionalism, and not a new type of "European science". He attempted to fit the
European Commission into the category of European Secretariats of which there had already
existed others before it.
Approaching the study of the European Commission, one cannot avoid the High
Authority. This was as close as one could get to a predecessor to the Commission. Their
differences, however, were partly due to the scope of the High Authority, which covered a
much smaller area of society, dealing only within the industries of coal and steel. Secondly, the
Treaties of the ECSC and EEC approached the legislative process rather differently. Within the
ECSC. legislative powers were given to the High Authority alone, whereas in the EEC. this was
shared between the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, making the EEC less
"supranational". Furthermore, differences between the two executive bodies can be found in the
characters of its two Presidents. Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein respectively. Monnet
approached the setting-up of the High Authority in a minimalist way, only expanding and
developing its administration according to needs. Hallstein believed in developing
administrative structures first, for then to be able to concentrate on the developing of policies.
It was also in this way that the Commission was able to perform its most characteristic, and
unique feature, that of a political leadership. The influence of President Hallstein was here to
prove considerable, together with the rest of the College of Commissioners, operating in a
strictly collegiate and independent manner. Particularly during the Free Trade Area negotiations
between the Six and the rest of the OEEC. the Commission showed its ability to take political
initiatives. The Free Trade Area negotiations had started in an intergovernmental fashion in
1956. two years before the EEC and the Commission came into operation. Nevertheless, the
Commission proved capable of entering the negotiations half way through, seeking to carry
them on as the single voice of the Six.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Les institutions sontplus importantes que les hommes. Mais seuls les
hommes, quand ils en ont la force, peuvent transformer et enrichir les
choses que les institutions transmettent ensuite aux generations
successives.
1. THE STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
1.1 Reasons for the "new" interest in the Commission
Jean Monnet, the "founding father" of the European Communities, stated in
connection with the setting-up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
that "Europe would be created by people but that it would not survive unless it was
firmly anchored in solid institutions".2 His approach to the institutions of the ECSC
was to be different from the institutions of the later European Economic Community
(EEC). The institutional framework, on the other hand, was more or less identical.
However, the executive institutions of the two Communities, the High Authority of
the ECSC and the Commission of the EEC, had a number of important differences.
These differences were partly due to the general mood in the member States towards
supranationalism and to the scope of operation, but maybe even more importantly
due to the different ideas and cultures of their two founding leaders, Jean Monnet
and Walter Hallstein. Jean Monnet was a Frenchman and very much an idealist. He
was concerned with a big idea and the larger picture. This was an idea of countries
working together for a common cause, rather than fighting against each other in
1 Jean Monnet, Clefs pour I'Action. "Institutions are more important than
people. But only people, with the necessary strength/power, can transform and
enrich those elements which the institutions pass on to succeeding generations."
Own free translation.
2 Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1990) A
Tribute to Emile Noel. Secretary-General of the European Commission from 1958
to 1987, p. 36.
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devastating wars. The ECSC and the High Authority were set up with an overall
purpose of keeping Germany and France at peace with each other, and Germany at
peace with the rest of Europe, and hence the world.' By the time the EEC was set
up in 1958, many dramatic events had changed the ideas and needs as they were seen
by the Six of the ECSC and their national politicians. After the idealist boost given
by the setting-up of the High Authority, a dramatic set-back came with the failure
of the European Defence Community (EDC) two years later. Other events on the
world scene, however, made the Six realize the need for a further and more far-
reaching integration. By the time of the setting-up of the EEC, the sector integration
"invented" and introduced by Jean Monnet had lost its importance in favour of a
general economic integration, involving all sectors of society. Together with the
scepticism of national politicians towards supranationalism, this would necessarily
produce a different kind of executive institution.
This thesis is not meant to be a general study of Europe of the 1950s, or an
analysis of why the European Communities were set up. Many studies of that kind
have been made already. Instead, the intention has been to make a study of how the
European Commission was set up and organised, and which factors influenced this
process. The study will concentrate on how the Commission, as a College of
Commissioners and as administration, came into being and how its founding
personalities came to inspire it into what it is today. If we take some time to analyse
and reflect over the words by Jean Monnet quoted above, it seems clear that
institutions are set up according to ideas and needs as seen by the human resources
available. Furthermore, the institution will survive into the future only if made solid,
whether this means "supranational", "independent", "bureaucratic" or "political", as
some possible characteristics. These characteristics might represent either the High
Authority or the European Commission, or both, at some point in their existence.
Unless otherwise specified, Germany will be used throughout the thesis
meaning West Germany or the Federal Republic of Germany. If other terms are
used this will be in quotations by other authors that will have to be kept in their
original form.
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As will be shown. Jean Monnet. the pioneer, believed in a minimalist administration
where no person or idea would be lost in "heavy" bureaucratic structures, and
therefore wanted to see all levels involved in the decision-making process. If the
administration needed to develop into something bigger, it would when the time was
right. Some years later Walter Hallstein brought his German bureaucratic traditions
with him as the President of the European Commission. After having played a part
in the creation of the German Foreign Office, the Auswartiges Amt, he brought with
him a highly hierarchical administrative tradition into the European Commission.
Unlike Jean Monnet who intended to develop the administration of the High
Authority according to needs. Hallstein. in the same fashion as Monnet, believed in
setting up the structure straight away for later to "fill the holes".4 Nevertheless, he
could not lay enough stress on the importance of the Commission establishing its
independence towards the member States. Already in 1950 Hallstein declared that
"The German Government reaffirms that the importance of the Schuman Plan is
above all political. In this context, economic problems, substantial as they may be,
are secondary: solutions to them will always be found."5
The political aspect was very important both to the High Authority as well
as to the European Commission. How political the two institutions have been, and
the latter in particular, has nevertheless been up to historians and political scientists
of more recent times to analyse. The Commission was to become restricted in its
actions by national governments not willing to see their "sovereignty" handed over
to the new Community of overall economic integration. In the early years, however,
it still represented the optimism created by the "relance europeenne" which had
brought the Messina Conference in 1955, leading to the two Treaties of Rome to be
signed on 27 March 1957. During the first years of existence of the European
4 Emile Noel. Temoignage: L Administration de la Communaute Europeenne
dans la retrospective d un ancien Haul Fonctionnaire. In: Yearbook of European
Administrative History 1992. pp. 157-158. "Pour la Commission, I'idee de
Hallstein etait d'etahlir tout de suite la structure et de garnir ensuite les cases."
Monnet (1978) Memoirs, p. 328.
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Commission, as will be shown, many policies had to be set out as part of the putting
into effect of the Treaty of Rome. Furthermore, there were other external factors
influencing the Commission to act in a political way. The first was the Free Trade
Area negotiations which were already under way as the Commission came into
being. Later there was the Kennedy Round of the GATT where the Commission
came to play an important part.
1.2 Material from the Historical Archives of the European Commission in Brussels
and Florence
In this study of the period of the creation of the European Commission, the
opening of the Historical Archives of the European Communities to the public has
been of great help in providing a fuller picture of the actual events. All classified
documents issued by the institutions of the European Communities are being kept in
their original status according to a 30-year rule. Theoretically, that means that all
documents at least up to 1965 are open for the public to read and study. This can be
done at the Historical Archives in Brussels or at the European University Institute
in Florence. In addition, each member State is eligible for three copies on request.
The period just mentioned includes most of the history of the High Authority of the
ECSC, the early history of the European Commission - the period of shaping new
administrative structures, as well as the European Free Trade Area negotiations
between the Six and the rest of the OEEC. The material to be found in the
Commission Archives are letters, drafts and documents, as well as minutes from
internal meetings of the Commission and between the Commission and other
institutions. They give an impression of how business was conducted and who
conducted it. and not least at what speed things happened.
In addition to documents from the European institutions, the archives in
Florence also include a collection of interviews with several of the pioneers from
both the High Authority and the European Communities. Their personal accounts of
the period give valuable information to a student of the early European Communities
4
- opinions that will not always be found in any book. Although many of these
interviews were conducted as much as thirty years later or more, the views they
express will be free from any political or confidential restrictions, and give totally
personal impressions. Characteristically, these interviews give an impression of a
group of people who were utterly enthusiastic about, and believed in, the integration
process they were part of.
As part of this research, a visit has also been made to the Archives of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. This has been most useful for getting an
impression of how the setting-up of the European Communities, as well as the Free
Trade Area negotiations, was viewed and discussed in the French Assemblee
Nationale. France was important on both of these occasions in many ways. She had
provided the political initiative behind the ECSC in 1950. and in 1954 she prevented
the European Defence Community and the European Political Community from being
set up. It was clear that there was not going to be another European Community
without her consent and complete participation. Within France there were strong
divisions between the "Europeans" on the one side and the more nationalist groups
on the other. Negotiations always had to be conducted with this in mind to satisfy
the many powerful groups at home and at the same time seek not to interrupt the
valuable process that had been started in 1950 with the Schuman Declaration. To the
five other founding states it was equally important to keep France on their side if the
overriding aim of peace in Europe was to be fulfilled and the European Communities
were to carry any real weight on the world scene. The impression one gets from
studying these documents is that, despite differences, France was preparing herself
considerably at home to handle the EEC when it was set up. During 1957, in the
months immediately before and after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, discussions
in the French Assemblee Nationale were very much concerned with the proposed
Free Trade Area with the United Kingdom and the rest of the OEEC countries.
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1.3 Interview with Emile Noel on 12 December 1994 in Paris
Emile Noel was appointed as the first Executive Secretary of the European
Commission in March 1958, a position in which he stayed for nearly thirty years,
until 1987.6 He observed at close hand how the Commission and its administration
took shape from the start and how it developed and adapted to the many changes that
occurred since. Furthermore, it is clear that he not only observed at first hand, but
also took part in these developments himself in a highly influential manner.
The characteristic ascribed to the European Commission during its very early
years was that of an organisation consisting of the "hard core" of the so-called
"Good Europeans" from the six member States. There existed a real feeling of
teamwork and team spirit which came about with a general feeling of accomplishing
substantial achievements. The kind of dedication given by the staff at the time was
demonstrated by the fact that such elements as payment came secondary to any other
task to be fulfilled. Emile Noel further gives the impression of this team of
"Europeans" being highly influenced by the leadership of the Commission President,
Walter Hallstein, who was very much in charge, leading the way on the setting-up
of administrative structures. Neither was his leadership disputed by any of his
colleagues among the College of Commissioners. This period, as Noel claimed,
demonstrated President Hallstein executing a political leadership of the Commission,
conducting real political discussions among the Commissioners, functioning to a
certain degree as the first European "politicians". One reason, it has to be
mentioned, why this was possible at the time, and maybe less possible later on, was
the fact that there was little if any executive and implementative work to do. In
relation to the Staff Regulations for the Commission, which came into force in 1962,
Emile Noel gave the impression of an organisation which, during the four years
prior, had to a certain extent even benefitted from being without too many
6 With the Merger Treaty of 1967 the Executive Secretariat changed the name
to the Secretariat General, and the Executive Secretary becoming the Secretary
General. In this thesis, however, the appropriate name will be Executive Secretary.
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regulations of such kind. In this way one could be certain that those who did come
to work for the European Commission in 1958 were truly devoted to the cause of
European integration, feeling they were doing something useful for the common
future of the continent. For these reasons they were willing to take risks, in a job
without status - at least not at that time, with no contract and no guarantees. It also
made it possible for the Commission to develop in its own speed and into its own
shape without too many rules and regulations made beforehand. Furthermore, the
interview with Emile Noel gave the impression of the European Commission as an
organisation which, given the time it was set up and the people involved, did not
have the opportunity to develop in any other direction.
The teamwork that existed from the start in 1958 throughout the Hallstein
presidency, in particular until around 1965, will be considered as rather unique in
the history of the European Commission.' Emile Noel put great importance in this
teamwork, which he claims to have been totally decisive for the development ahead.
Among the personalities involved, Emile Noel could tell of the special sense of
achievement that was felt, and of the feeling of doing something quite extraordinary
and very important. Nevertheless, careful assumptions were also made of a "heavy"
and bureaucratic administration which was established early in 1958 and resulted in
a certain lack of internal cooperation within the Commission. To face the immediate
tasks, such as the ongoing Free Trade Area negotiations, the building of common
One member of the Commission, Robert Marjolin from France, has
characterised the period between 1958 and 1965 as the "honeymoon" where there
was nothing but progress and favourable circumstances. As he put it in his
memoirs: "the proposals made and put before the Council of Ministers were certain
to get a favourable reception or. in any case not encounter an outright veto which
would have left no room for negotiations". Robert Marjolin (1989) Memoirs 1911-
86): Architect of European Unity (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson). The end of
the "honeymoon" came with the "empty chair" crisis when France withdrew her
representatives to the EEC, claiming that Hallstein and the Commission had by¬
passed the opinions of the member States regarding the "introduction of agricultural
levies, the introduction of the principle of "own resources' and a greater role for the
European Parliament". Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence (eds.) (1994) The
European Commission (Essex: Longman Group Ltd.). p. 5.
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policies and the setting-up of the Common Market. President Hallstein had taken
great care in recruiting officials of the highest standard to the administration already
during the three first months of 1958. It was during this period that Emile Noel had
been appointed as Executive Secretary of the European Commission. One of his
main tasks was in trying to develop better links between the Directorates General as
it soon became apparent that horizontal links between these were few already from
the start. Within the administration that appeared, the weekly meeting of the nine
Commissioners could not inspire similar behaviour further down in the system. This
seems to have been an area where Emile Noel was able to influence the system to
become less rigid.
To Emile Noel, all the different material that has been written about the
Commission and the various ways of identifying its many roles, seemed to be of
little concern. For someone who has seen the developments and the roles performed
at close hand, this is not such an unusual reaction. Furthermore, one could get the
feeling that the material could often reflect a "wrong", or misleading, picture.
Observers from the outside and "observers" like himself from the inside could
possibly put weight on different elements in the system. It seems from Emile Noel's
comments that, in his views, the political function of the Commission, during its
early years in particular, was the one of greatest importance and significance.
Another aspect which came out of the interview with Emile Noel was the
feeling that many elements such as the inter-executive groups and the "Meeting of
the Presidents" either had not existed at all or only happened on few occasions. This
might serve as an example of how theory and practice does not always go hand in
hand. The fact that such elements did exist, at least on paper, should be quite clear
as we have seen evidence of this, not only in the literature, but also in the archive
material.8 Whether they worked in reality, and served a purpose, will be another
s See for example Communaute Economique Europeenne, Commission,
Secretariat. 40/58-F. Bruxelles. le 5 mars 1958. Confidentiel. "Repartition et
Composition des Groupes". See below Chapter IV. 3.1.
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discussion. It is in such situations that a personal account of the actual story will
make the picture more complete, adding to what information one might find in~
archive material.
Even if people may have a tendency to play down their own role and
importance in any given situation, it has been of the greatest interest and significance
to the writing of this thesis to have listened to Emile Noel tell his part of the story
in his own words. By listening carefully one will understand what he has thought to
be the greatest achievements and where he has placed his loyalties. The establishing
of the European Commission in 1958 seems today a long time ago, and Emile Noel
has served this organisation under several Commission Presidents. Nevertheless, a
great admiration for what Walter Hallstein achieved during his time as President of
the Commission still exists. Whatever imperfections the Commission administration
might have seen, the fact that it was set up, and still exists in the same form, must
be regarded as an historical event. Its powers, we will see, should normally be
considered as too important for nation-states to want to hand over to other
"supranational" organisations.
For these reasons, one might think, people like Emile Noel were, and still
are, unwilling to see what might seem like details in the larger picture as having
caused any problems to the early European Commission. This could be whether there
were problems with national enclaves, or the fact that there existed no Staff
Regulations until 1962. That the European Commission was able to take political,
as well as administrative, decisions of great significance as early as during its first
year in operation must be given a greater importance within the historical picture.
What seems to have been established through the interview with Emile Noel is that
at least during its first few years in operation, which in this case would be from
1958 until 1962-63, the European Commission functioned as a collegiate body,
achieving a real spirit of teamwork among its members. Furthermore, President
Hallstein seems to have performed a real political leadership role, starting on the
first day. One way he did this was in the recruitment of personnel to the Commission
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administration. He personally interviewed most of them, certainly all the higher
officials for positions as Directors General and Directors, and his personal "green
light" was needed in every case. Another way of executing a political leadership was
in the establishment of the administrative structures of the Commission which, in the
view of Emile Noel, was set up according to decisions taken by President Hallstein,
only with the approval of the other eight Commissioners. The result, which Emile
Noel carefully has suggested might have become rather administratively "heavy",
must nevertheless be regarded as a political decision taken by President Hallstein.
From Emile Noel's description of the Commission administration which early
became rather hierarchical, with little or no horizontal communication, it could in
many ways seem to fit with Max Weber's theory on bureaucracy, which has been
used by David Coombes in his study on the functions of the European Commission.
The value of this interview with Emile Noel has been as a first hand
impression from someone who was present from the start, in the middle of these
historical developments. As the Executive Secretary, however, he was also situated
a bit on the side, almost as an observer of his own organisation, something which
might give a wider picture. Views expressed during the interview will be used
throughout Chapter IV in particular, as well as Chapter V, and always with a
reference in the footnotes.
2. EARLY STUDIES OF THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The following section of the Introduction will present the three main authors
used in this thesis, and their three different approaches to the study of the early
European Commission. Despite presenting highly different analyses, they have one
important factor in common: the fact that their work was published relatively soon
after the setting-up of the Commission and that they have remained among the main
literature on the organisation and functions of the Commission to this day.
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Leon N. Lindberg, an American scholar, was, together with his fellow
countryman Ernst B. Haas.9 important and influential to the neofunctionalist theory
of integration. The fact that they were both Americans also made them see the
processes that took place on the European continent with slightly different eyes.
Lindberg's book The Political Dynamics ofEuropean Economic Integration was the
first thorough work on the European Commission. It was published only five years
after it was set up, and to a certain extent one could say that Lindberg
conceptualized the Commission in a way which made it grow along the lines which
he envisaged. One of the reasons for Lindberg's interest in the EEC and the
European Commission was the political integration as a process "whereby a number
of nation-states come to construct a single political community".10 For such a
system to exist, Lindberg insisted on the importance of institutions and their
decision-making procedures. The European Commission had been given extensive
powers to exercise, including its right and obligation to propose legislation to the
Council of Ministers. However, he is generally not the one to present explanations
or solutions, but rather to construct arrangements for the characteristics of
integration. As another writer on European integration, Paul Taylor, has put it: "The
comparison rather than the explanation of integration process has become the new
goal of the Neofunctionalist theorists".11
David Coombes, at the time a British Professor from the University of
Reading, made a study of the European Commission for Political and Economic
Planning (PEP), published in 1970. This was a more practical, rather than
theoretical study. His use of Weber's theories of bureaucracy, however, was an
attempt to classify the Commission as a type of organisation that was already known
Ernst B. Haas" great work The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and
Economic Forces 1950-57 (1958) was. however, of an earlier date, written mainly
about the ECSC.
111 Lindberg (1963) The Political Dynamics ofEuropean Economics Integration,
p. vii.
"
Taylor (1971) International Co-operation Today, p. 74.
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to the reader. As the European Commission was a new type of organisation which
had not been seen before, there was a great need to try and define it and put a name
to it. Nevertheless, as it was a fast growing organisation, not only concerning its
number of staff but also its tasks, it was a useful study to see it in relation with
theories of bureaucracy. This would perhaps prove to some that the Commission had
become too big a "machine" which had lost all its flexibility and inventiveness. To
others the same findings could possibly be used to prove that in a future federal
Europe, the Commission would serve as the state administration with the
Commissioners as the ministers of a federal government.
The late Jean Siotis from Greece also made an early study of the European
Commission, only this time comparing it with other existing International
Secretariats. He was critical of the whole trend of studying the European
Communities as a separate study of international organisation. Siotis was a Professor
from the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva. He later worked as
Director General of the Centre for Translation and Interpretation in Corfu and
Director of the office of the European Commission in Athens. His study of the
European Commission was of a much shorter kind but is, nevertheless, still standing
as influential even today.
2.1. Leon N. Lindberg - Neofunctionalism
During the 1950s and early 1960s, Leon N. Lindberg was, together with
Ernst B. Haas, the principal scholar within the neofunctionalist theory. Their theories
were built upon the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952,
and later the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1958. The
neofunctionalist theory, one might say. was essentially a reformulation of the older
theory of Functionalism, applied to regional integration. The Functionalists, on the
other hand, "were concerned with the problem of war and sought to use international
12
institutions to transfer loyalties away from national governments".12
While the EEC later was founded on a system of integration involving,
gradually, the whole of the economic sector, the ECSC was, in Paul Taylor's words,
"an agency of partial integration". By partial integration was meant the way the
ECSC "sought to achieve a very high level of integration very quickly" in one area
in particular.13 In 1950-52 the coal and steel industries were seen as the most
important sectors to integrate both economically and politically, and also the sectors
which national governments most likely would agree on.14
Essential to the neofunctionalist theory was the concept of "spill-over". As
Lindberg put it, this concept "refers to a situation in which a given action, related
to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only
by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for
more action, and so forth." It was first talked about in relation to the setting-up of
the ECSC. Haas wanted to show that integrating one sector would inevitably lead to
the integration of other sectors of society, and in the end to full economic and
political integration. Nevertheless, he did point out the fact that there was no
precedent for such organisational behaviour. Lindberg further argued that "the initial
task and grant of power to the central institutions creates a situation or series of
situations that can be dealt with only by further expanding the task and the grant of
power".15 As he introduces the idea of institutions we also get the idea of their
important, or even essential role in the achievement of full integration, something
12
Taylor (1971) p. 6.
13 Taylor (1971) p. 16.
14 Coal and steel had a special significance to people at that time. They were
the two most important industries in Europe, and they were essential for the making
of weapons. As Paul Taylor puts it they were "the commanding heights of the
economy". Taylor (1971) p. 16. Furthermore, integration of the coal and steel
industries would lead eventually to a solution of the problem between France and
Germany over the Saar.
Lindberg (1963) p. 10
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which will be discussed further below.
In Haas' writings about the ECSC, it becomes clear that its executive body,
the High Authority, was to play an important role, as a supranational institution, in
the process of "spill-over", and in paving the way for complete European integration.
Its first president, Jean Monnet, had wanted a High Authority consisting of five
members only, by which approach he would have ensured that only the best
candidates were chosen and that nationality was not taken into account. There was
also a wish to make the High Authority responsible only to the Common Assembly,
which in turn would have resembled a parliamentary system. Knowing that in
Monnet's original plan for the ECSC there was no mention of a Council of
Ministers, it seems that he had more ambitious plans than what appeared. However,
going further than what the national governments were prepared to follow was
impossible, something which was to become quite evident when the French
Assemblee Nationale failed to ratify the EDC in 1954. This was a set back which
seemed for a while to disrupt all further plans for an integrated Europe.
Nevertheless, through the "relance europeenne" and the Benelux proposals, we saw
the setting-up of the EEC and Euratom in 1958. To the neofunctionalists this was
regarded as a proof that their theory, and the "spill-over" effect, was working. This,
despite the fact that the whole concept of supranationalism had been played down
due to the failure of the EDC. The word "supranationalism" was not used in any of
the Treaties of Rome, and the term "Commission" was thought less "flamboyant"
than "High Authority".16 Also, it was thought to involve fewer supranational
powers, in other words, to be a step back from the High Authority of the ECSC.
Neofunctionalism pointed to the importance of the Commission's engagement
with the governments and its increasing involvement with more politically sensitive
issues. It further pointed to the importance of the Commission's maximizing the
16 From an interview with Professor Pierre Uri in Paris on 21 September 1984.
Archives of the European Communities, European University Institute, Florence.
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public relations aspects of its administrative and policy-making functions. The
institutions set up under the Treaty of Rome were given legislative powers. In the
ECSC these powers had been vested in the "supranational" High Authority. In the
EEC they were instead given to the Community as a whole. This was, in particular,
a matter of cooperation and a shared responsibility between the Commission and the
Council of Ministers.
According to the French President de Gaulle, the Commission was seen as
a body of '"mere technicians', useful for France but certainly not to be endowed
with the chief role in integration".17 As he expressed in a statement at a Paris
Conference of 5 September 1960: "These bodies have their technical value, but they
have not, and cannot have, any political authority or consequently be effective".18
Despite this view taken by de Gaulle, however, the French, as Lindberg put it,
"have demonstrated a willingness to make concessions and have accepted the
initiatory and brokerage activities of the Commission".19 And hereby Lindberg
introduces two of the roles with which he characterised the Commission.
The first was the role of initiating policies, or in other words, the
Commission's right and obligation to propose legislation to the Council of Ministers.
This power was, in Lindberg's view, the "most important element". These proposals,
sometimes of very technical character, ranged over several areas of economic policy.
It was through this power that the Commission could determine, to a certain degree,
the direction and the speed of the whole Community by choosing the areas of
initiative. In doing so it had to present "bold, yet realistic policies" in order to fulfil
the objectives of the Treaties, and not only what the Council would want to hear. Put
in other words: "The Commission is thus the driving force behind the actions of the
17 Lindberg (1963) p. 289.
Ks France and the European Community. Occasional Paper No. 11. London,
PEP. 30 January 1961.
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Lindberg (1963) p. 289.
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Council, which filters, controls, and channels this force."20
Secondly, the Commission acted as a broker between the Community and the
member States, something it also did through its proposals to the Council. All
proposals from the Commission had to go through the Council to become legislation.
The Council could only change such proposals unanimously. However, if rejected,
they could be changed and modified by the Commission and sent back to the
Council. In this connection the Commission has been "accused of watering down its
own roles, both as a spokesman for the common interests of the entire Community
and as originator of proposals to the Council, by excessive reliance on prior
consultations with national experts".21 The national experts referred to here were
mostly the Permanent Representatives in COREPER, working under the Council, but
not as a Community institution. In Lindberg's opinion the Commission had a
tendency to base its proposals on what it thought the governments were most likely
to accept. He would, however, not go as far as to say that the Commission did not
design its proposals "to accommodate enough from each national position to win
support" or assent. Often it has seemed that "the Commission's proposals pleased
nobody, but were accepted ultimately because there seemed to be no alternative".22
A third role of the Commission, deriving from Article 155 of the Treaty of
Rome, was "ensuring the execution by the Member States of the Treaty and of the
acts of its institutions".23 In other words, to watch over the general functioning and
development of the Common Market. To fulfill this role, the Treaty had given the
Commission certain powers of recommendation and advice, as well as the right to
20 Lindberg (1963) p. 32.
21 Lindberg (1963) p. 62.
22 Lindberg (1963) p. 71.
2"' Article 155 EEC: "In order to ensure that the Common Market works
efficiently and develops satisfactorily, the Commission shall: - ensure that the
provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions by virtue of this
Treaty are carried out; [...]."
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gather information and verify any matter in its jurisdiction.24 Furthermore, the
Commission has a general role in representing the interests of the Community as a
whole, as a spokesman for the Community interests. This is a role it has through its
position as an independent body which may "neither seek nor take instructions from
any Government or other body".2:1 As Lindberg saw it. the staff of the Commission
was intended to be the nucleus of a European civil service, which was there to carry
out the day-to-day activities of the Community, ensuring that the provisions of the
Treaty were observed. Furthermore. Lindberg pointed out the fact that the European
Commission was a permanent body, essentially administrative or technical, as well
as a strictly collegiate body. Its role was, as mentioned above, to watch over the
general functioning and development of the Common Market, and to ensure the
execution by the member States of the Treaty and of the acts of the institutions
where the Commission had a general power of recommendation and advice. Without
going into any theories of bureaucracy, Lindberg called the Commission staff and
its officials a "vast bureaucratic system" which was developing, "involving thousands
of national and Community officials in a continuous decision-making process".26
One observation Lindberg made about the members of the Commission was
that they were not technicians, but had all held posts at cabinet level or in policy¬
making levels of national administrations. Many had been active in politics and were
thereby able to command considerable influence in their respective countries. These
members, and in particular those of the very first few years, were all firm advocates
24 Treaty of Rome. Articles 155. 169. 213. Under Article 169 the Commission
may bring a member States to the Court of Justice, as a last solution. In Article 162
the relations between the Commission and the Council has been laid down stating
their duty to "consult together" while deciding on "methods of collaboration by
mutual agreement".
2" Article 157.2 EEC: "The members of the Commission shall act completely
independently in the performance of their duties, in the general interest of the
Community. In the performance of their duties, they shall neither seek nor take
instructions from any Government or other body."
2,1
Lindberg (1963) p. 62.
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of a maximum economic and political integration, as well as for delegating national
powers to Community institutions. However, in Lindberg's view, the "formal
decision-making powers assigned to the Commission by the Treaty were distinctly
inferior to those of the High Authority" where "the Commission's role was to be
largely the technical one of supervision and preparation".2' What he referred to
here was the difference between the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Paris
concerning legislative powers. In the EEC "legislative powers and the ability to deal
directly with the subject matter of the Treaty" was granted the Community as a
whole, something which in particular involved the relationship between the
Commission and the Council of Ministers. In the ECSC, however, this legislative
power had been granted the High Authority alone.28
To the question of whether the Commission had turned into a European civil
service, Lindberg pointed out the problem of "staffing high posts with civil servants
serving on leave from their own administrations", which again would lead to
recruitment problems. He advanced the argument that with the kind of geographical
distribution the Commission practised concerning staffing and recruitment, it might
end up more like a multinational civil service. Furthermore, as Lindberg suggested,
"a large and complex administrative apparatus, combined with a strict national
distribution of policy-making positions, may not be particularly conducive, in the
long run, to the development of real Community initiatives, and may weaken the
27
Lindberg (1963) p. 67. This view has been challenged by Pierre Uri who
claimed that in the ECSC decisions were taken by the High Authority with support
from the Council of Ministers. In the EEC, on the other hand, decisions were taken
by the Council from a proposal by the Commission. Seen this way, the system
worked more or less according to the same practice in both Communities, based on
a cooperation between the executive body and the Council of Ministers. As Pierre
Uri has put it. it is not true that the Commission had less powers than the High
Authority. In fact, he claimed that the Commission had been given more extensive
powers but did not use them altogether. From an interview with Pierre Uri at the
EUI. Florence on 9 January 1989. Archives of the European Communities,
European University Institute. Florence.
28 Lindberg (1963) p. 29.
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authority of the Commission".29
2.2. David Coombes - Weberianism / Theories of Bureaucracy
As rightly pointed out by David Coombes, the European Commission "does
not seem to fit into any familiar classification of institutional types". It had been
given formal powers which did not reach up to those of an executive branch of a
federal government: it had no powers to raise revenue of its own, it was not an
elected body, and it lacked authority to make decisions on its own on the most
important matters. On the other hand, it must be stressed that it had been entrusted
with powers and functions that went far beyond those normally associated with an
international secretariat. These were first and foremost its formal powers to make
proposals upon which Community legislation would be based, and, secondly, its duty
to act as the "conscience of the Community". Furthermore, it was intended as the
political leadership of the Community, representing "the Community as a whole".
However, Coombes was of the opinion that the European Commission did not fit
with the definitions of its political role. Instead, in the search for a definition of the
role of the Commission that would suit all its functions, Coombes chose the one of
"an institution in the process of political unification".30
In his study of the European Commission, David Coombes relied heavily on
Max Weber's theories of bureaucracy.31 Weber has presented several different
approaches to the study of bureaucracy: his first approach sees bureaucracy in a
constitutional sense, referring to the "Administrative State". In this case the
organisation would be a machinery of public administration. The Commission could,
however, not be classified according to legal, constitutional criteria, and from a
29 Lindberg (1963) p. 73.
Coombes (1970) Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community. A
portrait of the Commission of the E.E.C.. pp. 101-102.
Coombes (1970) pp. 102-106.
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review of its formal powers it is not clear whether it was a bureaucracy in the
constitutional sense or not.
Secondly, Weber saw bureaucracy in a sociological sense, which was his
"ideal-type" bureaucracy in which it is "ideally represented by an administrative
system in which everything is sacrificed to the rational pursuit of specified goals".
Bureaucracy in a sociological sense would, further, refer to a more "general type of
organisation rather than to a particular set of institutions". Characteristics ofWeber's
"ideal-type" bureaucracy are first of all a clear division of labour with a high degree
of specialisation. Secondly, recruitment of officials is based on technical
qualifications, and administrative structures are based within a "pyramidical" system
where authority is clearly circumscribed at each level.
The Commission has, throughout its existence, been criticised for having
adopted the working methods of a large and slow bureaucracy. To prove whether or
not there was any justification in this, Coombes put forward an assumption, which
was to be the basis of his study, where he said: "In so far as [the Commission] is a
'bureaucracy', then the Commission will be unable to ensure the political leadership
which is required to bring about an effective union of Europe." In Coombes' view
the European Commission appeared as a new type of organisation which had been
difficult to fit into an already existing type of organisation. It was given powers
which generally belonged in a political system, and others which made it similar to
a national administration or a bureaucracy. As he put it: "Roughly speaking in some
aspects the Commission is expected to act as a bureaucracy and to have the essential
characteristics of an implementative, 'goal-seeking' organisation, while in others it
must behave as if it constituted the political leadership of the Community, acting as
an initiating, 'goal-setting' body".32 While studying the roles of the Commission
more closely. Coombes classified them into four different groups.
~ Coombes (1970) p. 234.
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The first of the four functions Coombes assigned to the European
Commission was that of Initiative. By this is meant the right and duty of the
Commission to initiate Community legislation and to "make recommendations on any
matter it thinks fit within the framework of the Treaty". Through this role the
Commission had got, not only the power, but also the obligation, to provide the
dynamic of the Community, and it would do so by setting the objectives for the
future through the elaboration of new programmes of action, as well as by
interpreting past achievements of the Community as a whole. Relating this back to
Coombes' initial discussion on bureaucracy, he said: "Initiation requires a degree of
innovative activity which is not normally found in a bureaucracy, which is designed
essentially for the execution of existing programmes.1,33 It is largely because of this
particular role that the Commission is so hard to classify. It performs a role which,
in a national setting, normally is confined to the government, a role which, by
federalists, may have been envisaged for the Commission in a future United States
of Europe. However, in the Community perspective, the Commission cannot take the
final decisions. This role has been given to the Council of Ministers, something
which makes the two institutions highly dependent on each other.
The second role of the Commission was what Coombes described as the
Normative function. Within this category comes such roles as the "guardian of the
Treaty" and the "conscience of the Community", and relates to the Commission's
role in interpreting the Treaty to make sure that all its acts and protocols are
followed by all parties. It, further, means that the Commission acts as an "honest
broker" during the legislative process in the Council of Minsters. This means that,
in order for the Council to be able to take decisions, the Commission will amend its
proposals in order for the Council to achieve a majority, as far as this serves the
interest of the Community. In this respect the Commission can take "upon itself the
duty of laying down the Community interest, rather as a national government
Coombes (1970) pp. 234-235.
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interprets the public interest".54 Furthermore, the Normative function includes the
"filling out" of the provisions of the Treaty, and the right to react to unforeseen
situations.35
In his discussion of the functions of the Commission, Coombes saw the
Initiative and Normative functions as belonging to the same category. In his view
they "give it the role of political leader and promoter of Community interest",
without which the Community would simply turn itself more and more into an
intergovernmental organisation of the same kind as the OECD or the Council of
Europe.36
As a third role. Coombes pointed out the Commission's Administrative
function. On the one hand, it had to prepare for decisions to be taken, produce data
and keep records, and take a number of regulatory decisions concerning the customs
union. On the other hand, it had. in its capacity as the "guardian of the Treaty", to
be on its guard against possible violations of the Treaty. The Administrative
function, which has a very different nature from the Initiating role, could, therefore
operate as a constant threat to the latter. As put by March and Simon:
"If all the resources of an organization are busily employed in
carrying out existing programs, the process of initiating new programs
will be slow and halting at best. Frequently, when a new program is
to be developed, a new organizational unit is created and charged with
the task first of elaborating the new program and then carrying it on
when it has been elaborated. This procedure provides for a spurt of
innovative, program-developing activity - a spurt that automatically
'4 Coombes (1970) pp. 235-236.
Coombes here mentioned as an example the Commission's reaction to the
French veto of British membership in 1963, where it condemned the French
Government for going outside the Council of Ministers. Another example of the
Commission executing its Normative function was when the Commission
represented the Community in the Kennedy Round negotiations. In both cases the
Commission spoke on behalf of the Community, laying down the Community
interest.
'6 Coombes (1970) p. 236.
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diminishes as the program is elaborated and the task shifts gradually
from one of planning to one of execution. "3
Lastly, the Commission had been given a Mediative function. It had as its duty to
try and achieve agreements between the member States in the Council of Ministers,
something Coombes compared to the function of the secretariat of an
intergovernmental organisation like that of GATT. In fulfilling this function the
Commission would often use its presence in the Committee of Permanent
Representatives, as well as in its sub-committees and the Council of Ministers itself.
This would mean that the Commission could and should involve itself in all the
various stages of the decision-making process.
As has been shown above, the various functions of the Commission seemed
to work well when seen one by one. To exist all together, however, within the same
organisation, is what could cause problems of definition. To be a mediator, Coombes
argued that the Commission could only with difficulty fulfill its normative function
as these two functions, he said, were incompatible, or even contradictory to each
other. The first required a flexible, objective and impartial organisation whereas the
latter worked where there was a commitment towards a certain set of values.
Furthermore, the mediator who initiated too often would run the risk of being
regarded as partisan, and the initiator needed the support of a legitimizing, norm-
setting authority. Creativity, on the other hand, was lacking in the administrator
while inventiveness was required by a mediator. The tension between the
bureaucratic responsibilities, represented by the Administrative and Mediative
functions, and the political responsibilities, represented by the Initiative and
Normative functions, has existed since the days of the High Authority, and has to
be worked on constantly. However, as Coombes pointed out, " [Rjight up to the time
of the merger, the Commission was still regarded [...] as a relatively intimate and
J. G. March and H. A. Simon (1958) Organizations (New York: Wiley), pp.
186-7. In: Coombes (1970) p. 238.
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cohesive body."38
During Coombes' discussion it appeared that the Commission became more
and more what he called a 'porous' organisation during the 1960s. By a 'porous'
organisation he meant a loose and open-ended organisation which would rely on
different forms of administration and different normative approaches which would
be competing for domination within the organisation. Such a situation, he argued,
would be suitable to the Mediative function of the Commission in that it would help
"to ensure that the organization is sufficiently flexible and impartial to react to
different national positions."39 As Coombes further argued, the Commission entered
a 'porous' condition as skilled, experienced specialists became more in demand,
resulting in an increasing recruitment of seconded national civil servants. These
would not necessarily seek employment in the Commission as a career. With
seconded civil servants there was also an increase in the national governments'
interest in how they were represented in the Commission, an element which could
lead to the formation of different enclaves within the organisation. The result of this
would be more interaction between the various levels, as well as between the
sections horizontally. The representative level of the organisation, in this case the
College of Commissioners, would be less overloaded and divided, which again
would lead to inefficiency.40
If the 'porous' organisation was suitable for the Mediative function on the one
hand, then it would, on the other hand, be conflicting with the Administrative as
well as the Normative functions. The Administrative function, which deals with
implementing and defending Community policies, needs consistency and uniformity
within the organisation, and would in the end result in a growth in bureaucratic rules
and procedures. The Normative function, however, required the Commission "to
38 Coombes (1970) p. 253.
Coombes (1970) p. 291.
40 Coombes (1970) pp. 257-258.
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take a definite stand on the future direction of the Community", vital to the process
of unification. Coombes argued that such requirements would be threatened by a
'porous' organisation which must be based upon a common culture, more like "the
partisan authority which was prevalent in the early years than the loose, flexible,
adaptive, 'coalition' arrangement that has developed".41 The common culture would
in the case of the Commission be something rather vague, like being "European",
which, Coombes argued, would not survive in the end in a 'porous' organisation. As
secondment of national civil servants became increasingly common as a recruiting
method to the Commission, the common culture became more difficult to maintain.
The Kennedy Round of GATT, however, together with Regional Policy at a later
stage, are examples where the Commission has existed and operated as a 'porous'
organisation. During the Kennedy Round negotiations the main responsibility was
divided up between special sections within three different Directorates General. The
Commission had decided to appoint a special team to take care of the negotiations
which resulted in conflicts over personal matters, politics and nationality, as in the
Commission itself. The list of negotiators was drawn up corresponding to the
national groups, similar to the system in operation within the staff of the
Commission as a whole. Furthermore, the Commission negotiators were for the
occasion given a higher rank with direct access to their Commissioner. This shows
how hierarchical and other status considerations existing within the Commission at
the time played less of an important role during the Kennedy Round negotiations.
More important was to create a suitable working team among the Commission staff
and officials.42
2.3. Jean Siotis - International Secretariats
Jean Siotis put. in his article "Some Problems of European Secretariats", a
critical finger on the various studies of the European institutions and the European
41 Coombes (1970) p. 261.
42 Coombes (1970) pp. 198-201.
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integration process through its newly established European, or regional institutions.
He was critical of the so-called "area study approach" which he claimed was only
focusing on "one particular stage in the evolution of one particular sector of that
area". By this he meant the fact that these "European" specialists looked at Europe
solely in the light of integration or federation, represented by the foundations of the
European Communities and their institutions.43
His second criticism related to the study based on the "uniqueness" of the
European institutions, which, he claimed, was justified solely due to "the insertion
of the term 'supra-national' in the Paris Treaty" as well as having been "used to
designate the powers of the Commission and the Council of the EEC". Thirdly, his
critique went to the "European science" approach where the existence of a
"European science" was looked upon as different from domestic political science and
from international relations. It would thereby be implied that there should exist a
"Community field". Lastly, he pointed out to those taking the "ideological"
approach, or commitment to the study of European regionalism/institutionalism, the
fact that the acclaimed "'irreversibility' of the unifying process" which was supposed
to lead to a "federal type of political union" had not yet been proved. Siotis
preferred to follow the example of Paul Reuter and treat the European institutions
as "one of the expressions of regionalism".44
Through his article Siotis attempted to define the term "European Secretariat"
and make this fit with the European Commission. As examples of other European
Secretariats he mentioned the Congresses and Conferences of the Concert of Europe,
the European Danube Commission, the Rhine Commission, and, finally, the League
~ Siotis (1964) Some Problems of European Secretariats, p. 222-223.
44 Siotis (1964) p. 223. The sort of regional organisation referred to in this
context is not restricted purely to the geographical term. The organisation is
regional because it cannot by definition be universal for political, geographical or
other reasons. See Paul Reuter (1958) International Institutions. Translated by J.
M. Chapman. (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd.)
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of Nations and the United Nations. They all had some kind of an executive body or
secretariat although they could not all be characterised in the same way, ranging
from purely administrative, at the one end. to "supranational", at the other.
In relation to the European Commission, as well as the High Authority, Siotis
raised several objections to the attempt to define these as "European Secretariats".
One objection was the fact that the High Authority and the European Commission
were "based on the original concept of an independent supranational executive body,
taking decisions by majority vote". As this involved exercising powers "transcending
the national frontiers of member States", it would not fit with the idea of a
"traditional" international organisation. This similarly goes for what was considered
as the ultimate goal of these institutions: "to attain, through integration, the complete
political unification, or at least the federation of the six countries". "Traditional"
international organisations were concerned about the relations between States and
how these could be as friendly as possible. A third objective had to do with the way
"the Commission ... [was] considered as one of the constituent elements of the
Communities on an equal basis with member States" and being "empowered to act
as the force motrice in promoting and applying Community policies". "Traditional"
international organisations, or secretariats, as Siotis pointed out, would be in a
subordinate position to multilateral decision-making bodies. One could here mention
the Free Trade Area negotiations and the Kennedy Round of the GATT as examples.
Lastly, Siotis made the observation that "the European institutions do not form a
regional system of international organisation in the traditional sense of the term".
The European Communities' institutions, as he pointed out, "are an expression of
a Community of nations" and cannot be qualified as international institutions,
whereas "'Community' institutions" could be a more appropriate term.45
With the four above mentioned objections in mind, Siotis continued with a
discussion on the composition and powers of the European Commission. One of the
45 Siotis (1964) p. 228.
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objections to the European Commission being qualified under the definition of
"European Secretariat" was the fact that "the Commission is independent of any
national or international authority". However, in Siotis' view, the fact that this
appeared from the Treaty of Rome could not be said to make it an original character
of the Commission as he claimed it had already been established in the Charter of
the United Nations. Nevertheless, from studying the functioning of the European
Commission and the Commission administration one must recognise the fact that the
Commission occupied the position of spokesman for "Community" interests, contrary
to the national interests expressed in the Council.
Another important role of the Commission was to "ensure the application of
the provisions of this Treaty and of the provisions enacted by the institutions of the
Community in pursuance thereof".46 This is what others have called the "guardian
of the Treaty" and does go further than powers developed by "traditional"
international Secretariats. As the "politically most important category", however,
Siotis stressed the Commission's role in the diplomatic field. The Commission
represented the Community's interests both inwards and in negotiations with
"outsiders". Such formal relations with other States was a role not normally
entrusted to an international organisation. Lastly, Siotis mentioned the role of
consultation which was given to the Commission and the Council of Ministers
together. According to Article 162 of the Treaty of Rome "[T]he Council and the
Commission shall consult together and shall decide on their methods of collaboration
by mutual agreement". The point which Siotis made here was the fact that this was
an element which, from a constitutional point of view, placed the Commission "on
an equal basis with the Council in regard to the vital problem of establishing the
nature of their collaboration".47
46 Siotis (1964) p. 237.
47 Siotis (1964) p. 238. Article 162 EEC, as quoted by Siotis: "The Council and
the Commission shall consult each other and shall settle by mutual agreement the
particulars of their collaboration." This was a translation made before there was an
official English version of the Treaty of Rome.
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Concerning the Communities having as their ultimate goal some sort of
political unification or federation of the member States, Siotis argued the fact that
no provisions for any such goals were to be found in any of the treaties and only
through the setting-up of "ministerial-type Divisions in the Commission's
administration". Further, he claimed that for a political union to exist or be created
there must exist a "common political consciousness, or at least an acceptance of
strong bonds of political solidarity" which neither existed nor was actively promoted
by any European executive.48
In an assumption Siotis made, he said: "If we admit that international
Secretariats are institutions which do assume executive functions, international in
their nature but extending on certain occasions into the field of domestic jurisdiction,
then we may consider that the EEC Commission, and the High Authority, considered
as a whole with their respective administrations, are international Secretariats." As
he further argued, the powers of the Commission which do "extend into the fields
of domestic jurisdiction of member States, they do so on matters which are not of
vital national importance and that the full execution of decisions adopted by them
depends, ultimately, on the co-operation of the competent national administrative
organs".49
In his conclusion, Siotis claimed that in times of political consensus the
Commission appeared as an independent entity with extensive executive functions.
However, his argument was that as soon as a crisis appeared the Commission took
the form of a multilateral organisation where each State would make claims for itself
without regard to the needs or interests of the other States, or of the Community as
whole.
48 Siotis (1964) p. 230.
49 Siotis (1964) p. 231.
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3. THE AIM AND SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The presence of Walter Hallstein as the Commission's first President, from
1958 until 1967, not only cast a strong influence over the establishment of the
European Commission. Also the institution itself became highly influenced by
German administrative and bureaucratic traditions, not least due to Hallstein's own
background in the German administrative system. This was a tradition of big
administrations serving according to a strictly hierarchical system. During a meeting
with the former Executive Secretary of the Commission, Emile Noel, he stressed the
highly political role of the European Commission during its first few years in
existence. The reason for this, he said, was the fact that the executive work during
this period was limited and the Commission could therefore concentrate on building
new policies, some of which were required set up by the Treaty of Rome.50
Secondly, the political discussions and negotiations with third countries performed
by the Commission in the Free Trade Area Negotiations and the Kennedy Round of
GATT were of major importance. Others, on the other hand, like Pierre Uri,51
thought the Commission had become too big and too bureaucratic from the very
beginning. This is a view which can possibly be understood from the fact that he had
been present at the setting-up of the High Authority and its administration from
1952, taking a more minimalist approach. Hallstein, however, had made a conscious
decision not to copy the High Authority and thought it important to build up a
workable administration as soon as possible. This was very much unlike the
approach taken by Jean Monnet. The latter had been of the opinion that the
administration should develop according to needs, and only in a minimalist way. One
reason for the fast growth in size of the Commission, however, was the need to
5(1 View expressed by Emile Noel at a meeting on 12 December 1994 in Paris.
M Pierre Uri had been with Jean Monnet in the Modernisation and Investment
Plan for France since 1947. and was highly involved in the team writing of the
Treaty of Paris in 1950. With the setting-up of the High Authority and its
Divisions, he became the Head and overall coordinator of the Economics Division.
He resigned from the High Authority in July 1959 and was later to be found with
Jean Monnet in the Action Committee for a United States of Europe.
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stress its independence of national governments and administrations, which had to
be done from its very first day.
The political role within the European Commission, which its President
Walter Hallstein is claimed to have played, could also be seen in the light of certain
actions taken by the French President de Gaulle. His refusal to re-appoint Hallstein
for a third period, to become the first President of the single Commission for the
European Communities in 1967, might possibly be seen as evidence of Hallstein
having acted too politically in his role, at least for the liking of some.52 De Gaulle
had initially only accepted the EEC after having received the promise of extensive
concessions for France. Once the chance appeared, however, the role and powers of
the member States were demonstrated clearly.53 It could further be interpreted as
evidence of the fact that the Commission and its Commissioners could act as
politically as they wanted, when given the chance by the member State Governments.
This seems to have been very much the case in the time between 1958 and 1962-63,
in particular, when there was a general will among the member States to see the
EEC in operation and the provisions of its Treaty set out. Combined with favourable
circumstances in general, it was an easier situation facing the European Commission
during the above mentioned period than that which was to come during the following
two decades. Nevertheless, the argument of this thesis will be that independent of
favourable external circumstances, the personal resources of the early Commission
placed it in a situation able to assume an independent political leadership.
Not accepting Hallstein as President of the single European Commission was,
as Coombes has put it. a "vengeance" for the Commission's behaviour before and
during the "empty chair" crisis and the Luxembourg Agreement. Coombes (1970)
p. 280.
" The particular case referred to here, of the Merger of the Executives, came
only two years after the crisis in 1965 when France withheld her representatives to
the institutions of the EEC over a period of six months, due to disagreements over
agricultural policies.
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In support of statements made by Entile Noel,54 it will be argued in the
chapters below that, despite its growing administrative structure, the European
Commission showed considerable political leadership during its first few years in
operation. This was in particular the case during the European Free Trade Area
negotiations between the Six and the rest of the OEEC. and the Kennedy Round of
GATT. In both cases the Commission managed to present a unified Community view
in negotiations with third countries or groups of third countries. It was important for
the newly created European Commission to demonstrate its independence in relation
to the national governments as well as towards the Council of Ministers at an early
stage. The above mentioned Free Trade Area Negotiations, where the Commission
only entered half-way through, proved to be useful for this purpose. Furthermore,
it will be argued that, despite having certain characteristics in common with a
bureaucracy or a civil service, this is a role which only with difficulty can be
combined with its role as an independent political body. The Commission had an
administration which in many ways resembled that of a national administration and
operated much like a civil service. However, the Commissioners themselves, who
make up the collegiate body, had a strong political role in shaping the future of the
Community through its role as the initiator of policies. Therefore, it seems important
to distinguish to a certain degree between the College of the Commissioners, on the
one hand, and its administrative staff on the other. There will, however, be a
thorough discussion of the four functions identified by Coombes below. From this
discussion it will seem clear that the Commission was an organisation consisting of
many others within itself, depending on the circumstances and the functions required
at the time. This is why it has been so problematic for scholars throughout the years
to place it into any known group of organisations.
As we have seen above, and which will be discussed further below, the three
authors Lindberg, Coombes and Siotis identified many of the same functions of the
"4 Reference to statements by Emile Noel will be found in the footnotes
throughout the thesis, in particular in Chapters IV and V.
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European Commission. The importance put on each of them and the reasons for this
may, however, vary considerably. An important reason for this could be the
difference in time of writing as well as the actual position of the author inside or
outside the Community system, combined with nationality.
Leon N. Lindberg came with his book on the European Commission at a very
early stage when he had few, if any, other authors to be influenced by. He wrote
during a time characterised by optimism and progress and a great willingness for
achievement. The main characteristic of Lindberg's writing was the importance he
placed on the Community institutions, and the European Commission in particular.
He belonged to the same school of thought as Ernst B. Haas who had earlier written
about the ECSC, where an equally great importance was placed on the High
Authority as the main instrument in the integration process, even if the two cases are
slightly different. Lindberg believed that it was going to be the Commission which
would be the driving force behind the process of European integration. With its right
and duty to initiate legislation it would push the Community forward into an even
stronger commitment, and a closer and deeper cooperation. This was the idea behind
his theory of "spill-over", where this process would happen more or less
automatically, due to the institutional framework given. Later critics of Lindberg
have claimed that he undermined the role and importance of the member States
during this process. Nevertheless, one has to see any writing in the light of the time
it was written. In this case, Lindberg carried out his study before any of the member
States had demonstrated their powers to the extent which was going to happen later
in the 1960s. An illustration of this can be found in the conclusion of his book where
Lindberg came with the following question: "Have the Six abandoned the desire and
ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other,
seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process
to new central institutions?""0 The combination of the right circumstances and
personalities coming together might make such a question seem reasonable after a
5 Lindberg (1963) p. 283.
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study of the performances of the European Commission before 1963. Lindberg
himself, however, was later going to be one of the first to realize that this had not
quite been the situation.
One of the important elements in the integration process identified by
Lindberg was the system of co-opting civil servants from national administrations
and interest groups. It was meant as a means to avoid conflicts between the
Community and the member States, as well as to gain support for the Commission
within the national administrations or interest groups. By sending civil servants from
the various national administrations to work in the Commission administration for
a period, it was believed that they would return with a more European outlook which
would, in turn, influence their work on the national arena, in a Europeanization of
the member States. This would in turn increase the general support for the European
Commission.
The fact that Lindberg wrote his book before the first veto by the French
President de Gaulle towards British membership to the European Communities, on
14 January 1963, and before the "empty-chair" crisis where France withdrew her
representatives from the Community institutions for six months in 1965, could have
led to the tempting conclusion that his writing is now totally out-dated and of no
important relevance in the study of the European Commission of the 1990s; if
anything, it is purely a historic document of nostalgic value. This, however, would
be far too easy an approach which will not be supported in this thesis. What
Lindberg did was to present theories and views that have been of help in analysing
the development of the European Commission in the period after his study was
published. Furthermore, by identifying the various functions and roles played by the
Commission within the Community system at such an early stage, it has been
possible to compare this with later developments, to see whether it has had any
influence in any way. Already two years later, however, in 1965, he recognised in
an article that his earlier writing had been much influenced by a "romanticism" of
the first period of the European Communities which had seemingly faded, making
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the decision-making process more complex.56 In spite of this, one should not draw
the conclusion that at the time of writing, many of his theories could not have been
correct.
Much of the early "romanticism" and optimism of Lindberg's writing had
already disappeared by the time of the publishing of David Coombes' Politics and
Bureaucracy in the European Community in 1970. By this time the Community had
already gone through several crises which had given the relationship between the
European Commission and the member States a different aspect. Lindberg had
concluded in his study that the European Commission had taken over aspects of the
political and foreign policies which were traditionally the domain of the member
States, and that this was likely to increase in the future. Coombes, on the other hand,
talked about a different picture where "the Commission came increasingly to exercise
purely delegated, administrative functions and that this was related to its tendency
to acquire a more and more bureaucratic organization".57 Despite identifying certain
functions of political character, he remained sceptical about putting too much into
this. He therefore pointed out the fact that the "political leadership" of the
Commission was no more than a group of men appointed by their national
governments, with most of their actual powers delegated. For a real political
leadership to be possible, he argued, its leaders would have to be politically elected.
Nevertheless, Coombes did. to a certain degree, recognise the promotive role played
by Walter Hallstein and his Commission which managed to develop an esprit-de-
corps, in their work for the European cause.58 Some would argue that what he here
has mentioned was already a political role, whereas others again would give the
credit to favourable circumstances, and a favourable environment given by the
member States, as well as to the fact that the political role performed by the
Lindberg. Decision-Making and Integration in the European Community,
International Organisation. Winter 1965, Vol. XIX. No. 1. pp. 56-80. In: Coombes
(1970) p. 94.
>7 Coombes (1970) p. 326.
58 Coombes (1970) p. 308-309.
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Commission was in the interest of the member States themselves. Coombes also
argued that up to the Merger of the Executives in 1967 "the Commission was still
regarded by some close observers as a relatively intimate and cohesive body",39
although others have observed how "thereafter collegiality and cohesiveness declined
and bureaucratic pressures exerted themselves".60
A negative effect, which has often tended to be regarded as a
"Europeanizing" element, however, was the practice of secondment of national civil
servants to the Commission administration. In Coombes' view this only led to the
"forming of 'coalitions' based on different styles of administration and different
norms", which further created a disunity within the organisation.61 One could
imagine such "coalitions" being created between the different groups of nationalities
and languages. Despite arguing mostly against the European Commission having
performed a political leadership, even during the first few years, Coombes does,
nonetheless, recognise the fact that "the Community venture cannot succeed unless
it is regarded as an essentially political undertaking".62 What one might read out
of this statement is that, even if it never was, nor will ever become, a political body,
the success of the Commission in its early years can only be explained by the fact
that the Commission itself, as well as the environment around it, regarded it, or
wanted to regard it, as having a political role to play in the European integration
process.
The article published by Jean Siotis presented quite a different approach to
the study of the European Commission from those taken by Lindberg and Coombes.
The element they all shared, however, was the search for a suitable category in
which to place this new organisational phenomenon; the European Commission.
^ Coombes (1970) p. 253.
60 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 7.
61 Coombes (1970) p. 310.
62 Coombes (1970) p. 307.
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Nevertheless. Siotis came to disagree with most of his contemporaries in the study
of this organisation. The fact that it was European, he argued, did not qualify for a
"new" science approach, and. of so-called "supranational" organisations, the
European continent had already seen several earlier examples. Furthermore, the
much acclaimed irreversibility, the essence of Lindberg's theory of "spill-over", was
at that stage too early to have been proved to be valid. Even the existence of a
European "Community", among the Six in a sociological sense, was something
which was disputed by Siotis. Two main reasons to support this argument was. on
the one hand, the fact that had the United Kingdom decided to join, the
"Community" would have taken quite a different course. On the other hand, this
"Community" of Six had not existed in any form before the setting-up of the ECSC.
In his discussion on the functions of the European Commission he referred to its
diplomatic role as the "probably politically most important category". Nevertheless,
he seemed rather critical of the fact that by referring to outside representatives to the
Community as "ambassadors", "the Community assumes an important prerogative
of statehood, and the Commission, in its relations with them, that of a
government".63 In his conclusion, Siotis mentioned the existence of national
"enclaves" at all levels of the Commission administration. This was an element also
discussed by other authors. Lindberg's view on co-opting national civil servants to
work in the Commission administration was seen to avoid conflicts within the
Commission. Coombes, on the other hand, was more concerned with the
"Europeanizing" effect on the national administrations, which in turn would increase
the support for the European Communities. Siotis did not regard the question from
the same point of view, but rather in relation to the political consensus. As long as
the political consensus remained, he argued, national "enclaves" "will not constitute
an obstacle to the normal functioning of the institution".64 Furthermore, without this
political consensus, the Commission would no longer seem like an independent
executive body in the Community system. Siotis concluded thereby that "in times of
6j Siotis (1964) p. 239.
64 Siotis (1964) p. 249.
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crisis, its multilateral character is accentuated". This latter point seems to a certain
extent to be supported by Emile Noel who claimed that, despite showing
considerable political leadership, multinational characteristics would appear in the
European Commission during times of crisis.65
In a study involving the structures and roles of the European Commission
there are two elements of special importance to be considered. One is the
Commission's role as the motor of integration, which has come out of its right and
duty to initiate legislation in the European interest. Another is the fact that it has to
be an independent body, meaning independent both of the national governments of
the member States, and independent of other bodies of political as well as economic
and industrial character. Both of these requirements can be traced directly from the
Treaty of Rome. It has perhaps been through its role as the initiator of legislation
that the political character, or lack of such when that has been the case, of the
Commission has been most easily observed. Executing this role, the Commission has
to take several important and decisive choices. These involve choosing the areas to
initiate legislation and how far they ought to go. Further, and equally important must
be its choice not to present any initiatives in certain areas and at certain times. All
these choices, one could argue, are political choices. Some legislative initiatives can
be more technical in outlook, and some can be more narrow than others. They will
all, to some extent, be of political character. When one has to see these aspects in
relation to external circumstances, one will find that they can be decisive in respect
of the direction and speed of the whole European integration process.
During the early days of the European Commission, its President Walter
Hallstein. made several decisions, or choices, concerning the organisational
structures and administrative outlook of the Commission. Both the structures with
which the Commission had to work, and the people recruited to work in it, were
View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
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conscious decisions taken by President Hallstein in conjunction with the rest of the
College of Commissioners. The people recruited to work in the Commission in 1958
were pioneers in every respect and probably more "European" than many of those
who came later. The first round of recruitment had no competitions or recruitment
procedures to follow either, as these were only established later on. The structures
of the Commission administration, as it appeared from very early onwards, has been
compared with civil services, international secretariats and bureaucracies. We will
see from the study below that the administrative structures established under the
presidency of Walter Hallstein have even been criticised for having been too
hierarchical and rigid. The study made by Coombes has proved most useful in the
study of the functions of the European Commission during its early years. He
presented a very clear division and description of what he considered to be its main
functions. This study, however, came at what must be considered as a rather "low"
period in the history of the European Communities. He had observed two vetoes
from the French President de Gaulle concerning the membership of the United
Kingdom in the EEC, and he had followed the "empty chair" crisis where France
withdrew its representatives to the EEC for six months in 1965. By 1970
supranational ism was more or less considered as "dead and buried" and the
neofunctionalist theory of integration did not seem to be applicable anymore.
Therefore, Coombes' study can be seen as very much in contrast to the earlier study
by Lindberg which can be characterised by an early optimism and a boost for
European integration. Lindberg's study, we will see, placed a considerable
importance on the institutions in this process. Coombes was later to see how the
member States and their governments had kept their grip on many final decisions.
In a study of the establishment of the European Commission and its
administrative development it will be necessary to go back even further in time and
look at the influences that existed in Europe during the late 1940s and 1950s.
Chapter II, therefore, will discuss the post-war period leading up to the Schuman
Declaration of 9 May 1950, and the development that followed of the High Authority
of the ECSC from 1952 onwards. In order to understand the developments that the
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later European Commission and its administration underwent, it will be interesting
as well as essential to make a study of the High Authority and its administrative
development. Apart from the Secretariat of the League of Nations which will be
discussed briefly, the High Authority was the only more or less equivalent
organisation that existed before the establishment of the European Commission, and
also in many ways a direct reason for the latter.
Chapter III will take the development further, through the steps leading up
to the signing of the Treaties of Rome. As the EDC and the EPC failed to
materialise in 1954, the prospect of any further European integration seemed bleak
until the Messina Conference of June 1955, followed by the Spaak Report of April
1956. The so-called "relance europeenne" will be seen as evidence of the willingness
of the Six to continue the integration process which had been started by the Schuman
Declaration. The Spaak Report largely defined the way ahead, and less than a year
later the two Treaties of Rome, setting-up the EEC and Euratom, were signed. As
we start the study of the European Commission, its formal powers will be the first
to be defined, together with a short discussion on bureaucracy. Lastly, a
phenomenon which deserves a proper discussion are the Commissioner's own
"cabinets" - particular to the European Commission when compared to other
"international organisations", and adopted from the French administrative tradition.
The existence of "cabinets" in the Commission has been seen over the years as both
an important resource as well as an element of great influence on the individual
Commissioners. The latter is an element which could even be regarded as a violation
of the Treaty of Rome and of the independence of the Commissioners from their
national administrations.
Chapter IV will be devoted to a discussion on the Commission itself, the first
Commissioners and the administration, how it was set up and what it came to look
like. Within the college of the Commission each personality will be discussed in
relation to nationality, occupation and procedures for appointment. Further down in
the Commission structures we will deal with the organisation of the Commission into
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portfolios and Directorates General, as well as the role of the Executive Secretary.
Furthermore, the Commission's functions and features will be dealt with in detail
together with the process leading up to the "Statut de Serx'ice". The latter was to be
an indication of the administration of the European Commission finally having
established itself as a truly international administration where Community nationals
could enjoy similar career prospects and securities to those existing in their national
administrations. This is also the chapter, together with Chapter V, where the
material collected from the Archives of the European Commission in Brussels has
proved to have been most useful.
Chapter V, which will be presented as a case study, will look at the European
Commission and analyse its role during the Free Trade Area negotiations. Since
these negotiations started before the Commission was set up it was its first chance
to show itself as an independent, political European executive body. We will here
discuss the Agreement of Association that was set up between the High Authority
and the United Kingdom which was also the first example of an association
negotiated between a European executive and a third country. The position of the
United Kingdom towards the European Communities will also prove to have been
important during the Free Trade Area negotiations. These negotiations would most
certainly never have happened had the United Kingdom wished to join the Six during
the 1950s. As the Six decided to set up the EEC and Euratom we will present an
analysis of the United Kingdom's approach to these as well as the Six's approach to
the former, all within the context of the Free Trade Area negotiations.
The novelty of the European Commission was the fact that it was the first
executive "supranational" body, voluntarily established by the Community member
States to cover all aspects of economic life, with the power and the duty of initiating
policies by sending its proposals to the Council of Ministers. Earlier examples of
similar kinds belonged to the so-called sectorial category, covering only specified
areas or particular industries. The European Commission was thereby a more
ambitious project, where the Treaty of Rome only gave an overall framework.
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Because of that the European Commission was shaped to a large extent by




FROM THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE ECSC TO THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
II n'y a pas d'idees prematurees, il y a des moments opportuns qu'il
faut savoir attendre,66
1. INTRODUCTION
When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and, with it, the High
Authority was established, several factors were there to make it possible. For such
a 'revolutionary' project to be possible and succeed it was necessary with a
combination of the right group of people, and the right circumstances, at the right
time. Jean Monnet, who had come from the Modernisation Plan for France and who
was "neither a civil servant nor a politician", but "in a category of his own",67 was
the man behind the idea. The French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman was the
political personification of this idea. Although Jean Monnet was a highly respected
man in political and governmental circles in many European countries as well as in
America, he was a man who worked behind the scenes and preferred to remain
there. In order to enjoy the credibility needed for other states to follow, a political
figure of high profile was needed to take the political responsibility. Due to
circumstances beyond control this came to be the Foreign Minister rather than the
Prime Minister at the time. Georges Bidault.68
For big steps to be taken there has to be present a certain will among the
66 Jean Monnet. Clefs pour I'Action, p. 31. "There are no premature ideas, there
are opportune moments that one must learn to wait for." Own free translation.
67 Interview with Baron Robert Rothschild by Francois Duchene in 1993. In:
Duchene (1994) Jean Monnet. First Statesman of Interdependence, p. 21.
hS
A full account, as seen by Jean Monnet. can be found in his Memoirs (1978)
pp. 298-300. See also Duchene (1994) pp. 199-201.
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people. However, without the right surrounding circumstances, great ideas will come
to nothing. The setting for the ECSC could possibly be said to have been perfect.
Both France and Germany were devastated after World War II. Uniting them,
together with other Western European states, in a common effort could replace war
with prosperity and peace.
The ECSC was the first of the total of three European Communities set up
during the 1950s. It was, as will be shown, the pioneer as well as the condition for
the latter two, the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom, to be set up
in 1958. By then several experiences had been made within the area of European
integration and European institutions. The High Authority was the first experiment
of a "European Civil Service" despite efforts to avoid such a thing to be created.
When the European Commission of the EEC was set up some years later certain
traces of the High Authority could be found, although what was equally evident were
the attempts of creating something different.
What will be done in this chapter is to analyse the favourable surrounding
circumstances for the success of the Schuman Plan leading to the ECSC in 1952.
Furthermore, a discussion of the setting-up of the High Authority, its administrative
structures, and how it functioned will follow. The purpose will be to see how this
could later have influenced the setting-up of the European Commission and its
administration in 1958. The League of Nations will be used as an example of a
supranational body functioning before the High Authority came into being. This
seems particularly appropriate considering the fact that Jean Monnet had worked as
deputy to the Secretary-General of the Secretariat of the League of Nations.
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2. INFLUENCES BEHIND THE SCHUMAN DECLARATION:
THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANCE
2.1. Germany in the Post-War Period
The post-war period in Europe was going to be very important, if not to say
decisive, for the future of the whole continent. One was faced with people who were
tired of being at war with one another but still sceptical of what might come. Five
years after the end of the second world war there was a certain anxiety and fear that,
if nothing was to be done, another war would soon occur. Germany would not, as
previously, be the instigator, but the prize. What was seen as essential, therefore,
for the western European countries, was to get Germany on their side. As the war
had divided Europe into two "blocks", the threat that the new, democratic German
republic would turn Eastwards, thereby creating a new security threat from East of
the Rhine, was constantly present. This fear was particularly apparent in France.69
In the newly created German State, on the other hand, there was an urgent
need to establish its credibility and reliability in international politics. There was also
here a wish to put an end to the turbulence of Franco-German relations which had
suffered greatly throughout history. Under such circumstances at the time it was
quite apparent that the new German State could not take any initiatives for European
cooperation or integration. It was prevented from acting in any manner that could
arouse any neighbouring countries' fear of renascent nationalism. Such initiatives had
to come from elsewhere, and the only country capable, with as much to gain, was
France.
The post-war period faced the world with a Germany destroyed and divided
after having lost two world wars in less than thirty years. Due to its turbulent past
the new and democratic state needed to gain recognition among its more established
partners in the post-war international order. What was expected of her was "good
behaviour" and no leadership role was envisaged. European integration was adopted
Bulmer and Paterson (1987) The Federal Republic and the European
Communities, p. 226.
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as one of the foundations of the German State, although it did not "shake off its
occupation status and attain formal sovereignty until 1955".70 To accept an open
international economy, the security protection and the continued presence of the
Western allies was, in fact, a pre-condition for its creation. As a consequence,
Germany had. in the early years, a limited sovereignty over foreign affairs and
defence. This aspect turned out to be an important factor in why it was interesting
for Germany to join the later ECSC. Not only would close German integration in a
supranational European Community be important to help the newly established
democracy. Also, one could argue, as it already had a limited sovereignty, the
thought of giving up more might have been less worrying.71 As it has been pointed
out by Simon Bulmer and William Paterson in their book The Federal Republic of
Germany and the European Community, it seems like a likely assumption that, due
to Allied presence, "ECSC membership [...] represented a means whereby control
of certain industries could be regained".72 Federalism was also familiar to Germany
due to the federal political structure of the relatively autonomous "Lander". This
structure was formally established with the adoption of the new constitution, the
"Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany" in 1949.77 National sovereignty
had become less determinant in German policy after the Nazi period and the division
of Germany.
With all these aspects in mind, it is no wonder that European integration was
so important in Germany from the very start. Commitment to European integration
can be seen as probably the most important element in the policies of the CDU-led
governments of the first two decades of the new German State. European integration,
Bulmer and Paterson (1987) p. 223.
1 The foreign policy of the new Federal Republic was at the time in the hands
of the Allied countries. USA. France and Great Britain.
Bulmer and Paterson (1987) p. 223.
7'
Already during the Bismarck rule 1870-1914 had there been princely states,
such as Bavaria and Hesse, with a certain amount of autonomy. See Herbert Jacob
(1963) German Administration Since Bismarck. Central authority versus local
autonomy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).
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and in particular Franco-German entente, was also the vision of the German
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who came to play an important role in the setting-up
of the ECSC.74 Adenauer was a Roman Catholic from the Rhineland. With this
background he had, according to Roger Morgan, "a deep distaste for everything
connected with Berlin, Prussia and the east", which further made him "hostile
towards both Socialism and Communism, and more favourably inclined towards
France and Western European integration" ,7> The way Adenauer saw it, European
integration would offer Germany "a way back towards equality of status and the
recognition of her national claims".76 Another aspect for his inclination towards the
west and European integration was his conviction that the atrocities of Hitler had
happened due to Germany's isolated position in the middle of an unstable and
divided European power system.77 Nevertheless, the German choice of participating
in the nascent European integration process was not made without opposition.
Germany had to make a choice. By leaning towards the West, the already minimal
prospect of a reunification with the East was further reduced. On the other hand,
Germany needed export partners due to its dependence on foreign trade. The years
1933-1945 had been strongly characterised by an inward-looking, internal production
which, after 1945, had turned towards an openness both of the economy and of the
political system. It was this dilemma that caused a split between the Christian
Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) lasting until 1956. The latter was
of the opinion that reunification efforts had to take priority over European
74 As early as in 1924 Konrad Adenauer "considered favourably the idea that
the best way to reconstruct Europe peacefully would be through a Franco-German
agreement for some form of joint management of the coal, iron and steel industries
of the Rhineland. eastern France and Luxembourg". Milward (1992) The European
Rescue of the Nation-Slate, p. 330. According to Thomas Jansen, Adenauer's
proposal came in 1923 for a "Franco-German Economic Community", where terms
like "European Common Market" and "Coal and Steel Union" were also used.
Bond. Smith and Wallace (1996) Eminent Europeans. Personalities who shaped
contemporary Europe, p. 98.
7"
Morgan (1972) West European Politics since 1945. p. 107.
76
Morgan (1972) p. 109.
7 Ibidem.
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integration. Adenauer, however, thought differently: "We shall not recover Berlin,
we shall not recover the German East, except by way of a unified Europe."78
The Federal Republic created in 1949 is the first German State in modern
times, since 1972, to have enjoyed friendly relations with all its eastern and western
neighbours. These relationships did, however, take place in a highly protected
environment of NATO and the European Communities. Nevertheless, the 1950s must
be regarded as highly formative years in the creation of the German economic
structure and of its social market principles. Membership of the ECSC, therefore,
ensured that integration became a key part of the post-war economic and political
values in Germany. Germany, likewise, came to be an important ally of the
European cause.
2.2 The influence of France
France, as a nation, had suffered deeply from the two world wars, materially
as well as psychologically. During the second world war she had experienced the
worst collapse since the Hundred Years War.79 During both wars she had also had
to rely on support from the United Kingdom and the United States for the defeat of
Germany. France has been a unified state since the sixteenth century, with a highly
centralised administration dating back to the seventeenth century. In her days of
glory, from the seventeenth century until the fall of the Empire in 1814, she had
been the dominant power in Europe. These factors must be taken into account when
studying what motivated the Schuman Declaration and the establishment of the
ECSC. Not only was there the need of a friendly economic and political coalition
with Germany. It was important for France, as a former world power, that this
would not be dominated by the United States and that it would be a cooperation
78
Speech in a CDU meeting in Essen in 1952, welcoming the Pleven Plan
initiative as an answer to the "Russian Fear". Willis (1968) France, Germany and
the New Europe 1945-1967, p. 154.
77 The Hundred Years War. between England and France, lasted more or less
constantly from 1337 until 1453.
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where she could regain the status and self-respect she had lost after the collapse in
1940. With these aspects in mind, there was a need, five years after the war, for
something to be done, and it had to be initiated by France. This "something" meant
a solution to the German problem which required a changing of the conditions that
not only made the future uncertain for the Germans, but all the same for her
neighbours. As Jean Monnet wrote in his notebook in 1950: "The course of events
must be altered. To do this, men's attitudes must be changed. [...] Only immediate
action on an essential point can change the present static situation. This action must
be radical, real, immediate, and dramatic; it must change things and make a reality
of the hopes which people are on the point of giving up."80 Not only was it
important to take rapid action, it also had to be in areas where misunderstandings
were most likely, and where past errors would be repeated. The area was industry.
France had already started feeling inferior to German dynamism. If she could lose
her fear of German industrial domination, then it seemed the greatest obstacle to a
united Europe would be removed. The essential thing was to get French industry on
the same footing as the German, and, at the same time, free Germany of
discrimination born of defeat.81
It was in the industries of coal and steel that European integration was to
begin. They were seen as the key to economic power as well as the raw materials
for forging weapons of war which, then, would give them an immediate symbolic
80 Monnet (1978) p. 291. Jean Monnet was the General Commissioner for the
Modernisation and Investment Plan for France (Plan de Modernisation et
d'Equipement. or simply "le Plan") 1946-49. appointed by General de Gaulle in
1945. to be the architect for France's economic recovery.
81 The Saar problem was very important in this connection. The area had
changed several times between being under German and French rule. However, its
inhabitants were mostly Germans in speech, political loyalty and way of life. In
economical terms, on the other hand, the area was very important to France,
especially after the Second World War. The Saar's output in coal and steel, if
added to that of France, equalled the coal and steel output of West Germany. With
the Saar remaining in West Germany, the latter's capacity would be nearly double
that of France. After their severe loss of prestige and very real sufferings in the
Second World War. France genuinely believed that there should be a "fair
balance"of industrial power between their country and the new Federal Republic.
Prittie (1972) Konrad Adenauer 1867-1976. pp. 174-75.
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significance to the whole continent. A pooling of coal and steel industries across
frontiers would, in this way. turn the coal and steel industries into a guarantee of
peace. On 16 April 1950. the first version of what was to become the Schuman
Declaration of 9 May 1950, was written by Jean Monnet. Paul Reuter and Etienne
Hirsch.82 They suggested to place the production and distribution of coal and steel
on a common basis, ensure that the two products were sold according to common
rules, which would improve the overall social conditions and continually improve
production. The end of the text, summarising the overall aim read: "This proposal
has an essential political objective: to make a breach in the ramparts of national
sovereignty which will be narrow enough to secure consent, but deep enough to open
the way towards the unity that is essential to peace."83 According to the French
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman "the aim of the proposal was not economic but
highly political".84 The proposal for a coal and steel community had a particular
meaning for Schuman himself. He came from Fuxembourg and moved later to
Lorraine where he became a German citizen as a result of the annexation of Alsace-
Lorraine by Germany after the 1870 war. He grew up a German and served as an
officer on the German side in the First World War, while his father had served as
a French officer in the war of 1870. In 1919 he became a Frenchman, for the first
time, in his early middle-age.85 Amongst the French, however, the fear was still
great that there would be another attack from Germany once she had recovered.
Possibly, it was believed, that there would be a corresponding desire for greater
82 Paul Reuter was a Professor of Law at the University of Aix-la-Chapelle.
Etienne Hirsch had been in the Planning Commissariat for Modernisation of France
together with Jean Monnet.
8' Monnet (1978) p. 296.
84 Robert Schuman in a letter to Konrad Adenauer (Erinnerungen, Vol I, 1945-
53. pp. 314-15). In: Monnet (1978) p. 303.
88 Prittie (1972) pp. 177-78. According to Richard Mayne, Schuman never wore
a German uniform as he failed the medical test. Instead he was seconded to the
civil administration. Hence, "a photograph of him in a German helmet published
by the French Communist press in the 1950s was a fake". In 1919 he was "elected
to the French Chamber of Deputies as representative of the Moselle". Bond, Smith,




Konrad Adenauer was very pleased with the French proposal, glad that
something he had dreamt about for many years finally would come true. In his own
words: "The proposal that France has just made to us is a generous move. It is a
decisive step forward in Franco-German relations. It is not a matter of vague
generalizations, but of concrete suggestions based on equal rights."86 A month later
there was a meeting between the two great Europeans Jean Monnet and Konrad
Adenauer where the latter assured that "In accepting it, my Government and my
country have no secret hankerings after hegemony. History since 1933 has taught us
the folly of such ideas. Germany knows that its fate is bound up with that of Western
Europe as a whole."87 Great achievements were made in those days of the spring
of 1950, decisive for the future of the European peoples. Six countries, France,
Germany, Italy and Benelux, had welcomed the Schuman Plan providing a basis for
the building of a new Europe through the achievement of a supranational regime
within a limited but controlling area of economic effort. "The indispensable first
principle of these proposals is the abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive
field [...] in my view, any plan which does not involve this indispensable first
principle can make no useful contribution to the solution of the grave problems that
face us. "88
2.3 The Schuman Plan Negotiations
Negotiations had been going on with the United Kingdom about the Schuman
Plan from the very beginning. The proposal of a Franco-German reconciliation was
indeed welcomed by the British Prime Minister Attlee as he spoke in the House of
86 Konrad Adenauer accepting the French proposal on 9 May 1950. Monnet
(1978) p. 304.
87 Monnet (1978) p. 310.




Commons on 11 May 1950.89 Nevertheless, the British were not going to commit
themselves to principles without knowing beforehand all the details about the
practical consequences. That was something no one could foresee at the time. There
was also opposition to the idea of federalism and the fact of having to give up some
of its independence. The United Kingdom was in quite a different position from the
continent at the time just after the war, as she had not been neither conquered nor
invaded. Also there was concern about losing the general well-being flowing from
the growing welfare state. "We must be with France" Winston Churchill claimed in
his speech in Edinburgh on 18 May 1950. He saw the recovery of Europe as
dependent on "Britain and France standing together with all their strength and all
their wounds, [...] offering their hands to Germany on honorable terms and with a
great and merciful desire to look forwards rather than back". Nevertheless, he
continued his speech by saying that although the "Schuman proposal is right in
principle we must consider with proper attention the way in which Great Britain can
participate most effectively in such a larger grouping of European industry. We must
be careful that it does not carry with it a lowering of British wages and standards of
life and labour. m9°
It was not only the United Kingdom that was sceptical of the plans of a coal
and steel community. Opposition came also from Germany, and France itself. There
were certain feelings among the German Socialists that they were in fact "accepting
occupation for another fifty years".91 In France the opposition came from the
Gaullists and from the extreme Left, with a general fear of German industry
becoming too dynamic and dominating. Others, like Pierre Cot from the extreme
89 Monnet (1978) p. 306.
90 Scottish Unionist Meeting. A Speech at the Usher Hall, Edinburgh 18 May
1950. In: "In the Balance". Speeches 1949 and 1950 by Winston S. Churchill.
Edited by Randolph S. Churchill. Cassell & Company Ltd., London 1951, pp. 279-
280.
91 The opinion of the German socialist leader Kurt Schumacher (SPD). Monnet
(1978) p. 319.
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Left called the whole thing a dream.92 As for this, to overcome attempts of the
opposition to spoil the plan, it was important to define the institutional framework
of the ECSC, and in particular to set up the High Authority, and to have the treaty
rapidly signed and ratified. The important significance of what was about to happen
was well put by Robert Schuman at the Schuman Plan Conference in June 1950:
"We believe that we cannot afford to fail, to give up without reaching a conclusion.
But never before have States undertaken or even envisaged the joint delegation of
part of their national sovereignty to an independent supranational body."93
The other four countries accepting the Schuman Plan, the Benelux countries
and Italy, had indeed welcomed the initiative. The three Benelux countries had
already established close relations in the Monetary Convention of 1943 and the
Customs Convention of 1944. This was the oldest ot the post-war arrangements for
integration in Europe, and although it only went as far as a customs union, it must
be seen as a "pilot project" for the later Common Market. In Italy the Movimento
Federalista Europeo had been founded in 1943 by three great Europeans, Altiero
Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni.94 However, after twenty years of
fascism, Italy had a long way to go in reconstructing its economy as well as building
a new political system. Italy needed to regain a position of equality in the
international environment and had therefore little opportunity to seek a role in uniting
Europe. The French initiative, however, was immediately welcomed by the Italian
Government and the Schuman Plan was seen as an assurance to the Italians who
feared German military resurgence. She also felt the need to take part to lessen the
fears of a Franco-German hegemony in western Europe. Despite their enthusiasm,
however, it was the Benelux countries that were going to cause the biggest problems
during the negotiations of the treaty to set up the ECSC. The hardest was to make
them all look at the task from the same point of view and to tackle it in common.
They needed to change their views and talk about the "European" coal and steel
92 Monnet (1978) p. 365.
93 Monnet (1978) p. 322.
94 Altiero Spinelli was the leader of the Movimento Federalista Europeo 1943-
1962.
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industry as opposed to for example the Italian or the French industry. This was also
meant to put the common interest above purely national concerns. A further
difficulty was to convince, in particular the Belgian and the Dutch delegates, that
although Franco-German reconciliation was the means to the Schuman Plan's goal
of peace, this would not be achieved at the expense of the smaller nations.
Moreover, it was due to their scepticism that the governments were given a role in
the Community through the Council of Ministers. This was something that Jean
Monnet originally did not have in mind. He had decided against including any
intergovernmental body in the Community's institutions, wishing to stick to the
principle of supranationalism.
The nature of the executive body to be set up, the High Authority, caused a
number of concerns among the Benelux delegates. As a representative of the Benelux
views, the Belgian delegate Maximilien Suetens expressed: "My government is not
prepared to give the High Authority excessive powers. That would make it an object
of fear; and besides, no such powers are needed to achieve our aims. These can be
attained more simply, by prior agreement among the States concerned [...] The
supervisory body should be the Ministers, who effectively exercise power."95
Further, the Netherlands' principal negotiator of the Treaty of Paris and later
member of the High Authority. Dirk Spierenburg, expressed an anxiety that "the
High Authority might exert dictatorial powers over the coal and steel industries
without being accountable to anyone".96
Such opposition and scepticism were carefully calmed down by Monnet's
convincing negotiating skills. He was also helped by the German delegate Walter
Hallstein9' who proclaimed: "The German Government reaffirms that the
95 Monnet (1978) p. 327.
Dirk Spierenburg to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 29 May 1950. In:
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) The History of the High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community. Supranationality in Operation, p. 12.
Walter Hallstein was the head of the German delegation to the Treaty of
Paris negotiations and was later to become the first President of the EEC
Commission in 1958.
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importance of the Schuman Plan is above all political [...] That is why the German
delegation appeals urgently to all members of this conference to subordinate their
economic interests to this great political goal. The war that has just broke out in
Korea gives Europe yet another reason for uniting, for the peace of the world is
under threat."98 This was indeed a clear indication that France and Germany were
still eager to get the plan working, which was the real crux of the matter.
The Benelux countries, however, would not abandon the idea of a body of
government representation. At a Benelux meeting on 14 June 1950 the setting-up of
a Council of Ministers as a control on the political decisions of the High Authority
was proposed by the Dutch delegation. It has been suggested that the reasons for this
proposal coming from the Benelux countries, Belgium and the Netherlands in
particular, was a fear of supranationalism. It was felt as uncertain how the smaller
countries of the proposed community would be represented in a truly supranational
High Authority without there being some sort of governmental control. A further,
and maybe even more important explanation which Marcel Frerotte has pointed out
in his article, was the fact of a supranational presence in the French, German and
Italian constitutions. In his words: "a I'invers des constitutions nouvelles de la
France, de I'Allemagne et de I'ltalie, qui autorisent le gouvernement a aliener sa
souverainete au profit d'une institution supranationale, rien de pareil ne se trouve
dans les constitutions des pays du Benelux".99 It was further felt that, as the High
Authority "would have important economic implications to the national economic
policies", there would be a need for ministers who were responsible before national
parliaments, something which would make them more accountable to reactions from
public opinion.100
98 At the Schuman Plan Conference. July 1950. Monnet (1978) p. 328.
99 Marcel Frerotte. La CECA. In: Studia Diplomatica (1981) p. 267. "Contrary
to the new constitutions of France, Germany and Italy, which authorise the
governments to give up sovereignty to the benefit of supranational institutions, a
similar authorization is not to be found in the constitutions of the Benelux
countries." Own translation.
Studia Diplomatica (1981) p. 270. Own translation. "Faction de la Haute
Autorite pouvait avoir des implications importantes pour lespolitiques economiques
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During the Schuman Plan Conference in July 1950, the system acquired a
definite form. The institutional structure of the future, it was agreed, was going to
consist of a supranational authority, the High Authority, a council of national
Ministers, the so-called Special Council of Ministers, as well as a Common
Assembly and a Court of Justice providing parliamentary and judicial control. This
decision was issued in a Memorandum by the Six of 5 August 1950. From then on
it did not take long before the Treaty of Paris was signed and ratified, all in a matter
of two years.101
"L'Europe ne se fera pas d'un coup, ni dans une construction
d'ensemble: elle se fera par des realisations concretes creant d'abord
une solidarite du fait. "102
These words came to mean a whole lot during the spring of 1950. Already
a concrete achievement had been made with the French proposal of the Schuman
Declaration and the ECSC. Although a French proposal, originally initiated by Jean
Monnet, the negotiations made sure that it would become a joint work in the end.
The idea to pool the coal and steel industries of France and Germany was one of
great significance that would eliminate the "age-old opposition between France and
Germany". As the famous quote by Robert Schuman says: "the solidarity [...] thus
achieved will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not
only unthinkable but materially impossible".103 The supreme goal of the proposal
was to create lasting peace among the European nations. Other important goals were
to overcome the French fear of the dynamic and dominating German industry, and
the German need to re-establish its credibility and reputation in the international
nationales."
101 All the six national Parliaments had ratified the ECSC Treaty of Paris by
July 1952.
"): Monnet (1978) p. 300. From the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950.
"Europe will not be built at once, or as a single whole: it will be built by concrete
achievements which first create de facto solidarity."
"b "La solidarite de production qui sera ainsi nouee manifestera que toute
guerre entre la France et I'Allemagne devient non seulement impensable, mais
materiellement impossible. " The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. Jean Monnet
Fondation (1985).
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environment. This was done through the creation of an institutional framework in
which all member States had an equal role according to size and population; an
institutional framework which had not been seen before.
3. THE HIGH AUTHORITY
"Si vous ne failes pas de politique, elle se fera sans vous et contre
vous. " W. E. Gladstone, cited by Jean Rey.104
Ideas about the uniting of Europe were not something new in the aftermath
of the Second World War. The French writer and scholar Alexis de Tocqueville
expressed already in 1835 that "[T]he nations seem to be advancing to unity", and
that it would be "impossible for men to remain strangers to each other".105 In
particular reference to the wars and struggles in Europe he believed that "God
destines a calmer and more certain future to the Communities of Europe".106
Although de Tocqueville's prophesies or wishes did not come true in his
lifetime, they were to live on for more than a century. In 1919, as the First World
War had ended, the first efforts were made to reform international relations with the
creation of the League of Nations. It turned out to be a mainly European body and
one of the key initiators was the Frenchman Jean Monnet. In 1929 another French
visionary, Aristide Briand,107 came with a proposal for "a United States of
11)4 Fenaux (1972) Jean Rey, enfant et artisan de I'Europe, p. 190. "If you do
not take part in politics, things will be done without you and against you." Own
translation.
Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America. In: Hallstein (1962) Uniting
Europe: Challenge and Opportunity, p. 2.
106 Hallstein (1962) p. 3.
107 Aristide Briand had served eleven times as premier of France and held
twentysix ministerial posts between 1906 and 1932. In April 1925 he became
Foreign Minister, a post he held in fourteen successive governments, four of which
he headed himself. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 2, 15th edition 1991.
57
Europe".108 The main motive behind this proposal, which later came to be the
motive behind the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, was the
need to settle a unifying and peaceful relationship between France and Germany. The
idea was that to stabilize the situation on the European continent and make the peace
last, France and Germany would have to be tied closer together in common interests.
When Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s had just lived through another great
war, this became clearer to even more people; statesmen and others. The feeling was
growing among the European people that in the new world of superpowers, the old
nation-states of Europe would have to band together. Europe's position in the world
had been altered drastically as a result of the war as well as by the growth of the
United States and Russia. People also saw that nations became increasingly
interdependent with the pressure of technology and a growing communication.
In 1947 the American Secretary of State George Marshall came up with a
plan for economic aid to Europe. The result became the creation of the Organisation
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) which was seen by many as the first
step towards a European Union, and strongly supported by the Americans. However,
for those hoping for a real and rapid unity of Europe, the OEEC was disappointing
by not going far enough. The OEEC was set up primarily on the initiative of the
American Government in order for the European countries to organise and distribute
the Marshall Aid amongst themselves, by themselves. To be able to achieve this
goal, the Americans believed in some sort of European integration. However, as an
integrating organisation, it was considered to be too loosely structured, with too
many member countries and no supranational powers. Much the same was the case
with the Council of Europe, set up in May 1949 between 18 member States. This
organisation was based on the exchange of ideas and information on social, legal and
cultural matters. Pressure for the uniting of Europe in a political and economic
union, as well as a European Assembly and a European Court, began to come from
")S "Je pense qu 'entre des peuples qui sont geographiquement groupes comme
les peuples d'Europe, il doit exister une sorte de lien federal." Aristide Briand at
the sixth plenary session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 5 September
1929. In: Achille Elisha (1965) Aristide Briand. Discours et ecrits de politique
etrangere (Paris: Plon) p. 220.
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leaders of private organisations in the European countries. However, different
countries with different views resulted in an Assembly which was not allowed to set
its own agenda, and a Committee of Ministers bound by unanimous voting, which
meant that it could be subject to veto by any single member.1"9
The real start of what was to become the European Coal and Steel
Community came on 9 May 1950 with the Schuman Declaration by the French
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. The Declaration read:
"World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative
efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. [...]
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It
will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de
facto solidarity. [...]
[The French Government] proposes that Franco-German production
of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High
Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the
participation of the other countries of Europe.
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide
for the setting up of common foundations for economic development
as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the
destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the
manufacture of war, of which they have been the most constant
victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it
plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely
unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful
productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound
ultimately to provide all member countries with the basic element of
industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for
their economic unification. This production will be offered to the
world as a whole without distinction or
exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and
to promote peaceful achievements. [...] By pooling basic production
and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind
France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead
to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European
federation indispensable to the presentation of peace. [,..]"110
109 The Congress of Europe. May 1948. the immediate progenitor of the
Council of Europe. Hallstein (1962) pp. 8-9.
1,11 Pascal Fontaine. Europe: A Fresh Start. The Schuman Declaration 1950-90.
European Documentation 1990. pp. 44-46.
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In the short run it was believed that by pooling the production of coal and
steel, the establishment of common bases for economic growth would be assured. In
the long run it would serve as a means to peace among the European countries as the
two materials coal and steel had been the basic material used in the military industry
of the two world wars.111 Schuman and his advisers, most notably Jean Monnet,
also hoped that such an initiative would lead towards a European Federation which
would mean an even tighter cooperation and. hence, a war between France and
Germany would "not only be unthinkable" but also "materially impossible". The
creation of common institutions for coal and steel production would, therefore, in
the eyes of Schuman and Monnet, only be the beginning of what was to come.
However, it was though necessary to start on a smaller scale to create the kind of
solidarity that was needed.
As the work went on after the Schuman Declaration, the negotiations between
France and Germany were joined by Italy and the three Benelux countries, Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom had been invited to take part
but "refused to accept in advance the basic principles and commitments contained in
the declaration of 9 May".112 On 18 April 1951 the Treaty establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed in Paris. The Community
aimed to be supranational, practical and partial, and would abolish the economic
effects of frontiers between the signatory countries in the sector of coal and steel.
By July 1952 the Treaty had finally been ratified by the Parliaments of the six
countries. The Six met in Paris on 23 July 1952 to appoint the members of the High
Authority, as well as to sort out the official languages and the site of the
institutions.113 The members were appointed by the end of July and on 10
'11 Others had already before seen the importance of the European coal and
steel industries. Adolf Hitler said during World War 11 that "[T]o control coal and
steel is to control Europe". Rene Foch. Europe and Technology. The Atlantic
Papers 2. 1970. The Atlantic Institute, p. 7. This had. of course a different meaning,
but it nevertheless implies the importance of these two industries at the time.
112 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 11.
This was not sorted out until the Merger Treaty of 1967 where it was left
open for the governments of the member States to decide. Article 77: "The seat of
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September 1952 the High Authority of the ECSC held its first meetings in
Luxembourg where the Community was to set up offices. As Jean Monnet recalled
in his Memoires: "On the morning of August 10, 1952, Europe came to
Luxembourg".114
3.1 The work of the High Authority
The High Authority was first mentioned in Article 7 of the ECSC Treaty
where it said that "[T]he institutions of the Community shall be as follows: a HIGH
AUTHORITY, assisted by a Consultative Committee;...".115 Article 8 of the same
Treaty said further that "[T]he High Authority shall be responsible for assuring the
fulfillment of the purposes stated in the present Treaty under the terms thereof."116
The High Authority was the executive body of the ECSC and its powers and duties
were dealt with in Chapter I of the Treaty, Articles 9 to 19. The High Authority
consisted of nine members and worked as a collegiate agency. The members were
appointed for a period of six years. Eight of the members were appointed by the
member governments by common agreement and the ninth member was co-opted,
which means that this member was "elected by the majority vote of the eight already
chosen".117 Only representatives from the member States could be appointed and
there could not be more than two representatives of the same nationality. The
members had to exercise their functions in complete independence and in the general
interest of the Community. They could not solicit or accept any instructions from
the institutions of the Community will be determined by common accord of the
Government of the Member States."
114 Monnet (1978) p. 372.
"7 Article 7 ECSC: "Les institutions de ia Communaute sont: - une HAUTE
AUTORITE. assistee d'un Comite Consultatif; (...) "
11,1 Article 8 ECSC: "La Haute Autorite est chargee d assurer la realisation des
ohjets fixee par le present Traite dans les conditions prevues par celui-ci."
117 Article 10 ECSC, 1st paragraph: "Les membres des Etats membres nomment
d un common accord huit membres. Ceux-ci procedent a la nomination du
neuvieme membre. qui est elu s 7/ recueille ait mains cinq voix." Ernst B. Haas
(1958) p. 42.
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their individual governments or any other member State's government. This last
point was all in accordance with the supposed supranational character spelled out in
Article 9 whereby the members "will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the
supranational character of their functions. Each member State agreed to respect this
supranational character and to make no effort to influence the members of the High
Authority in the execution of their duties."118
As has been shown above, the High Authority had powers which were
normally only enjoyed by national governments. The High Authority acted by
majority vote which could take three different forms. In the form of a decision it
meant that the High Authority was binding in every respect. A recommendation was
binding with respect to the objectives but not as regards the means by which those
objectives shall be achieved, and lastly the High Authority could come up with
opinions which were not binding in any respect.
As the executive body of the ECSC the High Authority had direct powers of
decision on most matters covered by the Treaty. It was only on questions of broader
policy that decisions required consent by the Council of Ministers. The main function
of the High Authority was to secure the realization of the aim of the Community,
being "economic expansion, the development of employment and the improvement
of the standard of living in the participating countries".119 To ensure this the High
Authority had to make sure that there were no import or export duties on the
movement of coal and steel within the Community, that no discrimination among
producers, buyers or consumers was being practiced, and that no state imposed any
subsidies or other types of state assistance. Concerning the industries of coal and
steel, the High Authority also made decisions regarding prices, tariffs, transport rates
118 Article 9 ECSC. 6th paragraph: "Chaque Etat membre sengage a respecter
ce caractere supranational et a ne pas chercher a influencer les membres de la
Haute Autorite dans 1execution de lew laches."
"y Article 2 ECSC, 1st paragraph: "... a I'expansion economique, au
developpement de I'emploi et cm relevement du niveau de vie dans les Etats
membres. "
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and similar matters. Decisions taken were immediately binding on the enterprises
concerned without need for any action by national authorities, which was considered
the essence of the supranational power of the High Authority. In addition to the
powers just mentioned, the High Authority had the power to raise the money
necessary for the operation of the Community by placing levies on the production
of coal and steel. These levies was to be paid directly to the High Authority itself.
There were a number of checks and balances in the Treaty of the ECSC. A
reason for that was to satisfy the member State governments in making sure that the
powers of the High Authority did not become too wide. This was especially true for
the Benelux countries who insisted on a Council of Ministers being set up,
representing the individual member States. Its purpose was to coordinate the actions
of the High Authority and those of the national governments responsible for the
general economic policy in each of the six countries. The Benelux countries, being
smaller nations, were afraid of a too strong Franco-German dominance in a
"supranational" High Authority with excessive powers. Therefore, at a meeting on
7 June 1950 the three countries worked out a common proposal for an "equal
representation on a board made up of government-appointed members". A few days
later, on 14 June, "the Dutch delegation proposed the creation of a Council of
Ministers to control the High Authority's political decisions."120 This had not been
included in the original Schuman Plan and was not immediately welcomed by Jean
Monnet.121 Nevertheless, at the inaugural meeting of the Council of Ministers on
8-10 September 1952, Monnet emphasised the Council's vital task as ensuring "that
there would be 'constant harmony between the activities of the Community and those
of the member states'".122 The High Authority, it was decided, had to consult the
Council in a number of cases, among them the establishment of the levy. The
1211
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 12-13.
121 According to Pierre Uri. Jean Monnet had thought this was a good idea and
wished he had thought of it himself. It was considered a body which could be more
or less equivalent to the German "Bundesrat". Interview with Pierre Uri on 9
January 1989. The Historical Archives, European University Institute, Florence.
122 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 59.
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Council of Ministers, on the other hand, could only oppose High Authority decisions
unanimously.123
The Common Assembly was a body consisting of representatives from the
parliaments of the six member States. The Assembly had to receive and debate the
annual reports of the High Authority, and it also had the power of enforcing the
collective resignation of the High Authority by vote of censure in cases where it
might reject the High Authority's policy. One of the criticisms of the Common
Assembly was that it was not a directly elected parliamentary institution.
Nevertheless, its members were, before being appointed to the Common Assembly,
elected by the people to their national parliaments. In some ways, therefore, it could
be seen as enjoying some kind of democratic control.124
The Court of Justice was designed as another control upon the work of the
High Authority. If decisions and recommendations were found not to be in
accordance with the Treaty they could be annulled by the Court. Its role was, thus,
crucial in establishing a pattern of "narrow", or strict Treaty interpretation. The
Court did on some occasions take action against the High Authority where it felt that
the latter had acted contrary to the Treaty. Jean Monnet was in favour of this as it
was seen to be "a new proof of the effective functioning of the institutions of the
Community" as federal organs.125
The Consultative Committee, an advisory body consisting of between 30 and
51 members, was set up to provide the High Authority with assistance and "expert"
advice. The members of the Consultative Committee were producers, workers,
consumers and traders, representing the economic and social interests of society. The
High Authority was obliged to consult the Committee on a number of cases listed in
123 Article 28 ECSC.
1-4 Article 20 ECSC: "L 'Assemble e composee de representants des peuples des
Etats reunis dans la Communaute, exerce les ponvoirs de contrdle qui lui sont
attributes par le present Traite. "
Quoted in Haas (1958) p. 474.
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the Treaty as well as to keep it informed about its activities in the field of
investments, cartels and concentrations.12h
3.2 The Supranational character of the High Authority and the Federal aim of the
ECSC
In the dictionary the term "supranationalism" is explained as "overriding
national sovereignty; in belonging to, more than one nation. Outside the authority
of a single national government".12' In other words, a supranational organisation
is one which is over and above the individual participating national States. Such an
organisation can take decisions that are binding on governments without necessarily
receiving their prior consent. It is here that lies the difference between supranational
and international where the latter has a rule of unar;mity, meaning that no state can
be bound without its prior approval. The term "supranational" was first mentioned
in debates in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe during the summer
of 1949. However, it was always understood as something "subordinated to all
governments".128 The first time it was used to describe an actual body, or one that
was to be set up, was in the ECSC Treaty describing the High Authority. By the
founding fathers it was used as a way of distinguishing the Community as it was
from the ultimate aim of full federation, which would be achieved by way of
supranationality.129 While explaining his plan to the Consultative Committee of the
Council of Europe on 10 August 1950, Robert Schuman expressed his opinion on the
High Authority saying that "[T]he Authority thus set up will be the first example of
an independent supranational institution".120
In Schuman's view the supranational element represented "a new step in the
126 Articles 18 and 19 ECSC.
127 Collins English Dictionary.
128 Robertson (1957 ) Legal Problems of European Integration, p. 144.
129 Haas (1958) p. 32.
130 Robertson (1957) p. 145.
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gradation of powers", where these powers must be placed somewhere above the
national level but had not yet attained the status of federal authority.131 One could
argue, however, that the High Authority and the ECSC possessed through the Treaty
the formal attributes necessary to make it an agent of European integration. It was
empowered to make policy binding on the governments as well as on the coal and
steel industries directly. It also had the powers of taxing, lending, borrowing,
planning and rule-making. Nonetheless, when it came to the national governments,
they were considered by the High Authority as the crucial limits on supranational
policy. The High Authority had, according to the Treaty, the power to make
decisions that would be binding as well for the national governments. However, it
had no real means of enforcing these decisions. One can assume that national
governments would not recognise any authority above themselves. However, when
it came to the Council of Ministers it could be assumed, as this was made up of
representatives of national governments, that the latter would be bound by such
decisions.132 As considered by Jean Monnet, the first President of the High
Authority, the High Authority was "the repository of the European General Will,
with the evil governments merely the spokesmen for the selfish particular wills".133
In this point of view the national governments were considered as the crucial limits
on a supranational policy. The Treaty of the ECSC, as administered by the High
Authority was, according to Jean Monnet, the basic European consensus for
progress, peace and federation.
As mentioned above, the High Authority had the power to give orders
directly binding to the enterprises concerned, as well as to impose fines and penalties
1,1 Robertson (1966) European Institutions: Cooperation, Integration,
Unification, p. 136.
132 Haas (1958) p. 47.
Haas (1958) p. 456. Rousseau talked about the general will as something
that "constitutes order, the supreme rule, and this general and personified rule is
what I call the Sovereign." He argued further that the existence of a political
authority would guarantee that relations between men would have some kind of
regularity. However, there would have to be a sovereign which would give the
general will the dominant place. Maurizo Viroli (1988) Jean-Jeacques Rousseau
and the well-ordered society' (Cambridge University Press) p. 188.
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on these enterprises. In cases where fines were not paid the High Authority could
withhold money from the enterprise in question. However, it must be said that the
High Authority's power of enforcement was, in the end, through the medium of
national governments which is in fact what limits the "supranational" element. In
other important national spheres like monetary, fiscal, foreign economic, wage and
social welfare policies, the High Authority was restricted to performing studies and
giving advice.134
Although the national governments were considered as the main limit upon
the supranational it had also proved difficult for the governments to resist the facts
and recommendations put before the Council by the High Authority. In cases where
a government was determined to argue but found itself unable to formulate the
necessary compromise, the High Authority was asked to step in and mediate.
Nevertheless, if a government was determined not to find a federal solution to a
problem, the High Authority initiative would be neither solicited nor respected.
The German politician and Vice-President of the High Authority, Franz Etzel,
was of the opinion that the ECSC should be a test for the functioning of
supranational institutions. Therefore, he said, "political cooperation must already
now be exercised in such a manner as to develop a lively and close relationship
between the High Authority and the Common Assembly".135 Supranationality, Haas
argued, "in structural terms, [...] means the existence of governmental authorities
closer to the archtype of federation than any past international organisation, but not
yet identical with it. [...] the remaining limits on the ability to implement decisions
and to expand the scope of the system independently still suggest the characteristics
of international organisation".136 He further pointed out the fact that the High
Authority did not make a consistent use of the Assembly in stressing the application
of supranational solutions in discussions with the six governments. In disagreements
134 Haas (1958) p. 58.
" Franz Etzel in a speech at Handelshochschule St.Gallen. In: Haas (1958) p.
478.
Ijf> Haas (1958) p. 599.
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with the majority of the colleagues on a narrow Treaty interpretation, the individual
members of the High Authority did not seek support from their political friends in
the Assembly.137 This was a sign of no real political support existing between the
High Authority and the Assembly which should be the characteristic of a federal
system. The relations between the High Authority, the Assembly and the Council
seemed to violate the federal logic that had been insisted strongly upon by Jean
Monnet already from the start.138 It was a fact that supranationality was a new
concept and had not been used to describe any earlier organisation. Attempts were
made by several of its contemporaries and people involved in the setting-up of the
ECSC and the High Authority to define supranationalism. As Ernst B. Haas saw it:
"[Sjupranationality in operation - as distinguished from structure - depends on the
behaviour of men and groups of men".139
The European Coal and Steel Community was a non-exclusive organisation,
open to all European countries wishing to join. It was further thought to be the first
step in the direction of a unification of Europe. The Community also had the purpose
of demonstrating the technical and practical feasibility of economic integration and
thereby to act as precursor to the extension of this Community. The question remains
whether the High Authority managed to fulfil this purpose or whether it merely acted
as a vigorous coal and steel executive.
Among the industrialists of the six member States there seems to have been
a general satisfaction with the supranational policy, and loyalty was shown towards
the High Authority and its decisions even when the decisions had been opposed. It
might seem, therefore, that the High Authority was an active agent in the redirection
of loyalties and expectations towards a federal focus. It is also known that the
Common Assembly at several occasions voted according to political conviction and
1,7 Remark made by Max Kohnstamm. Secretary of the High Authority, 1954.
In: Haas (1958) p. 479.
138 Haas (1958) pp. 478-479.
139 Haas (1958) p. 59.
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not according to nationality,140 which seems to indicate the existence of a certain
amount of supranational ism in the Community, or at least some feeling of
Community spirit.
One of the difficulties in the work of the High Authority was the fact that it
was very important at all times to keep a good relationship with both France and
Germany. This was to make sure that the old conflict between the two countries
would not blow up again and that, instead, the relationship between them would be
kept good and stable. This is one of the reasons why the High Authority was rather
unwilling to risk opposition and unpopularity by giving an energetic federal
interpretation to powers which it possessed, and thus disappoint groups and
governments expecting a positive federal policy. Under the presidency of Jean
Monnet it was decided that no disagreement between the members of the High
Authority was to come out public. As Haas put it: "[Vjoting is avoided as a general
practice; only if a negotiated consensus seems unobtainable does the simple majority
voting rule become operative. No information of possible differences of opinion
among the members is permitted to reach the public."141 This was further verified
by Albert Coppe, the Belgian member of the High Authority from 1952. He has
pointed out the fact that "Monnet did not like to take a formal vote for the risk of
putting the Germans in a minority position". He would therefore always try to get
an agreement with the Germans before the start of negotiations or discussions. Coppe
did not share this concern and would always insist on holding a vote, but to no
avail.142
The ECSC's institutional structure, consisting of an executive, a Council of
1411 One of these occations was when Paul-Henri Spaak was elected by the
Common Assembly to sit on the ad hoc Constitutional Committee in September
1952. Knowing that the Common Assembly had no legislative power, however, this
might arguably be seen as a rather minor factor. Monnet (1978) p. 382.
141 Haas (1958) p. 452.
I4~ Interview with Albert Coppe. Archives of the European Communities,
European University Institute. Florence.
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Ministers, a Common Assembly and a Court of Justice, bears many resemblances
to that of a federation of states, despite the presence of the Council of Ministers and
the restrictions put on the High Authority, as well as the lack of legislative powers
given to the Common Assembly. Nevertheless, there existed certain hopes for the
future. The ECSC Treaty was set up for a period of fifty years, with no withdrawal
clause included.143 The founding fathers expected a full federation to have replaced
the existing multi-state system in Europe by the end of this period. As Maurice
Lagrange144 concluded: "Thus, the supranational institutions of the Schuman Plan
definitely constitute the precursors of future federal European institutions."145
Nevertheless, the High Authority was to discover that no integration could proceed
against the will of the national governments involved. This could be considered as
a reason why the High Authority was not able to make use of its extensive
supranational powers and came to consult the Council far more often than envisaged
in the Community Treaty. In Haas' opinion it was "the considered policy of the High
Authority to consult the Council of Ministers on every major decision, whether such
a step is required by the Treaty or not".146
The High Authority has often been referred to as Europe's first supranational
institution. Moreover, being the first one meant that it had to deal with a lot of new
problems and probably the most important one was to convince the governments of
the participating states that the Community was working for the good of the whole
Community, which in the end would be for the good of the individual member
states.
14' Article 97 ECSC: "Le present Traite est conclu pour une duree de cinquante
cms a dciter de son entree en vigueur."
144 Maurice Lagrange was an Advocate General in the Court of Justice between
1952 and 1964. He took part in the negotiations for the Treaty of Paris as an
expert, representing France.
14:1 Maurice Lagrange (1953) Le caractere supranational des pouvoirs et leur
articulation dans le cadre de la CECA, p. 34. "Ainsi, les institutions
supranationales du Plan Schuman constitutent bien la prefiguration des futures
institutions federales europeennes."
146 Haas (1958) p. 480.
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4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION
"Rien n 'est possible sans les homines, rien n 'est durable sans les
institutions. "147
4.1 Setting up the High Authority
With the establishment of the ECSC. a whole new political and administrative
form had been established in that area of international administration. It was not
merely a classical international cooperation between states. The executive body of
the ECSC. the High Authority, had been delegated powers in the fields of coal and
steel and was to function to a certain degree independently from the national
governments.
In the history of European integration until the Second World War, the idea
of the sovereignty of the States had been the dominating factor. In the postwar
period, however, the States' absolute sovereignty came to be considered as an
obstacle to the organisation of peace and to the construction of a united Europe.
Experiences with the Council of Europe and the OEEC had particularly shown the
insufficiency caused by the rule of unanimity and intergovernmentalism. At this
period in time a need was felt for an organisation which would be above the member
States, as well as securing the equality among the States involved, including
Germany. Other European organisations from the past, like the League of Nations
and the International Authority of the Ruhr, had both involved Germany but in a
discriminatory way as a result of the two world wars. In the postwar period,
however, it came to be understood that a working and lasting cooperation needed to
build on equality among all states involved. Germany was also important to the
western European States and a failure to incorporate her on an equal basis created
a fear that she might turn eastward instead, looking for other partners.
147 Monnet (1978) pp. 304-5. "Nothing is possible without men: nothing is
lasting without institutions."
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In his book "The European Rescue of the Nation State", Alan S. Milward
challenges this view that national political leaders, as well as others involved in the
European integration process, should have seen the nation-state as an obstacle to
peace and prosperity. What he argued was that "[T]he development of the European
Community, the process of European integration, was [...] a part of that post-war
rescue of the European nation-state, because the new political consensus on which
the rescue was built required the process of integration, the surrender of limited
areas of national sovereignty to the supranation".148 This is a view completely
opposite to what was argued by the neofunctionalists in the 1950s and 1960s.
Milward, however, tried to play down the importance of particular people, the
people one has generally tended to refer to as the "founding fathers" of the European
Communities; Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer, in particular.
Their main motive, he argued, was exactly the "rescue of the nation-state" where it
was thought that "without the European Community, the nation-state could not have
offered to its citizens the same measure of security and prosperity which it has
provided and which has justified its survival".149 Setting up the European
Communities was therefore no more than an act of preserving the nation-state' status
quo. As for France, Milward argued that "integration was an attempt to restore
France as a major national force by creating an integrated area in western Europe
which France would dominate politically and economically".150 We have seen that
the motives behind the rescue of the nation-state were of economic character, and
as Milward has put it "the Europeanization of its rescue had also to be
economic".151 If European integration also could solve the problem of the future
of Germany, so much the better.
As an interesting theory, and a valuable contribution to the study of European
integration, the above mentioned book by Milward has been included in this thesis.
148 Milward (1992) p. 4.
149 Milward (1992) p. 3.
150 Milward (1992) p. 17.
Milward (1992) p. 44.
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However, the thesis will rather try to show how political factors and personal
resources played a greater part in the setting-up of the European Communities than
economic factors.
With the High Authority installed in Luxembourg on 10 August 1952, the
first "civil servants" of the European Community appeared. The High Authority's
administration was, however, initially considered as secondary to the opening of the
common market of coal and steel. As Luxembourg was only considered as a
temporary location, and the personnel employed on short-term contracts, the
development of its administration was rather piecemeal and often confusing. Its
development happened only according to the work and the problems to be met, and
not according to any plan or strict rule in the early years. As we will see below, the
development of the administration happened much according to the personality of the
High Authority's president of this specific time. The first president, Jean Monnet,
was, as one of the founding fathers of the ECSC, not very occupied with
administrative structures. His main concern was with getting the work done and
thereby letting the administration develop according to needs. This changed,
however, from 1955 onwards, with his successor Rene Mayer. By this time the work
of the High Authority had expanded and a need for a more clearly defined
administration followed as stricter rules for working procedures became apparent.
As has already been mentioned above, the establishment of the High
Authority meant something completely new in European organisations. No one knew
at the time of establishment quite how it was going to look. Jean Monnet was one
of the most influential personalities in the early years. It was Monnet who launched
the idea of sectorial economic integration. He had discovered since the First World
War the means to develop international cooperation. This, he felt, could not be done
by a system of traditional diplomacy of negotiations and compromises in rival
national interests. The way to secure cooperation between different nations was to
create action in common interests in the view of a global solution. This is where the
idea of a pooling of the coal and steel industries of France and Germany came from,
which would be joined by other interested Western European countries, and
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administered by a power independent of the member States. Monnet's role as
initiator, however, was not the only reason for his great influence over the new
organisation's development. His decisive impact on the building-up of the new
administration was also to some extent provided for by the Treaty itself. Article 16
of the ECSC Treaty stated that "le President de la Haute Autorite est charge de
1'administration des services".152 Monnet saw this as a rigid power which could
not be delegated to others.153
Monnet was deeply convinced of the importance of institutions for the
establishment of stable and close relationships between nations. Institutions were of
such an importance, he said, as they are the only means of securing the endurance
of political innovations. They would also make it possible to collect the experiences
and the wisdom of one generation and pass it on to the next, providing that the
functioning of a political system can be steadily improved. At the time of the
setting-up of the High Authority it was thought much more important to set up
immediately and efficiently the institutions provided for by the Treaty. By defining
the institutional framework, administrative structures could be developed at a later
stage.
One distinction made by Monnet was between the political role to be played
by the institution and the preparatory and supporting role to be played by the
administration attached to this institution. The carrying out of the institutional duties
of the High Authority needed a "general competence" of its members. The
administrative staff preparing the High Authority's decisions were the one's needing
"technical qualifications" of an efficient administration that would ensure the
fulfillment of the political tasks of the institution. In Monnet's view, such ambitions
needed a small, efficient administration working in close cooperation with the
lv Article 16 ECSC: "The President of the High Authority shall be responsible
for the administration of its services, and shall ensure the execution of the acts of
the High Authority."
Roger Morgan. Jean Monnet and the ECSC Administration: Challenges,
Functions and the Inheritance of Ideas. In: Yearbook of European Administrative
History 1992. p. 1.
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members of the High Authority. The best method, he thought, was to concentrate
on the task to be carried out, and afterwards, to determine, in the light of
experiences, the form of organisation needed; an "administration de mission".
Although he did wish to see the installation of numerous permanent European
officials in Luxembourg, he also wanted to set a limit on the number; "I'autorite
s'exercait mieux avec des instruments legers".154 He preferred informal meetings
and ad hoc committees to restrictions imposed by a rigid organisation, something
which could make him seem authoritarian to his colleagues.155 From former
experiences however, in the League of Nations and his work with the modernisation
of France in 1946, Monnet had learned that the tendency to create an administration
covering all the functions of its national counterparts often entailed an inflation of
staff, and, more importantly, endangered the "free circulation of ideas". Based on
this, Monnet was strongly in favour of a smaller, and less bureaucratic
administration for the High Authority "whose internal organization should correspond
as closely as possible to the immediate tasks of the new institution", and that would
not be a "copy" of national administrations.156 In keeping the administration as
small as possible, however, it was necessary to define clearly the tasks and the
spheres of responsibility of each administrative unit.
In Monnet's opening speech at the formal establishment of the High
Authority, on 10 August 1952, he stressed the fact that the transfer of national
sovereignty to the ECSC institutions was the factor which made them totally different
from any other international institution. He also gave considerable importance to the
independence of the new administration from the member States. This was one
reason why he did not want to copy national administrations, and why the new
administration had to be kept to a minimum size. He gave more importance to
developing a "European spirit"157 among the members of the High Authority and
"4 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 4.
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 56.
Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 4.
Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 5.
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its administrative staff. Also, working methods suitable for a supranational
administration had to be developed before anything else. The main concern,
therefore, at the time of the establishment of the High Authority, was in creating
"new" administrative structures. New in the sense that there had never before been
set up an executive body which was also to have extensive political powers and
powers of sanction towards its member States.
In the final draft of the Schuman Declaration, written by Monnet and his team
on 27 April 1950, the future institutions of the new community were described.
About the High Authority it was written that, as it was to be "charged with the
functioning of the whole regime it will be composed of independent persons, equal
to governments: one president chosen in common agreement by the
governments".1'^8 It was a revolutionary decision, and in the words of Paul Reuter,
one of the authors behind the Schuman Declaration, "there is no precedent for the
establishment of the ECSC, and the High Authority. Not among other international
agreements, nor among agreements over base products had similar spirits been
invoked. [...] The ECSC means a real transfer of sovereignty that none of the States
concerned has ever before agreed to".159 The "political invention" of the High
Authority was in fact that it prefigured, although in a limited economic domain, what
could have been a European government of a federal character. For these reasons
it was necessary quickly to establish the institutional and administrative structures,
and to concentrate later on policies.
It was clear that both France and Germany wanted an independent and strong
High Authority. The Benelux countries, on the other hand, were slightly more
reserved during the negotiations. They were afraid of being dominated by France and
Germany which were the two biggest coal and steel producers, and they were
reluctant to let the High Authority exercise supranational powers over their national
l>x Pierre Gerbet. La Haute Authorite de la Communaute Europeenne du
Charbon et de I'Acier. In: Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p.
14.
Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 14.
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governments. What had to be solved was the problem of political control. The Dutch
delegate insisted that the High Authority should be responsible to a Council of
national ministers which would give directives to the High Authority. Monnet and
the chief German delegate, Walter Hallstein. however, insisted strongly on not
falling into a system of intergovernmentalism. thereby reducing the High Authority
to a mere international secretariat. In the end the French and the Germans had to
give in and agreed to the establishment of a Council of Ministers, although with less
power than what the Benelux countries had initially wanted.
To further stress the principle of supranationalism. the French and the
Germans proposed the High Authority as a collegium of five members,
demonstrating that they were not representatives of the States. The Benelux
countries, again afraid of Franco-German domination, insisted on one member from
each State. The composition of the High Authority resulted, in the end, in nine
members, nominated for six years, with no more than two members from the same
State. According to Article 9 of the Treaty, the independent members were to be
"chosen because of their general competence".160 As the High Authority was to
have responsibilities of a political character, it meant that competencies only in the
field of coal and steel would not be enough. What came to be some of the main
characteristics for the governments in choosing candidates were personality,
European "engagement" and a necessary authority in negotiating with governments
in complete independence, rather than a particular competence of technical character.
Being holders of such general competencies it was a fact that the nine members were
not always qualified for the many technical aspects needing to be dealt with by the
High Authority. This was however solved by setting up small competent teams
around the members of the High Authority "who were enthusiastic and willing to
give a great deal of their time".161
160 Article 9 ECSC. 1st paragraph: "La Haute Autorite est composee de neuf
membres nommes pour six arts et choisis en raison de leur competence generate."
161
Apart from wanting a small administration for the High Authority, it was
also a fact that Jean Monnet demanded a great deal of his colleagues and something
which soon was to be a problem was the lack of rules concerning working hours.
The days could therefore often be very long, weekends included. Spierenburg and
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The first years of the High Authority's functioning was characterised by a
homogeneity of the collegium as well as of the personality of its president. Its work
functioned as a small team of close collaborators, launching ideas and giving each
other impulses. It was President Monnet's ambition to avoid a heavy administration.
Therefore, the High Authority's administrative structures developed progressively
with its Services created out of need. It was important to Monnet not to separate
decision-making from the execution. The best way to avoid this, in his opinion, was
to start off with men who had already participated in the Treaty negotiations, helped
only by a number of national experts.
The High Authority itself was organised as a collegium, taking decisions by
a simple majority and thereby making all decisions a collective responsibility. The
idea of the High Authority was important to Monnet to avoid the members each
taking charge of their own sector of activity. He was afraid this would lead to a
separation of competence, and thereby power, and easily the establishment of heavy
administrative structures around each sector of activity, slowing down the
decision-making procedures. In Monnet's view, two solutions presented themselves
as possible working methods for the High Authority. On the one hand, "[T]he
President could be responsible for managing the administration, as regards both
executive tasks and preparatory tasks which the administration might have to
assume".162 As the President could delegate powers, the High Authority would act
as a joint body, both in discussions as well as in decision-making, but not where
administrative responsibilities were concerned. On the other hand, each member
could be "responsible, as delegated by the President, for a division or a department".
In this case the High Authority would operate as a Council of Ministers, "whilst the
President [...] would be responsible for the overall view and ensuring that all the
work followed the policy guidelines laid down by the High Authority".163 The first
solution was preferred by Monnet and. after weeks of debating, working parties
Poidevin (1994) p. 57.
162 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 70.
"" Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 70.
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began to take shape in October 1952.
The working parties which were set up each consisted of three to four
members from the High Authority plus a competent director. Each member took part
in two to three working parties, thereby staying "en courant" at meetings of the High
Authority and integrated in all decisions. This way it was felt that work was being
rationalised and the principle of collegiality respected. As put by President Monnet
before the Assembly in June 1953: "les membres restent competents en tout,
specialistes en rien",164 The president himself did not take part in any of the
working parties but functioned as a coordinator of the activities. It was decided, after
heavy discussions among the members of the High Authority, that the President
should delegate executive powers to the chairmen of the working parties while he
remained responsible for the implementation.165 The working parties were six in
number and established in December 1953 for a trial period until August 1954. They
represented market; investment and finance; production; labour; external relations;
long-term policies; and administration.166
4.2 From Monnet to Mayer: Administrative developments
In the early years of the High Authority, Monnet achieved his goal of creating
a real team spirit among its members. However, as mentioned above, these were still
early days when the High Authority was a complete novelty and its working
procedures not yet completely established. In 1954, with the defeat of the European
164 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 23.
I6>
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 73.
166 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) pp. 73-74. In the "Report on the Situation
of the Community" of January 1953 a preliminary list of Divisions and Services
were published which included Production Division; Market Division; Investment
Division; Finance Division; Transport Division; Economic Division; Division on
Labour Problems; Division charged with assuring the maintenance of competitive
conditions: Juridical Service; Statistical Service; Internal Service; Interpreting and
Translating Service; Press Service; and the Secretariat of the High Authority.
European Coal and Steel Community. The High Authority. Report on the Situation
of the Community. Luxembourg, 10 January 1953.
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Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC),167 a
change occurred creating a less than favourable climate for supranationalism,
meaning that more stress had to be put on persuasion and negotiation of ideas. This
was one of the reasons why Jean Monnet left his job as President of the High
Authority in 1955 to set up the Action Committee for the United States of Europe,
carrying on his work for supranationalism. His successor as President was the
Frenchman Rene Mayer,168 appointed as President of the High Authority on 1 June
1955. He was seen as being particularly qualified, being both a statesman as well as
a great administrator. He fitted in well, being both technical and political, and it was
to him the High Authority would later owe its Statute of Personnel, or Staff
Regulations as they will be called in English.
Rene Mayer was of a completely different nature to Monnet, and more
humble in his relations with the other members as well as towards the member
governments, something which he indicated in his book:
"Mes collegues et moi, les hommes de la Haute Autorite avons de
grands pouvoirs. Mais nous ne devons pas les utiliser tout le temps,
chaque jour, a chaque occasion. Nous devons savoir quand les utiliser
et I 'expliquer aux interesses. II est preferable d'arriver a un consensus
que de donner des ordres. "169
In line with his views thereby expressed, continuous consultations developed between
the governments, the industries and the trade unions.
167 See Chapter III. 5. The Influence of the Spaak Committee on the
establishment of the European Commission.
",s Rene Mayer sat as a member of several governments between 1947 and
1953. as Minister for Finance, Minister for Justice, Minister for Finance and
Economic Affairs, among others. From 1953 he became member of the National
Assembly, representing the Radical Party. Together with Rene Pleven he was also
the only member of the French Government that had been informed by Robert
Schuman about the scheme of pooling the coal and steel industries, before 9 May
1950. Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 242.
"w Rene Mayer (1956) Pour line politique europeenne. In: Yearbook of
European Administrative History 1992, p. 25. "My colleagues and I in the High
Authority have great powers. But we should not use them all the time, every day,
on every occasion. We ought to know when to use them and explain this to
interested parties. It is preferable to arrive at a consensus than to give orders." Own
translation.
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In his relationship with the Assembly Jean Monnet always seemed to show
a certain degree of suspiciousness. Rene Mayer, on the other hand, came from the
French Assemblee Nationale and, in seeing its importance more clearly, seemed to
be on much better terms with the Common Assembly of the ECSC. After he was
nominated as President he presented his programme to this Assembly. Such a gesture
was much appreciated by the parliamentarians who, having the right to overthrow
the High Authority, also wanted to participate in its development, and Mayer thus
created a precedent for later Presidents of the High Authority, as well as later
European executives. He frequently gave accounts of the activities of the High
Authority to the Common Assembly which proved good for the functioning of the
Community as a whole.
Mayer's relationship with the Council was to a certain extent less easy. He
was a great defender of supranational ism and, in that sense, held the view that a
common market could not function properly without its rules being drawn up
independently of States. Nevertheless, as a result of his more frequent consultations
with national authorities and the Council, the balance of the ECSC institutions was
progressively tilted in favour of the Council during Mayer's presidency. Looking
back, it was stated by Robert Marjolin in 1958 that the High Authority had played
its role as the central body given to it by the Treaty, that it had been the motive
factor among the Community institutions. It had frequently played the mediator role
between the governments and thereby made agreements easier. He continued by
saying that as frequent consultations had been established between the High
Authority and representatives of national authorities in areas exclusively given to the
High Authority by the Treaty, this had only showed how extremely difficult it would
be to oppose several States, or even only one, when vital interests of the State were
at stake.1™
As mentioned above, it was under the presidency of Rene Mayer that Staff
Regulations were established. Monnet had not been a particularly administrative
Pierre Gerbet. La Haute Autorite de la CECA. In: Yearbook of European
Administrative History 1992. p. 26.
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person, and had instead delegated to the Belgian member Paul Finet the preparation
and execution of administrative matters. Although an administrative working group
had been set up in 1953 it had not received very much attention from the President.
Its job was to assist the President in the administration of personnel, as well as to
give advice on nominations and administrative rules. It ended up, however, taking
decisions in a majority of the cases on its own with powers delegated from the
President. From the earliest days, a "Statutory Committee" was set up to prepare a
draft of Staff Regulations, which it started in 1953. Although this was principally
against the wishes of Jean Monnet, there was a wish to create an administrative
situation closer to national administrations rather than to that of international
organisations. This was primarily because it was thought that "a body of
supranational civil servants was in reality almost a body of national civil servants,
where the nationality was supranational".171
During the presidency of Monnet the interest in formulating Staff Regulations
was minimal. He had been "in no hurry to see the general organizational regulations,
provided under Article 16 of the Treaty, adopted".172 According to Article 16 "The
High Authority shall make all appropriate administrative arrangements for the
operation of its departments. It may set up study committees, including an economic
study committee." These regulations were adopted on 5 November 1954.173 To
Monnet the factor of competence always came first. From 1953 onwards, however,
his interest in administrative matters grew to some extent. He was at this time more
and more turned towards the EDC and EPC, and his interest in the Staff Regulations
was for a future functioning of a public federal Europe. Nevertheless, by the end of
171 Declared by Jacques Reuff who was at the time a Judge at the European
Court of Justice. Yves Conrad. La Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de
I'Acier et la situation de ses agents. Du regime contractuel au regime statutaire
(1952-58). In: Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 64. Own
translation, "un corps de fonctionnaires supranationaux etait, en realite, presque
un corps de fonctionnaires nationaux, pour lesquels la nationality etait la
supranationalite ".
172
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 75.
I7j Official Journal 24 November 1954. pp. 513-17. In: Spierenburg and
Poidevin (1994) p. 75.
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1954 and the beginning of 1955 there was a growing discontent among the
administrative personnel caused by the lack of regulations. Concern was expressed
about the lack of rules governing the selection of officials for certain posts, poorly
defined tasks and responsibilities, as well as the lack of criteria concerning the fixing
of salaries.174 The nomination of Rene Mayer as President was to set a fundamental
mark on the final preparation of the Staff Regulations. They were adopted on 28
January 1956. with a "Reglement General du Personnel" to be adopted soon after,
and finally coming into force on 1 July 1956. As Rene Mayer was more
administratively oriented than Monnet had been, he felt the need for providing the
personnel of the institutions with fixed Regulations. Monnet, one might say, was
more interested in the institutions as such, to see them in operation, achieving their
goals. Mayer, on the other hand, found it quite important to secure and safeguard
the personnel of the institutions, something he saw as essential to achieving the same
goals as set out by Monnet.
With President Mayer came also the establishment of formal recruitment
procedures. In the very early days it was agreed among the members that the
administrative structures of the High Authority should be determined by the functions
which the organisation performed. As the ECSC was characterised by a rather
experimental nature in 1952/53. this was an element that cautioned against any heavy
impositions of rigid administrative structures. No formal recruitment was established
at that time, because it was realized that both the type of administrative personnel
and organisation required would change over time as the functions of the High
Authority evolved. This view is clearly to be found with Pierre Uri, writing in 1952
that " given the novelty of the tasks to be fulfilled by the High Authority, it would
be a mistake to try to set it up and apply to it an organisational outline a priori".175
174 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 78.
|7" Pierre Uri - Aide-Memoire sur la conversation avec M. Etzel, 16 juillet
1952. Sonia Mazey. Conception and Evolution of the High Authority's
Administrative Services (1952-56): from Supranational Principles to Multinational
Practices. In: Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 32. Own
translation. "Etant donne la nouveaute des fetches que devra remplir la Haute
Autorite. ce serait une erreur de dresser et de vouloir appliquer un schema
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President Monnet himself also said, in a speech to the Assembly on 8 November
1952, that "[W]e have wanted to set up an organisation that adapts to the work we
have to do. and to the problems we have to solve. We do not want an abstract
organisation. "176
During Monnet's presidency, what was expected of the members of the High
Authority was to possess considerable linguistic abilities, a "European spirit", along
with "sufficient general and cultural skills to be able to negotiate at the highest
level". He also believed that a horizontal administration organised along functional
lines would facilitate the communication between members of the High Authority,
officials, national experts and civil servants. In the High Authority there was a wish
to recruit highly qualified people with an experience from similar work. As no
recruitment procedures were established at the beginning, each High Authority
member put forward a list of qualified people from his own country. As procedures
became somewhat more established, nominations were left to the directors.177
Recruitment of personnel did to a large extent evolve alongside the
development of the High Authority. During Monnet's early days as President, the
Services were organised horizontally, along functional lines and, in keeping with the
desire to retain flexible administrative structures, officials were recruited on an
informal basis as well as employed on short-term contracts. Nevertheless, as the
High Authority's responsibilities expanded, the limitations of the initial
administrative arrangements became apparent. During 1954-55, therefore, the High
Authority underwent an administrative reorganisation leading to a more effective and
more traditionally structured bureaucracy. In its first year the relations between the
High Authority and the administrative services were fairly informal, with senior
officials often present at meetings of the High Authority. This, however, was an
element that disappeared with a growing bureaucratisation.
d 'organisation a priori. "
1Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 32.
" Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 33.
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The informal recruitment procedures of the early years became an important
source of internal division within the administration. These internal divisions
followed particularly along national lines. It was an element which also existed
within the collegium of the High Authority and was quickly reproduced at the
administrative level. Although Monnet had wished to avoid allocating posts to
particular member States, and rather to employ the best qualified candidate, there
was a growing concern among the members of the High Authority about the number
of administrative posts held by each member State. Implementing a national
quota-system was the only solution to this problem.
4.3 Influences from the League of Nations
The first President of the High Authority. Jenn Monnet, is not only known
as being the initiator of the Schuman Declaration. He also had experience from
earlier international secretariats of a "similar" kind. He had been a Deputy to the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations, 1919-1923, and from his extensive
travels throughout his life he had been able to study other federal systems. During
his work as Planning Commissioner for the modernisation of France in 1946 he was
largely inspired by the United States' federal system, in particular the technical
expertise available to the US government.
The League of Nations was set up in 1919 as a free association of States
undertaking to pursue certain common aims. With its permanent Secretariat and its
own budget it was seen to be a more strongly constituted body than most
confederations known to that date. Its Covenant was a compromise between two
conceptions in general: the old conception of the absolute sovereignty of States and
that of the newer and bolder conception towards which the world was moving - that
States must accept some limitations to their sovereignty. To join, however, the States
did not have to renounce neither their national sovereignty nor their right to veto,
and allusions to the maintenance of the principle of sovereignty of States was
frequent in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
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At the time of the League of Nations it was not commonly recognised that a
pooling of sovereignty could be a way of solving international problems. It was
"thought that it was bound to prevail, by sheer moral strength, by the appeal to
public opinion, and by the force of habit".178 In the seeking of peace the League
was concerned with the revival of old historical demarcation-lines, or the drawing
of new ones, and the need to safeguard them against any change. This was quite
different from movements started in the 1940s and 1950s, gradually trying to abolish
national frontiers, aiming for the same goal of peace.
The way the League of Nations was institutionally organised was to resemble
in many ways that of the later ECSC and EEC. It had a Council, an Assembly and
a Secretariat. The latter stood roughly in the same relation towards the Council and
the Assembly as ministerial departments stand towards their national governments.
Before the birth of the League of Nations there did not exist a general and common
administrative body like the League Secretariat. The importance of securing the
independence and impartiality of what was to become the permanent civil service of
the League was realized at the time, and the Secretariat was thought to be this truly
independent body. However, it was still not entirely independent of the governments
represented. There was no provision in the Covenant concerning the nationality and
status of the members of the Secretariat. According to a statement embodied in a
report submitted to, and adopted by the Council in May 1920 by Mr. A. J.
Balfour,179 "the duty of selecting the staff falls upon the Council. [...] Evidently
no one nation or group of nations ought to have a monopoly in providing the
material for its international institution. [...] the members of the Secretariat once
appointed are no longer the servants of the country of which they are citizens, but
become for the time being the servants only of the League of Nations. Their duties
178 Monnet (1978) p. 81.
174 Mr. A. J. Balfour was the British Foreign Secretary between 1916 and 1919,
as well as Prime Minister from 1902 until 1905, representing the Conservative
Party.
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are not national but international."180 It was thus clear that in its intentions it was
to be an international civil service, independent of the governments of its various
members. In its way it showed signs of being the forerunner of the later High
Authority. Although not intended to be supranational, an international civil service
was something quite new at the time.
In his Memoirs Jean Monnet described how he later came to realize the way
in which the League Secretariat prefigured supranationalism. This, he said, was
"through underlying agreement among men who enjoyed widespread influence in
their own countries, so that awareness of the general interest was communicated to
the places where national decisions were reached".181 Nevertheless, the evolution
of the League Secretariat also shows similarities with the High Authority and the
problems this was later to face. The latter was meant to be supranational and
completely independent of national authorities. It showed, however, that these
intentions were rather too ambitious as no nation was prepared to renounce any
sovereignty over its vital interests. The League Secretariat was a body intended as
assistance to the Council, which again was dependent on the will and agreement of
the Great Powers. As Monnet expressed: "No one really tried to solve the actual
problems: their main concern was to find answers that would respect the interests of
all those around the table. [...] the whole organization fell into the routine of mere
co-operation".182 The same problem was later going to face both the High
Authority as well as the European Commission.
The League Secretariat, as opposed to the High Authority, was to be
international, open to nationals of all members of the League as well as to nationals
of non-member States. Officials of the League Secretariat were also bound by a
double loyalty, almost unavoidable. They were appointed on a short-term basis,
seconded from the national services and depended on the good will of their national
,s"
Rappard (1930) Uniting Europe. The trend ofinternational cooperation since
the war. pp. 214-215.
181 Monnet (1978) p. 85.
182 Monnet (1978) p. 96.
87
governments. The delegates came to claim the presence of a certain proportion of
their nationals in the Secretariat as one of the prerogatives of membership, similar
to what happened in the High Authority.
The League of Nations was to make great attempts to realize its aim of
achieving world peace. Nevertheless, it was faced with an obstacle still present to
this day. It brought governments together, trying to get national officials to
cooperate. However, as soon as national interests conflicted, the method broke
down. Monnet wrote in a Memorandum in 1919: "It is [...] important to make both
Governments and peoples know each other better, so that they come to see problems
that face them, not from the point of view of their own interests, but in the light of
the general interest."183 Thus can be traced the ambitions and the limits of the
method that gradually led to the idea of the European Community. The League of
Nations can be said to have prefigured supranationality in its underlying agreement
among men enjoying widespread influence in their own countries, bringing
awareness of the general interest to the places where national decisions were
reached. What the League of Nations lacked though was an independent political
body that could take a common view of the problems and arrive at a common
decision. However, the shortcomings of the League of Nations were, especially
through Jean Monnet, taken into account when establishing the High Authority. One
element essential to success was that of equality among nations. The League system
was built on discrimination against Germany and greatly in favour of the Great
Powers and their right to veto. The League of Nations also ended in failure, and the
outbreak of the Second World War.
It was during the time of the League of Nations, which was considered as the
first great experiment in international administration,184 that the term "International
Secretariat" became part of the vocabulary. By international administration was
,s" Monnet (1978) p. 83.
1X4 Ranshofen-Wertheimer (1945) The International Secretariat. A Great
Experiment in International Administration, p. 3. Mr Ranshofen-Wertheimer was
a British official at the Secretariat of the League of Nations 1930-40.
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traditionally meant '"public administration' in a wider sense", "management applied
to the affairs of the state", and even "a permanent process, based on division of
labour, and hierarchically organized, by means of which official business is carried
out".185 However, with the setting-up of the League of Nations, it was felt that a
redefining of the term would be appropriate. As Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer pointed
out "If it is granted that the work performed by the League Secretariat and the
International Labour Office is international administration and that its staff members
are international administrators, it is nevertheless true that the League was not
essentially an "operating" agency in the accepted meaning, but resembled in some
cardinal respects ministerial and other governmental departments which resort to ad
hoc agencies or local authorities for the execution of some or all of their
policies".186 According to Jean Siotis' explanation, which was related to the later
European Commission, the term refers to "international bodies which have a distinct
existence within a given system of multilateral diplomacy and which exercise
administrative and/or executive functions, implicitly recognised or explicitly
entrusted to them by member States".187 The Secretariat of the League of Nations
was the first to be qualified under this description. In a comparison between national
administrations and international Secretariats Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer pointed
out the fact that the first is a part of the executive branch of government, under
permanent control of the legislative branch of government. As for the League
Secretariat, however, it would be the only permanent element in an international
organisation.188 Before the experience with the European Communities there was
also the fact that international administrations were not operational and did not have
their own international executive agencies. International administrations of the time
of the League of Nations and before were consultative, recommendatory, and
advisory bodies, with the execution of decisions delegated to national or local
agencies already functioning. As one way of looking at the differences between the
,v Ranshofen-Wertheimer (1945) p. 3.
Is" Ranshofen-Wertheimer (1945) p. 4.
187 Siotis (1964) p. 226.
ISS Ranshofen-Wertheimer (1945) p. 9.
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executive powers of the High Authority and the European Commission, one could
point out the former which had direct powers of execution in the area of coal and
steel, and the later European Commission, where a large part of the execution was
left to the various administrations of the member States.189
Jean Monnet, with his experience in the League Secretariat, was eager to
make the High Authority of the ECSC into an improved version of it. With his
experience he wished to maintain the concept of the League Secretariat and the way
it functioned before it eroded and became nothing but a battleground between
nations. He learned however that still, in the 1950s, nations were not ready to give
up much of their sovereignty. He wanted the High Authority to be supranational in
the true meaning of the word. Its administration was to develop according to needs,
without being copied from any of the national administrations, and without national
quotas determining its members and staff. He was very reluctant to give in and
instead left the High Authority to put his energies elsewhere where he could
influence more strongly.190 His successor as President of the High Authority, Rene
Mayer, was more of an administrative type and with him came the Staff Regulations
which were in great demand as the organisation became bigger and more
bureaucratic. Both under the presidency of Jean Monnet and of Rene Mayer,
however, the High Authority was constituted of a team of European outlook.
Through their work they managed to accustom the member States as well as the
public to the idea of a European authority with which national administrations,
enterprises and trade unions had to collaborate. Lastly, and most importantly though,
its experiences altered the notion of an independent European collegiate body.
184 See Chapter III. 4. Functions and Features of the European Commission, for
a more extensive discussion on international Secretariats.
190 In 1955 Jean Monnet established the "Action Committee for the United
States of Europe" which had the support of all the major unions of the Six, as well
as personalities like Guy Mollet. Robert Marjolin. Pierre Uri, Guido Carli and
Richard Mayne. The Committee held its first meeting on 18 January 1956 in Paris.
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5. CONCLUSION
Why did the establishment of the High Authority of the ECSC come when it
did, and what were the factors making it possible? As we have shown it was not as
much due to one person or one event, as to a combination of different factors.
Germany, we have seen, was not in position at the time to refuse to take part in the
European integration process. She was in a vulnerable position with too much at
stake for the future. The ECSC was further a way of regaining her credibility as a
world partner as early as five years after the end of the Second World War.
France was in a different but still difficult situation. The war had been a
traumatic experience on the domestic scene and financially she was in a ruin. It was
important for her to find a new role in post-war Europe. In order for her financial
recovery it was further necessary with a peaceful cooperation with Germany. Jean
Monnet had the idea of using the coal and steel industries as the way to integration.
These were important industries at the time, used in war making, as well as
involving the highly controversial Saar problem.
The institutional structures of the High Authority were determined already at
the Schuman Plan conference of July 1950. It was thanks to the Benelux fear of a
Franco-German domination, and against the wishes of Jean Monnet, that the idea of
a Council of Ministers was adopted. Monnet had originally wanted the High
Authority to be responsible to the Common Assembly only. All that was certain
about the High Authority was that it should be independent and supranational,
working as a kind of European "government". Its more administrative structures, we
have seen, came to depend to a large extent upon the personality of its president.
Nevertheless, we must not forget that when Jean Monnet wanted a small
administration working from case to case, involving all levels, this was more
possible during its first few years as the workload was smaller. Towards the end of
Monnet's presidency we have seen how the administration necessarily grew,
demanding more rigid, and perhaps bureaucratic, structures. The system adopted in
the High Authority was piecemeal in the sense that Monnet and the other members
91
of the High Authority would deal with the problems as they came along, adopting
the administration accordingly. Under the presidency of Walter Hallstein we will
later see how the European Commission started working from the other end,




TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EEC
"We are not integrating economies, we are integrating policies. We
are not just sharing our furniture, we are jointly building a new and
bigger house. "m
1. INTRODUCTION
When the Treaty of Rome came into force on 1 January 1958 and the
Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) was set up, eight years
had already passed since the Schuman Declaration leading to the establishment of the
ECSC two years later, and four years since the EDC and the EPC had been
defeated. At this time the hope for a common market, comparable in size to the US,
was very attractive to many as a means for greater wealth and a basis for a political
union.
In a speech before the European Parliamentary Assembly on 12 October
1960, Walter Hallstein expressed what he saw as the objective of the European
Commission, namely "the political unification of our continent".192 To achieve this,
economic integration had to be made irreversible. This would only be possible if the
integrity of the Community as an economic union were to be preserved, the
provisions of the Treaty fully implemented, if not speeded up, and the independent
role of the Commission expanded or at least protected.
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the theory of neofunctionalism
and how it was affected by the establishment of the European Communities.
191 Hallstein (1962) p. 66.
|1,: EEC Commission Bulletin. No. 8-9 1969. p. 15. See also Lindberg (1963)
p. 69.
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Neofunctionalism was, in Paul Taylor's words, a reformulation of "the older
Functionalist ideas, and applied [...] particularly to regional integration".193 With
the establishment of the ECSC in 1952 and the Communities stemming from the
Treaties of Rome in 1958. scholars found a need to develop a theoretical
explanation. As this was a totally new concept of international cooperation, new sets
of explanations seemed to be required.
In the previous chapter we discussed the setting-up of the High Authority of
the ECSC and how it came to look and function administratively. This chapter will
take the development further towards the creation of the European Commission,
through the co-called "relance europeenne" and the Messina Conference of 1955.
After the EDC had failed to go through the French Assemblee Nationale all hope for
further European integration seemed lost. The process that had been started with the
Schuman Declaration was, nevertheless, to prove too strong and powerful to stop
there. The Messina Conference took place less than a year later, preparing the
grounds for the Treaties of Rome. The idea of a European Commission was first
introduced in the Spaak Report, produced by the Intergovernmental Committee set
up in Messina.
Towards the end of this chapter a few aspects of the European Commission
will be discussed, such as its formal powers and the concept of "cabinets" which was
adopted into this system. The Kennedy Round of GATT in particular, as well as the
Luxembourg - Lorraine case briefly, will be studied for the purpose of finding out
to what extent the Commission could, and did, speak with one voice, as a
supranational body.
193 Taylor (1971) p. 6.
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2. TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EEC
2.1 Neofunctionalist theory of integration
The decade starting with the Schuman Declaration in 1950 became in Europe
very much dominated by the neofunctionalist thinkers and their theories about
integration. One of the most prominent thinkers was the American scholar Ernst B.
Haas. The term integration is used to describe a large range of different inter¬
relationships between states or within states. In a narrow and ambitious sense
integration is used to describe a tendency towards the fusion of governmental
structures, or the establishment of a new political authority which inhabits the area
of two or more previously separate states. In Haas' view "integration in the EEC
would progress not by the efforts of individual politicians, but through governments,
'adaptive interest groups, bureaucracies, technocrats, and other units with modest but
pragmatic interest' and furthermore by incremental steps". He believed, further, that
"'rational' welfare-oriented administrators" like the Commission were to be
"responsible for leading the new technocratic Europe towards its supranational goal".
He further stressed the need for the setting-up of central bureaucratic institutions
whose task would be to channel conflicting demands into "merging ideological
patterns", which would mean, in fact, "to guide them into supranationality". As one
might understand from this, the early form of neofunctionalism embodied an
acceptance of supranationalism as the goal of integration. These theories went well
in line with the establishment of the ECSC and the High Authority, whose aim
through the Treaty was to be a supranational body.194
According to another influential neofunctionalist thinker of the time, and also
American, Leon N. Lindberg. the European Economic Community was characterised
as a crisis system. As he put it "[T]he European Community is [...] a crisis system
that seems to advance most often as a result of very tense and explosive
situations".This seems to be true at least after the defeat of the EDC and the
194 Groom and Taylor (1975) Functionalism. Theory and Practice in
International Relations, p. 39.
Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) p. 240. In: Groom and Taylor (1975) p. 45.
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EPC, and the rapid development that followed. It does not, however, explain the
ECSC.
Within the neofunctionalist theory, which has also been called a process
theory, it was believed that, as integration proceeded, the consensus characteristic
of the domestic political system would be recreated at the Community level so as to
replace power-politics. It was believed that the sovereign power of the state would
be superseded by the authority of supranational institutions. In the new, emergent
Europe, Elaas believed that a new centre would develop with institutions possessing
or demanding jurisdiction over the pre-existing ones. This view goes along with his
definition of integration as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political
activities towards a new and larger setting." Furthermore, "integration is
conceptualised as resulting from an institutionalised pattern of interest politics played
out within existing international organisations".196 From a neofunctionalist point
of view the emergence of a political community would lead interest groups to
articulate supranational solutions to their problems and to begin to address their
demands to the supranational institutions. Political integration, therefore, would come
about through the interaction of political forces like interest groups, political parties,
governments and international agencies, which would seek to exploit these pressures
in pursuit of their own interests.
In Haas's view, integration would have the greatest success in a regional
setting. As it also was believed by the neofunctionalists that the autonomy of the
nation-state could be questioned already in the post-industrial "new" Europe, it was
further believed that the nation-state would be in "full retreat" in the European
Community. Supranationalism, it was thought, not federation, confederation, of
intergovernmental organisations, seemed to be the appropriate regional counterpart
to the national State which was no longer felt as capable of realizing welfare aims
within its own narrow borders. Supranationalism was also what had been sought, in
196 Taylor (1971) pp. 65-66.
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some ways successfully, with the establishment of the High Authority from the
ECSC. Neofunctionalism, one might say, is the product of functionalist ideas with
experience of the ECSC. It was hoped that the ECSC would remove the States'
material capacity to make war again. It was also expected that the conditions would
speedily be created for the spread of such arrangements to other sectors so that the
actual solidarity would evolve gradually and almost automatically into a supranational
European government.
In the case of the ECSC. the kind of integration that was aimed for, and
largely achieved, was a very specific and partial integration as it was only concerned
with the area of coal and steel production. It was sought to achieve a very high level
of integration, within a small and restricted area, very quickly. The essence of
partial integration was that, although a high level of integration was obtained in some
areas, the scope of integration was rather low. In the case of the ECSC, the
relationship between the integrated and unintegrated sectors gave rise to a number
of problems. The neofunctionalists, however, saw partial integration as a useful
stepping stone to further and wider integration. This, in neofunctionalist terms, was
what was referred to as the concept of "spill-over". The "spill-over" effect was the
way they explained how the ECSC helped bringing out a solution in which it would
be easier later to set up the EEC.
The "spill-over" effect was used as an explanation as to how integration in
one area might, or even most likely would, contribute to further and deeper
integration. It involved first of all functional areas such as financial and commercial
activity. Through the attitudes and expectations of the actors, however, experience
would make further steps easier. As put by Bulmer and Wessels: "The
neofunctionalist theory of integration envisaged the gradual transfer of policy
responsibilities (spill-over) to a level above the nation state, with the dynamic being
provided by non-governmental political elites who would regard political activities
on the European level as being in their own self-interest. These elites (political
parties or interest groups) did not in fact provide the dynamic envisaged and
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remained subordinate to national governmental elites."'1''
The neofunctionalist theory was a further development from the older
functionalist theories. These were concerned with the problems of war, and sought
to use the international institutions to transfer loyalties away from national
governments. It was thought that international organisations would slowly strengthen
a community of co-operation which would then transcend national frontiers and lead
to the decline of national governments. What the neofunctionalists later did was to
reformulate the functionalist ideas and apply them particularly to regional integration
which was the case of Europe. In the 1950s, the neofunctionalist theories seemed
highly successful and triumphed because the theories fitted in with what was
happening and therefore seemed to work.
The High Authority of the ECSC was set up as a supranational body,
independent from the member governments. It was an example of what has been
mentioned above as partial integration and its Treaty had quite a precise statement
of rules as well as a machinery for their application. However, it was never the
intention of the founders of the ECSC that unification and integration among the
European countries, or at least among "the Six", should stop at that level.
Negotiations for the EPC and EDC started almost immediately after the Treaty of
the ECSC had been signed in 1951. However, with France's failure to ratify the
EDC treaty on 30 August 1954, which also stranded the EPC, the ECSC was left as
the sole survivor of the hopes of a European political unity. Nevertheless, despite
the desperate situation that many felt because of this, work for further integration
went on and accelerated with the "relance europeenne", which culminated in 1957
with the signing of the Treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom. As distinct from
the partial integration of the ECSC, the establishment of the EEC was an attempt to
achieve gradual integration over a much larger area. The Treaty of the EEC
amounted to "a general statement of goals with a set of institutions and a procedure
1,7 Bulmer and Wessels (1987) The European Council. Decision-making, note
5. p. 153.
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for their attainment"; a so-called "Traite cadre".198 In other words the Treaty
establishing the EEC was more of a framework treaty that set forth "the basis of
economic unification, leaving much of the content vague, but establishing an
institutional system with the power to define the future order of things".199 The
ECSC Treaty, on the other hand, was more a statement of rules with a set machinery
for their application; a "Traite loi".
The European Commission was set up as a body of executive character.
However, its powers seemed distinctively more limited than that of the High
Authority of the ECSC. This was, on the other hand, an argument that was strongly
disputed by Pierre Uri of the High Authority. He claimed that the European
Commission in fact had more powers than the High Authority, only it did not use
them all.200 Nevertheless, the High Authority had direct, executive responsibilities
whereas the European Commission had to share this responsibility with the Council
of Ministers. As most of the important decisions depended on the Council of
Ministers, the supranational element was therefore lacking from the powers of the
Commission. The word "supranational" does not even occur in the Treaty of Rome,
as it did in the ECSC Treaty. One reason for this might be explained by the lesson
that was learned from the experiences of the ECSC. It became clear that integration
could not possibly proceed against the will of the governments involved. Therefore,
the High Authority was not able to make use of its supranational powers to the extent
that it was meant to, and came to consult the Council much more than envisaged in
the Treaty. The failure of the EDC in August 1954 was probably an even more
important reason, of which the first is dependent. It created a less favourable climate
among the states involved for anything supranational. The powers given to the EEC
institutions were, therefore, not invested in a supranational executive as in the
ECSC, but given to the Community as a whole.
I9S Lindberg (1963) p. 27.
199
Lindberg (1963) p. 27.
200 Interview with Pierre Uri on 9 January 1989. In the Historical Archives of
the European Communities, European University Institute. Florence.
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2.2 From the OEEC to the Messina Conference
It was only under pressure from the United States of America (USA) that a
permanent European body was set up after the Second World War. Marshall Aid was
only meant to be temporary and not to lead to a permanent organisation. To the
European countries it was nevertheless felt convenient as well as adding to their
security to have this organised from America. However, it was in the interest of the
Americans, as well as of the Europeans in the long run, that Europe should organise
the Marshall Aid on its own. As a consequence, the Treaty of the Organisation of
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was signed on 16 April 1948 in Paris.
This was experienced as a rather unexpected and also unwanted responsibility for
some.
The OEEC was a heterogenous organisation of intergovernmental cooperation.
It had 17 members amongst which were NATO members and neutrals, highly
industrialised countries as well as less favoured ones in both economic and political
terms. The organisation had no real decision-making powers of its own but was
based on "[Mjutual agreement of all members".201 The most important original
function of the OEEC was the preparation of the European Recovery Programme.
The OEEC was made up of different quasi-executive boards and a Council with
executive powers in the sense that it could take decisions that were binding on the
Member Governments. However, it had no Parliamentary Assembly. The type of
integration that developed between the European countries as a result of the
establishment of the OEEC was one of coordination which was much looser and
wider than the partial integration that developed from the ECSC. By coordination
was here meant that international institutions were actively engaged in locating those
areas where alignment of structures and policies were desirable. They would exert
influence upon governments to obtain the necessary alignments and they did not
acquire formal powers of their own.
:i" Convention for the OEEC. Article 14.
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The kind of integration the OEEC offered was much too loose and non¬
committal for the "European visionaries" of the time, like Jean Monnet and Walter
Hallstein. It was felt that Europe neither could nor should rely for ever on Marshall
Aid, nor remain dependent on America. It was seen as essential that Europe should
learn to stand on her own feet which required a form of collective effort in which
Germany's contribution could safely be included. However, it also seemed an
illusion to expect this of the OEEC with its 17 separate and sovereign member
States. A European federation was what was believed to be the necessary solution.
By 1955 the OEEC, which some had believed might become the basis of a
European customs union, had become a useful but traditional body for cooperation
between sovereign States. At the same time the Council of Europe, which had been
established as a consequence of the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948, was
considered as virtually powerless and the plan for the establishment of the EDC and
EPC had already been buried. There were also other incidents which greatly effected
the Europeans at this stage. The death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 had diminished the
fear of the USSR, which had helped spur the Europeans towards unity. Another
death in 1954, that of the Italian statesman Alcide De Gasperi,202 who was
considered as Italy's greatest "European", removed one of Europe's foremost
friends. Nevertheless, the Treaties of Rome were signed less than two years later by
the six members of the ECSC.
202 A comparison has been made between De Gasperi and Schuman, and their
origins from disputed border territories, making them less committed to the nation-
state as an organisational framework. De Gasperi (1881-1954) started his political
career by representing the Italian minority of Alto Adige before 1914 in the
Imperial Reichstag in Vienna, which was part of Austro-Hungary. De Gasperi
became an Italian citizen at the age of 38. while Schuman had been 33 years old
when he became a French citizen. Milward (1992) pp. 327-28 and Bond, Smith and
Wallace (1996) p. 30. The effects of such a background was, nevertheless, disputed
by Jean Monnet in the following statement: "If he [Robert Schuman] was able to
act on 9 May 1950. it was because he had never been afraid of responsibility and
had accepted so important a post only in order to build a better world." Admittedly,
to Schuman one might assume that this must have been a more sympathetic
characteristic. Bond. Smith and Wallace (1996) p. 24.
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Although the OEEC had registered certain achievements like liberalisation of
trade and the establishment of the European Payments Union (EPU),203 it had seen
more success with immediate problems than with longer-term questions of investment
and balanced growth. This was in many ways due to two handicaps. One was
Europe's inability to deal with the USA as an equal, which was to a great extent
caused by the second, which was the lack of real unity among the Europeans
themselves. The OEEC was an organisation consisting of too many different and
conflicting interests. It was in many ways the ECSC members against the others, in
particular the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries. The United Kingdom
preferred working through the heterogenous organisation of the OEEC. In her view
the Common Market would be an exclusive group which could lead to the formation
of a discriminatory block, nullifying parts of the OEEC's multilateral work. Despite
fears of "dividing Europe", "the Six" were determined to continue their work for the
creation of a common market. They saw the need for a deeper and wider integration
that could not be achieved by the ECSC alone. It was seen as essential to create
common institutions, independent from national governments, that would be given
more extensive powers over the national economies.
Through the signing of the Treaties of Rome, the member States had given
up the power to act autonomously and unilaterally within a whole spectrum of
specific and general cases by virtue of the authority and role granted to the
institutions. Despite the many similarities between the European Commission and the
High Authority, the formal decision-making powers assigned to the Commission
were distinctly inferior to those set out for the High Authority. In the Treaty of
Rome the superiority of the Council of Ministers over the Commission was clearly
spelled out and the Commission's role was to be largely the technical one of
supervision and preparation. The responsibility of the Commission was to represent
the interests of the Community as a whole with its staff being the nucleus of a
: " It has to be acknowledged that the creation of the European Payments Union
had reduced considerably the quota protections, and the European economy was
restored to a degree and at a speed which was considered as quite remarkable at the
time.
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European civil service. It was to serve as a watchdog over the general functioning
and development of the Common Market as well as ensuring the execution by the
member States of the Treaty and of the acts of its institutions.204
In most international organisations negotiations involving government
representatives "end in a compromise on the basis of a give and take bargain, or in
a lack of compromise ensuring cooperation through inaction".205 To avoid this,
therefore, the Treaty of Rome provided that all major decisions of the Community
were to be based on proposals from the Commission, representing the interests of
the Community as a whole. Also, it had a duty of trying to achieve a compromise
between the divergent positions of the Member States, as well as between these and
the Commission. This is also a task which was performed by the Committee of
Permanent Representatives.
The Commission was established as a body of independent international "civil
servants". Its members were firm advocates of maximum economic and political
integration and of national powers being delegated to the Community institutions. It
also sought to "change the very climate of the discussions by concentrating on the
study of concrete problems rather than on discussions of the theory.[...] (and) to
adapt the external policy of the Community to the new realities of the world
economy, particularly to the changing commercial and financial relations between
Europe and America".206 As the Third General Report of the Commission put it:
"From the very beginning of its existence, circumstances brought the Community
face to face with its international responsibilities, and the earliest difficulties met by
the Common Market came from outside. The first task which had to be accomplished
were to take the sting out of attacks, to grasp the initiative in creating conditions for
co-operation with non-member states in a spirit of mutual confidence, in other words
to practice a dynamic external policy, to establish its liberal character and to make
204 A thorough discussion on the functions of the European Commission will
follow below in Chapter IV of the thesis.
Lindberg (1963) pp. 65-66.
21)0 Lindberg (1963) p. 165.
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its content increasingly clear, and so to make the personality of the Community stand
out against a world setting."207 The Commission was further convinced of the need
for an association with the other OEEC countries; to "associate" these with the
existing Common Market of the Six to leave the Community unaltered. The
Commission was also considered as playing a an important role in relations between
the Community institutions and the member State Governments. Where the Six were
unable to achieve a solution to a problem, the task of elaborating a solution was then
given to the Commission, the only organisation that represented the interests of them
all. The keystone of the Commission's tactics was the effort to engage the
governments in the process of preparation and decision, and to convince them that
the very integrity of the Community was at stake. This was essential in the work of
the Commission as it understood quite clearly that integration could not proceed
against the will of the member States.
The British and the Scandinavians played a role of considerable importance
in the OEEC. Even among the Six there were people who felt a certain melancholy
after the Schuman Declaration in 1950, that the other economies would instead move
towards a free-trade "integration". The tireless and fruitless debates over the setting-
up of a Free Trade Area, which occupied most of the first months of the European
Commission, had the character of a match between the OEEC and the EEC which
worsened the relations between the Commission and London from the start.
3. THE INFLUENCE OF THE SPAAK COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
3.1 Spaak. Beyen and the Benelux proposal
Following the signing of the ECSC Treaty in 1951, negotiations were opened
with a view to creating a European Defence Community (EDC) and a European
Political Community (EPC). These were signed by the Heads of State and
207 EEC - Third General Report. May 1960. p. 10.
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Government of the six member States of the ECSC in Paris on 27 May 1952, during
a period of immense optimism for a unified Europe of the Six. The ratification
process, however, dragged out. By the summer of 1954 the EDC Treaty had been
ratified by all but France, which in the end rejected the EDC Treaty in the Assemble
Nationale on 30 August 1954. Since a European Political Community was closely
linked up with the EDC. and the two treaties had been under negotiation at the same
time, a rejection of one automatically lead to the rejection of the other.208
The failure of the EDC also came to be seen as a failure of the whole concept
of supranationalism. It seemed therefore difficult to continue the integration process
within the framework of the "supranational" High Authority and the ECSC. Among
the six member States of the ECSC there was no great support for the creation of
other supranational institutions than those which already existed. This was especially
true for France where these feelings were particularly strong. In the opinion of Dirk
Spierenburg, former Vice-President of the High Authority, the failure of the EDC
meant the end to a political, as well as a supranational Europe. However, as he put
it, "[A]s far as I am concerned, I never liked the word supranational because it
would mean something above the governments. I have always preferred the word
community to mean institutions; a Commission and a Council of Ministers, working
together in making decisions."209 The two communities established by the Treaties
of Rome, the EEC and Euratom, were each granted an executive body, both with the
208 The European Political Community was a result of the insertion of Article
38 of the EDC Treaty which foreshadowed the establishment of a long-term
political structure which would govern the supranational elements of the new
Europe. Article 38. 2nd paragraph says: "The final organisation which will replace
the present provisional organisation should be so conceived as to be able to
constitute one of the elements in a subsequent federal or confederal structure, based
on the principle of the separation of powers and having, in particular, a two-
chamber system of representation." As the contemplated EPC was so closely tied
to the EDC. it was generally assumed that a failure of the latter would
automatically lead to the dissolution of EPC.
209 The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome, p. 163. Dirk
Spierenburg and Jean Monnet had often conflicting view on the European
integration process and how it should be dealt with. As Monnet put it in his
Memoires, Spierenburg was the "living incarnation of Dutch stubbornness". Monnet
(1978) p. 324.
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name "Commission". In both cases they had to share their initiating and decision¬
making powers with the Council of Ministers to a much greater extent than the High
Authority had according to the Treaty of Paris.
Although the prospects of continued European integration seemed grim during
the autumn of 1954. the "relance europeenne" was to occur soon after. All the six
member States of the ECSC were in favour of continued integration in one form or
another. In retrospect it was probably too big a step to take going from a Community
of coal and steel to the much more ambitious Political and Defence Communities.
Nevertheless, as a proof of the present will, it took less than a year from the
rejection of the EDC to the Messina Conference where the Six agreed to make an
effort for further European construction. Although the principle of supranationality
and common defence had failed, it was nonetheless an agreement concerning the
other principles of the EDC Treaty: the principle of non-discrimination among
member States, and integration.210
The failure of integration in the fields of defence and common policies meant
that the weight had shifted over to economic integration, a situation which seemed
particularly suitable to the Netherlands and Belgium.211 Defence has always been
a sector of the profoundest of policies, touching on the foreign policy as well as the
sovereignty itself of a state, much more than the economic policy dealing with
production and circulation of goods.
Although this period was. and has been, characterised as a situation which
caused the simmering crisis in the movement for European unification to boil over,
it was also a period of which the process was carried further than ever before.
210 According to Andre de Smet the EDC Treaty was based on four fundamental
principles: supranationalism. defence, non-discrimination, and integration, de Smet
(1966) p. 25.
211 Belgium and. in particular, the Netherlands, were all along during the EDC
negotiations sceptical to the idea of a defence community without the participation
of Great Britain, as well as to the way it all seemed to indicate that the integration
process was becoming far too political for their liking.
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Leading politicians in western Europe, such as Konrad Adenauer. Walter Hallstein,
Paul-Henri Spaak, Jan Willem Beyen and Jean Monnet, were convinced that time
was against them, as well as the European idea, if they did not succeed without delay
in giving unification a new impulse.
The principle of supranationality was considered as important not only to
expand the autonomy of the Community, but also as a means of controlling the
military autonomy of Germany, by incorporating her into the European defence
system without giving her the right to her own national army. Nevertheless, the
French Prime Minister at the time. Pierre Mendes-France, failed to get the EDC
Treaty ratified by the Assemblee Nationale to a great extent by refusing all talk on
German rearmament. It was a subject full of passion and old ideas, which had no
parliamentary majority in the Assemblee Nationale, and which was why there were
delays in bringing it to a vote. According to Gaston Palewski, the adviser to the
French government on European policies during the ratification of the ECSC Treaty,
the ratification of the EDC Treaty and German rearmament was "le probleme le plus
grave qu'une Assemblee franqais ait eu a resoudre depuis 1936".212 A refusal of
the EDC, however, opened the way for a German national army, instead of
controlling this within the framework of a Defence Community.213 It has been
claimed by supporters of the EDC Treaty that this could have been ratified had the
Mendes-France Government made the ratification a cabinet question.214 Of the
same opinion was Rene Pleven, who thought it was clear that if the Mendes-France
Government had committed itself to the question, the Treaty would have been
l_
Bjol (1966) p. 19. 1936 was the year of the electoral victory of the Front
Populaire. when they formed a government for the first time, together with the
Radicals and the SFIO (Section Franqaise de I Internationale Ouvriere).
:L> Robert Rothschild. Une Certain Idee de I'Europe. In: Studia Diplomatica
(1981) p. 62. Robert Rothschild was Spaak's "directeur de cabinet" at the time of
the "relance europeenne".
'14
Bjol (1966) La France devant I Europe, p. 425. "Pour moi, il n'y a aucun
doute que s'il (le gouvernement Mendes-France) s'etait engage le traite aurait ete
ratifie."
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ratified.216 Others claimed that since a number of parliamentary deputies had taken
a position against the Treaty by the spring of 1954. it would not have been ratified
in any case.
In the Assemblee Nationale on 30 August 1954 it was not the Treaty itself
that was put up for a vote. What was voted on was a Gaullist motion to remove the
Treaty altogether from the agenda. This refusal to consider the Treaty was supported
by 319 votes against 264 with 43 abstentions, some of whom included members of
the Mendes-France Government itself. However, the question of whether the EDC
Treaty would have been ratified in the case of making its ratification a question of
confidence is a highly hypothetical one which is not going to be speculated upon
here.216 It should only be mentioned briefly that a question of confidence was used
to secure the ratification of the Paris Agreements in December 1954, which was to
save the Atlantic Pact and a German rearmament within this organisation.217 The
fall of the Mendes-France Government made planning for the future of Europe
somewhat easier, but even with the new government under Edgar Faure, the creation
of new supranational institutions had become an impossibility.218
217 Bjol (1966) p. 29. Rene Pleven was Prime Minister of France 1950-52 and
Minister of Defence 1952-54.
216 To Mendes-France himself it was clear already in advance that the EDC
Treaty would be turned down by the Parliament. Nevertheless, to people in Brussels
it came as a shock, and the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer firmly believed
in its ratification.
217 On 29 December 1954. when the Paris Agreements were put forward as a
question of confidence, the Government obtained 287 votes against 256. In
comparison, in the vote on 23 December, when the question of confidence was not
put. the government had 259 votes against 280. Bjol (1966) p. 29.
"1 s This Mendes-France Government lasted from 18 June 1954 with Pierre
Mendes-France as Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister, and Edgar Faure as
Minister of Finance. After the failure of the EDC Treaty there were several Cabinet
reshuffles and in February 1955. Christian Pineau made an attempt on forming a
new government, which did not succeed. On 20 February 1955 Edgar Faure formed
his government with Antoine Pinay as Foreign Minister and Robert Schuman as
Minister of Justice, both of whom were favourable towards European integration.
In this government there was as well only one Gaullist member, whereas Mendes-
France had between three and five in each of his governments.
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At the time when the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven proposed the
creation of a European army.219 on 24 October 1950, the Netherlands and Belgium
were hesitant to such plans. On the one hand, they would rather see a Germany
within NATO. On the other hand, it was believed that the creation of a European
army would need political organs, which again would involve the creation of a
complete federal state. The Netherlands was very concerned about keeping the
Atlantic alliance in NATO. Further, the attitude of the United States and the fact that
United Kingdom would not be a part of the new European army were of great
concern at that time.
It was also feared that the EDC plans would in the future be expanded into
the political field far beyond the original concept. This fear was caused by several
public statements the French Foreign Minister Schuman had made about the creation
of a European political association. The French proposal for the creation of a
political community seemed to become more and more radical, and it was not
believed that the French parliament would ever approve the radical pro-integration
policy of its own government.
In 1952 the Belgians and the Dutch were a lot more favourable to an
economic integration among the European countries. In September of that year the
Dutch Prime Minister Beyen brought forward his first proposal for closer economic
cooperation between the continental countries of Western Europe. This cooperation
was. however, sought to be realized within the framework of the European Political
Community. Beyen was again convinced that the realisation of the EDC would pave
the way for a closer economic cooperation in Western Europe, but was completely
against advanced political integration in Europe.
With the failure of the EDC as well as the EPC in August 1954, the situation
thereby changed in favour of the views held by the Netherlands and Belgium since
1950. With France no longer in the natural leading position, it seemed a good time
219 From the end of July 1951 the term European Defence Community replaced
that of "European Army".
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for the Benelux countries to start influencing the European integration process more
strongly. As observed by the Belgian civil servant Comte Snoy et d'Oppuers:
"Jamais les trois administrations et les trois gouvernements de
Benelux n'ont atteint ce coefficient d 'unite dans la gestion de la
politique internationale qu'ils avaient atteint avec Beyen, Spaak et
Bech. "22°
Paul-Henri Spaak was a socialist and a Minister of Foreign Affairs in
Belgium, a small country of no military importance. Nevertheless, he acquired a
prestige almost equal to that of his colleagues Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer.
Like them, he had allied the talent and skill with a warm conviction and he was
made a champion of an old cause supported by the great majority of the population:
the "relance europeenne". He had previously been the President of the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe, from which he resigned in 1951 to the great
disillusionment of the federalists within this body. His ideas were received with
scepticism in Paris, Bonn and Rome where they were considered premature. On the
other hand, they were applauded by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Joseph Bech, of Luxembourg, and in the Netherlands by the Foreign
Minister Jan Willem Beyen. The latter even thought the ideas insufficient as it
carried no prospects of the creation of any real economic solidarity as he desired,
progressing sector by sector.
Paul-Henri Spaak initially wanted the relaunch of European integration to be
created within the ECSC, and to be limited to start with. The Belgians did not want
any pressure put on France, and therefore proceeded with caution. The Dutch
Foreign Minister Beyen, on the other hand, defended his ideas of a broader
integration. As he stated in a memorandum to Spaak of 4 April 1955: "such an
initiative ought to have as its objective to create a supranational community with the
~2" Enrico Serra (1989) The Relaunching of Europe and the Treaties of Rome,
p. 77. "Never before had the three administrations and the three Benelux
Governments reached such a unity within international politics as they did under
Beyen. Spaak and Bech." Own translation.
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task of achieving economic integration in Europe in a general sense, using a customs
union to the achievement of an economic union."221
The Dutch wanted to see the creation of a political community administered
by a supranational institution with powers for the gradual development of a joint
economic policy. In contrast to Beyen, Sicco Mansholt. the Dutch Minister of
Agriculture, believed that political unity should be the basis and starting point of a
development towards economic integration. As much as the Belgians wanted no
pressure put on France, the Dutch felt that as she had ratified the Paris Agreements,
times were more favourable and it was unlikely that France would say no a second
time.
Spaak was, like Monnet. in favour of a sectoral integration on the basis of the
ECSC. to be supplemented by an atomic authority. In the above mentioned
memorandum of 4 April 1955 Beyen wrote to Spaak telling how "... ['integration
par secteur ne contribue pas a renforcer le sentiment de solidarite et d'unite de
I 'Europe dans la meme mesure que I 'integration economique generate. [...] il est
essentiel que la notion d'une responsabilite commune des Etats europeens pour le
bien commun soit incorporee dans une organisation propre a suivre les interets
generaux et dont I'organe executif est responsable, non pas devant les gouvernments
nationaux mais devant un parlement supranational. "222
Spaak had his doubts about whether France would accept such a far reaching
~_1
Spaak (1969) Combats Inacheves. De l espoir aux deceptions, p. 65. Own
translation. "Une telle initiative aurait pour objet de creer une communaute
supranationale ayant pour tdche de realiser Vintegration economique de I'Europe
au sens general, en passant, par la voie d une union douaniere. a la realisation
dune union economique."
22- Enrico Serra (1989) p. 77. "Integration by sector would not contribute to the
reinforcement of the solidarity and unity of Europe to the same extent as a general
economic integration. [...] it is essential with a feeling of common responsibility
among the European States for the common good to be incorporated into a proper
organisation to continue the general interest, and where the executive body is not
only responsible towards the national governments, but towards a supranational
parliament." Own translation.
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proposal as a common market and feared "I'echec" which had happened after the
EDC. However, he agreed, together with the President of the Council and Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Joseph Bech, to go along with the Beyen
proposal, and in case of failure put forward a more modest proposal based on the
ECSC. Unification in the economic field was also considered easier than political
integration. On the one hand, economic progress had already been made in the
ECSC, and, on the other hand, economic questions caused less controversy in public
debate than the political problems of integration.
With the initiatives that came forth from the Benelux countries, in particular
from Beyen and Spaak, the smaller countries showed themselves to be brave in a
way which was going to be greatly welcomed by "the big". They had also already
experience with the Benelux customs union which was set up in 1948. As a
consequence, and while defending their own interests, they could serve as
intermediaries between the parties involved in searching for a compromise. Beyen
set up a plan against further sectoral integration which could be either within or
without the ECSC. He further rejected "the general opinion that horizontal economic
cooperation in Europe would only be possible on an intergovernmental basis and
cooperation on a supranational basis would only be possible for specific sectors,
related to those administered by the ECSC".223
The Belgian and Dutch delegations showed a pragmatic attitude during the
negotiations, placing more importance on the role of the future institutions than on
the "regies preetablies". The Belgians took advantage of the presidency to the
fullest, not only to satisfy their national interests, but also to contribute to the
success on the whole. The joint Benelux approach, drawn up by Dutch and Belgian
civil servants for the Messina Conference in June 1955, argued that "[A] unified
Europe could be created by means of developing common institutions, the
progressive fusion of the national economies, the establishment of a great common
Enrico Serra (ed) (1989) pp. 143-144.
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market and the progressive harmonisation of social policies".224
3.2 France
After the rejection of the EDC Treaty it became impossible for France to take
any leading role in the relaunch of Europe. The integration process had seemed to
be set back because of her, and the French Government of Pierre Mendes-France
was weak both within France as well as abroad. Even Jean Monnet, although himself
very much present on the scene, turned to Spaak and the Benelux governments.
On the very same evening of the French rejection of the EDC, Monnet started
his weeks of consultations with others from the member countries of the ECSC;
Antoine Pinay, Rene Pleven, Robert Schuman, Maurice Faure,225 Guy Mollet,226
Christian Pineau, Pierre Mendes-France. Paul-Henri Spaak. Jean Rey, Joseph Bech,
Guiseppe Pella, Ludwig Erhard, Walter Hallstein and Konrad Adenauer were his
principal contacts. The Frenchman Pierre Uri, an advisor to Jean Monnet in the High
Authority, was one of the co-authors of the Spaak Report and had in fact been
recommended to Spaak by Monnet himself. Uri was a partisan of a European
political union, and according to Spaak, he must be considered as one of the
principal architects of the Treaties of Rome.227
As has been mentioned above, Monnet was in favour of extending the
integration process started by the ECSC into other areas. It was a Community that
already existed and was well established, and its competencies could be extended to
include competition, gas, electricity and atomic energy. To Monnet it seemed wiser
not to depart from a model that had proved its worth and had become an accepted
224 Enrico Serra (ed) (1989) p. 151.
227 Minister of State at the French Foreign Office.
226 Secretary of the SFIO (Section Frangaise de 1"Internationale Ouvriere).
Pierre Uri had been with Jean Monnet in the Planning Commissariat since
the late-1940s and was one of Monnet's principal advisers in drafting the Schuman
Plan as well as in the High Authority.
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feature among its member States. He therefore saw the next step as extending the
activities of the High Authority to include the above mentioned areas. The sector of
atomic energy, however, would require to be dealt with in a separate
community.228
After the defeat of the Mendes-France Government in January 1955, which
brought the Socialists to power under the leadership of Edgar Faure and Antoine
Pinay as Foreign Minister, a more open-minded approach to European policy was
expected of France.229 However, a gradual change of opinion did not begin to
appear until the spring of 1956. This process was initiated to begin with by a few
European-minded officials close to Prime Minister Guy Mollet who was convinced
of a long-term benefit to France from participation in the Common Market.230
The French were the only ones really to be in favour of a sacred sovereignty.
However, the dialectic of Spaak convinced his French colleagues to accept a limited
system balanced by the majority vote, although surrounded by many precautions and
long transition periods. For those in favour of a federal Europe, it was nevertheless
a defeat. Moreover, it was also clear that the defenders of sovereignty would not
accept giving up any further sovereignty. In France there was opposition to European
integration within the administration as well as the army. The administration was
apparently against giving sovereignty to supranational bodies in connection to the
ECSC and the later EEC. The army was opposed to the EDC as well as
Euratom.231
228 Monnet (1978) p. 401.
:y' The Edgar Faure Government was instituted on 23 February 1955. On 29
November the same year it lost a vote of confidence in the Assemblee Nationale.
General elections were held on 2 January 1956 and the Guy Mollet Government
was instituted a month later, on 1 February.
2,0 Guy Mollet became Prime Minister in January 1956. with Mendes-France
as Minister of State. Pineau as Foreign Minister and Maurice Faure as Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.
2jl Bjol (1966) p. 443.
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Monnet. together with his staff, had worked out a plan that envisaged
extending unification in the field of atomic energy and placing it under the High
Authority. "Monnet was considered as the 'last Community bastion' in Europe after
the failure of the EDC. It was not only a question of defending the option of
supranationality in relation to the option of intergovernmental cooperation. We
simply were of the opinion that it was only within a Community framework that
Germany could become integrated in Europe, and that Europe could play the political
role it ought to in the world."232
The deliberations of the Belgian, Dutch and also the German Governments
were quite different. Here the debate concentrated on progress towards unification
in the economic field. Spaak succeeded in the course of extensive talks with Monnet
and Beyen in bringing their diametrically opposed ideas, Euratom and a Customs
Union, together in a single memorandum. The national economies were gradually
to be merged with one another and common institutions with powers of decision
established.
The institutional questions were particularly delicate to France because of the
"querelle" over supranationality. It gave instructions to its experts to do "ce qu'il
fallait faire", without worrying about the powers or structures of the institutions.
They were asked to regulate the elaboration of the institutional system in a way that
would bring real powers to common institutions without being dictated by ideological
or political considerations. The French were in favour of a Common Market without
supranational institutions, which was considered better than no agreement at all.
Conversations between Monnet, Dr. Ophiils233 and Pierre Uri in 1955 show
that the Germans could be interested in Euratom if at the same time an economic
community also would be set up. Pierre Uri is said to be the brain behind the idea
of connecting the two proposals together with the ideas of Spaak and Beyen, which
2"2 Max Kohnstamm on Monnet. In: Enrico Serra (1989) p. 175.
2j" German diplomat and head of the western European section of the Foreign
Office.
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eventually led to the Messina Communique.234
3.3 Germany
In Germany strong forces were arguing in favour of continuing the European
integration process. The concept of partial integration was considered difficult to
defend theoretically and even more difficult to realize politically. Consequently, in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was highly influenced by the Chancellor and
Foreign Minister Konrad Adenauer, there was no doubt that the best form of
integration was one as complete as possible, which also included the institutional
dimension. At the opening session of the Spaak Committee, Walter Hallstein made
it clear that what Germany wanted was the outcome of the negotiations to be another
set of supranational institutions, despite the fact that the Spaak Report recommended
the Council of Ministers to be the main decision-making body. The Germans
emphasised the functional and institutional dimension of integration and believed that
the institutional rules of the ECSC ought to be applied to any new and further
approach. Nevertheless, it was pointed out that the approach was not first to create
the institutions, but rather to let the institutions develop accordingly. In other words,
an integration in stages.235
In the Schuman Plan Department of the German Ministry of Economic
Affairs, deliberations were taking place under the direction of Hans von der Groeben
for a customs union.236 A memorandum put forward at the Messina Conference
234 Bjol (1966) p. 431.
" In the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Erhard was sceptical towards proposals
for any European economic integration which he considered potentially dangerous
for trade liberalisation on a world wide scale, which he further felt would lead to
regional protection and state dirigism. He supported rather the idea of the setting
up of a European Free Trade Area which would also include the United Kingdom.
(See Chapter V)
2l" Hans von der Groeben was in 1952 appointed Director in the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, dealing with European affairs and the ECSC in particular. He
later became a member of the first European Commission in 1958. Bjol (1966) p.
179.
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proposed the removal of all barriers to trade within the areas covered by the ECSC.
To Brussels and The Hague signals were sent indicating that the German
Government would not support proposals for a new supranational cooperation. This
was also based on the widespread opinion that since France was the potential
stumbling block for new integration efforts, the German Government would not
accept any proposals to go beyond what the French Government could accept.237
In fact, the French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay, himself a pro "European", was
restricted by his government which was in favour of an effort of sector integration
in the fields of energy and transport.
Walter Hallstein. the German Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign
Ministry, showed himself to be more in favour of the Common Market approach.
However, regarding the institutional issue, the German government would not go
further than the setting-up of a consultative body. It was stated in the minutes of the
meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Messina that "le Gouvernemenr
federal est d'avis qu'ilfaut eviter de creer de nouvelles institutions Europeens ",238
Chancellor Adenauer, although favourable to economic integration, believed the first
task would be a political union. He feared that to concentrate on economic tasks
would prevent the achievement of this. Nevertheless, he did understand that an
economic community could create solid links between the member States of the
ECSC, and in particular between France and Germany. As recorded by Hans von
der Groeben. Adenauer saw the coming EEC Treaty not as "a gospel of truth, not
an objective in itself, but an instrument for the furtherance of economic and political
union in Europe". He further believed that a "Franco-German reconciliation,
understanding and cooperation were not only prerequisites for European unification
~'7 Enrico Serra (1989) p. 153.
~,s"Projet de proces-verbal de la reunion des Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres
des Etats membres de la C.E.C.A.. Messine ler et 2 juin 1955". Luxembourg
13.6.1955. In: Enrico Serra (1989) p. 155. "The Federal Government is of the
opinion that the creation of new European institutions ought to be avoided." Own
translation.
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but also of intrinsic value".239
After the experience of the EDC it hardly seemed likely that France's
government under the leadership of Edgar Faure would be prepared to make its
restrictive attitude towards European integration more flexible. Only politicians of
the Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) and the Foreign Minister, Antoine
Pinay (Independent Republican), showed an interest in a new European initiative. In
order to get France to the negotiating table it was necessary to include Monnet's
Euratom project in the discussions. Germany, on the other hand would not accept
this unless it were to be developed within the same framework as a general common
market.
3.4 The Messina Conference
On 1 June 1955, less than a year after the defeat of the EDC, the Foreign
Ministers of the Six met in Messina to "charge an intergovernmental conference or
conferences to work out, with the appropriate aid of the Community's institutions,
the necessary draft treaties for the achievement of the next steps in European
integration, of which the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community
was the beginning".240 At the Messina Conference Spaak and Beyen were pleading
for partial integration in the realms of atomic energy and a customs union,241 while
the German side, led by Walter Hallstein, sought comprehensive economic
integration. In the beginning Pinay rejected all the propositions but then let his own
Government's interests in a common programme of nuclear research become evident.
He refused, however, to transfer responsibility in this field to the High Authority.
The result of the Messina Conference of June 1955 was the setting-up of an
2"9
von der Groeben (1985) The European Community. The Formative Years,
p. 39.
2411 Mavne (1970) The Recovery ofEurope - from devastation to unity, p. 287.
41
According to Spaak it was "more desirous to obtain concrete results than to
defend a theory". Ibidem.
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Intergovernmental Committee of delegations from the foreign ministries of the six
countries from which a Resolution was adopted reading: "The Governments believe
that the time has come to make a fresh advance towards the building of Europe.
They are of the opinion that this must be achieved first of all in the economic field."
It further stressed the need "to work for the establishment of a united Europe by the
development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of national economies,
the creation of a common market and the progressive harmonisation of their social
policies".242
Talks and negotiations in the committee resulted in the issuing of the Spaak
Report on 21 April 1956. The Committee was assisted in its work by the High
Authority of the ECSC, with the United Kingdom being invited to take part. The
report offered a concrete plan of action towards the realising of a community of the
atomic industries and a common market. Although it did not offer any concrete steps
in the direction of a political union it was not excluded as a possibility for the future:
"While waiting for a more confined unit of monetary, budgetary and social policies,
it is necessary to distinguish between the questions of general economic policies
which belongs to the domain of the governments, and problems which are linked to
the functioning of the common market."243
The Intergovernmental Committee met in November 1955 under the
leadership of Spaak. His personality, together with his initiatives and the fact that he
was a leading political figure had made him the obvious choice of leader. However,
other personalities like Hans von der Groeben and Pierre Uri played a leading part
in working out an overall plan. It was this which was accepted as the basis for treaty
negotiations at the conference of foreign ministers in Venice in May 1956. What had
242 Mayne (1970) p. 236.
24j Report by the Heads of Delegations at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
Brussels 21 April 1956. p. 24. "en attendant une unite plus etroite des politiques
monetaires. budgetaires et sociales, il est necesaire de distinguer entre les questions
de politique economique generate qui demeurent le domaine reserve des
gouvernements. et les prohlemes qui sont lies au fonctionnement meme du marche
commun."
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originally been intended as a technical report became a political plan of action which
for the governments was no longer completely without obligations but nevertheless
permitted them at any time to distance themselves from any unacceptable proposal.
A unified Europe could be created by means of developing common
institutions, the progressive fusion of the national economies, the establishment of
a great common market and the progressive harmonisation of social policies. The
Belgian administration prepared a practical proposal for sectoral integration in the
fields of transport, "traditional" energy, and atomic energy. The Dutch
administration on the other hand came up with a proposal for the establishment of
an economic community based on a common market. The Memorandum issued by
the Benelux countries was careful in its wording. It did not mention the word
"supranational", nor the concept of a "High Authority", so as not to awaken any
anti-supranational sentiments in France or any other country.244 The Declaration
made by the Messina Conference, although heavily based on the Benelux
memorandum, showed also a suppression of its institutional suggestions. Where the
Benelux had proposed a "common authority", the Declaration stated the intention to
"study" the creation of a "common organisation".
The experience of the ECSC showed that the process of partial integration
had already reached the limits of its possibilities within only a few years and could
therefore not provide a new impetus for the aim of overall integration. As far as the
institutional form of the new economic organisation was concerned, the ECSC Treaty
served nevertheless as a model. It was, however, significant not so much that the
basic institutions were retained but rather more that, barely two years after the
failure of the supranational EDC and in the face of continued opposition in national
government circles, the proposition that a federal institution be built into the
decision-making structure of the new Community was accepted in principle by the
244 The use of the word "supranational", which had first been used in the ECSC
Treaty of 1951. ended with the EDC Treaty where it was used in Articles 1 and 20,
and made explicit in Article 80. Because of the opposition among the member
States the word was taken out in later community treaties.
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governments of the Six.
France was not prepared to grant powers of control to the Community in
policy areas such as economic and monetary policy issues. Its financial situation at
the time was not good and the French negotiators of the Treaty of Rome, therefore,
had to insist on the insertion of a series of clauses which would have made it
possible for France to enjoy in practice all the benefits of the Common Market,
without assuming its most important obligations.245 In Germany there was a fear
of a too highly planned system that would stand in the way of the principles of
market economy. In this way significant areas of policy in the field of economic
integration remained in the hands of the member States. The nature of the institutions
to be created and the description of the principles that were to guide them were
determined by political compromise and by functional decisions which were needed
to put the Treaty into practice. The dual system of a Council and a Commission
arose on the one hand because the sovereign member States wanted to retain the
ultimate powers of decision and legislation and, on the other hand, because of the
necessity for an independent organ, representing the will of the Community, to
ensure the application of the Treaty provisions at the supranational level. To this end
an institutional system was set up with the aim of doing justice to both the
intergovernmental and the supranational concepts. The material and institutional
provisions of the EEC Treaty were a mirror image of the powers which it had been
possible, with the agreement of their respective parliaments, to take from the
national governments in the course of the negotiations and transfer directly or in
stages to the Community institutions.
The Spaak Report suggested the creation of an independent institution with
a common responsibility, which could act by a simple majority of its members. This
institution was to be called the "European Commission". Depending on the
24> The other countries had changed their minds about being prepared to let
France maintain important restrictions for as long as its balance of payment
remained in deficit. However, these clauses never had to be invoked as the financial
and monetary reforms carried out throughout 1958 made it possible to assume the
full obligations from the beginning.
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circumstances, it would have powers of investigation, of initiating proposals to the
Council of Ministers, and to administer readaptation and investment funds. In
addition, the European Commission would be in charge of administering the Treaty
and watching over the functioning and development of the Common Market. It was
further suggested, according to democratic principles, that it should be responsible
to a parliament, where the Common Assembly of the ECSC could fulfil such a task
if it were suitably enlarged. As it was written in the Spaak Report:
"
line Commission europeenne, dont le president et les membres
seraient nommes en commun par les gouvernements, et qui pourrait
ainsi agir a la majorite simple, sera chargee d'administrer le traite et
de veiller au fonctionnement et an developpement du marche commun.
Elle aura [...] des pouvoirs de decision - un role d'instruction dans les
affaires appelees a etre soumises a une procedure juridictionnelle - la
charge de propositions a soumettre au Conseil - une fonction de
gestion pour la readaptation ou pour I 'examen de projets
d'investissements, qui feraient appel a un finaneement commun. "24b
The setting-up of the suggested common market would mean a free movement
of goods, services, workers and capital between all member States. However, this
would also only mean a partial economic integration as this common market would
not involve interference with national budgetary, financial or social policies, nor the
establishment of a single monetary system. Although there was pressure for
continuing the European integration process started by the ECSC, there was a serious
setback after the rejection of the EDC, which meant that the government in France
in particular would not at that time commit itself to further supranational moves.
Comite Intergouvernemental cree par la Conference de Messine. Raport des
Chefs de Delegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres. Bruxelles. 21 avril
1956. p. 25. "A European Commission, where the president and the members will
be nominated in common by the governments, and who may act on a simple
majority, will be in charge of administrating the Treaty and to watch over the
functioning and development of the common market. It will have, according to the
situation. - a decision-making power - an instructing role in affairs called to be
subject to a judicial procedure - the responsibility of sending proposals to the
Council - a management function for the readaptation and examination of
investment projects, which would appeal to a common financing." Own translation.
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Instead of working out several proposals that would he negotiated later, the
Spaak Report presented only one plan which the political actors had to either accept
or reject as it was. It was accepted more or less unchanged. The "Messina
Resolution" tried to do justice to all the standards of integration but it could not
eliminate the real differences of opinion and interest regarding further steps towards
integration. The Messina Conference put European integration back on the
negotiating table. It was decided that new talks would be on economic integration,
and a certain method for these talks was agreed on.
The distribution of power between nations, which was to be represented in
the Council of Ministers, and the supranational power represented by the
Commission, tended much more in favour of the nation-states compared to what
Hallstein had indicated as desirable to Germany. Neither was it of much satisfaction
to German civil servants like Ophtils or von der Groeben who had fought for a
common market. However, with the French objections to a greater degree of
supranational powers, it would have been impossible to go any further at that time.
4. THE ORGANISATION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
4.1 Formal powers of the European Commission
There were two fundamental principles concerning the "gradualist" approach
to integration. One was that the sovereignty of the nation-states would not be
destroyed totally. Central organisations of some kind would instead be developed as
the need arose. The second was that any new structures emerging would be based
on democratic principles. "The Community Method", therefore, relied to a great
extent on the existence of central, "supranational" institutions, independent of the
national governments. As the integration process proceeded these would take over
more and more of the decisions. These institutions were also thought to have
wide-ranging effects on political behaviour, and would therefore provide an impetus
for a growing political union.
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The Treaty establishing the EEC envisaged eventual integration of the whole
economic sector. However, most of the major decisions were not taken by the Treaty
but fixed for later dates, which is why the EEC Treaty is often referred to as a
"Traite cadre", or framework treaty. The Commission of the EEC had fewer
executive powers of decision than the High Authority of the ECSC, and the role of
the representatives of the member governments in the Council of Ministers was
greatly expanded. One reason for this was that the High Authority had tended to seek
agreement from the member governments before taking any major decisions. The
member governments were not ready to give up too much power to a supranational
Community body which they would have little control over.
Because of the fate of the EDC and the EPC, the initiatives which led to the
Treaty of Rome were far more cautious than earlier approaches, particularly in what
concerned the ECSC. The Treaty of Rome was also rather vague about the ultimate
prospects of political union. This was left entirely to the initiative of the Community
institutions and the member States. The main power of decision in the EEC was to
be shared between the independent Commission and the Council of Ministers
representing the member governments, although the main decision-making body was
to be the Council. The Commission, on the other hand, was to act as an independent
spokesman of the common interests with an important right of initiative. Its task
would be to bring about compromises between the representatives of the member
States, while ensuring that the solutions reached would be in the best interest of the
whole Community. This task was often to be in conflict with the other main
institutional goal facing the representatives of the Commission, namely the task of
defending, or promoting the interests of the Community as a whole. To perform its
tasks, the Commission would have to be both "European", or partisan, and
independent, to perform the function of the impartial mediator among the various
national positions.
The scope of integration envisaged in the Treaty of Rome was different from
the Treaty of the ECSC as it involved the whole economic sector as well as
important elements of social policy. The Treaty created an evolving political system
124
with a constitution, the Treaty of Rome, a set of political institutions, and a number
of voluntary political groups and associations. The Treaty set out the objectives of
the Community, it laid down the essential organisation and structure of the
institutions, and determined the relations between them. Further, it vested the
institutions with the power to make Community laws and it provided means by which
these laws could be enforced.
By the people who drafted the Treaty of Rome the Community was
considered as basically political. The Customs Union was never looked at as an end
in itself, but as a step towards a political federation, or at least a political
"constellation" of powers, which would behave as a unit in its relations with the rest
of the world. According to Robert Marjolin, the only convincing argument in favour
of a united Europe had always been the political argument. "A united, or more
united, Europe might be able to make a more effective contribution to the solution
of the most important current world problems than can the European countries acting
separately. [...] Only through unity can Europe regain its proper place in the world
and exercise the influence that is both its right and its duty."247
The immediate objective of the Treaty of Rome, however, was the creation
of a customs union by the removal of all restrictions to trade between the six
countries, and the creation of an economic union by the establishment of common
policies.248 According to Article 103 of the Treaty, the Commission had an
important part to play in this matter in that "[Mjember States shall consider their
short-term economic policy as a matter of common interest. They should consult
with each other and with the Commission on measures to be taken in response to
~4; Robert Marjolin. The Unification ofEurope. Economic and other problems.
The University of Edinburgh. Encyclopedia Britannica Lecture, 1 May 1969.
248 Article 2, Treaty of Rome: "It shall be the task of the Community, by
establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic
policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between its Member States."
current circumstances." Hence, a development of some kind of economic union was
implied in the Treaty, but not explained. The progress would depend on the initiative
and will-power of the Community institutions and the national governments.
Nevertheless, there had been a certain lack of political unity which proved a restraint
to joint action between the Six.
For the EEC to be more than just an industrial customs union it was clear that
it had to become more dynamic. The creation of the common market, therefore, was
expected to be the kind of dynamic necessary for further integration. Nevertheless,
these supposedly dynamic elements did not seem to be effective without any
measures of political initiative. This was, in many ways, the dilemma of the
Commission who, in its early years, tried to establish its role as initiator of policies
but lacked the power of making decisions on its own on all the most important
questions. According to Article 157 of the Treaty of Rome, the members of the
Commission should carry out their functions in "complete independence" and "in the
general interest of the Community". This meant that the members of the Commission
could neither request, nor accept instructions from any member government or other
body, and the member states must not seek to influence the Commissioners in
carrying out their functions. The Commission must be impartial politically as well
as indifferent to nationality. Further, in its role as "European", the Commission must
be both partisan and protagonistic. Therefore, the Commission must be characterised
as being more than a civil service or secretariat, and as having executive-type
functions such as taking initiatives, laying down rules, and generally interpreting and
furthering the common interest.
In the opinion of David Coombes, the formal powers of the Commission
could be classified into five groups.24" The first, and most important one, was to
initiate Community legislation. Secondly, it had the role of implementing Community
legislation. This meant that the Commission is what has been called the "guardian
of the Treaty". It can also make certain delegated legislation, meaning that it has the
~4" Coombes (1970) pp. 81-82. A more extensive discussion of the functions
and role of the Commission will come in Chapter III.
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power to act alone and on its own initiative in certain situations. Thirdly, the
Commission was a "technical and advisory body" as well as, fourthly, acting as the
diplomatic representative of the Community in relations with third countries. In the
execution of this role, it played an important part in the Kennedy Round of the
GATT negotiations, which will be discussed below. Lastly, the Commission was the
so-called "conscience of the Community". It had a general responsibility of "filling
out" the provisions of the Treaty, of reminding other parts of the Community of its
fundamental objectives, and of suggesting new paths for the Community to follow.
As the "protagonist of the common interest", the Commission assumed "a special
responsibility" including the "thinking out and formulating of the main lines of the
action to be taken". In its First General Report, the Commission defined its roles this
way:
"The lines on which the Community is moving determine the tasks
and responsibilities of the institutions and the role to be played by
each of them. Far from being merely the machinery for executing a
series of technical measures, they form a dynamic element which will
bring about the progressive approximation of national policies and,
later, the application of a common policy. In this matter the
Commission is assuming a special responsibility. It is an independent
body capable of taking a broad, objective view of the Community's
problems. As guardian of the Treaty it is first and foremost
responsible for thinking out and formulating the main lines of the
action to be taken. "25<>
As one can see from this short description of the roles of the Commission, its
powers were certainly wider than what is normal in a "classical" bureaucracy. In
particular the Commission's power to initiate policies was far from that of a
"classical" bureaucracy of the Western democracies. A more thorough discussion on
this matter will follow below.
:;,l) EEC - First General Report 1958, p. 13, Section 8.
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4.2 The Community speaking with one voice
A. The Kennedy Round
After having discussed the formal powers of the Commission above, the
attempt of this section will be to see how these powers were used in the
decision-making process. The Kennedy Round of the GA'l'T negotiations2"51 and the
Luxembourg - Lorraine case252 will be used as examples, although somewhat
briefly. What is interesting here is mainly the part played by the Commission.
According to the neofunctionalist scholar. Leon N. Lindberg, there were four
aspects of the role of the Commission in the Community decision-making process
that were of particular importance.252 The first is that it was required to reduce the
intensity of conflict by "isolating issues and identifying common interests" to bring
about unity among the member states, and avoid major conflicts. Secondly, the
Commission had to interpret its own role in a way that would ensure that its own
competence could be increased, and its support gained. Thirdly, Lindberg argued
that the Commission had to compensate for its existing lack of competence by
promoting consensus among the member states, and fourthly, it had to include
national policy-makers in the decision-making process at the Community level. To
fulfil these last two aspects, the Commission engaged national civil servants and
interest groups in the decision-making process. According to these last two aspects
therefore, Lindberg argued that the success of the Community in the early years was
determined by the Commission's central tactic of "co-opting" from national
administrations and interest groups. This last point was also seen as important in the
Commission's role as "honest broker" among the interests of the member States. The
involvement of national officials at an early stage was used as a way of cutting
corners and to facilitate the progress in the Council of Ministers. Another reason
2M This round of GATT negotiations lasted from 1964 until 1967 and were
started on the initiative of the American President J. F. Kennedy.
The Luxembourg - Lorraine case was under discussion from the end of the
1950s throughout the 1960s.
2v' Coombes (1970) p. 93.
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why national civil servants were extensively used in the Commission was because
the Commission often felt obliged to draw up proposals that would have the greatest
possible chance of being accepted by the Council, as a failure to do so might have
slowed down the development of the whole community.
A Committee of Permanent Representatives was set up as a result of the
coming into force of the EEC.254 It was meant to be a link between the Community
and the individual member States. The Committee consisted of the national
delegations of the member States, acting as a kind of Embassy to the Community,
being in charge of coordinating the groundwork for the Community decisions. It
would assist the Council of Minsters in preparing its discussions in meetings assisted
by the Commission. Its more political role would be in preparing legislative texts to
be adopted. A tradition where the President of the Commission would receive the
Chairman of the Committee each week was started so as to "exchange information
or impressions on important current or future business, to discuss difficulties and
possible solutions, and where appropriate to co-ordinate the efforts which the
Chairman of the Committee and the Commission will make in their respective fields
to bring about any necessary decisions".255 The Commission was further
represented on the Committee by its Deputy Executive Secretary, or even sometimes
by the Executive Secretary himself.
As the Committee acted as a "watchdog" of the national interests, the
interaction between the Committee and the Commission could often be said to have
had a certain influence on Commission decision-making.256 The "dilemma" often
>4 The Committee of Permanent Representatives has existed since 1958. It did
not have any legal status in the Treaty of Rome, but was mentioned in Article 151
as a committee which "may" be established. It has only been legally recognised,
however, from 1965. in Article 4 of the Merger Treaty.
Noel (1967) The Committee ofPermanent Representatives, p. 238.
As the Committee of Permanent Representatives represented the interests of
the national governments, and the Commission, although supposedly a supranational
body, often had to take this into consideration before presenting its proposals for
legislation, one might say that there has been a certain influence here.
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seen with these links between the Commission and the Committee of Permanent
Representatives was, however, that, in contrast to the Commission itself, the
members of the Committee were representatives of the national governments and
therefore only responsible to these. The Committee's importance, therefore, was
regarded by many as the threat to the "European" element in the Community
decision-making, as well as a challenge to the Commission's right of initiative.23'
The Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiations has been seen as a prime
example, as well as the first one, of the Commission acting in the field of positive
integration. It was considered as a major advance in European integration itself. The
Commission was, in these negotiations, able to act on behalf of the Community as
a whole which was believed to be the role the Commission had to perform
increasingly if the Community was to move from being a customs union to becoming
a full economic union. The negotiations were also seen as a test of the Community's
internal cohesion and of the effectiveness of the type of integration the Community
represented.
In the early stages of the negotiations the Commission was mostly concerned
with formulating a general policy on the Community's approach to the negotiations,
and with the difficult question of finding a common position on disparities. A rather
difficult task considering that at that time the Community neither possessed an
industrial policy, nor yet a common economic policy. Nevertheless, under the
leadership of President Hallstein, a real team spirit was created in the efforts of
trying to reach common decisions.238 The dilemma of the Commission involved
making the negotiations succeed and at the same time preserving internal unity within
the Community.
In the Kennedy Round negotiations the Commission had to take important
:"7 For a further discussion of The Committee of Permanent Representatives,
see Chapter IV, 3.4.
238 View expressed by Emile Noel in an interview in Paris on 12 December
1994.
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decisions as well as to play an important mediating role. Therefore, the role of the
Commission depended as much on its independence and commitment as on its skill
as a mediator. It must be said, on that basis, that the Commission had to be
characterised as being much more than an administrative organisation or a
bureaucracy. What was facing the Commission was the need for "critical", incentive
decision-making in constantly changing situations. It had to be innovative and highly
flexible, and skilled at improvisation. This was a fact although the final decisions on
general policy rested with the Council.
One of the characteristics that has been identified as the success of the
Commission in the Kennedy Round was that the officials all stressed the point of
"having a policy of its own". This aspect must certainly be said to be rather unusual
for civil servants who, according to a classical definition, normally should have to
follow the policies worked out by their governments at the time. According to the
members of the Commission themselves, the aspect of "having a policy of its own"
was even seen as more important than such aspects as the "ability to appeal for
support over the heads of national governments", "negotiation flexibility", and
"commitment to European integration".259 The fact that the members of the
Commission had to show a considerable measure of political leadership, as well as
technical facility and negotiating skills, has been characterised as the reasons why
the Commission had the ability to take on the role as the representative of the
Community as a whole so successfully. In the final stages of the negotiations the
Commission's negotiators showed an ability to take up a position in response to the
situation in Geneva, where the negotiations took place, rather than looking at what
was happening in the Council. This is a rather unusual situation for a
bureaucracy260 as the Commission should normally have had to negotiate according
to strict orders from the Council of Ministers. Neither "classical" bureaucratic
elements, nor internal "political" considerations seem to have been taking
precedence. There was a lack of emphasis on hierarchical structures, an ease of
Coombes (1970) p. 211.
260 That is if one agrees with the definition of the Commission as a
bureaucracy.
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personal relationships, as well as a confidence in the colleagues' approachability and
discretion. An explanation might possibly be that the goals of the Commission in the
Kennedy Round were not solely to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.
They also had to consider other important aspects like the need to maintain unity
between the Six, and the desire to use the negotiations as a means of furthering the
Community policies.
During the Kennedy Round negotiations, the representatives of the
Commission who were involved had to show a considerable measure of political
leadership as well as technical facility and negotiating skill. Further, a formulation
of distinct Commission policies was needed on most issues concerned in the
negotiations, were the negotiations to succeed. Achievement of these conditions
could not depend entirely on the member States for the positions the Commission
took in Geneva, as that would have made it very difficult for taking initiatives. This
way, the Commission came to act in a very similar way to that of the national
governments with which it was negotiating.
As David Coombes has pointed out, the Kennedy Round could be seen as an
example of the Community responding successfully to challenges of positive
integration.261 As a condition for this success he stressed the Commission's ability
to act. particularly towards the final period of the negotiations, with a certain
element of political leadership. Later on in its development, however, it might be
argued that the Commission became an increasingly administrative and bureaucratic
organisation.
261 With "positive" integration Coombes refers to "the formulation and
application of coordinated policies designed to fulfil broad economic and welfare
objectives", as opposed to "negative" integration which "consists of the removal of
discrimination". Coombes (1970) p. 54.
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B. The Luxembourg - Lorraine case
Another example of the Commission's decision-making procedure in the early
years, which only will be mentioned briefly here, was the dispute between the
southern section of the Belgian Province of Luxembourg and the northern part of the
French region of Lorraine. This was a case of regional development were the
Commission lacked an explicit authority to act. The role of the Commission was,
therefore, rather limited in this case. It served merely as an observer as it would
only act if called upon by the national governments. The two officials concerned
with this case were not any typical civil servants, where one was not even a full-time
official. It has therefore been argued that this issue never would have got as far as
a Commission's recommendation to the two states concerned unless personal
commitment, individual relationships and background, and influence from the
officials on the decision-making procedure had been possible. Nevertheless, as an
answer to a question on Commission involvement from M. Toubeau, the
Commissioner Robert Marjolin told the Parliamentary Assembly that "the
Commission was at the disposal of the Belgian and French governments - as well as
other governments of the Community to sort out other frontier problems". However,
he concluded by saying that it was up to the national governments in the end to
invite the Commission to take part in this work.262
4.3 The European Commission - a bureaucracy?
What is meant by "bureaucracy" is "a system of administration based upon
organisation into bureaus, division of labour, a hierarchy of authority, etc".263
Despite this explanation of fairly simple character, the word "bureaucracy" has seen
many uses. It is used in a constitutional sense referring to the central administrative
apparatus of the State as a list of organisations and institutions. In a sociological
sense it refers to certain characteristics which affect the ability of organisations to
Parlement Europeen, 23 mars 1964. Question Orale No. 1, "Cooperation
entre le nord de Lorraine el le sud du Luxembourg beige", pp. 65-66.
2f>" Collins Concise Dictionary Plus
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achieve their purpose.
One of the most prominent theorists of bureaucracy was Max Weber whose
"ideal-type" bureaucracy was an abstraction from the characteristics which seemed
to make large, complex organisations so effective in modern society. Bureaucracy,
thus, according to Weber, is ideally represented by an administrative system in
which everything is sacrificed to the rational pursuit of specified goals. There is a
clear division of labour which enables a high degree of specialisation. Officials are
recruited purely on the basis of technical qualifications and not as a result of
personal influence. In this "ideal-type" bureaucracy, a strong hierarchical structure
is established and at each level authority is clearly restricted. Further, a uniform
system of rules govern all individual official decisions and actions, and ensures
continuity in decision-making. Officials are also expected to avoid making personal
considerations in all their actions. Weber's description of bureaucracy fits in many
ways with what is associated with Western democratic civil service and other
administrative agencies at the level of the State, also what concerns the six member
States of the EEC. What will be interesting to see, therefore, is to what extent these
characteristics were transferred to the organisation of the Commission, if at all.
The question we are left with at this stage is whether the Commission could
be characterised as a bureaucracy, a political leadership, both of these, or any at all.
It must be said that certain characteristics of the Commission made it very different
from political leaders or the ministerial heads of government of a nation-state. The
first important point is that the Commissioners were not elected by a popular
majority with any mandate to govern. They were not, therefore, responsible to any
directly elected representative assembly. There is the point to make here,
nevertheless, that the Commission had to face the possibility of a motion of censure
by the Parliamentary Assembly. However, this could only be aimed at the
Commission as a whole, and the Parliamentary Assembly was not at the time a
134
directly elected body.264 The member governments themselves were responsible for
the appointment of the members of the Commission, which was not usually discussed
between them. Some might here argue that the Commissioners could not be said to
be collectively responsible for their tenure of office as their individual responsibility
lay with their own national governments. However, this would not be the way the
Commissioners themselves regarded their task, particularly not in the early days of
European enthusiasm, identified by a common feeling of collectiveness.
In the very early days of the Commission, its posts were distributed by the
so-called "gentleman's agreement" among the six nationalities, basically according
to their contribution to the Community budget.265 The candidates then came mainly
from government departments as well as other international organisations like the
ECSC.266 The main characteristic about these early candidates was that they had
to be "pro-European", something which had also been the case in the High Authority
six years earlier. No particular skills were required apart from a linguistic one, and,
as they so often were already civil servants from their own national administrations,
the service was very often used as a means of furthering their careers at home. This,
it has been argued, was so because of the lack of possibilities of advancement within
the Commission.267 In line with these above mentioned arguments, the first
Commission, under the leadership of Walter Hallstein, was to a large extent held
~"4 Article 144 of the Treaty of Rome: "[...] If the vote of censure is carried by
a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, and representing a majority of the members
of the Assembly, the members of the Commission shall collectively resign their
office. They shall continue to carry out business until their replacement in
accordance with the provisions of Article 158."
265 Coombes (1970) pp. 141-142.
2f'" The ECSC. and the High Authority in particular, did not. however, provide
the Commission with as much staff as might have been thought. This was also in
line with the policy of the Commission wanting to point out the fact that it was an
entirely new body and not build too much on experience from other earlier
organisations. Furthermore, there was no rush of people coming from the High
Authority wishing to work for the European Commission. Views expressed by
Emile Noel in conversation in Paris on 12 December 1994.
267 The lack of Community pensions and other welfare schemes at the time also
played an important role here.
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together by a common understanding and had little demand for any mechanical rules
and regulations. There was also little stress on hierarchical lines of command or on
departmental prerogatives.268 The most important values at this stage were energy,
enthusiasm, and creativeness which made them all work for the common cause.
As has been briefly mentioned above, the organisation of the Commission
reflected both political and bureaucratic characteristics. It performed a number of
functions in the political system of the Community as well as being expected to act
as a bureaucracy and to have the essential characteristics of an implementative,
"goal-seeking" body.
David Coombes was one who wrote about, and tried to analyse, the functions
of the European Commission. As he pointed out, one of the main functions of the
Commission, the initiative function, required a degree of innovative activity which
is not normally found in a bureaucracy. It involved initiating Community legislation
as well as making recommendations on any matter it thought fitted within the
framework of the Treaty. Further, it had a normative function as the "guardian of
the Treaty" and the "conscience of the Community". These two functions were seen
as interdependent and together they gave the Commission the role of a political
leader and promoter of the Community interests. It was furthermore these functions
that in many ways made the Commission differ from an inter-governmental
organisation like the OEEC.
The Commission also had an administrative function of preparing for
decisions, taking a number of regulatory decisions arising under Community
legislation, and implementing existing policies and programmes. In this function, it
has been said that the Commission had the choice between acting as an independent,
uncommitted secretariat or as a zealous band of Europeans. Lastly, there was the
Commission's function as a mediator in bringing about agreement between the
member states in the Council of Ministers. In Coombes' view this was a function
268 This was soon to change, however, as the administration grew and became
more bureaucratic in its working methods.
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which is also normally to be found in the secretariat of such intergovernmental
organisations as the GATT.
The four main functions of the Commission created certain strains within the
organisation, between the normative and initiative, on the one hand, and the
mediative and administrative, on the other. It was a situation which has been
described as one between a political or promotive role and a bureaucratic or
implementative one.269
5. THE PRACTICE OF "MINISTERIAL CABINETS" IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION: A THREAT TO SUPRANATIONALISM?
The politico-administrative system of the early ECSC, as well as that of the
EEC, has been greatly influenced by the administrative, governmental system of
France. There are several reasons explaining this. It was in France that the whole
idea of a European Community took shape with Jean Monnet as a driving force.
France was, at the time, the biggest, most powerful country among the Six, and the
French were very active in this period. Although the whole idea initially was to be
based on cooperation between France and Germany, and open to others which would
like to join in. Germany was at the time in a less powerful position as to exert
influence on the administrative side. The Germans were very much present, sharing
their ideas and goals, but were also at the stage of rebuilding their own country after
the Second World War. Germany came, however, to influence the EEC system at
a later stage in the bureaucratisation process and building-up of a hierarchical system
in the European administration, to the greatest extent due to the President of the
European Commission, Walter Hallstein. In the very early days, though, one can
detect in particular the presence of the French. Not only was this so for the
establishment of the ECSC. When the first EEC Commission was set up in 1958,
some influences from the ECSC's High Authority were carried along, although not
269 Coombes (1970) pp. 234-242.
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as much as had been in the interest of the High Authority itself. One element that
was transferred from the High Authority, however, was the French system of
ministerial "cabinets". A similar system existed in other continental countries and
their bureaucracies as well, but it was in the French political system that they were
the most developed, and had existed the longest. Therefore, as a background to the
discussion of "cabinets" in the EEC Commission, it will be necessary to look at how
the system of ministerial "cabinets" works and has developed in France. Towards the
end of this section there will be a discussion about whether the system of "cabinets"
possibly can be said to be in conflict with the idea of supranationalism or with
Article 157.2 of the Treaty of Rome stating: "In performance of their duties, (the
Commissioners) shall not seek or accept instructions from any Government or other
body. [...] Each Member State undertakes to respect this character and not to seek
to influence the members of the Commission in the performance of their duties."
5.1 The historic development of "cabinets" - France
A ministerial "cabinet" is usually a small "informal" group270 of personal
advisers attached to each minister in the Government. They are embedded in the
French politico-administrative system and have played an important role in the
shaping of its structure.271
The system of "cabinets" can be traced back as far as the 15th century when
they had advisers, or "entourages" of the "grands officiers" and Secretaries of State
of the King. In the sense they are known today, they have been since the early 19th
century, and the name "cabinet" seems to have appeared for the first time in 1822.
Since then the essence of their role has been more or less the same, despite the
changing of their environment. Both in the 19th century and today they have been
acting as a channel for political favours, handling appointments for posts in the
270 The size of the cabinets has tended to grow somewhat bigger over the years.
It is also subject to the importance of the Minister.
271 Searls (1978) The Fragmented French Executives. Ministerial Cabinets in
the Fifth Republic, p. 161.
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administration, as well as transmitting the wishes of the minister to the
administration, and ensuring that they were carried out. In this century they have
developed as an indispensable channel for manipulating and liaising with the
administration, giving advice on political and policy matters. They began to play an
important role in shaping the relations between the minister and the administration
as the relationship between these two became characterised by a widening gulf. In
France, where political conditions have always been volatile, and ministers were in
a particular need of reliable men in political circles, the cabinet's main function was
to bridge the gap between the political and the administrative world. As Ella Searls
has put it: "Their power bred new power and their growth stimulated further
growth".272 Once created they continued to exist, and, finding themselves in a
convenient position, they took on new functions, surpassing their original raison
d'etre. The main roles of the "cabinets" have been to deal with political problems
in areas directly or indirectly affecting the position of the minister or the
Government. They were also to keep a close eye on political demonstrations, dealing
with tax changes, and meeting the important pressure groups, all according to which
ministry they belonged. As the administration grew and the role of the minister
changed it also became the norm of the "cabinet" to become involved in
administrative details. This last point was made under the pretext of giving
information to the minister, and as a necessary consequence of its normal function
of supervising the services over political matters. This situation of blurring and
duplication of the functions between the "cabinet" and the administration has
consequently led, in certain cases, to much ill-feeling between the two elements.
The Fifth Republic of France has seen the development of a relatively stable,
executive-dominated regime which has placed the individual minister under the
supervision, and. to a certain degree, close control, of the President of the Republic
and of the Prime Minister, embedded in the Constitution. As a contrast to earlier
regimes, the ministers also need a more continual contact with their colleagues in the
government. This relative cohesiveness of the government has considerably increased
272 Searls (1978) p. 162.
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the power of the "cabinets" at the expense of the administration in the
inter-ministerial bargaining. Most of the preliminary contact over political issues
between the ministers now takes place at a "cabinet"-level.
The relationship between the minister and his "cabinet" could be both
dynamic and dual. The Minister is, to some degree, formed by his "cabinet".
Further, depending on the minister's personality, the "cabinet" may either reflect and
magnify the qualities of the minister, or it may compensate for and complement
it.273 As a qualification for entry into a "cabinet", loyalty to the minister and
administrative competence has been seen as more important than personal politics.
In the times before the Fifth Republic ministers in France traditionally stayed for
very short periods and therefore needed the help of a personal staff to secure
effective control of their departments. "Cabinet" members had to be both politically
reliable as well as well versed in the techniques of administration. Up to the Third
Republic most members of the "cabinets" were recruited among friends and
acquaintances of the minister, or from people recommended to him. Still, today, the
most important member of "cabinet" will mostly be personally chosen by the
minister. The other members may, however, be chosen by the "chef du cabinet" or
other leading members of the team. There has, thus, developed an increasingly
formalised and hierarchical nature of the "cabinet"-system than ever before.274
As the "cabinet" essentially is a customary body, whose work has not been
laid down in rules and regulations, this is one reason for its informal structure.27:>
27~' Searls (1978) p. 167. With the Minister being "formed by his "cabinet"" is
here understood it in the sense of an influence going back and forth between the
Minister and the "cabinet", both ways.
274 "Cabinets" usually have a maximum of ten members, except those of the
Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Finance and Interior, which
tend to have more. The titles and ranks of the members of the cabinets are, in order
of importance: directeur. chef, chef-adjoint, and attache.
One "cabinet" rule, however, came in 1911. followed by a decision of the
Conseil d'Etat. which held for the first time that "cabinet" members were to be civil
servants. In the decade 1945-55. only one third of those appointed to ministerial
"cabinets" did not come from the civil service.
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Informal work with no binding regulations helps facilitate the communication and
free flow of information within the team, a degree of flexibility lacking from the
permanent administration. The informality of its structure also makes the "cabinet"
able to constantly keep in touch with the demands of the minister's job and for the
"cabinet" members to act as an antennae for the Minister. Over the years the
"cabinets" have become more specialised, administrative and hierarchical, with a
growth in the number of "cabinet" members. This is to a large extent the result of
more stable governments in the Fifth Republic which has meant that each "cabinet"
has existed over a longer period of time, leading to a specialisation of the functions
of its members. The increasing bureaucratisation has to a certain degree undermined
the effectiveness of the "cabinet" as a flexible group of political and policy advisers.
Nevertheless, the "cabinets" have been one of the key holders of power and its
members have functioned as focal points of decision-making in the French
politico-administrative system.
In France the "cabinets" are considered as a part of any normal administrative
practice. Nevertheless, as we will see, others might believe they "contribute to the
reinforcement of the national enclaves within the institution" as well as being a
"superfluous additional bureaucratic echelon in an administrative structure which is
already much too cumbersome".276
5.2 The existence and importance of "cabinets" in the European Commission
As has been mentioned above, the system of ministerial "cabinets" has been
more developed in France than in most other European country. It existed in
Belgium since the 19th century, and in Italy after the Second World War, but to a
lesser degree than in France where the "cabinets" have been an important part of the
politico-administrative system for centuries. It was also generally assumed that the
French model would be the most appropriate one in the EEC Commission as it had
already been applied to the ECSC's High Authority. It was felt that a flexible system
276 Siotis (1964) p. 243.
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of policy advice would be a great help for the Commissioners and a way of
sustaining a dynamic element. The system was seen as having considerable
advantages, assisting the Commissioners in the performance of their duties by
keeping them informed of developments within and outside their allocated policy
areas, and by liaising with other parts of the Commission as well as with outside
institutions and interests. The first Commission of the EEC of 1958, thus, set up
"cabinet" offices on the pattern of the French ministerial "cabinets". They were
small personal groups of staff not part of the Commission's bureaucracy nor of the
Directorates General (DGs). However, they came to play a crucial role in the
internal political management and the external links of the Commission.
In the early years of the Commission there was a conflict over the size of the
"cabinets". The President of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, who was brought up
in the German system and not so familiar with "cabinets", preferred them to be
small, stressing rather the importance of the administration itself. On the other hand,
the French, as well as the Italians were of the opinion that the Commissioner's heavy
work load necessitated larger "cabinets". That, according to Hallstein, would be a
threat to good working relations between the Commissioners and their civil servants,
as well as a force against the development of collectivism and Europeanism.
Nevertheless, it was agreed to keep the Commissioner's "cabinets" consisting of two
members plus a secretary and a typist. The "cabinet" of the President of the
Commission would consist of an additional two members. The members of the
"cabinets" have mostly been fellow nationals of the Commissioner, usually recruited
from the national political parties or seconded from the domestic civil services.
The "cabinets" of the early Commission were smaller, as well as more
innovative and policy oriented, than the French "cabinets" of the same period.
Nevertheless, relations between the "cabinets" and other parts of the Commission
became more formalised throughout the 1960s. They became the centre of a complex
web of policy pressures, negotiations and package deals as well as an indispensable
part of the policy-making process in the EEC. A reason why the system of
"cabinets" was seen as a good element to adopt in the EEC system was that they
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provided politicians, in this case the Commissioners, with a think-tank, and that they
were flexible and unstructured. They were believed to be a "forum where ideas
could be exchanged freely regardless of members' role or background". It was
transformed to the early Commission where the "cabinet" members were a group of
civil servants bound together by the same feeling of common purpose, "embarking
on an adventure together".277
In a study made by David Coombes it was claimed that the early Commission
was a highly creative, dynamic and committed organisation with a shared sense of
identity and purpose. Much because of the still underdeveloped administrative
structure, the scene was open for individuals to make their mark and give dynamic
leadership. President Hallstein imposed a strong leadership on the Commission. With
his political direction and impetus he set the tone for the work of the Commissioners
and their "cabinets". A sense of collective European purpose that would foster a
European identity within the member States was his goal.
The "cabinets" of the early Commission were flexible, wide-ranging with
functions spreading through many areas of interests. They were, in general,
organising the work of their Commissioners, and contact between the different
"cabinets" was constant and informal. To facilitate such contact, there was once a
week, shadowing the Wednesday meeting of the Commission, a "Meeting of the
Heads of Cabinets" that could be instructed by the Commission to make preparations
for its meetings.278 According to Emile Noel, however, this was a decision taken
by the first President of the common Commission of the European Communities,
Jean Rey. to set up the so-called "Weekly Meetings of the Heads of Cabinets".
Before the Merger in 1967 such meetings only happened from time to time, a few
211 Interview with Richard Mayne. Ella Ritchie The Model ofFrench Ministerial
Cabinets in the Early European Commission. In: Yearbook of European
Administration 1992. p. 100.
278 These meetings were given formal status by the Merger Treaty of 1967 after
a decision by the Commission President Jean Rey. Yearbook of European
Administrative History 1992. p. 100.
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times a year, mainly to solve technical problems.279
The "cabinets" were active in the fields of policy advice and cooperation,
liaison with the member States, as well as appointments and promotions of staff.
Particularly with regard to the latter, the "Meeting of Heads of Cabinets" has been
the venue where questions concerning personnel and administration have received
preliminary, or even decisive, consideration. The system of the Commission was that
each Commissioner was given one area of primary responsibility and, in addition,
the subsidiary responsibility of two more. It was in this case put upon the "cabinet"
to give policy advice in the two subsidiary fields in particular, and to ensure that the
Commissioner was well briefed across a whole range of subjects. In doing so, it was
essential for the "cabinets" to liaison with other "cabinets", in addition to
COREPER, national civil servants and interest groups. By performing this task the
"cabinets" came to perform a vital role in clearing the ground for a consensus on
policy issues.
Throughout the 1960s the Commission developed a more institutionalised
pattern of policy-making. Together with the developing bureaucratic culture and
administrative practices within the DGs, it had an effect on the relationships between
the "cabinets" and the administration that was not as flexible as before. There had
been a certain amount of informal liaising between the "cabinets", and the services
of the DGs, as well as with national civil servants and interest groups.280 However,
an evolution of rules and regulations and an institutionalised pattern of policy-making
led to much more formalised work with an increasing use of written procedure. With
the Reglenient Interieur, Article 15, the existence of "cabinets" became
institutionalised, stating that "the President and the members of the Commission may
constitute cabinets whose duty will be to assist them in the accomplishment of their
279 View expressed by Emile Noel in conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
2MI Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 103.
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tasks".281 The Directors General, however, did not have such an arrangement at
their disposal. Nevertheless, they often had a "special assistant" or "assistant" which
in practice could be transformed into a "miniature cabinet".282
The idea of supranationalism in the European integration means that the
organisation and its institutions should be independent from the member States. This
principle, although not including the word "supranational", is laid down in Article
157.2 of the Treaty of Rome stating that the Commissioners must "in the general
interest of the Communities, be completely independent in the performance of their
duties" and therefore "shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government
or from any other body". This must also be respected by the member States who
must refrain themselves from trying to influence any member of the Commission in
performing their duties.
The idea of the Commission was as a body autonomous from the member
States, free to pursue the Community interests. In the early years it gained
considerable prestige by the rapid and professional manner whereby it coordinated
the process of implementation and by its skill in fulfilling the "broker" role in
searching the agreement of, and settling the disputes among the member States'
Governments. No doubt this was a fact much due to the role of the "cabinets". The
"cabinet" members functioned as antennae for the Commissioners being in direct
contact with the member States as well as with one another. The weekly meetings
of the "Chefs du cabinet" have been considered as the Commission's most effective
tool for managing the work of its departments. It is true that one of the first concerns
of the EEC Commission was to confirm its independence vis-a-vis the member
States. This might, to a large extent, be considered as successful. However, criticism
has been made of the fact that the Commissioner and his "cabinet" usually have been
of the same nationality and the "cabinet" therefore played an important role in the
relations between the Commissioner and his home country, representing national
~'SI Journal Officiel des Communaute's Europeennes. sixieme annee. No. 17. 31
January 1963.
282 Siotis (1964) p. 243.
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interests in the Commission's organisation. As the Commission is the institution
representing the "Community as a whole", the thought of the "cabinet" system as
actually working against the principles of the institution as a whole is therefore an
interesting one which will have to be considered constantly.
Although the Commission was a "supranational" body, independent from the
member States, it has all the time been important to gain the necessary national
political support for its initiatives. Interest from the national governments and other
bodies has tended to determine the success or failure of initiatives taken by the
Commission. This became more and more clear throughout the 1960s when the
Community institutions increasingly became subject to national pressure. In the role
of the Commissioners trying to reconcile Community interests with the national ones,
they gained considerable support from their "cabinets". However, the "cabinets"
have also been under considerable pressure from national politicians to act in their
interests. Whether this has been a real threat would, presumably, depend on the
personality of the Commissioner, as well as the situation of the "cabinet" itself. A
genuinely "European" Commissioner would probably know how to combine national
pressures with his superior duties laid down in the Treaty. On the other hand,
members of the "cabinets" might, after having served the Commission, want to go
back to a career in their own country. In this case it could be of particular difficulty
not to put extra weight on national considerations.
It must be stressed that a decline in supranational ism, or even a failure to
follow the words of the Treaty, cannot be caused by the "cabinet" alone.
Nevertheless, it could be seen as a possible element in this decline that has occurred
in the Commission. It is a fact that there has been, since 1958, a shift towards a
member States' domination in the execution of Community policies. On the other
hand, it must be pointed out in this respect, the considerable amount of contact there
has been at all times between the various "cabinets" and the weekly "Meeting of
Chefs du Cabinet". This has made the "cabinets" aware of not only their own
national interests, but those of the other member States as well. To say, therefore,
that the "cabinets" have been a threat to supranationalism or to the execution of
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Article 157.2 seems rather too strong. Another factor which seems more likely to
have had an influence on this is directed not to the "cabinets", appointed by the
Commissioner, but to the Commissioner himself and the personnel of the
Commission. As the importance of the Commission increased and this became
evident to the member States, the latter began to take an active interest in the
appointment of the Commissioners as well as of the Commission personnel.
In the European Commission, as well as within the French Government, the
system of "cabinets" has played an important part in gathering information and
clearing the ground for a consensus on policy issues. Although not heavily regulated
by rules and regulations, they have become an important element not likely to
disappear. They perform their duties in loyalty to their Commissioner, influencing
the relationship between the Commissioner and the administration. In the EEC they
were representing the Commissioner's home country and have been seen as elements
of national interests in the Commission. Considering the fact that the Commission
was set up as an institution independent of member States with the task of "fostering
a European identity", one might understand how the whole idea of "cabinets" in the
Commission has been criticised from certain angles. That the creation of a European
identity should have been encouraged by the "cabinets" seems somewhat unlikely.
On the other hand, whether they have worked as a tool for the member States to put
national pressure on the Community would, in any case, not be the sole reason for
the Commission's decline of supranational ism.
147
6. CONCLUSION
The situation in Europe after the defeat of the EDC Treaty in 1954 seemed,
for what was to be only a moment of the larger historical picture, less than
favourable towards any further integration among the Six. With the "relance
europeenne" that followed it seemed beyond every doubt that, despite differing
national interests, vital forces drew the countries together in an even more wide-
ranging cooperation than before. The conditions behind this development, which
have been discussed so far, are what has determined the outcome - the European
Commission. Whether this has shown to be a convincing political leadership or a
"mere" bureaucracy has depended on the conditions put before it, as well as the
personalities given to its disposal.
As has been shown above, the Commission did reflect certain elements
characteristic of a bureaucracy. However, it cannot be said to have been only that.
In the very early years of its existence, what the members of the Commission had
in common was simply the fact that they were considered to be "good Europeans".
They had, in one way or the other, all been involved in the foundation of the
Community, a situation rather unique for a "bureaucracy", which as well must be
considered as small with only its nine members. The Commission, at this time, was
expected to perform functions that were normally associated with the political leaders
of a state in initiating policies for the common good, and setting and preserving
norms of action. Further, the Commission was expected gradually to increase its
powers and scope in economic matters at the expense of national governments so as
to later act as a magnet for political forces in the member countries.
The Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiations was seen as a major
achievement in European integration. However, nothing could have been achieved
without the consent of the member governments. This was also what was often
considered to be the major dilemma of the Commission. It could not perform all its
functions sufficiently without a political leadership independent of national
governments, at a Community level. This could not happen at a time when the
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member States saw the Commission as nothing more than a "supranational"
bureaucracy. Therefore, the Commission became increasingly to exercise purely
delegated, administrative functions which related to its tendency of acquiring an
increasingly bureaucratic organisation. Towards the end the Kennedy Round
negotiations however. Coombes argued that the Commission as well as the individual
Commissioners did exercise a certain amount of political leadership, which one
might regard as the reason for its success.283
The place the European Commission has occupied in the Community
institutional structure has been determined already from the Treaty of Rome. The
role it has played within this structure, on the other hand, has depended on other
external as well as internal factors, and has varied throughout its history. To claim,
however, that an element like the "cabinets" has served the interest of the national
governments does not seem accurat in a discussion about the early period of the
Commission. This chapter has shown how the Commission has taken upon itself
political leadership in the Kennedy Round negotiations, and it has shown how the
personalities involved were enthusiastic about the European cause - one of the most
important employment criteria of that time.
283 Coombes (1970) p. 197.
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CHAPTER IV
THE INTERNAL ORGANISATION OF THE FIRST EUROPEAN
COMMISSION OF 1958
"Les homines sont necessaire au changement, les institutions pour faire vivre le
changement. "284
1. INTRODUCTION
The Messina Conference in June 1955 was what is generally acknowledged
as the start of a process leading to the establishment of the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). In
Messina an intergovernmental committee, headed by the Belgian Foreign Minister
Paul-Henri Spaak, was set up and the negotiations for the Treaties of Rome started,
consisting of the six member States of the ECSC. The member governments asked
for the assistance of the High Authority which was represented by Dirk Spierenburg.
The purpose was to study the already three year long experience of the High
Authority, in order to draw on some of its experiences for the future Communities.
The High Authority published an official opinion on 7 November 1955 on the work
of the Committee. This opinion expressed a great interest in the establishment of a
general common market affecting all economical activities, alongside a "joint energy
and transport infrastructure".285 We will see, however, that the interest shown by
the High Authority towards the new European Commission was not going to be
received quite in the same way by the latter.
284
"People are necessary to make changes, institutions are necessary for change
to last." Own translation. Jean Monnet Clefs pour iAction, Amis de Jean Monnet,
L'Atelier Merat Maquette Jean-Pierre Rosier, 1988. p. 18.
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 340.
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The first year, if not to say the first few months, of the European
Commission being in operation, was full of new events and experiences. The
governments and officials who were to set up the new Commission of the EEC were
pioneers in many ways by taking up work in a completely new institution in a totally
new Community. Elowever, they did in some ways look to the High Authority of the
ECSC for help and advice, although not as much as one might have though as we
shall see. In many ways the early Commission resembled much the organisation of
the High Authority, although the administrative structures of the Commission were
to become much more complex than those of the High Authority, based on both staff
and line units.286 During the negotiations in 1956 on what were to become the
Treaties of Rome, the movement towards a European unity was still reeling from the
rejection of the European Defence Community in August 1954. Therefore, the High
Authority was seen as the symbol of the "supranational" element of the ECSC and,
as a consequence, the target of the critiques of "Europeanization". A more modest
term, the Commission, was chosen out of political reasons.
During the negotiations for the ECSC Treaty, Jean Monnet had wanted the
High Authority to consist of only five representatives. This would prove the
supranational aspect where members would be selected on basis of qualifications and
enthusiasm over the case of European integration, and not on nationality. In fact, not
every member State would have had a member represented in the High Authority at
the same time. With the opposition from the member governments, however, each
member State had to be represented at all times, and the number chosen was nine.
The same number was later chosen by the Commission.
On 1 January 1958 the EEC came into being after the Treaty of Rome had
been signed on 25 March 1957 and ratified by all the parliaments of the six member
States. Ten days later, on 10 January, the nine members of the Commission of the
EEC were appointed by the member Governments, who had met in Paris on 6-7
^ When the High Authority reorganised its administration some years after the
EEC Commission was set up. the latter was used as its model.
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January, in accordance with Article 158 of the Treaty of Rome.287 These were men
who all had in one way or other been involved in the European integration process,
either in their own countries or at an intergovernmental level.
On 14 January 1958 the President of the new Commission, Walter Hallstein,
held initial conversations with the Presidents of the ECSC, Paul Finet, and of
Euratom, Louis Armand. These conversations were later agreed to be
institutionalised. Two days later, in the Val-Duchesse castle in Brussels on 16
January, the Commission was formally constituted, and its members taking over the
duties given solemnly to them according to Article 157 of the Treaty of Rome. This
was a day to be remembered. Not because it was the first European executive body
to be set up, as the High Authority of the ECSC already had existed for five years,
but because it was the first European executive body that had as an objective the
integration of the whole economic sector of the six member States. As was
anticipated and hoped for by the founding fathers of the ECSC, as well as by the
neofunctionalist theorists, European integration had taken a step forward and been
extended into further areas of life.288
The Treaty of Rome had laid down most of the ground rules concerning the
running of the Community and its institutions. However, the only thing the Treaty
provided in detail about the Commission was the procedure for appointing its
members, their condition of service, and the vote of censure which can be given on
the activities of the Commission by the Assembly. Much of the organising of the
Commission was therefore left for the members alone to decide. In this respect, the
years 1958 and 1959 will be seen as years of trying out and judging the procedures
and methods to be used in defining the policy that ought to follow the Community
287
European Economic Community - First General Report on the Activities of
the Community 1958. p. 20. Article 158 EEC: "The members of the Commission
shall be appointed by mutual agreement between the Governments of Member
States." All Articles from the Treaty of Rome referred to in this thesis are taken
from the original, unamended Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957.
288 This process was seen at the time as a proof of the "spill-over" theory. See
above. Chapter III. 2.1.
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into the 1960s. Also, the trying out process was applied to the building up of the
administration of the Commission. What its organisational structures ought to look
like and how it should function was not defined in the Treaty of Rome, which on this
matter only established the fact that Staff Regulations concerning its administrative
staff should be set up in the future.289 Part of the problem was rooted in the fact
that the Commission was a completely new and original invention. It was not a
government in the supranational sense of the word, but it was much more than an
intergovernmental body in the traditional sense.
The Commission's own administration was to be set up at a rapid speed
during the first few months of 1958. The main idea of how the administration would
succeed was seen in limiting its scope and giving it one high quality. The
administration which was set up was to be different from traditional, national
bureaucratic administrations. This new administration was, first and foremost, a
political authority, and only administrative in certain measures. It was a difficult task
and, as it was put by President Hallstein in his farewell address to the European
Parliament on 21 lune 1967: "The members of the Commission had to constitute a
unified, independent, integral body. The Commissioners had to be one, bound
together by the principle and practice of collegiality. "29°
The High Authority had, in 1951, been considered as a collective head of an
independent administration, exercising "supranational" executive functions.
According to Jean Siotis, however, this was not the case for the European
Commission in 1957. The latter came to be considered as something more than a
multilateral body, yet something less than an independent executive.291 As a
preliminary comment one could say that the High Authority was more executive,
289 Article 212 of the Treaty of Rome. In the original Treaty of 1958 the term
"statute of service" is used also in the English version, but throughout the thesis,
the term "Staff Regulations" will be used, which is also what has been used in later
amended Treaty versions.
211(1 Hallstein (1972) Europe in the Making, p. 59.
291 Siotis (1964) p. 247.
153
whereas the Commission showed signs of being more of a developmental body. In
the High Authority, "supranationalism" had showed, after some time, not to be
working, as it in practice always had to consult both the member State governments
and the Council. The European Commission. Siotis claimed, would be considered
as both a multilateral body as well as the top echelon of an independent
administration assuming executive functions, according to the circumstances. In
periods of political consensus it would appear as an independent entity, whereas in
times of crisis its multilateral character would be accentuated. In Siotis' view the
existence of national "enclaves" at all echelons of the administration, as well as
within all administrative units, did not, however, seem to constitute an obstacle to
the normal functioning of the institution as long as the consensus, which was the
most important principle of the "Community" institutional theory, would remain a
reality.292
The new thing about the Treaty of Rome lay in the structure of its executive
body, the Commission, and the existing relationship between this European body and
the Council of national ministers. In the ECSC there had been an essentially political
wish from the negotiators of the Treaty of wanting to create a European
Government. However, as they saw how the national governments had intervened
in the activities of the High Authority, this had to be taken into consideration by the
authors of the Treaty of Rome. Another difference between the High Authority and
the Commission of the EEC was that the latter, in most cases, could not take
independent decisions but was assigned to implement the decisions taken by the
Council of Ministers. Its powers lay in the fact that the Council could not take any
decisions without first having received a proposal from the Commission. To modify
or reject such a proposal there had to be unanimity in the Council. This was further
why the Commission was also, in some ways, considered as more "important" than
the High Authority. It was on proposals from the Commission that the six
governments were to take measures aiming at the establishment of the European
Economic Community, as the Commission represented the interests of the
292 Siotis (1964) p. 249.
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Community as a whole, reaching much further than the High Authority and the
ECSC. In a comparison with the national systems, the Commission bore similarities
with a government in its right to propose laws, as well as in its capacity of taking
political initiative.
The establishment of the EEC and its Commission was important in the sense
that it was thought that the creation of common interests could lead to a further
integration, which then would require the establishment of other common agencies;
the so-called "spill-over" effect of the neofunctionalist theory.293 To achieve this
effect, three conditions were necessary. First, there had to exist a common
sovereignty, above that of the member States. Secondly, independent institutions had
to be set up, and lastly, there had to be equality between the member States. The
building up of the administrative structures of the Commission was in this respect
seen as crucial to this development as it was to be independent of the member States
with certain initiating powers of its own.
This chapter will discuss the organisational background of the first European
Commission of 1958, and how it was set up. The background of the Commissioners
will be considered, and what became their task in the Commission, as well as the
selection of its staff. Further, an analyses of the functions of the Commission will
be made, how the Commission worked in itself, as well as in cooperation with the
other two European executives. This analysis will in particular involve the process
of establishing a "Statut de Sen'ice", or "Staff Regulations".
As a definition of "executive", this can be either "a person or group
responsible for the administration of a project, activity or business", or, as will be
found more suitable for the European Commission, "a branch of government
responsible for carrying out laws, decrees etc.".294 Although the Commission was
nothing like the executive branch of a government, it will be shown that they had
29"' See chapter II. 2.1.
244 Collins English Dictionary.
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certain characteristics, and certain functions in common. According to Jean Siotis'
definition of "executive", it describes "the functions of a body acting independently
within certain legislative limits and participating in the process leading to the
adoption of the decisions or assuming itself the decision-making function".295 A
discussion will follow later in this chapter on how the European Commission of
1958-59 fitted into these various definitions.296
As it was put by Walter Hallstein, the first President of the European
Commission: "politics does not only consist of knowing, nor of wanting, but of
acting".297 This is what has characterised the first years in existence of the
European Commission.
2. THE COMMISSIONERS
2.1 The nomination of the Commissioners
Among the negotiators of the Treaty of the ECSC there were certain forces
pulling in the direction of the High Authority as a collegiate, a truly homogeneous
team of only three, or at the maximum five members. This way decisions could be
taken rapidly and responsibilities clearly established. Only France and Germany
supported this idea of supranationality, however, with the other member States
demanding one representative from each State. As a compromise it was decided on
nine, and this same pattern was as well chosen for the Commission of the EEC.
According to the Treaty of Rome, Article 157.1, the new European
Commission had to consist of at least one representative from each member State and
no more than two of the same nationality, with the total number of nine. There
should be one president and, originally, two Vice-Presidents. The latter number was,
295 Siotis (1964) p. 227.
2% See below. 4. "Functions and Features of the Commission".
2"7 Declaration by Walter Hallstein. President of the Commission of the EEC,
to the European Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg. 21 October 1958.
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however, changed to three from the very beginning by the member governments in
a tacit and unofficial attempt to achieve a geographical and political equilibrium.298
With this means that the agreement was never written down anywhere and, among
the nine Commissioners it was not a matter that had to be discussed but seemed
rather obvious at the time. Article 161 of the Treaty states nevertheless: "The
President and the two Vice-Presidents. and this was not changed until the
Merger Treaty when the number of Commissioners was changed anyway.299 The
members were to be nominated for two years by a common agreement of the six
governments and in consultation with the Commission.
The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 summoned an "[A]uthority with no
ties or obligations to the States". Therefore, discussions arouse on how to elect or
nominate the members of the High Authority in a way that would not call on the
member States. A French working paper suggested that "la nomination de ses
membres (...) soit assuree en commun par les Gouvernements sans qu 'aucun membre
reqoive son mandat directement d'un Gouvernement particulier".300 According to
Jean Monnet, the members of the High Authority were common representatives,
independent of government considerations and private interests. Further, the
nomination of the members was done unanimously during the transitional period.
Later, it was to be done by a five sixths majority. Under the Treaty of Rome the
established majority agreement was abandoned in favour of unanimity.
Robert Schuman proposed a system of how to reduce the monopoly of the
governments over the composition of the High Authority, which would be through
the co-option of members. During the course of the transition period one single
298 Lemaignen (1964) L'Europe an Berceau. Souvenirs d'un tecnocrate, p. 26-
27.
~99 In the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965 the number of Vice-Presidents was
changed to five.
""
Condorelli Braun (1972) Commissaires et Juges dans les Communaute's
Europeennes. p. 13. Own translation, "the nomination of its members [...] would
be assured in common by the governments without any member receiving his
mandate from any government in particular."
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member would be coopted. Later, as Nicole Condorelli Braun has put it. this should
be increased to one out of two so as to balance up the governmental nominations. In
the Treaty of the ECSC. the system of co-option was one of its originalities, or one
of its supranational elements.301 The President of the High Authority, Piero
Malvestiti, said during a European Parliamentary Debate on 20 October 1961 that:
"La cooptation offre de nombreux avantages politiques: pour les gouvernements elle
ne represente pas un saut dans I'inconnu; pour I'executif elle offre la possibility de
completer le college unique au gre de ses vues communautaires. "302 Nevertheless,
as the system did not fulfill the hopes of the negotiators, it was not adopted for the
Treaties of Rome.
2.2 The first President of the European Commission. Walter Hallstein
On 16 January 1958 the Commissioners of the very first European
Commission were instituted at Val Duchesse in Brussels with these words:
"Je jure, dans I'accomplissement de mes devoirs, de ne solliciter ni
d'accepter d'instructions d'aucun Gouvernement ni d'aucun
organisme, et de m 'abstenir de tout acte incompatible avec le
caractere de mes fonctions... "m
It was a day dominated by two strong sentiments, as recounted by Robert
Lemaignen: "(...) the astonishment of finding myself all of a sudden in front of a
task as heavy and as exalting, and the concern for raising myself to its level."304
"'()l Condorelli Braun (1972) pp. 14-15. "Ensuite un membre sur deux le serait
de maniere a equilihrer les nominations gouvernementales."
Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne. Debats. Session d'octobre 1961.
Seance du 20 octobre 1961.
-,lb
Lemaignen (1964) p. 15. "I swear, in the fulfillment of my duties, not to
seek nor accept any instructions from any government or any institution, and to
refrain from all actions which are incompatible with the character of my functions."
Own translation.
~04 "I'etonnement de me trouver subitement en face d'une tdche si lourde et si
exaltante, et le souci de me hausser d son niveau." Own translation. Lemaignen
(1964) p. 16.
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The President of this new Commission came from Germany. His name was
Walter Hallstein and he was a professor of law, as well as a diplomat and a former
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1951-57). An intellectual and a Christian
Democrat (CDU), he was capable of expressing himself perfectly and elegantly in
French. English and Italian as well as German. Despite the difficulties Germany
faced after the war, he was able to achieve international respect for himself and his
country in a relatively short period of time due to the use of careful diplomacy. In
company with such names as Antoine Pinay and Paul-Henri Spaak, he was sent by
Adenauer as the German government's representative at the Messina Conference in
his position as Secretary of State.305 A few years earlier he had been the leader of
the German delegation during the negotiations for the ECSC Treaty.306 Hallstein
was in many ways regarded as the disciple of the German Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer by whom he enjoyed the total confidence,307 and was chosen as an
advisor on his European policies.308 Hallstein was the Secretary of State in the
Foreign Office under Adenauer between 1951, when it was formally created, and
195 5.309 During this period one could even say that Hallstein "operated as a quasi-
Interesting here is the fact that the other five countries sent their Head of
State and Foreign Minister, and for Germany Walter Hallstein was the one chosen
to go together with Chancellor Adenauer, despite his official title being Secretary
of State.
j06 As a characteristic of Chancellor Adenauer, as well as of Hallstein himself,
the latter once said in an interview with Terence Prittie: "Adenauer loathed wasting
time. He made his decisions quickly - in my case for instance, he talked to me
about the Schuman Plan and three days later asked me to lead the German
Delegation." Prittie (1972) p. 220. That Hallstein accepted would indicate that they
were equally interested in getting the job done.
,07 Walter Hallstein was considered as "precise, pernickety, sometimes
garrulous". Prittie (1972) p. 216. He was also the most convinced "European" in
Adenauer's entourage, with tremendous faith in the ideal of a political as well as
an economic union.
j0K Konrad Adenauer was the leader of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU)
from mid-1948, and was elected the first Chancellor of the new Federal Republic
of Germany on 15 September 1949. a position in which he stayed until he retired
in 1963 at the age of 87.
~OT After the Second World War the Allied High Commissioners were in charge
of the external relations of the new Federal Republic of Germany. In September
1950 it was suggested by the Western Foreign Ministers that the Federal Republic
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Foreign Minister", despite the fact that he sat as an unelected representative of a
Foreign Ministry that was not yet independent from the Allied forces.310 Although
it was Adenauer who was the formal bearer of the title of Foreign Minister, one
could even go as far as to say that it was Hallstein who built up the German Foreign
Ministry, in the same way as he would do with the European Commission a few
years later.311 Both Adenauer and Hallstein worked eagerly for a complete
reintegration of Germany in the concert of the European nations, and the elimination
of all types of discrimination.312 Hallstein was also seen as the "pope" in his
relations with the "emperor" Charles de Gaulle, where Hallstein would be the one
defending the Treaty and the Community spirit, and de Gaulle the most powerful
Head of State in the Community.313 The appointment of Walter Hallstein satisfied
soon should have its own Foreign Minister. Thus, on 6 March 1951 the High
Commissioners revised the Occupation Statute with the most important provision
being that the Federal Republic should be in charge of its own external relations.
Adenauer accordingly was appointed Foreign Minister, in addition to being
Chancellor, on 15 March 1951. At the time, however, this was not an elected
position. On the other hand, nomination of German ministers has been the
responsibility of the chancellery and not the Bundestag.
Padget (ed.) (1994) Adenauer to Kohl. The Development of the German
Chancellorship, p. 130.
View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
"'2 Already in 1919, after becoming Mayor of Cologne, did Adenauer mention
his hopes for a united Europe. In a speech he made at Cologne University, he said:
"[...] German civilization and the civilization of the Western democracies will meet
during the decades to come. Unless a genuine reconciliation is possible between
them, unless the European nations learn to recognise and cultivate that which is
common to all European civilizations [...] unless it becomes possible once more to
unite the nations through cultural understanding, unless in this way we shall be able
to prevent a new war among the nations of Europe. European leadership will be
lost forever." Prittie (1972) p. 171.
jl" Pierre Gerbet (1983) La Construction de L'Europe (Paris: Imprimerie
Nationale) p. 319. The relationship between General de Gaulle and Adenauer was
not always an easy one. As de Gaulle had been a prisoner of war in Germany
during the First World War. he had little reason to like the Germans very much.
During the Second World War he had been the leader of the Free French,
determined to defeat Germany. In Adenauer's eyes he did not appear to be a "good
European", having opposed the idea of the EDC, and being lukewarm towards the
burgeoning European Common Market.
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the opponents of the Commission adopting a purely economic approach. With
Hallstein as President the Commission would also take upon itself a political and
institutional side as he found the political matters to be of primary importance. As
we have seen, he was in favour of the Commissioners having smaller cabinets
consisting of only two members, one secretary and a typist. The reason was his fear
of the development of nationalism within the cabinets, which would put the
collegiality and the Community spirit of the Commission at risk. From the moment
he was appointed as President of the Commission he immediately assumed a clear
leadership which was neither disputed by the other members of the Commission, nor
so much by the member States. He became a natural leader of the managing and
development of the Commission, as well as in charge of all main decisions.314
Referring to the independence of the European Commission from the national
governments, it has been said that as Adenauer asked Hallstein, on assuming the role
as President of the Commission, to "continue his goodwill toward the Federal
Chancellor", Hallstein supposedly replied: "Chancellor, I learnt from you how to
deal with those who represent the constituent parts of the state, the Lander.".315
This quote should illustrate with what earnestness and consistency, as well as strict
obedience to the Community treaties he assumed his new role. As he also played a
major role in the process of all main appointments of the first few years, he largely
came to decide the size of the Commission administration.316 Walter Hallstein
served as the President of the EEC Commission until the Merger of the Executives
in 1967.
"I4
Comparisons are often made between the Presidency of Walter Hallstein
(1958-1967) and that of Jacques Delors (1985-1995) who both executed a strong
leadership role, resulting in presidencies of evolution of progress.
"l3 Bond. Smith and Wallace (1996) p. 114.
~'16 View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
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2.3 The members of the first European Commission
One of the three Vice-Presidents was Sicco Mansholt from the Netherlands.
He served as Vice-President from 1958 until 1967, and later as Vice-President of the
single Commission of the European Communities after the Merger in 1967. He had
earlier been a Socialist Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (1945-58). Already in
1950 had he proposed to the OEEC the establishment of a sovereign European body
to bring down customs barriers and to fix the prices of agricultural products. As he
expressed it in a conversation with Janine Delaunay:
"Dans des annees 1951. 1952. j 'ai commence a m 'initier aux relations
internationales, a la politique agricole europeenne. Apres 1952, j'ai
entrepris un effort plus systematique pour arriver non pas a un traite
agricole, mais a un programme des regies communes pour
I'importation et I'exportation des produits agricoles dans les pays,
adherents a la communaute du charbon et de I'acier. C'etait le
premier plan agricole europeen." 317
What he here referred to was the so-called "Green Pool" which was attempted set
up under the framework of the OEEC.318 He had also had the wish to become the
very first President of the European Commission. However, when the German
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer heard about him, it seemed unthinkable to have a
President of the Commission who was both a socialist and a farmer. Nevertheless,
as Vice-President and Commissioner for Agriculture he was more than accepted, and
in 1972 he was chosen as the President of the common Commission of the European
Communities. His name is also linked to the battle for a political union by means of
economic and social policies.
The other Vice-President was a Frenchman, Robert Marjolin. who held his
,|7 Mansholt (1974) La Crise. p. 46.
",|8 The "Green Pool" negotiations took place within the framework of the
OEEC at the beginning of the 1950s. Later, several of the ideas launched during
these negotiations were picked up again by Sicco Mansholt during the preparations
for a Common Agricultural Policy, from 1958 onwards. View expressed in
conversation with M. Emile Noel in Paris on 12 December 1994.
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position between 1958 and 1967.?1" During 1945 and 1946 he worked with Jean
Monnet in the recovery plan of France. Further, he was the former Secretary
General of the OEEC (1948-55), where he was involved in managing the Marshall
Plan. Later, he served as the Head of the French delegation at official level to the
negotiations of the Treaties of Rome, under the authority of the French Foreign
Minister, Christian Pineau. and of Maurice Faure.320 He was also a professor of
Law and Economic Science and a member of the Socialist party since 1929. He was
respected as an administrator and had even been one of the suggestions to replace
Jean Monnet as President of the High Authority.
The third in the group of Vice-Presidents was Piero Malvestiti from Italy. He
had been a Deputy Under-Secretary in various ministries (1946-58), as well as being
a philosopher and an economist, representing the Christian Democratic Party. He
also played an important part in the Italian resistance during the Second World War.
On 15 September 1959 he resigned from the Commission in order to replace Paul
Finet as President of the High Authority of the ECSC, where he stayed until 1963.
He was replaced in the Commission by Giuseppe Caron, former Under-Secretary of
State in the Italian government.
The political equilibrium mentioned above which was created by appointing
three, instead of two Vice-Presidents, was made up by President Hallstein and Piero
Malvestiti representing the Christian Democratic parties of their countries, and on
the other hand, Sicco Mansholt and Robert Marjolin being both Socialists. It was
thought, although their political affiliations were not supposed to matter, that this
jl" Emile Noel has pointed out the fact that the group of three Vice-Presidents
was not divided according to any rank, apart from possibly the element of age. The
order they appear in this text is therefore no according to rank, and solely the
responsibility of the author.
Maurice Faure was the Secretary General of the Radical Socialist Party and
a member of the French Assemblee Nationale. In February 1956 he was appointed
as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Guy Mollet Government. Under the
Foreign Minister. Christian Pineau. he was the main French negotiator for the
Treaties of Rome at political level. In 1956 he also negotiated with Walter Hallstein
about the Saar.
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would be a better arrangement among the group of president/vice-presidents. Sicco
Mansholt and Piero Malvestiti were both reputable party politicians in their own
countries. Robert Marjolin was a respected political official, and Walter Hallstein
represented both the category of a respected academic as well as a higher political
official. Another reason for having three Vice-Presidents was that there would be one
representative from all the three "big" countries, and one representing the Benelux
countries. However, not much has been written about this in the literature. It seems
to be a decision that was taken in complete unanimity because it was felt necessary
and therefore did not need too much discussion. According to the Executive
Secretary at the time, Emile Noel, this decision did not make much of a difference
for the running of the Commission either. The Vice-Presidents did not execute any
particular powers and had no other duties than the ordinary members. The only
difference, although important to the person concerned, was a 10% higher
salary.'21
The other six were so-called members of the Commission.322 One was
Giuseppe Petrilli from Italy. He was a specialist in economics, finance and social
insurance, and a Christian Democrat. He was a member of the Commission until
October I960.323 The second member from Germany was Hans von der Groeben.
He was a civil servant and a former member of the Spaak Committee, as well as of
the Coordinating Commission of the ECSC Council of Ministers (COCOR). Later
he became one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Rome for Germany. He was a
member of the EEC Commission until 1967, and of the joint Commission until 1970.
In the two Commissions he worked tirelessly for the creation of the Community
competition policy. His political affiliations, however, were never known at the time,
although after having left the Commission, he became a member of the CDU. The
,21 View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
~22 According to Robert Lemaignen, critics of the creation of the European
Community and of the Commission spoke of the division between President - Vice-
Presidents - members as being inspired by the South-American Armies consisting
of one General, three Colonels and five simple soldiers. Lemaignen (1964) p. 27.
j2j Condorelli Braun (1972) p. 225.
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second member from France was Robert Lemaignen, a businessman and Vice-
President of the International Relations Committee of CNPF (Conseil National du
Patronat Frangais). He was independent of any party affiliations, and he left the
Commission in January 1962. Robert Marjolin had been the one obvious candidate
to the European Commission from France, and Prime Minister Antoine Pinay was
nominated as the second candidate. However, he refused as a matter of principle as
he felt the country had too many problems with the Fourth Republic falling to pieces
and his place would therefore have to be where he was.324 Although Pinay refused
the position himself he had at first strong wishes for the candidate to be one of his
political friends. However, as this failed, a non-political figure was suggested. The
candidature of Robert Lemaignen was put forward with the idea of being a business
interest group official in the Commission, with intimate knowledge of the CNPF and
the unions. The fact that he was chosen was. further, considered as a sign of
willingness from the Government's side to assure the goodwill of the employers who
were still rather critical towards European integration.
The Belgian member was Jean Rey. He was a lawyer and a former Liberal
Minister of Economic Affairs. At the age of 34, in 1939, he was elected to the
"Chambre des Representants" for the first time, where he stayed until 1958,
representing his home town of Liege. In 1949 he made his debut in the Government
as Minister of Reconstruction, and later he became the Minister of Economic Affairs
(1954-58), the latter also involving him in the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome.
He had already taken up seat in the Council of Ministers of the ECSC where he held
the presidency three times and became deeply involved in the running of the Coal
and Steel Community. He offered a moral authority and a patriotism which had put
him two years in a concentration camp during the Second World War. With a perfect
knowledge of four languages as well as being a good orator with an amazing
working power made him well prepared for the difficult tasks in the European
~24 The Fourth Republic fell on 14 May 1958. In June the same year General
Charles de Gaulle was appointed as Prime Minister of France, and on 4 October the
new Constitution of the Fifth Republic was accepted in a referendum. In 1959 de
Gaulle was elected President of the French Republic, a position which he held until
1969.
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Commission. By being a Protestant he represented a minority in Belgium of only 2%
at the time. From 6 July 1967. when the three executives of the European
Communities merged, he was appointed President of the Commission of the
European Communities. Before 1967, Germany. France and Italy held the
presidencies of one Community each325. After the merger, however, it was
necessary with a rotation in favour of one of the smaller countries and Jean Rey
from Belgium was chosen. At this time Jean Rey had just had great success in
terminating the Kennedy Round of the GATT negotiations as the Commission
representative being the Commissioner for External Relations. After he left the
European Community he served at the European College in Bruges as the President
of the Council of Administration, as well as being a member of the "Chambre des
Representants de I'Europe Unie". In his view the spirit of the Community, if not to
say its profound ideology, was Democracy. "Democracy is everywhere in our treaty.
Democracy is the spiritual basis of the community of our different countries."326
According to Rey the word "Community" had two meanings. One would be the
spiritual one and the other the institutional one. The spiritual meaning, he said, was
a common faith and a profound ideal which made people stick together.
From Luxembourg came Michel Rasquin. He was a journalist and a former
Socialist Minister of Economic Affairs (1951-58), and he had been in the Council
of Ministers of the ECSC. His career in the Commission became short, however,
with his death in June 1958.327 Lambert Schaus was a lawyer, a diplomat and a
politician. He was a former Minister of Economic Affairs and Army, representing
the Christian Democratic Party, and was appointed to take over the membership post
j27 The President of the EEC, Walter Hallstein, came from Germany and the
President of Euratom, Louis Armand, from France. The latter resigned from his
position in June 1958 due to health reasons, and was replaced by another
Frenchman. Etienne Hirsch. Italy had the presidency of ECSC from 1959 with
Piero Malvestiti (1959-1963) and Dino Del Bo (1963-1967).
j26 Fenaux (1972) p. 127. "La democratic est partout dans notre traite. La
democratic est la base spirituelle de la Communaute de nos differents pays. " Own
translation.
'27 Michel Rasquin was obliged to leave the Commission already at the end of
March 1958 due to his illness.
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for Luxembourg. He had taken part in the Spaak Committee and had also been the
head of the Luxembourg delegation during the Treaty of Rome negotiations, as well
as in the Interim Committee. When the EEC was set up he served as a Permanent
Representative with the Communities until the death of Michel Rasquin. He was
appointed as a Commissioner on 18 June 1958 and retired in 1967 when he was
appointed as Ambassador of Luxembourg in Belgium.
In the group of the original nine Commissioners one can find a pattern of
three groups. One group would be of reputable party politicians in which were Sicco
Mansholt, Jean Rey and Piero Malvestiti. Robert Marjolin, Hans von der Groeben,
Lambert Schaus and Giuseppe Petrilli all belonged to the group of political officials,
whereas Robert Lemaignen was the economist. President Walter Hallstein would
represent a group of his own as he was not only the president, but also an academic
and a political official.
The appointment of Walter Hallstein, one of Germany's most senior officials
at the time, as president was, in fact, seen as a political decision. This was
particularly true regarding the fact that his political line had been made known
through a number of speeches and political actions. However, what was stressed by
the Commissioners themselves, many of whom were also high officials in their
countries, was the political importance of their task as opposed to being purely
bureaucrats in a European Administration.
Later members of the European Commission under President Hallstein's
leadership were Lionello Levi-Sandri from Italy who succeeded Giuseppe Petrilli in
February 1961, and became Vice-President in 1964. He was an Administrator,
professor and municipal councillor from the Social Democratic Party. Further, there
was Giuseppe Caron, another Italian, industrialist, senator and junior minister from
the Christian Democratic Party. He stayed in the Commission until May 1963,
serving as Vice-President from December 1959. Before that he served in the
Common Assembly of the ECSC between 1954 and 1958. Lastly, from France, came
Henri Rochereau who was an exporter, senator (1946-59), and former Minister of
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Agriculture (1959-61). from the centre-right Independent Republican Party (RI).
In the European Commission during the presidency of Walter Hallstein,
which lasted from 1958 until 1967. there served altogether 14 Commissioners. Only
five of these had experience as fully fledged national ministers, while President
Hallstein had been Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office. Commissioner
Caron had been Italian junior minister and deputy. The remaining seven were all
civil servants, academics or "technicians". Five of them came from the Christian
Democratic parties of their countries. Three were Socialists, one was a Fiberal, one
a Social Democrat, another was an Independent Republican and, for the remaining
three, their political affiliations were unknown. Although nothing was written on this
matter, and no official agreement had been made, it became an established pattern
that the Benelux countries should have three Commissioners between them, one
Socialist, one Fiberal and one Christian Democrat. The countries with two
Commissioners, France. Germany and Italy, should not provide them from the same
political party. There was a conscious attempt to create a political balance in the
choice of members, as well as a deliberate effort to avoid the appointment of any
strong party men.
All of the members of the European Commission set up in 1958 were highly
respectable people. They all had a mixture of administrative and political experience
from their countries in the past, but there were no political leaders among them. A
large number of the early Commission members had also taken part in the
negotiations relating to European affairs and the Treaties setting-up the European
Communities. This made them convinced, through their practical experience and
personal commitment, about the need for European integration as well as in real
contact with European affairs.328 Not only was this a unique situation which could
only be characteristic of the early history of the European Commission. Together
with other external factors, this might also have been the reason for its early success
and fast progress. Later on. when the Commissioners became more distant from the
28 View expressed by Enrile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
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treaties, the picture would change. Among the group of original Commissioners six
stayed for the whole period the European Commission operated as a single
Commission. Of these, three stayed to serve the Single Commission after the Merger
of the Executives, of whom two served time as presidents.329
2.4 Appointments of Commissioners and Officials
According to Article 7 of the Staff Regulations330 nationality should not be
taken into account when appointing officials to the Commission administration: "The
appointing authority shall, acting solely in the interest of the service and without
regard to nationality, [...].1,331 These Regulations did not come into force until 1
January 1962. Nevertheless, the sort of gentleman's agreement implied about the
appointment according to nationalities was still applied and placed a certain
responsibility on the Selection Board to maintain a rough national balance. Each
country's contribution to the Community budget also came into consideration here.
It was felt that a fair balance between the nationalities of the member States had to
be kept so as not to create bad feelings between them. This was not, however, meant
as any kind of nationalism. It was built on the idea that all members, in this case
nation states, should have equally many representatives measured according to their
populations. It would have been impossible to create an executive supranational body
where national quotas would not be necessary or even wanted.
Lists of potential candidates were drawn up for each nationality by the
"'29 Walter Hallstein (President 1958-67), Sicco Mansholt (Vice-President 1958-
67, Vice-President 1967-70. President March 1972 - January 1973), Robert
Marjolin (1958-67). Hans von der Groeben (1958-67, 1967-70), Jean Rey (1958-67,
President 1967-70). Lambert Schaus (1958-67).
JJ,) The Staff Regulations came into force on 1 January 1962 and will be
discussed under point 6. "The setting up of internal administrative structures and
the creation of a "Statut de Service" for the Commission.
Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The Official
Journal of the European Communities, 14.6.62, 1385/62.
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Commissioner(s) concerned, with the help of close personal and political friends and
assistants, and by others in the national administrations and elsewhere closely
involved in negotiating the Treaty of Rome. Candidates came mainly from
government departments and other international institutions, but also from business,
industry, universities and other professional occupations. What they all had in
common, and their only criteria, was that they were all "pro-Europeans". Before the
Staff Regulations came into force, recruitment of higher officials came mainly from
the outside, as mentioned above. After 1962, moreover, promotion or transfer came
to a large extent from within, or was done by internal competition.332
As mentioned above, the principal characteristic the members of the first
Commission had in common, and their main criteria for being selected, was that they
were all considered as "good Europeans", as well as being highly qualified men in
other ways. They had all previously been involved in various ways with the
foundation of the Community and had great ambitions for the creation of a Federal
Europe. In the early days, before the Staff Regulations of 1962, secondment of civil
servants was the only way they could serve with the Commission without losing their
rights associated with work in the national administrations. Therefore, the ones
serving with the Commission in the beginning were all committed to the cause of
European integration. Secondment was also considered, in particular by the French,
as a way of Europeanizing the national civil services by letting as many as possible
serve with the Commission for a while, and then return to their home countries.333
332 Coombes (1970) p. 141-142.
According to Emile Noel, however, secondment from the French
administration was not as significant as some have argued. It was only possible for
administrative tasks and, although it was possible to give secondment for a long
time, it was not so easy to come back to the French administration. Some years, it
seems, was all right, but for a longer period, it could be difficult to obtain a
position of the same sort of importance within the national administration.
Therefore, secondments were usually preferred to be short, which would as well
strengthen the Europeanization of the French administration more. Those who
stayed in the Commission for longer periods would normally stay in Brussels,
building a career as a European official, as they were usually the most convinced
"Europeans" from the start. View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in
Paris on 12 December 1994.
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In connection with secondment from the French administration it should also be
mentioned the fact that the Government under General de Gaulle was rather reluctant
towards the European administration and that the officials who came from the French
administration therefore tended to have a stronger personal commitment than those
recruited as purely technicians.334
As has been mentioned above, the Commissioners were appointed by the
representatives of their member States in Paris on 6-7 January, and took up their
duties officially on 16 January. The Commissioners had. however, held meetings
before, in an old hotel in Luxembourg. At this time only the nine Commissioners
and the Executive Secretary were present. The idea was then that "il faut faire
Europe",335 All they had at the time was a few files, the treaties and great ideas,
not even paper and pens. In the beginning the nine both lived and worked together.
They had no staff yet, nor secretaries, but what they had was great confidence and
lots of optimism for the new future.
Hallstein preferred meetings to be held in small, intimate rooms, reducing to
a minimum the number of collaborators to accompany the meetings. He preferred
the nine Commissioners to meet alone on the basis of psychological reason, believing
it would create the necessary amicable team spirit. Efficiency, he believed, depended
on an affectionate and total confidence between the nine, which would create a
"family feeling" and the "total" independence which the Commission needed in
particular in the beginning.336 By this he made sure that in the early days of the
Commission a real teamwork and a real team spirit existed between the members,
which was due to a genuine effort by President Hallstein in the attempt of reaching
common decisions.337
J'4 View expressed by Emile Noel in conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
"We must create Europe." Own translation. Mansholt (1974) p. 86.
"6 Mansholt (1974) p. 86.
v'7 View expressed by M. Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12
December 1994.
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3. EUROPEAN COMMISSION STRUCTURES
The European Commission started the building of its organisation from the
top down. The setting-up of the administration was done almost without written
texts, through "tete-a-tete" conversations, as well as in plenary meetings, without
plan, changing points of view and progressively adopting one position after the
other. It made arrangements for work to be divided up within the Commission itself,
before it would decide on the occupants of most of the senior administrative posts
like the heads of the departments of the administration. Later would come the
interdepartmental planning and other staffing questions. Although the Commission
appeared to be quite a "heavy" administration, there was no attempt of setting-up the
whole administration at one time in the very beginning. This was something that had
to come as time went by and the needs for how the administration ought to look like
would become more clear. As Jean Rey put it:
"Souvent, nous, les commissaires, suggerons des methodes
administratives que nous connaissons bien dans notre pays - et qui
nous semblent par consequent naturelles et normales - alors que nos
collegues s'etonnent ou s'esclaffent, en se disant qu'on n'a jamais
entendu parler d'idees aussi originales."338
The dominant characteristic of the administrative structures of the
Commission was, nevertheless, its formal resemblance to that of national
administrations divided into ministerial departments. In this respect the Commission
was divided into Directorates General (DGs) which received their instructions from
the individual Commissioners responsible for the various fields of activities, or
Portfolios as they were called.
v,s Cassese and della Cananea. The Commission of the European Economic
Community: the Administrative Ramifications of its Political Development (1957-
1967). In: Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 84. "Often, we
the Commissioners, suggested administrative methods which we knew well from
our own countries, and that seemed consequently quite normal - whereas our
colleagues would be amazed or even burst out laughing, saying they had never
heard of such strange ideas." Own translation.
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3.1 Portfolios
One would have thought that the European Commission would have looked
towards the High Authority of the ECSC and organised itself accordingly, as the
former was the only similar body existing. Nevertheless, it was more or less the
opposite that happened, and the system of Groups in the High Authority worked in
a very different way from that of Portfolios in the Commission.339 From the
beginning eight different Portfolios were set up. and one for administrative matters.
To facilitate cooperation between the Commissioners, and following the principle of
collegiality, each area consisted of a group of three to four Commissioners.340 One
presided the work, acting as the president of the group, and exercising a particular
responsibility in the area. The other two or three were ordinary members. According
to former Executive Secretary Emile Noel, however, these groups more or less
disappeared after only a few months, or appeared only occasionally, and existed
mainly as a means to choose officials and appoint staff. Although they did exist,
most of them had a limited, or sometimes fictional role.341 At the head of each DG
there was a Director General. The DGs were further "divided into Directorates"
with three to four Directors, "and sub- divided into Divisions"342, with three to
four Heads of Division.
By the end of March 1958 the broad lines of the organisation of the
Commission was more or less completed. A year later, on 7 March 1959, the
Commission had set up definitions and descriptions of the work of the higher civil
At the time when an administrative reorganisation of the High Authority
seemed inevitable its President Piero Malvestiti (1959-63) came up with the "idea
of adopting the organizational structure of the EEC". Spierenburg and Poidevin
(1994) p. 479.
340 Coombes (1970) p. 124.
j41 View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
j4: Coombes (1970) p. 124.
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servants of Category A.343 The Directors General, as well as the Executive
Secretary Emile Noel, were all formally appointed on the same day, at a
Commission meeting on the 23-24 March, after a long meeting between the
Commissioners and President Hallstein. The initial proposals had been presented by
the responsible Commissioner assisted by his two assessors.
During the first few months of 1958 there was a conscious attempt within the
Commission to establish an administration with structures as easy and
straightforward as possible. To achieve this it had been necessary to keep the number
of big administrative units at a minimum. The notion of having a "light"
administration had been inherited from the High Authority. As its President, Jean
Monnet had refrained himself from creating an administration that would be too big
for the members to have a complete picture of the work in progress. With Rene
Mayer as the next president the picture changed somehow. Not only because it fitted
more with the personality of Rene Mayer, who had a background from the French
Assemblee Nationale, but also because the tasks of the High Authority had expanded
and more administration and bureaucracy was therefore needed.344
Walter Hallstein came from the German bureaucratic traditions, which
generally tends to have a strongly hierarchical structured administration. This meant
a system where each administrative level would have been given its responsibility
and all its affairs would either go up or down from there.345 However, the system
of the new German republic was also one of a relatively small Bonn administration
"4" Communaute' Econontique Europeenne, Commission, Secretariat. Bruxelles,
le 7 mars 1959. Confidentiel. Description des Taches des Fonctionnaires de
Categorie "A". CEAB 2/1672.
~44 See Chapter 11. 3. The Development of the High Authority and its
Administration.
,4;i Emile Noel. Temoignage: 1'administration de la Communaute europeenne
dans la retrospective d'un ancien haut fonctionnaire. In: Yearbook of European
Administrative History 1992. p. 150.
174
and "heavier" administrations in the Lander.346 As has been mentioned above.
Hallstein took part in building up the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
therefore had a unique experience which made him particularly fit for the job as
President of the European Commission. The system of the European Community
was, at least intentionally, to be built on much the same principles as the federal
system in Germany. The central administration in Brussels and as its task the
conception and general orientation of Community affairs. The necessary measures
concerning implementation required an important number of executive personnel
within the national administrations. The way the Commission was built up was
according to a very conscious choice of Hallstein, although all the time in agreement
with his colleagues. It was seen as useful to build an efficient administration from
the start which would be able to give answers to the many problems. It was also
going to take part in real political discussions at a high level. From the point of view
of Emile Noel, this was how the Commission came to operate in its early years.347
Hallstein saw the need to restrict the size of the European Commission
administration. At the same time, he wanted the Commission administration to have
only planning, supervisory and monitoring functions, a view which had been shared
earlier by Jean Monnet. Nevertheless, the two had different models and aims.
According to Cassese and della Cananea, this was the reason why "the Commission
was not charged with implementation tasks and did not need a "street corner"
bureaucracy".348 As President Hallstein himself once said to his colleagues in the
Commission: "nous allons etablir line grande administration" of which he meant "an
administration capable of dealing independently, based on its own competencies, with
,4h
Apart from federal responsibilities like for example Foreign Affairs and
Defence, the Bonn administration was kept at a minimum.
,J7 View expressed by Emile Noel in conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
,4S Cassese and della Cananea in: Yearbook of European Administrative History
1992. p. 89.
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the most important preparatory studies for which the Commission is
responsible".349 It will, nevertheless, have to be mentioned in this respect the fact
that there were people who considered the Commission as too bureaucratic already
from its beginning. As expressed by M. Pierre Uri, it must be considered as a
mistake to have set up the Commission administration straight away. Consequently
the Commission became too busy in making a bureaucracy instead of being occupied
with European affairs, something which was instead left to the Council of
Ministers.350
In relation to staffing, the main preoccupation in building up the
administration was, in the beginning, to secure officials of the highest quality
possible. During the first few months the Commission consisted of only twenty to
thirty people and no real administration. Most of the work that was to be done had
to be done at a high level, and until the end of March 1958 this meant the
Commissioners and the Commission President themselves, only assisted by their
personal assistants. When it came to the recruitment of staff for the higher level, the
final decisions were taken by the Commission itself. President Hallstein, however,
maintained a strong supervision of all appointments.
As has been mentioned above, the so-called Groups that were set up between
the Commissioners in the various areas do not seem to have had any great
significance, and according to Emile Noel their role was rapidly reduced.351
Nevertheless, they were set up at an early stage and it is worth having a look at how
",49 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 152. "we are going
to establish a grand administration." "line administration capable de traiter
independamment, du fait de sa propre competence, / essentiel des etudes
preparatoires incombant d la Commission." Own translations.
Interview with M. Pierre Uri by Ambassador R. Ducci, Principal of the
Faculty of Social Science. University of Rome, and Madame Melchionni, Assistant
Principal of same University, in Paris on 21 September 1984. In the Archives of
the European Communities, European University Institute. Florence.
■ol View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
176
they were organised, and how they were supposed to have functioned. They are also
mentioned in the literature, by Leon N. Lindberg,353 David Coombes,353 and in
the book by the former Commissioner Robert Lemaignen.354 Furthermore, they
were mentioned in the First General Report on the Activities of the Community.355
As it appeared in a confidential report from the Secretariat of the Commission on 5
March 1958, the distribution and composition of groups had now been set up, as
well as its tasks defined.356 This report contained all the eight groups, the one for
administration, and the Secretariat with the tasks of each group and the names of its
members.
Group I, which dealt with External Relations, had Jean Rey as president, and
Robert Marjolin and Giuseppe Petrilli as members. Three nationalities were hereby
represented; Belgium, France and Italy. This group was divided into three different
parts. The first one dealt with general questions like international organisations, as
well as ambassadors from third countries and international organisations to the
European Community. The second dealt with membership or association by third
countries, and thirdly there was one dealing with commercial policies. The latter
comprised matters such as customs negotiations, autonomous modifications of the
common external tariff and safeguarding clauses in cases of diversion of traffic.357
As Director General was appointed a German, Mr. Seeliger, of ambassador rank.
As the former Executive Secretary Emile Noel has pointed out, the fact that Jean
Lindberg (1963) p. 72.
Coombes (1970) p. 124.
"54 Lemaignen (1964) pp. 65-66.
First General Report on the Activities of the Community, 1 January - 17
September 1958, p. 21. "Internal Organisation of the European Commission.
Division of responsibilities and composition of the groups." It is here stated that the
work of the Commission had been divided into eight technical sections as well as
one for administrations. Each of the technical sections had been entrusted to a
group of three to four members of whom one was the chairman of the group.
",56 Communaute Economique Europeenne, Commission. Secretariat. Bruxelles,
le 5 mars 1958. Confidentiel. Repartition et Composition des Groupes. (40/58-F)
"7
Articles 115 and 134 of the Treaty of Rome.
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Rey was the Commissioner for External Relations made him have to cooperate with
other Commissioners like Hans von der Groeben and Sicco Mansholt. The main
problem to deal with in 1958 had been the Free Trade Area negotiations which were
conducted by Jean Rey, although openly and involving Petrilli and Marjolin.
However, this was done on an informal basis.338
In Group II Robert Marjolin served as president, with Hans von der Groeben,
Piero Malvestiti, and Sicco Mansholt as the three members. These four represented
four different nationalities; France. Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. This group
dealt with economic and financial matters and was the one Marjolin had hoped to be
given the responsibility for. He had experience in this area from his time as
Secretary General of the OEEC. It was, like the first one, divided into three areas.
There was one for the study of the evolution of the economic and political situation.
The second dealt with monetary policies, and the third with investment. The Italian
Franco Bobba served as the first Director General, a higher official from the
Department of Economy of Foreign Affairs, who also had played an important part
in the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome.
Group III was the one for Internal Market, lead by Piero Malvestiti. The
other members here were Schaus and Rey, with the Frenchman Frangois-Xavier
Ortoli as Director General.359 Chef de Cabinet was Gambelli, a General Inspector
of Administrative Affairs in the Ministry of Economy in Italy. He had followed all
the Treaty negotiations, particularly those relating to the Customs Union. Eater, he
was offered the department of Commercial Affairs in DG VIII, coordinating the
European Customs Union with the commercial policies of the Overseas Territories.
Further, there was Group IV which dealt with Competition under the
"8 View expressed by Ernile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
'olJ According to Emile Noel. M. Ortoli worked as the Chef de Cabinet to
Robert Lemaignen for a few months, before being appointed Director General of
the Internal Market Directorate.
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presidency of Hans von der Groeben, with the Dutch Mr. Veerloren van Themat,
an economist, lawyer and university professor as Director General. The other
members from the Commission were Marjolin and Rey. Group V for Social
Questions was the area of Giuseppe Petrilli. It consisted of the two members
Mansholt and Lemaignen, and got the Belgian Mr. De Muyinck as Director General.
The latter was an old trade unionist who enjoyed a great moral authority in the
Belgian environment of workers.
Group VI for Agriculture was led by Sicco Mansholt. While Louis Rabot
from France was his Director General, there were a further three members from the
Commission; Lemaignen, Schaus and von der Groeben. The above mentioned Rabot
was a higher official in the area of Agriculture who had known Mansholt for a long
time, not least from the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. He had come from the
OEEC where he had been in charge of the agricultural department where he also had
been involved in the negotiations for a "Green Pool". Mr. Van der Lee was
appointed as the Chef de Cabinet of Mansholt as he was a man of higher university
culture in Law and Economics, oriented towards humanitarian and social questions
with many friends in the leading political and economic environments of the
Netherlands. In Group VII for Transport, Michel Rasquin was its leader,360 and
Malvestiti and Lemaignen its members. This Group got a Director General from
Italy, Mr. Renzetti, who was a higher official from the Ministry of Transport in
Rome.
Group VIII for Overseas countries and territories was the responsibility of
Robert Lemaignen, with the assistance of von der Groeben and Petrilli. The Director
General. Mr. Allardt, came from Germany, and had for six years been the German
ambassador in Djakarta. In France there had been a certain opposition to having a
German Director General in the DG for Overseas countries and territories. The
reason for this, as Lemaignen explained, was the fact that many countries, especially
in Africa, which were dependent on France, had been under German domination
"60 Michel Rasquin died in June 1958 and his fellow countryman Lambert
Schaus took over his position.
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during the First World War.361 Fie therefore had to appoint a Frenchman as
Director General to start with. Jacques Vignes, an inspector of the Overseas
territories who had also been a defender of the French point of view relating to the
Overseas territories in the Treaty negotiations. It was only after Lemaignen had
managed to calm down Paris as well as the African capitals that Mr. Allardt could
be nominated, which must be seen as an important step, despite differences in the
relationship between the latter and Lemaignen.362 Chef de Cabinet of Lemaignen
was Jacques Ferrandi who had for a long time served as the Director General of
Economic Affairs in Dakar with qualities as negotiator and experience with the
African economies.363
The ninth Group dealt with Administration and personnel matters and was
separated from the other eight in the way it was set up and run. It was divided into
three different divisions; Internal Affairs, Budget and Personnel.364 This Group
worked under the control of the President of the Commission, assisted by the three
Vice-Presidents, the so-called "Meeting of the Presidents".365 It was done this way
as it was felt that these matters were of such great importance for the running of the
Commission as a whole, and the way it would be shaped, that an overall leadership
would be needed. In practice this meant that any initiative had to come from the
President himself. The President also had the right to put any matter before the
"6I As Robert Lemaignen expressed it himself, this was particularly upsetting
for French and African politicians due to the German domination in Togo and
Cameroun which had been "worsened by the outburst of Hitlerian racism". (
"aggraves par Veclat du racism hitlerien") Lemaignen (1964) p. 66-67.
~62
Lemaignen (1964) p. 66
j6" Former Executive Secretary Emile Noel, on the other hand, did not agree
with such a presentation of the Commission and claimed there to have been other,
unknown reasons for not appointing Mr. Allart immediately. View expressed by
Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December 1994.
-,64 Services common to all the three Communities. ECSC, EEC and Euratom:
Legal Service, Statistical Office and the Common Service for Press and
Information.
After the initial few months, as Emile Noel recalls, the "Meeting of the
Presidents" came together with less frequency. See below 5.1.
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European Commission at any time as being a person above the Groups and the
Directorates General.366 The ninth Group did not, however, meet with too much
frequency. Within this Group, which was totally separate from the DG IX for
Administration, was also put the responsibility for the Common Services which each
was run by an Inter-executive Group, formed by Commissioners from the two
Commissions of the EEC and Euratom, as well as representatives from the High
Authority.367
The DG IX for Administration was divided into three Directorates. By 1967
it had become the largest single unit among the Commission's administrative
services, with more than twice as many officials as the largest of the other DGs.
However, due to its structures and leadership, it was also the weakest and the least
autonomous, with less power delegated from the Commission staff. One of the
reasons for the size of the DG IX had to do with the large number of translators,
interpreters, and also of various technicians. The size of this DG, therefore, does
not tell very much about its organisation or importance. The Director General of DG
IX was the Dutch Mr. van Karnebek. He was a diplomat from a family traditionally
attached to the "Pleyjn", the Dutch "Quai d'Orsay".
3.2 Directorates General
In correspondence with the groups indicated above, the Commission also
organised its services into nine Directorates General, and one Executive Secretariat.
In the beginning there was normally one DG under the responsibility of each
Commissioner.368 To these groups were added other sectors, in particular certain
services that the three executives had in common. The DGs themselves were also
jA6 £££ _ pjrst Qeneraj Rep0rt 1958. p. 21.
"6/ View expressed by Ernile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
-6S As the Commission has expanded its role into other areas, as well as
enlarged the number of member States in the Community, the number of DGs has
increased. There are as of 1995 more than one DG under each Commissioner.
(1994: 17 Commissioners and 23 DGs. 1995: 20 Commissioners and 23 DGs)
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subdivided into directorates endowed with proper allocations. Each Directorate,
further contained three to four Divisions which were sub-areas of the Directorates.
The DGs were lead by a Director General, who would be the highest civil servant
in the Commission administration, an administrative figure who played the role more
or less as the Permanent Secretary in a British Government. Apart from Luxembourg
with no Director General,369 and Belgium which had one, the other member Slates
were all represented with two Directors General. As the head of its administration
the Director General was responsible to the Commission, through the appropriate
Commissioner. Serving as the head of each Directorate was a Director, and the
Divisions all had their "Chef de Division"-, Head of Division.
At the time of the publishing of the First General Report, on 17 September
1958, the principal framework of the groups had been equipped with their tenure and
a certain number of officials had also been recruited. This, in fact, had been done
relatively quickly at an earlier stage. As has been mentioned above, the broad lines
of the Commission's organisation was already set up by the beginning of March
1958, and the DGs were constructed shortly afterwards. Considering the provisional
character of the administrative and financial regime, it seems that the personnel had
been engaged on much the same basis as what was practiced by the ECSC. This
meant that the European Commission also made possible a harmonisation of the
regimes applicable to the personnel in all three of the European Communities.
A provisional plan for the distribution of tasks in the DGs was published in
February of 1958,370 however with some posts among the personnel still being
vacant as the Council of Ministers would distribute these the year after. It shows that
some stress was put on national quotas. According to an early agreement, each
country had a certain number of posts, but when it came to higher levels, these had
~'69 The Government of Luxembourg had considered it difficult to present an
adequate candidate, from its small population, for such a heavy task as a Director
General.
,7" Communaute Economique Europeenne. Commission. Plan Provisoire de
Repartition des Taches. (1652/2/58-F)
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to be staffed by different nationalities. The Commissioner and the Director General
had to be of different nationality, and the same applied for the Director General and
the Director of the same DG. The division by nationalities was, in principle, based
on the same system with the same quotas used for the Commissioners: two each for
Germany, France and Italy, and three together for the Benelux countries. Despite
such a division, there were no strict rules regarding the distribution of posts. From
very early on, however, Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries had more
or less the same number of grade A officials.
Discussions were going on between the Commissioners during the period
from January until March 1958 about portfolios, the structuring of the DGs, naming
of Directors General and so forth. The selection of candidates to posts in the DGs
was a careful process which was followed closely by President Hallstein. The
Directors General were chosen by the responsible Commissioner, assisted by his
assessors, before their appointments were taken to the Commission.'71
Nevertheless, all the main candidates were personally received by President Hallstein
for an interview, and his "green light" was essential for any appointment. On the 23-
24 March 1958 a global decision was taken where all the nine Directors General,
together with the Executive Secretary, were nominated. Decisions regarding the
more detailed structure of the DGs were taken shortly after by the Commissioners
and their President jointly. The problem from this date onwards was to implement
the decisions taken.372
3.3 The Executive Secretary
As a tenth "division", although different and separate from the others, was
the Executive Secretariat of the Commission, which was modelled on the French
"Secretariat General du gouvernement". Its job was to prepare and run the
Commission meetings, as well as pass on decisions taken by the Commission and to
j71 Lemaignen (1964) p. 64-65.
,7: View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
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have the administrative control of the execution of these. It was further the
administrative link with other institutions of the Community and with the other two
European Communities. Of particular importance was its administrative relations
with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Communities, its working groups, and
relations with other European Assemblies. It has served as the Community's
"watchdog" vis-a-vis the administration, the member States, and the "outside" world.
The Deputy Secretary served as the Permanent Representative of the Commission in
the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The Executive Secretariat was also
responsible for the publication of the "Journal Officiel", where all official acts of the
Commission had to appear.
The idea behind the Executive Secretariat was as an attempt to institutionalise
the Commission's collegiality. It had a similar role to that of the Cabinet Secretariat
in the UK,373 and it acted as a guardian of the collegial nature of the Commission.
The role of the Executive Secretariat was described in Article 16 of the "Reglement
Interieur de la Commission",374 where it was stated that it should, among other
things, assist the President of the Commission in preparing for the Commission's
meetings, conduct the written procedure, ensure that the decisions of the Commission
were followed up as required ("s'assurer [...] la regularite de I'execution des
deliberations de la Commission")?1^ It further represented the Commission in its
The origins of the Cabinet Secretariat can be traced back to 1903 when,
under Prime Minister A. J. Balfour, a Foreign Office clerk was assigned to keep the
Minutes of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Later, the size and importance of
the Secretariat grew and it came to prepare agendas and keep Minutes as well as
provide a link between the departments concerned. During the 1950s and 1960s the
Cabinet Secretariat was the support of the whole Cabinet system, keeping the
Cabinet and the committees in mesh. The Cabinet Secretariat became an important
instrument in providing a link between decisions taken in the Cabinet or committee
and the departments of State. Patrick G. Walker (1970) The Cabinet (London:
Jonathan Cape Ltd.) pp. 48-56.
'74
Reglement Interieur de la Commission. Journal Officiel des Communautes
Europeennes. 31.1.63.
"7" "to ensure [...] the regularity in execution of Commission decisions".
Reglement Interieur de la Commission. Journal Officiel des Communautes
Europeennes. 31.1.63.
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relations with other institutions of the EEC as well as those of the ECSC and
Euratom.
The first Executive Secretary of the Executive Secretariat was the Frenchman
Emile Noel, with the Deputy Executive Secretary being the German Winrich Behr.
Originally it was meant to be no more than a technical, administrative body to assist
the Commission when required. However, under the personality of Emile Noel, it
acquired a more important role and became an essential part of the Commission's
machinery, essential for its functioning in many vital sectors.376
Emile Noel served as the Executive Secretary of the European Commission
from its start in 1958, when he was only 36 years old. He retired from this position
in 1987 to become the Principal of the European University Institute in Florence.
Before that he had already worked as a truly European civil servant. He started his
career in 1949 as the Secretary of the General Affairs Committee of the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe, where he stayed until 1952. From 1952 until
1954 he was the Head of the Secretariat of the Constitutional Committee of the ad
hoc Assembly where he was responsible for drafting a blueprint for a European
Political Community. Between 1954 and 1956 he was back in the Council of Europe
serving as the Chef de Cabinet to the then President of the Consultative Assembly
of the Council of Europe, Guy Mollet. In 1956 Guy Mollet was elected Socialist
Prime Minister of France and Emile Noel followed him as his Chef de Cabinet, and
later Deputy Director of his Private Office. In the latter position he was the Prime
Minister's representative in the French delegation to the negotiations for the Treaties
of Rome.377
Emile Noel influenced strongly trying to keep the Commission administration
as open as possible. As he was not appointed until the end of March 1958, most of
the decisions on administrative structures had already been taken and approved, and
376 Hallstein (1972) p. 61.
~77
University of Edinburgh. Degree of Doctor honoris causa. Laureation
Address, 23 July 1982: Emile Noel.
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he could do little about its shape. However, once appointed to his position, he
worked for a better coordination between the DGs, keeping all the various "lines"
open. In the beginning there were the nine Directors General, the Executive
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, and there was hardly any staff. Openness as
well as cooperation and coordination among them was essential during the first year,
and they functioned very much as a close team. Later, however, it seemed that the
DGs developed themselves as a kind of fortress, and any horizontal links between
the DGs became more and more difficult and rare. The vertical system that
developed between the DGs came soon to reveal itself as too closed, and as the
administration grew the links between the Commission and the DGs became fewer.
Nevertheless, he managed to improve the efficiency and working methods of the
Commission and its administration. Emile Noel's task was to build up an efficient
department as well as to try to maintain links with other departments and levels. In
the beginning there had been practically no links between the heads of the various
departments and the lower levels and this was where he could put in some influence
of his own. Together with the Deputy Secretary, the Executive Secretary was the
only non-Commissioner allowed to participate in the Commission meetings, which
took place on Wednesday mornings. Emile Noel further introduced a Thursday
meeting with the Directors General, as well as a Friday meeting with the assistants
to the Directors General. Both of these meetings were meant as a briefing on the
work of the Commission and its policies. With the Merger of the Executives in
1967, the Executive Secretary started to meet at a regular basis with the Chefs de
Cabinet. Such meetings helped to open up the Commission, as well as bringing the
staff into the team.378
3.4 The Committee of Permanent Representatives
During the negotiations of the Treaties of Rome, a Committee of Heads of
Delegations was set up under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak. It became a
meeting place for authorised and faithful spokesmen of the six governments. After
,7S Views expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
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25 March 1957. when the Treaties of Rome had been signed, more or less the same
men were to be found in what was known as the "Interim Committee".379 At the
conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris on 7-8 January 1958 a
Communique was published stating that "the Ministers of Foreign Affairs had
recognised the advisability of appointing permanent representatives to the
Communities as soon as possible." The Permanent Representatives were hence given
ambassadorial "rank and prerogatives", and, according to Emile Noel, it seems
reasonable to think that this was introduced at the initiative of members of the
"Interim Committee". Some of these were later to become the first Permanent
Representatives to the European Communities.380
The Treaty of Rome wanted to make the Commission into the "motor" of the
Community. However, as put by Lemaignen, "almost every time the Commission
tried to take any of the initiatives given to it by the Treaty, the national
administrations would combine their efforts in trying to substitute the Community
actions with a traditional negotiation of the Six."381 The first manifestation of this
came with the creation of the "Permanent Representatives" to the Community, in
January 1958. The decision was justified by Article 151. second paragraph, of the
Treaty of Rome, where a committee of representatives from the member States was
mentioned: "The Council shall lay down its rules of procedure. These rules of
procedure may provide for the establishment of a committee of representatives of
,79 The members of the Interim Committee were: Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers,
President (Belgium). M. Ophiiels (Germany), M. Faure (France), M. Benvenuti
(Italy). M. Schaus (Luxembourg), and M. Linthorst Hornan (Netherlands). Other
members were: M. Van Tichelen and M. Van der Meulen (Belgium). M. Cattani
(Italy), and M. Borschette (Luxembourg). The Interim Committee consisted of
heads of the national delegations who had taken part in the intergovernmental
conference. The Committee's mandate expired originally on 1 January 1958, with
the coming into force of the Treaty of Rome, however not the need for it. It
prepared the inaugural Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 25 January 1958 where
it decided unilaterally to call themselves "permanent representatives". In: Hayes-
Renshaw (1990) The Role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in the
Decision-Making Process of the European Community, p. 106.
380 Noel (1967) p. 219-220.
,SI Lemaignen (1964) p. 84.
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Member States. The Council shall determine the duties and powers of that
Committee." Nevertheless, the size and level of these delegations to the Community
would be up to the member State governments themselves to decide.3X2
As the installation of a Permanent Delegation and the appointment of a
Permanent Representative was an act of national concern, representing a member
state of the Communities, it did not need to be sanctioned by the Community. The
Committee was an auxiliary body to the Council, consisting of national civil
servants. In 1958 its role was presented as "the servant, the eye and the ear of his
Government",383 by being tied by instructions to his government. Firstly, the
Permanent Delegeations were a link between their national administrations and the
Community institutions and a mutual supply of information. Secondly, they
participated in working out and coordinating national attitudes, and lastly, they
participated directly in the work of the Community institutions. The Permanent
Delegations were also generally better informed and more alert than the government
services, and they followed closely the actions and the initiatives of the Commission.
This way they could more easily pick out what might be foreign to the views of their
Governments. The Permanent Delegations also helped working out its Government's
position on various matters. Therefore, in many ways, they acted as "ambassador of
the Community" to their Government, or one could even say that they acted "as a
powerful advocate of the Community interest when national positions are being
formulated"384. Emile Noel further argued that "[T]he Committee is sometimes the
setting chosen by the Governments to express their reservations on a measure taken,
or even a declaration made, by the Commission in the hope that they will there
It was not until the Merger Treaty. Article 4. which came into force on 1
July 1967. that a "committee consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the
Member States" was formally established. Article 4 reads as follows: "A
Committee, consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States shall
be responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks
assigned to it by the latter."
383 Noel (1967) p. 223.
~'84 Official Publication of the European Communities (1990) p. 96.
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obtain the support of other delegations - which is sometimes the case."38"' Further,
there was a civil servant from the Commission who would assist in the meetings of
the Permanent Representatives and give a report of its debates to the Commission.
Neither the Council of Ministers, nor the Permanent Representatives could
seize other questions than the ones the Treaty had foreseen in the discussions
between the Commission and the Council, which formed a necessary protection for
the role of the Commission. Considering the fact that the Committee of Permanent
Representatives was both a meeting place and a place for dialogue between the
national and Community authorities, it was seen by Emile Noel as "the beginning of
a political process working towards - and sometimes eventually achieving - the
synthesis of a Community solution which the Council and the Commission will
ultimately have to approve".386
The decision to establish the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER387) was taken at the first session of the Councils on 25 January
1958.388 However, it was not given any power of decision of its own. This would
remain entirely with the Council of Ministers. Article 16 of the Rules of Procedure
of the Council mentioned, as did the Treaty itself, a "Committee composed of
representatives of Member States". This meant that each member State remained free
whether or not it would appoint its 'representative' in the Article 16 Committee.
385 Noel (1967) p. 243.
386 official Publication of the European Communities (1990) p. 87.
"s7 COREPER stands for the French title "Comite des representants permanents
des Communautes eitrope'ennes", and will be used throughout as an abbreviation.
,ss M. Cattani from Italy was appointed as Ambassador to the Community on
11 February 1958. with the other member countries following shortly after. On 22
February M. Schaus (Luxembourg) was appointed. Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers
(Belgium) was appointed to the EEC and M. Van Tichelen (Belgium) to Euratom
on 8 April. Belgium was the only country to appoint two Ambassadors, but they
were replaced a few months later by M. van der Meulen. Further, on 19 April M.
de Carbonnet was appointed from France, M. Linthorst Floman from the
Netherlands on 12 May, and. lastly. M. Ophiiels from Germany on 26 June.
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They were neither legally obliged to entrust this function to its Permanent
Representative. This was proved by Belgium and Luxembourg who, in 1958 and
1959, expressly confirmed that their Permanent Representatives would speak for
them in the Article 16 Committee.
The system of Permanent Representatives to the Community could in certain
ways be compared with the German Lander system. The Permanent Representatives
have more or less the same relationship to the Governments as between the
permanent representatives in Bonn and the Lander ministries.
COREPER follows the same system of presidency as the Council of
Ministers. The chair would be taken by the Permanent Representative of the member
State occupying the chair at the Council, with the same six month rotation.
The Commission was represented in COREPER only by officials. COREPER
has sometimes raised the question of having members of the Commission at certain
deliberations. The Commission itself, however, preferred meetings on specific
matters between its competent member, at his invitation, and the Permanent
Representatives. As soon as the services were set up in the spring of 1958 the
Commission handed over the responsibility of representing the Commission in
COREPER permanently to the Executive Secretariat. However, the Executive
Secretary did not have this responsibility alone. Also the various Departments of the
Commission were represented according to the agenda. As Emile Noel has pointed
out. "the Executive Secretary and his deputy are represented at all Commission
meetings" which "puts them directly in the picture as to the general thinking and
main concern of the latter [the Commission], and this helps to guide their action in
the Committee [of Permanent Representatives] or, where necessary, enables them to
advise the Directorates-General."389
In Robert Lemaignen's opinion, the creation of COREPER was the first
389 Noel (1967) p. 240-241.
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attempt of the national administrations towards their secretly entertained dream of
seeing this body completely dependent on the governments, progressively substituting
itself for the Commission, shrinking the Treaty of Rome, and making its actions
discreetly oriented towards traditional international meetings.390
4. FUNCTIONS AND FEATURES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
4.1 The Functioning of the European Commission
As a Community institution the European Commission is independent of any
national or international authority, and as opposed to the Council of Ministers
representing the national interests, the Commission is the spokesman for the
"Community interests". Nevertheless, this independence of the Commission has often
been a matter of discussion. As Siotis pointed out, the "absence of certain political
conditions" has often slowed down, or even stopped completely, the activities and
processes initiated by the Commission "if the Council was unable to reach any
decision".391
The rules concerning the functioning of the Commission were established
from the very beginning by the Treaty of Rome. Article 163 stated that resolutions
of the Commission were acquired by the majority of the number of members already
fixed by the Treaty which was a majority of five votes. For the Commission to be
a quorum, it was decided that at least five members out of the nine had to be
present. This follows the example of the High Authority of the ECSC.
Rules concerning the decision-making procedures of the Commission were
mostly decided by the Treaty. However, it was up to the Commission itself to define
the particulars of its internal organisation by which decisions would be prepared and
their implementation controlled. According to the view of Sicco Mansholt, national
",9°
Lemaignen (1964) p. 87. In Emile Noel's view, however, the opinion hereby
presented has not been confirmed nor supported through the work of this body.
391 Siotis (1964) p. 229.
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sovereignty would stay total as long as the right to veto remained.392
The First General Report of the EEC of 1958 described two counter-opposed
solutions in the area of decision-making. On the one hand it was the strict collegial
virtue where even the preparation and control with implementation would be dealt
with entirely by the Commission. The other solution was one of a division of tasks
where each member of the European Commission would assume the responsibility
for one particular sector, a kind of ministerial principle. The first theory was not
considered as very practical as it would involve the Commissioners spending all their
time holding meetings. The second theory, the supranational principle, had not yet
gone far enough to allow of resort to a ministerial procedure. As a consequence, the
Commission followed the practice of the High Authority,393 adopted an
intermediate system and "divided its work into eight technical sections, to which
must be added the further section covering administrative questions".394
David Coombes, on the other hand, has pointed out the fact that "the
Commission has two essential characteristics, one of which is summed up in the term
'independent', and the other in the term 'European'". To deal with the first point
first, the Commission must listen to the member States with equal respect, and be
impartial politically as well as towards nationality. By "European" Coombes referred
to the fact that the Commission "must discern the common interest clearly and
accurately and promote it energetically. In this sense it must be partisan and
392 Mansholt (1974) p. 118.
In Jean Monnet's opinion there were two possibilities of how to organise the
work of the High Authority. Either, the President would be responsible for the
administration, although powers would be widely delegated. Further, "in discussions
and decision making, the High Authority would act as a joint body, but not where
administrative responsibilities were concerned". As a second alternative, each
member of the High Authority would be given the responsibility of a division or
a department, making the High Authority act like the Council of Ministers. Monnet
preferred the latter solution which was adopted after long consultations with the
other colleagues. Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 70-71.
'94 EEC - First General Report 1958, p. 21. The "sections" referred to here are




In his discussion about the use of the majority rule adopted by the
Commission, Siotis claimed that this practice was not all that much used. He
indicated that "rarely, if ever, were important decisions taken in the absence of
unanimity among its members", due, to a large extent, to national
considerations.396 The institutions of the EEC were based on the original concept
of an independent executive body, taking decisions by majority vote. This would
mean exercising powers transcending the national frontiers of the member States.
The ultimate objective would be to attain, through integration, a complete political
unification, or at least a federation of the Six. As an example of the use of majority
vote, he mentioned the European Danube Commission where members who found
themselves in a minority rarely exercised their veto rights because of their adherence
to the concept of the "general interest" of Europe.397 However, this was not the
case in the European Commission where national interests always seemed to come
first. He argued further that the promoters of the "functionalist integrationist"
institutions of the Communities saw their establishment as the first step towards
political union. This would, however, imply the existence of a common political
consciousness, or, at the very least, the acceptance of strong bonds of political
solidarity. As Siotis claimed, it would be difficult to say that the structures and the
functioning of the European executives were preparing the way for the realisation of
such a political union. He further pointed out the, in his view, false assumption that
395 Coombes (1970) p. 78.
,l"' Siotis (1964) p. 229- 230. Emile Noel does not wholeheartedly agree with
these arguments put forward by Siotis. According to Noel the Commission took
decisions based on a consensus during its early years, and later, in the 1960s, it
started voting procedures. The idea formed by Jean Monnet in the High Authority,
of always arriving at a consensus on an informal basis before any decisions were
taken, had thereby been left behind. Monnet's idea had its outspring in the thought
that the High Authority was a collegiate body where there should be no trace of
any disagreements, especially not between France and Germany. It had also been
easier to carry out with a more modest workload.
,97 The Executive Committee of the European Danube Commission was
responsible for the functioning of the supranational administration which was
established by the Paris Treaty of 1856. Siotis (1964) p. 229.
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the six member States should represent already before joining together in the
European Communities, a "Community" in a sociological sense of the term. For a
Community to exist according to such a definition, there would have to exist "certain
bonds of solidarity" between the members which would distinguish them, and their
Community, from other members of the surrounding social milieu. Siotis was in this
connection questioning whether their "intra-Community" relations had made any
changes or modifications to their patterns of national political behaviour, making this
distinct from the behaviour governing their relations with outsiders. In fact, what he
said was that one could never assume that an economic transformation of a region
should have any "automatic effects on the nature of the regional political sub¬
system", in this case the European Community.398
4.2 The Functions of the European Commission
When analysing the various functions of the Commission, commentators have
identified different categories. The way David Coombes saw it they could be divided
into four functions. These would be an Initiative function, a Normative function, an
Administrative function, and a Mediative function. With the Initiative function he
meant the Commission's right to initiate Community legislation and its power to
make recommendations on any matter which it thought fit within the framework of
the Treaty. To be able to fulfil this function required a dynamic and innovative
institution which is not usually what is thought of as a bureaucracy. The second
function described by Coombes was the Normative function. This was where the
Commission acted as the "guardian of the Treaty", or "the conscience of the
Community", interpreting the Treaty and determining the Community interest.
Coombes argued that with the two functions mentioned above the Commission was
given the role of a political leader and promoter of the Community interest. This was
also, he argued, how the Commission could be distinguished from an
intergovernmental organisation like for example the OEEC.
'9S Siotis (1964) p. 235.
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The third Commission function would be the Administrative one where it had to
perform certain technical tasks as well as the taking of a vast number of regulatory
decisions with its outspring in the Community legislation. According to Coombes,
its initiating role came constantly under threat from its administrative responsibilities.
The fourth, and last of the Commission's functions was the Mediative function
arising from its duty to bring about agreements between the member States in the
Council of Ministers, and he argued that this was what the Commission seemed to
be doing as its role in COREPER. in its sub-committees, and in the Council of
Ministers.
The Commission was, as Coombes pointed out, constantly being strained
between its Normative and Initiative functions on the one side and its Mediative and
Administrative functions on the other. The first group was a promotive group and
the other, an implementative group. In a "classical" civil service these two groups
would not be combined and the stress would be put on the implementative functions.
Jean Siotis, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the politically most
important category of the Commission's functions was to be found in the diplomatic
field. One was its representational functions, where the Commission operated in a
similar way to national diplomatic representatives. Another category would be those
functions which have developed in the EEC practice of negotiating with "outsiders".
As the representatives of non-member States are classed as "ambassadors" to the
Community, the Community assumed an important prerogative of statehood and the
Commission, in its relations with them, that of a government.399
Other roles of the Commission were, in Siotis' opinion, first the role
conferred upon it by Article 155 of the Treaty of Rome, stating that "the
Commission shall 'ensure the application of the provisions of this Treaty and of the
provisions enacted by the institutions of the Community in pursuance thereof'". In
other words, the Commission had a role as the "guardian of the Treaty". As a
399 Siotis (1964) p. 239.
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second category of Commission roles Siotis pointed out "the function of the
Commission related to its powers to take decisions 'of its own (d'un pouvoir de
decision propre), under the conditions laid down in this Treaty'", and further to
"participate in the preparation of acts of the Council and the Assembly". This latter
category referred to its decision-making powers as well as its right, and obligation,
to propose legislation to the Council of Ministers.400
Sabino Cassese and Giacinto della Cananea401 divided the functions of the
Commission into three different categories. The first one was "initiating the decision
and law-making process, by forwarding proposals" to the law-making body, the
Council of Ministers. Secondly, the Commission was to "act as the guardian of
Community orthodoxy", or "guardian of the Treaty" as others would call it. This
would involve being a "watchdog" over the "implementation by Member States of
their obligations stemming both from the Treaty and subsequent legislation". As a
last function, it was to implement the Community's laws and policies. Although, as
Cassese and della Cananea argued, the Commission was the Community institution
with the widest executive functions, they would not go as far as to call it the
"executive body of the Community". One of the reasons for this being the fact that
in most cases the implementation of Community legislation was left to the national
administrations.
In Walter Hallstein's view the functions of the Commission were threefold.
Firstly, it was to serve as the motor of the Community. The Commission had been
given the obligatory responsibility of drafting proposals and plans in two ways. It
had to initiate action which was the only way the Council of Ministers could take
decisions, and. furthermore, it had the monopoly in initiating action. Secondly, the
Commission was the "guardian of the Treaty" where it had the duty to make sure
that Treaty provisions were being kept as well as to intervene if they were broken.
In certain circumstances the Commission could bring an action before the Court of
400 Siotis (1964) p. 237.
401 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, pp. 82-83.
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Justice. Lastly, the Commission was the "honest broker" of the Community. This
would mean taking deliberations of the Council of Ministers as a matter of course,
to initiate and submit plans and help the Council to reach decisions. The Commission
would as well operate as an institution outside national interests.402
During the first few years of the Commission's existence, in particular during
1958 and 1959, it would be fair to characterise the European Commission as more
of a political body. Its most important task during this period was the launching of
common policies, implementing the common market and building common policies,
as well as negotiating with third countries in the Free Trade Area negotiations and
the Kennedy Round of GATT. Furthermore, there was little work to be done at this
early stage in the field of executive implementation.403
4.3 The European Commission - a "European Civil Service"?
In the way the European Commission was built up and according to several
of its functions, it had many similarities with national governments where the
Commissioners would play the role of the ministers, and the staff the role of the civil
servants. Despite similarities, however, scholars disagree as to what extent the
Commission staff can be classified as a "European Civil Service".
The Staff Regulations were set up to provide the legal framework for a
"classical" career civil service. They dealt with official representation of personnel,
and arrangements for automatic advancement of salaries and promotion by seniority.
They further gave the right to pensions, and a limitation of recruitment to lower
grades as well as to candidates possessing fixed qualifications by an independent
selection board.
According to the Treaty of Rome, Article 212 it was stated that "The Council
402 Hallstein (1972) p. 58.
4(b The Free Trade Area negotiations and the Commission's role during these
will be the theme of Chapter V below.
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shall, by unanimous decisions, in co-operation with the Commission and after
consulting the other institutions concerned, lay down the Staff Regulations for
officials and the conditions of employment for other servants of the Community.
After this Treaty has been in force for four years, the Council may amend such
regulations and conditions of employment. It shall do so by qualified majority vote
on a proposal of the Commission after the other institutions concerned have been
consulted." Another place in the Treaty, Article 179, was referring to the Staff
Regulations in that "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate in any
dispute between the Community and its subordinates within the limits of and under
the conditions laid down by their regulations or terms of employment."
The Staff Regulations for the EEC and Euratom came into force on 1 January
1962.404 The provisions of the Regulations had been adopted in draft form at the
end of February 1961 and approved by the European Parliamentary Assembly and
the European Court of Justice in October that year, as required by the Treaty of
Rome. These Regulations were to apply to all officials appointed to permanent posts
under its provisions within the institutions of the EEC and Euratom.
It had taken nearly four years of negotiations between all the parties involved.
It was a battle between the national forces, represented by the Council, as well as
by COREPER. on the one hand, and the Community forces, represented by the two
Commissions on the other. Each member State did its best to exert influence in the
direction of their own national administration, while the two Commissions tried to
create the best administrative system for a European "civil service", independent of
national administrations and governments. Before the Staff Regulations came into
force, the appointment of officials to the Commission was done by individual
contracts. As a foundation for the Regulations was used the equivalent Staff
Regulations, or "Statut de Service" of the ECSC, adopted in 1956. However, the
establishment of administrative foundations was not seen as a priority by the majority
404 Stutut des fonctionciires et le regime applicable ctux autre agents de la CEE
et de la CEEA. Reglement No. 31 (CEE). 11 (CEEA). Journal Officiel des
Communaute's Europeennes, No. 45. 1962. pp. 1385-1460.
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of the members, and. in particular, not by the Commission President Walter
Hallstein.
According to the definition of a "classical" civil service, five standards had
to be met by the Commission as far as that would have been possible. Firstly, there
had to be an open competition based on a competitive examination of merit or
technical ability. Secondly, higher posts would be filled from within the service and
recruitment would be confined to the lowest grades. Further, promotion happened
by seniority, usually in combination with merit. A fourth standard was that
supervision and control should be centralised, which means delegating responsibility
for personnel administration to a specialised agency within the service. Lastly,
membership of the service should normally constitute a lifetime's career and the
official should not be prejudiced by any "subjective" elements, such as political or
personal views, race, sex or place of origin.405 These criteria were being met to
a large extent by the Western European countries, although not completely. This was
the case also for the member States of the EEC but when it came to the latter there
were certain obligations of a much more pressing and immediate nature. Firstly, in
the Commission, distribution of posts was supposed to take place according to
nationalities. A common agreement had made this distribution to be roughly
proportionate to the member States' budgetary contributions as laid down in the
Treaty of Rome, Article 200.1. According to Article 27 of the Staff Regulations,
officials were to be recruited "on the widest possible geographical basis among the
nationals of member States" and the Commission was under strong political pressure
to maintain this distribution even if it served as a limitation on its freedom to appoint
to posts. Secondly, distribution of posts in the Commission were to be by grades. It
was up to the Council of Ministers to determine the total number of posts to be filled
by the Commission in any one year as well as the distribution of those posts in
categories and grades. As a third obligation the possibilities of transfer from within
were limited by the specialised function associated with many of the higher posts in
the administration. Therefore it was often necessary to recruit from the outside, and
4<b Max Weber's definition of a "classical" civil service. Coombes (1970) p.
124-125.
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at the same time recognising that, according to a "classical" career civil service, they
should have been filled from within. Lastly, there was the obligation arising from
the interest of the member governments in the administration of personnel of
reserved posts. The selection and preferment of officials was closely followed by the
member governments and the individual Commissioners. Although it was difficult,
or almost impossible, to prove that certain posts in the service might in practice have
been reserved for a particular type of candidate or party affiliation, the existence of
reserved posts was not denied and was often the cause for long delays and difficulties
in filling posts in the need to find the "right" candidate.
The responsibility of recruiting the most senior staff to the Commission was
intended as a national responsibility, at least in so far as the involvement of national
governments were concerned. As David Coombes put it, it would seem "widely
accepted that the more responsible positions were bound to be filled with some
reference to the appointee's political views or to his nationality".406 Furthermore,
he pointed out "the Commission's dependence on the support of member States and
their representatives for sustaining progress in the development of the
Community".407 The responsibility of promotion of staff, on the other hand, was
meant to be kept as a Community responsibility, which would mean the
responsibility of the Commission. Nevertheless, promotion as well seemed
increasingly to become a national responsibility. It was the only way the national
governments could influence the development of the Commission administration.
According to Commission President Walter Hallstein, however, this was not so much
of a problem. As he put it:
"I have never shared the view that in selecting its civil servants the
Commission could loftily dismiss the question of the nationality of the
candidates, by simply saying: 'We recognize only Europeans'. Such
an attitude appears to me not only to be naive and dogmatic but also
to ignore political reality. It is only natural that the nations making up
the Community want to see their membership reflected in the
406 Coombes (1970) p. 162.
4<n Ibidem.
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composition of the Community's Civil Service."408
Although what he is talking about here is the fact that there existed national quotas
in the Commission administration, it does show something about his general attitude
to the problem.
Jean Siotis has claimed that "the procedures for recruitment, nomination and
promotion and the more general questions of staff mobility"409 composed some of
the problems of an administrative character the Commission had to face. He further
declared the reason for this to be the lack of interest administrative matters had
received during the establishment of the Commission, and in particular the fact that
"the direction generate de I'administration was the last to be established".410 This,
he claimed, had much to do with "a limited interest in administrative matters"411
from President Hallstein who. in his function as President of the Commission was
directly in charge of administration. Further, one of the main problems of the
functioning of the Commission was the fact that policies and traditions from several
different administrations of the Community had been brought together in one,
without having formulated a coherent policy during the process of building up a
"European Civil Service". The responsibility of recruiting, nominating and
promoting staff was to lie with the Commission. When it comes to recruiting during
the first years, this happened mainly through secondment from national
administrations. Although nominations were supposed to be done by the
"Commission acting collectively" this meant in practice that national considerations
were taken into account by the individual Commissioner. Lastly, as Siotis argues,
the promoting of staff had become a rather bureaucratic procedure, certainly due to
the introduction of the Staff Regulations of 1962.412
408 Hallstein (1972) p. 61.
409 Siotis (1964) p. 244.
410 Siotis (1964) p. 244. We have earlier stated that all the nine DGs had been
established at the same time, on 23-24 March 1958.
411 Siotis (1964) p. 245.
412 Siotis (1964) p. 245-246. No other documentation has been found in support
of Siotis' assumption that Hallstein had a "limited interest in administrative
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The "Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of
Other Servants" which came into force in 1962 were meant to secure for the
Community the services of officials of the highest standard of independence, ability,
efficiency and integrity. At the same time staff were to be recruited on the broadest
possible geographical basis from the member States. In this way maximum efficiency
was hoped for. The responsibility for recruitment was given to what was called the
"appointing authority", without any further specification.413
Despite these obligations put on the Commission, making it impossible to
create a proper "European Civil Service", the laying of administrative foundations,
in the way known from national administrations and civil services, was not a priority
of the leading actors in the new Community. In the first years the administrative
arrangements were essentially ad hoc and pragmatic. Not only were there
deficiencies in the system and framework of the administration when compared to
a "classical" career civil service, but also the staff that was being employed had
different attitudes and outlooks. France, as well as Italy to a large extent, had a
system of short-term secondment from its national administration.414 Germany's
system was based on "lending" officials, and it was left to the officials themselves
to decide whether they would return to their national administration or not, however
matters".
41j Regulation No 31 (EEC). 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Official
Journal of the European Communities, 14.6.62, 1385/62, Articles 27-34.
414 This system of secondment of officials from national administrations had
already been established in the Secretariat of the League ofNations. These officials,
although being in the same position as their colleagues who served in the League
Secretariat as a career, remained on the staff lists of their national departments
being on indefinite leave of absence. On renouncing their service in the League
they returned to their national departments with the years spent in the League
service automatically added to their seniority privileges. In Mr. Ranshofen-
Wertheimer's opinion, the danger of this system was the fact that these officials
would fulfil their duties "with one eye constantly on the pleasure of their
governments, with the result that they never fully entered into the spirit of their
international employment". Mr. Ranshofen-Wertheimer served as an official in the
League Secretariat from 1930 until 1940. Ranshofen-Wertheimer (1945) p. 343.
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with no formal assurance given regarding the post to which they might return. At the
time, the nearest one could get to a real "European Civil Servant" were the young
graduates coming directly from the various universities, who would be primarily
loyal to their specialism. They did not join the Commission out of commitment or
in hope of later advancement in a national civil service, but rather to get a decent
job. In Coombes' view these were "the nearest thing to real 'European civil
servants'" as they had not already made ties with any national administration,
making them "truly independent".41''
As well as being unable to meet all the normal standards of a "classical"
career civil service, despite putting into force the Staff Regulations, it was also
understood in the Commission that the highest posts in the service could not be
regarded as normal parts of an official's career. This was largely so because they
were limited in number, but also because it seemed widely accepted that the more
responsible positions were bound to be filled with some reference to political views,
nationality, or other factors besides merit or technical ability.416 As Coombes
pointed out, however, even in most national civil services it would be next to
impossible to distinguish between politics and administration at these levels and
access to them could not be based purely on "objective" criteria.417
Between 1958 and 1966 nearly sixty appointments were made to the rank of
Director in the Commission. Of these Directors, less than a quarter would be
promoted from a lower rank within the Commission. The survey carried out by
Coombes discovered that many of them had come from a Commissioner's cabinet
rather than from a Directorate General.418 When compared with a career civil
service, promotion to the highest grades should be a reasonable possibility. In the
4b Coombes (1970) p. 150.
416 Emile Noel has here disputed the reference to "political views" which
Coombes. from his study, has claimed to have been a consideration taken into
account during the appointment procedures.
417 Coombes (1970) p. 161-162.
418 Coombes (1970) p. 146.
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administrative services of the Commission this was not yet the case.
4.4 The European Commission - a comparison with other "similar" bodies
The European Commission was a new and unique organisation when it was
set up in 1958. Ever since, scholars have tried to place it into different categories
of organisations and secretariats. It might also have fitted into several of these
different categories, but only partly. The European Commission has been tried
characterised as a new form of bureaucratic body, as a so-called "European Civil
Service", and it has been tried classified within the group of international
secretariats. Furthermore, it has been widely compared to its "forerunner", the High
Authority of the ECSC.
One of the main characteristics of the High Authority was the fact that it was
an executive body with executive powers of its own with regard to the coal and steel
industries. The High Authority was not an international organisation as one used to
know them but rather represented the merging of the member governments'
sovereignties in its participating field. Hence, there were no delegations from the
member States to the High Authority and the High Authority needed to have a direct
access to the Ministers concerned.419 Another very important aspect of the High
Authority was its right to "impose fines or periodic penalty payments on
undertakings",420 as well as imposing levies directly on enterprises in the member
States.421 Such rights were, and still are, usually thought of in relation to national
Governments or other national administrations. The transfer of sovereignty from the
member States to the High Authority was in fact already agreed and the Treaty
419 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 47.
4-0 Article 47 ECSC: "The High Authority may impose fines or periodic penalty
payments on undertakings which evade their obligations under decisions taken in
pursuance of this Article or which knowingly furnish false information."
421 Article 49 ECSC: "The High Authority is empowered to procure the funds
it requires to carry out its tasks:
- by imposing levies on the production of coal and steel;
- by contracting loans."
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characteristically says throughout "The High Authority may" and "The High
Authority shall". Very rarely does it add "after consultation with" which became
more the case for the Commission in the Treaty of Rome. The ECSC Treaty was,
further, very specific and technical compared to the EEC Treaty which was much
more general.
The European Commission, on the other hand, might be said to be more of
an administrative body. This was certainly the way it developed after its first few
years in operation. Its role was to take initiatives and to develop policies. The
executive role, however, was always going to be kept at a national level. In the
beginning of its existence the Commission operated in many ways as a political
body, in particular through its efforts in implementing the Common Market and the
common policies, as well as in negotiations over the Free Trade Area and with other
third countries.
Jean Siotis expressed, in his article, a rather critical view on the comparison
of the European Commission with an international secretariat. However, one of the
comparisons that one has not seen too often, and which might be argued could be the
most correct one, is the comparison with the federal ministries in Germany.422 One
of the reasons for this is the fact that the President of the Commission, Walter
Hallstein. not only played a major part in setting-up the European Commission, but
earlier also practically set up the first Foreign Ministry of Germany in 1951.423
Another reason, as defined by Cassese and della Cananea, was the fact that "the
Commission was conceived by its President as an independent body with an
extensive and highly informed administration and with a well-defined organizational
422 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 86.
42" See 2.2 of this chapter. The administrations of the German ministries are
divided into four hierarchical levels. At the top is the Executive which consists of
the minister and usually two state secretaries. Directly under comes the
Departments with political civil servants in charge. The two non-political levels are
the Sub-departments and the Sections where civil servants from the Higher Service
occupy the top. Conradt (1989) The German Polity (London, New York: Longman,
Fourth Edition) p. 175-179.
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design".424
David Coombes, on the other hand, found it impossible to fit the Commission
into any group of formal powers or other existing bodies such as international
secretariats and federal governments. The Commission, he argued, had been assigned
formal powers and characteristics in an unprecedented way. It performed a variety
of functions in the political system of the Community, and in some aspects it was
also expected to act as a bureaucracy and have essential characteristics of an
implementative, "goal-seeking" organisation. In other aspects it had to behave as if
constituting the political leadership of the Community, acting as an initiating and
"goal-setting" body. Hence, the Commission reflected both political and bureaucratic
characteristics.
Jean Siotis argued that, as the Commission was independent of other national
and international authorities, he had great objections in using the term "European
Secretariat" in describing the Commission.425 In discussions with Community
officials, Siotis also experienced objections to the use of the term "Secretariat" in
describing the High Authority and the Commission. As he argued, the Commission
had implicitly been recognised as the spokesman for the "Community interests" as
opposed to national interests which were expressed in the Council of Ministers. One
may, however, question the "absolute" independence of the Commission, as well as
that of the High Authority, in view of the fluctuations of their membership as a
result of the internal political evolution of the member States.426 What is hereby
understood is that as the Commissioners are appointed by common accord among the
national Governments, the chances are that a Commissioner acting too much against
his own government would not be renominated for a new term.427 Although this
4-4 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 86.
425 Siotis (1964) p. 228.
426 Siotis (1964) p. 229.
4-7 Article 158 EEC: "The members of the Commission shall be appointed by
common accord of the Governments of the Member States. Their term of office
shall be four years. It shall be renewable."
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is the way the national Governments can perform some kind of control over "their"
Commissioner, despite the fact that they are supposedly acting independently.
Siotis, further, mentioned other reasons for why the Commission could not
be classified as a "Secretariat". Firstly, it was because it was an institution "based
on the original concept of an independent supranational executive body, taking
decisions by a majority vote", having the right to exercise its powers outside the
national frontiers of its member States. Another reason being the ultimate objective
of attaining a "complete political unification, or a federation of the member States".
Lastly, the fact that the institutions of the EEC did not form "a regional system of
international organisations" in what he calls a "traditional" sense of the term, but
rather were "an expression of a Community of nations". On the other hand, he
argued that: "If we admit that international Secretariats are institutions which do
assume executive functions, international in their nature but extending on certain
occasions into the field of domestic jurisdiction, then we may consider that the EEC
Commission, and the High Authority, considered as a whole with their respective
administrations, are international Secretariats."428
By looking at the wording of the Treaty, though, it does suggest the powers
of the Commission do go further than those of other international Secretariats. In
Article 155 it was stated that the Commission shall "ensure the application of the
provisions of this Treaty and of the provisions enacted by the institutions of the
Community in pursuance thereof".429 Comparing this with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. Article 99 of its Charter430 recognises its right of "ensuring"
but not of "assuming responsibility for", as was the case with the High
428 Siotis (1964) p. 230-231.
In the Treaty of the ECSC it was said about the High Authority that it was
"responsible for ensuring the achievement of the purpose stated in this Treaty in
accordance with the terms thereof".
4 ,(1 Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations: "The Secretary-General may
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."
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Authority.431
During his time as the first President of the European Commission, Walter
Hallstein argued that discussions about whether it was correct to use the term
"executive" to describe the Commission, or if another term would have been more
appropriate, seemed a question of pure terminology, practically without any
interest.432 This was a view which was to a large extent supported by the former
Executive Secretary of the European Commission, Emile Noel. According to the
latter one must rather characterise the Commission as a political leadership more
than anything else during its first years in operation. The executive work at this time
was limited, but, on the other hand, there were real political discussions taking place
among the Commissioners in their efforts to build common policies, as well as in
negotiations with third countries and organisations.433
5. COORDINATION OF THE THREE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
5.1 The Coordination of the three European Executives
In a Resolution of the European Parliamentary Assembly on 27 June 1958 it
was stated that "the three European Communities stem from the same political idea
and constitute still three different elements in a unitary construction".434 One will
be able to observe a certain vision for the future which also the Treaty of Rome
formally indicated. With the establishment of the EEC and Euratom in 1958 the
Common Assembly and the Court of Justice were instituted as common to the three
Communities. From 18 March 1958 this body has been referred to as the European
Parliamentary Assembly. The EEC and Euratom had in common the Economic and
431 Siotis (1964) p. 237.
4,2 Hallstein (1970) p. 74.
4jj Views expressed in a conversation with Emile Noel in Paris on 12 December
1994.
4"4 EEC - First general Report 1958. p. 28.
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Social Committee.435
In the First General Report by the Commission, it was written that "[0]ne of
the outstanding features of the Community is the major role accorded to the common
Institutions; in the last resort the success of the Community will depend on the
effectiveness of the body of Institutions."436 The institutions of the Community
were considered as crucial to the realisation of tasks entrusted to it. In the First
General Report, therefore, the institutional apparatus was outlined, covering "the
creation and early activities of the institutions and organs; the relations between the
institutions and the other Communities as they appear in the light of the first month's
work, and the material circumstances of the start, location and financing".437 The
Report further pointed out that the Commission, with its duty to build up an entirely
new administration, had "taken the greatest care in the selection of its personnel".
It also showed itself grateful towards the Fligh Authority which had been generous
in its assistance and the cooperation that had been established had not only helped
"to ensure unity of policy but also to avoid duplication of effort".438
Article 232 of the Treaty instituting the European Economic Community
stipulated that its dispositions would not affect those instituting the ECSC in relation
to the rights and obligations of the member States, the powers of the ECSC
institutions, nor the rules laid down concerning the functioning of the common
market of coal and steel. The same article also lays down that the dispositions of the
Treaty would not depart from the stipulations of the Euratom Treaty. Thus, the three
communities would be distinct judicial entities. One must also understand that the
texts signed in Rome did not anticipate any organic link between the High Authority
and the new European Commission. However, from the start, it was set out as an
aim that the presidents of the three Communities should meet regularly "for the
40 The Economical and Social Committee had 101 members who were
appointed by the Council of Ministers on 22 April 1958.
4'6 EEC - First General Report 1958. p. 28.
4" EEC - First General Report 1958. p. 17.
4-s EEC - First General Report 1958, p. 11-12.
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purpose of comparing and harmonizing policies, and of avoiding duplication of
administrative and technical work". Their first meeting took place on 14 January
1958, discussing the "fundamental necessity and practical requirements for effective
cooperation among the three Executives" and deciding to "meet at regular
intervals".439 There would also be established a committee formed by members
of the three executive authorities that would be in charge of general problems of
collaboration.440 The "Meeting of the Presidents" would, furthermore, assure an
overall coordination of the inter-executive groups that had been set up, by mutual
information and a coordination of key policies.441
Conscious of the fundamental unity of the European Community, and
determined to solve in a practical way the separation as a result of the Treaties, the
three executives had, since the setting-up of the two European Commissions,
established a regular contact to examine measures to be taken so as to guarantee the
closest possible cooperation between them.
Thus the High Authority and the two European Commissions were convinced
by, first of all, instituting periodic meetings of their presidents. The Presidents of
the two European Commissions were appointed at the meeting of the six member
Governments in Paris on 6-7 January 1958.442 According to the First General
Report 1958 of the EEC, as well as the Seventh General Report 1959 of the ECSC,
one meeting between the three Presidents had already taken place before the
Commissions of EEC and Euratom had been formally established, during the week
between 7 and 14 January 1958. The idea was to institutionalise these meetings one
way or the other in the future: "Accordingly, having recorded their agreement, in
the course of a thorough discussion of the matter on January 14, 1958, as to the
fundamental necessity and practical requirements for effective cooperation among the
4j9 ECSC - Seventh General Report 1959. p. 32.
4411 ECSC - Seventh General Report 1959, p. 32.
441 View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
442 See 1. INTRODUCTION above.
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three Executives, the President of the High Authority of the E.C.S.C., the President
of the Commission of the European Economic Community and the President of the
Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community decided to meet at regular
intervals.1,443 This was also something that had been particularly strived for by the
High Authority which had "called for 'wide-ranging presidential meetings' to discuss
inter-institutional problems, the free trade zone and other issues".444 During these
meetings the three presidents examined all problems of common interest, concerning
the general policies of the Communities. When seen as necessary and appropriate,
they would also be accompanied by other members of the executives. Agreements
of holding regular meetings between the three presidents were taken on 6 October
195 8.445
Furthermore, the three Executives agreed upon constituting inter-executive
groups consisting of one or more members of each institution, depending on the
need. This procedure was contemplated on a provisional basis, by the following
questions: external relations, economic and financial policies, energy policies, social
policies, transport, and, lastly, press and information.446 Within these groups, the
members of the executives conducted a permanent examination of the problems, the
projects and decisions concerning the three institutions in common, which were of
interest to the later development of the Community. Furthermore, with the idea of
pursuing the study of the channels of cooperation instituted between them, the
executives set up a committee within which each one would delegate one or two of
its members. The task of this committee was to follow constantly the execution of
measures already taken and elaborate propositions for new measures to be taken.
Despite these procedures, they were not to have any effect on what concerned each
executive, the accomplishment of their assignments, or their own responsibilities.
44' ECSC - Seventh General Report 1959. p. 32.
444 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 382.
44" Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) ibidem. These meetings were to take place
every second Monday of each month. Three out of four would be held in Brussels
and the fourth in Luxembourg.
446 EEC - First General Report 1958. p. 30.
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The responsibility taken by the European Commission was to become
characteristic of the whole inter-executive cooperation, despite the fact that it was
among the executives of the EEC and Euratom that the least enthusiasm was to be
found for having a formalised cooperation. The High Authority, on the other hand,
as the senior of the three executives, was pushing for cooperation as an attempt to
keep its position and prestige in this new competition. There was also another
dilemma concerning the setting-up of inter-executive groups, namely the fact that
both the European Commission as well as the High Authority were anxious to
maintain their own autonomy.44. Nevertheless, the High Authority claimed to have
"been hard at work ever since the beginning of the transition period for the
introduction of the General Common Market, trying to fix upon the best forms of
co-operation with the Institutions of the new Communities. [...] for the purpose of
comparing and harmonizing policies, and of avoiding duplication of administrative
and technical work."448
The problem of coordination between the three executives was chiefly a
problem of uniting action and policies. If one had been limited by taking measures
over the administrative plan only, this essential objective would not have been
touched. It was at the level of the executives themselves that one had to assure the
closest cooperation possible.
5.2 Administrative Cooperation - Common Services of the European Communities
In such a spirit, the High Authority facilitated the initial work of the new
Commissions by putting at their disposal both personnel and material. This assistance
was particularly appreciated by the European Commission: "[...] the High Authority
has aided the early work of the two new Commissions by placing at their disposal
a considerable number of staff and quantities of material. Such assistance has been
particularly valuable to the European Commission, which takes this opportunity of
447 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 381-383.
44fi ECSC - Seventh General Report 1959. p. 32.
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expressing its appreciation."449 It ought here to be mentioned the fact that
personalities like Emile Noel would strongly play down the amount of aid of material
and personal character received from the High Authority at any level during the
early period, although he recognizes the fact that both material and financial support
had been given by the High Authority, and gratefully received by the two new
Commissions. The small number of personnel received from the High Authority was
largly due to the wishes of Walter Hallstein.450 Agreement was, however, made
at the very beginning of 1958 between the three European Executives to establish
three common services.
It was decided from the beginning to publish one single "Journal Officiel" for
the three Communities, administered from a common office. This started in April
1958 and the office was what had earlier been established as the Publishing Service
of the High Authority. This office also examined candidates for the positions of
interpreters and secretaries, the institution of a common administrative inter¬
community charged with examining the common problems concerning regulations,
payment, insurance, and so forth, and collaboration at the level of civil servants
concerning budgetary matters. In addition, the two Commissions also harmonised
their dispositions concerning classification of personnel and, where possible, those
concerning payment, with those used in the ECSC.
Other measures were further taken that would see a start of enforcement: the
establishment of common regulations for all the officials of the Communities; a
common treatment of recruiting matters, a common administration for planning and
insurance, the creation of a common office for interpreters, as well as putting
together the services in charge of the following tasks: distribution of publications,
449 EEC - First General Report 1958. p. 29.
4M) Views expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994. Worth mentioning in this respect are certain insinuations made by
Spierenburg and Poidevin about a great number of High Authority officials leaving
for Brussels during 1958: "What worried the High Authority most was the number
of employees who were leaving for Brussels." Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994)
p. 379.
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addresses and data processing, purchase, storage, and library. As suggested by the
Parliamentary Assembly in its resolution of June 1958, the European Commission
inspired a certain dynamic conception of the institutional structure in order to obtain
the maximum coordination between the three Communities, running all possibilities
offered by the Treaties. In spite of trying to obtain an organic unity of the three
institutions, it further underlined the problems caused by the absence of a common
seat which it would always be difficult, if not practically impossible to achieve.
During the early period of the operation of the European Commission, the
High Authority was more than willing to assist by making staff available as well as
expertise. The Commission itself, however, was more reserved towards these offers.
President Hallstein accepted a certain amount of technical support in the form of
interpreters and other technicians. According to former Executive Secretary Emile
Noel it was a conscious decision taken by President Hallstein to assure an
independent elaboration of the policies of the EEC, which after all had quite different
characteristics from the other two Communities.451
Some officials were, however, appointed from the High Authority. These
were mainly appointed to the middle and lower levels. As Emile Noel recalls, none
of the Directors General, nor the Commissioners, had formerly served with the High
Authority, except for the Director General of Common Legal Service EEC
wing.452 At this level President Hallstein particularly wanted to recruit "new"
people. The Commission was to represent a totally new concept and it was felt as
important that they got to "do it their own way" as much as possible. In this way the
novelty of the European Commission was emphasised, as was its independence from
the other European Communities and the member States. The appointments that were
made from the High Authority were all made on a personal basis without any
View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
4": From the writing of Spierenburg and Poidevin this seems to have been the
Frenchman Michel Gaudet, who was "one of the two co-directors of the Legal
Service. [...] given the task of setting up the EEC wing of the Joint Legal Service".
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 380.
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political considerations taken into account. Furthermore, there was no rush of
officials from the High Authority seeking to work for the European Commission.
The Civil Servants who were engaged from the High Authority were chosen on an
individual basis, and in positions corresponding to their abilities in the new
hierarchy. They were not, however, as might have been wished by the High
Authority, put in charge of services or appointed as higher civil servants.453
Concerning the plan of the sectors, cooperation was developed constantly.
This was vital for three essential reasons: to permit and facilitate unity of policies
between the executives, to manifest to the exterior a unity between the Communities,
and finally to use in the most rational way the means set up for them.
After the Commissioners had been appointed and the structure of the
Commission administration was more or less developed, an official Spokesman was
appointed with a small staff, to keep important links with the press. Further, the
Commission shared with the Executives of the other two Communities, the ECSC
and Euratom, the responsibility for the three Common Services.454 Each of the
Common Services were placed under the authority of an inter-executive group
formed by three Commissioners appointed by each of the three Executives. These
common services were the Common Legal Service, the Statistical Service of the
European Communities, and the Common Service for Press and Information. The
Common Legal Service, which was put under the leadership of a Board of Directors,
with one Director General for each Community, was to "consist of three sections
representing the three Communities". The legal experts for this Service were
appointed by common assent of the three Executives. The number of legal experts
on the European Communities was, however, rather limited at this time, which made
them particularly sought after. The main task of the Common Legal Service was to
assure a regular cooperation between the three Communities concerning
interpretations, as well as implementation of analogous arrangements existing in the
Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992. p. 145.
454 Coombes (1970) p. 124.
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three treaties. The Statistical Service was set up to be "working under the Director
of the High Authority's original Statistics Division".455 Its field of study had been
broadened to new areas covered by the two new Communities, and, in Emile Noel's
view, it was the most "authentic" common service.456 The organisation of this
Service, which became known as the Statistics Office and had its office in
Luxembourg, was agreed upon by the end of 1959.457
The third of the three Common Services of the European Communities was
the Common Service for Press and Information. Its internal organisation was still
under process of being decided on at the beginning of 1959, although a number of
agreements had already been reached concerning the coordination of the various
Press and Information Offices in the member States throughout 1958. As stated in
the Seventh General Report of the ECSC, there were two basic requirements
concerning the organisation of this Service. The first was that "each Executive
should have a spokesman", answerable only to "its" Executive, and, secondly, that
"the functional and administrative unity of the Information Service of the European
Communities must be preserved".458 By the time of the publishing of the Eighth
General Report of the ECSC in 1960 it becomes clear that the "structure and
working programme" for the Press and Information Service had still not been
decided on. This, despite the fact that the High Authority had, already in February
1958, "provisionally made the facilities of its own Information Service available to
the two new Communities".459 In Emile Noel's view, this Common Service only
played a limited role during the early years of the EEC and the European
Commission.
Three inter-executive groups, which each had three members, were set up to
475 ECSC - Seventh General Report 1959. p. 34.
4:16 Views expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
4~7 ECSC - Eight General Report 1960, p. 41.
4>s ECSC - Seventh General Report 1959. p. 34.
474 ECSC - Eight General Report 1960. p. 42.
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coordinate the activities of the Common Services. Jean Rey. the Commissioner for
External Relations, was put in charge of the Legal Service inter-executive group. As
Emile Noel has pointed out. however, apart from the inter-executive groups for legal
affairs, administrative arrangements and energy, most of these inter-executive groups
existed only on paper. Within the Legal Service Group the Commission received
some help from the High Authority in terms of counsellors with knowledge on
Community law, some of whom had taken part in the Treaty negotiations. There was
at the time a lack of people with this type of knowledge which is why assistance had
to be sought from the High Authority. They further worked together on common
rules in the Treaties trying to develop a common interpretation. However, as has
been pointed out before, there was a clear resistance from President Hallstein to any
further involvement from the High Authority, certainly at the political level.460
Among common services of the three communities already in operation from
the start was a uniform procedure for the appointment of personnel in middle and
lower grades, as well as for translators and interpreters. This was an attempt to
avoid competition. There existed in the beginning some kind of common pool for
interpreters as this need was quite a new one. There was a great need for developing
training of interpreters to work with, until then, unusual combinations of languages,
like for example Italian to Dutch. Many were recruited from other international
organisations like the Council of Europe, OEEC and the United Nations.
Nevertheless, as Emile Noel has pointed out, the kind of need the European
Commission created was a new one.461 An expert group was created within the
ECSC but was presided later by the European Commission, which was mostly in
charge of the detailed studies, while competent civil servants of the High Authority
and Euratom were called upon to participate.
4WI Views expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
461 View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
217
5.3 The Seat of the Institutions
According to Article 216 of the Treaty of Rome "the seat of the institutions
of the Community shall be determined by common accord of the Governments of the
Member States". However, this has proved to be such a controversial issue that not
until the Edinburgh European Summit of 11-12 December 1992 was any such
decision taken.462
From when the Treaty of Paris was signed on 18 April 1951 until long after
the EEC and Euratom were set up in 1958, discussions were going on in the
different capitals as to where the institutions of the European Communities ought to
be placed. Some argued for the creation of a "European District",463 others for the
institutions to be spread out in various cities. Some wanted the cities to be small,
others thought they ought to be big. When the ECSC was set up in 1952, the seats
chosen were only provisional but nevertheless remained for as long as the ECSC
existed as a separate community, with the High Authority and the Court of Justice
established in Luxembourg and the Common Assembly in Strasbourg. The same
situation happened to the two new Communities in 1958 when the two Commissions
were set up in Brussels.
The terms of the decision reached between the foreign ministers of the six
countries at their meeting in Paris on 6 and 7 January 1958 aimed at a gathering
together in the same place of all the institutions of the Europe of the Six. In a Note
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris it was confirmed the indications from
Germany and the Benelux countries to accept Brussels as the seat of the executive
bodies of the EEC and Euratom. The ECSC would remain in Luxembourg and an
462
European Report Document. Supplement to European Report no. 1821,
December 16, 1992. Edinburgh European Summit, December 11-12, 1992, Annex
to Part A: Decision taken by common agreement between the representatives of the
governments of the Member States on the location of the seats of the institutions
and of certain bodies and departments of the European Communities. It was
"agreed that the current situation would continue on a permanent basis".
463 Monnet (1978) p. 369.
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eventual Investment Bank was desired set up in Milan.464 The choice of place,
however, was postponed until their next meeting on 1 June 1958. Several
consultations had been carried out in preparing for the choice. In the meantime, the
Councils of Ministers held meetings set up by their presidents, the Parliamentary
Assembly sat in Strasbourg, and the two Commissions received the recommendation
for having their meetings at the Val-Duchesse in Brussels, or in Luxembourg,
according to practical reasons. The arrangements thus agreed were carried out until
the new meeting by the foreign ministers in Brussels on 1 July 1958.466
The European Commission estimated that, to conform to the recommendations
of the governments, it could agree on meeting alternatively in Brussels and in
Luxembourg. For the creation of common services for the three Communities, the
Commission had to resort to the services of the High Authority in Luxembourg. The
administration of the European Commission, in terms of organisation, started its
work mainly in Brussels. The Council of Ministers met generally in Brussels where
they were also to set up the services of the European Investment Bank. Despite long
hours of discussions and negotiations, the conference by the foreign ministers on 1
June 1958 did not solve the problem of location. The European Commission was
brought to take the consequences of this situation. The practical arrangements taken
earlier concerning installation of its services in Brussels were not altered. In what
concerns the meetings of the Commission, a decision was made to hold these where
the services had been installed, for obvious practical reasons. As was put by the
President of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, in his Statement to the European
Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg on 20 March 1958: "failure to decide on the
seat of the institutions of the Community not only causes great inconvenience and
waste of energy but is also prejudicial to the work". The absence of a permanent
place for the new Commission in the beginning was considered as putting the
creation of a rational organisation and efficiency of action at risk. During a session
464 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dir. Gen. Pol. Europe, Paris 3 January 1958.
EUROPE 1944-1960. COPIE P. Generalites (Questions Internationales), Vol.: 173-
174. Vues: 630. From the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.
46- EEC - First General Report 1958. pp. 35-36.
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of the Assemblee Nationale in France in November 1959 it was argued by Prime
Minister Michel Debre that "a complete or partial gathering (of the institutions)
would permit a better functioning of these international administrations and,
therefore, certainly a better European cooperation".466
The importance of establishing a common seat for the Community institutions
had to do with the fact that, the founding fathers of the ECSC, as much as the
founders of the EEC and Euratom, believed that they would all one day belong to
the same European Community that would cover all areas of society. It was therefore
important to prepare for this already from the start. Furthermore, there were
national, as well as technical, considerations to take into account. National
considerations would always have to be respected, and technical considerations had
to be respected to ensure a good functioning of the Community as well as a quick
start of the institutions. Further, there was "the importance of uniting the institutions
on the same place to avoid them breaking up",467 and avoiding the elimination of
psychological and political obstacles.There was also the material factor to bear in
mind that "several different locations means a loss of time, money and efficiency,
materially as well as politically".468 Luxembourg, however, would veto the
departure of the ECSC which had already been in operation for more than five years,
bringing with it employment, capital and even prestige to the small country. From
466 Extrait du compte rendu integral de la seance du 5 novembre 1959 de
FAssemblee Nationale Franqaise (Doc. 1067). EUROPE 1944-1960. Generalites,
Copie P. Vol.: 172. Vues: 485. From the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Paris. Own translation, "un regroupement total on partiel permettrait un
meilleur fonctionnement de ces administrations internationales et, de ce fait,
certainement une meilleure cooperation europeenne." Ibidem.
467 Aide-memoire sur les discussions des six Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres
relatives au siege de la CECA. Le 29/7/52. EUROPE 1944-1960, Copie P,
Generalites (Questions Internationales), Vol.: 173-174, Vues: 630. From the
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.
468 Ambassade de France en Belgique, Bruxelles 2 janvier 1957. From
Ambassador Raymond Bosquet to Minister of Foreign Affaires M. Christian Pineau.
According to Spierenburg and Poidevin this was a known fact. However, the
dilemma was that having the three Communities in the little Grand Duchy created
fear among its inhabitants for losing their identity. Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994)
p. 245.
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the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1957 it was pointed out that a
decentralisation of the institutions would share them between the member States
which would satisfy the national considerations. On the other hand, a centralisation
of the institutions could have a federalising effect on the Community as a whole.469
Concerning the discussion above on the establishment of the Common Services of
the three European Communities, the High Authority stressed the fact that "the
organization of the work of the European Executives is encumbered by an additional
burden through the absence of a single seat".471' In an earlier Report the High
Authority had already emphasized "that the absence of a single seat has very
considerably restricted the scope for setting up common services".471 It had a
decentralizing effect on the Communities, and even the monthly meetings of the
Executives were to prove impossible to carry out.
There was a common opinion, which was shared by President Hallstein,
where the three Communities were regarded as "branches of one and the same
stem". An internal unity among them, achieved by the common services, was
therefore seen as crucial. However, it was not felt as necessary, especially by the
Commission at an initial stage, to determine the final manner in which the common
services would be administratively fit together, or even how the hierarchy should be
established. These were matters that would have to be decided on with time and
experience. The Commission would also do its best to avoid giving the impression
of taking a position on the matter. To the national governments, on the other hand,
this was more of an important national issue concerning the renouncing of
sovereignty and autonomy. Until common headquarters would be set up, the new
executive bodies had their own spokesmen, each with a small staff.
469 Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Paris 30 July 1957. Note pour le President.
EUROPE 1944-1960. Copie P. Generalites (Questions Internationales), Vol.: 173-
174, Vues: 630. From the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.
4711 ECSC - Eight General Report 1960. p. 40.
471 ECSC - Seventh General Report 1959. p. 36.
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6. ESTABLISHING INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES AND THE
"STATUT DE SERVICE"
6.1 The "Statut de Seri'ice"
Although creating administrative structures was not regarded as a main
priority in the early European Commission, an increasing number of officials made
a "Statut de Service", or Staff Regulations as they will be called, inevitable. The
Treaty of Rome gave no instructions or guidelines about the internal organisation of
the Commission, nor about recruitment and employment of staff.472 Therefore,
during the first few years of the Commission, Staff Regulations were not really
among the main tasks of the Commissioners. At that time they had more than enough
work in ensuring the successful opening of the Common Market and in building and
implementing common policies, as well as making sure the independence of the
Commission administration was maintained. Among the people who came to the
Commission in 1958 there was a real sense of adventure and of believing in what
they were doing, despite the fact that the Commission administration had no real
careers and no job security. The fact that the Commission operated for four years
without any Staff Regulations might, according to Emile Noel, have had more of a
positive effect on the administration and its performance than anything else. This
because the officials recruited were committed people working for a cause with no
status and no guarantee. They were appointed according to some kind of European
"spirit". However, with a future enlargement in mind, especially a British accession,
it became important that the Staff Regulations were in place and operating. Only then
would it be possible to recruit a large number of officials in a very short time to an
already existing and operating Commission administration. Furthermore, there was
a growing uncertainty as to the status of the officials, as well as difficulties regarding
the payment of officials and the securing of their career prospects. This uncertainty
was to a large extent created by the national representatives, reluctant to accept the
level of salaries and benefits that were in force in the ECSC, and wanting to be less
generous for the two new Communities. Therefore, to the dedicated "European" the
472 Coombes (1970) p. 122.
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formulation and enactment in the EEC of the Staff Regulations was considered as
having a great psychological and legal importance. It was seen as an essential step
towards European integration as well as an escape from the uncertainties of the early
years. As well one could say that the Staff Regulations did help to build a real
European Civil Service by creating a system of independent careers in the
Commissions.473
The Staff Regulations which were set up in the end provided for a Staff
Committee474 which would represent the interests of the personnel and ensure a
permanent contact between administrative and staff sides. This Committee had the
power to bring up any difficulty of general significance relating to the interpretation
and application of the Staff Regulations and it could be consulted by the authority
on any such difficulty. Each institution had its own Staff Committee.
According to David Coombes. it was the uncertainty regarding the future role
of the Community institutions which created the problem with applying the Staff
Regulations. Establishing a permanent, independent career service on the same broad
principles as those laid down in the Regulations of the ECSC, he maintained, had
important political implications. It was feared that the new Regulations would be
supporting the independence of the Commission, in that officials would not depend
on their national governments for promotion or for future careers. The calls for the
speeding up of the process came thus from those in favour of the application of the
Treaty and strengthening the authority of the Commission.475
The Staff Regulations followed closely the French "Statut des Fonctionnaires"
in its provisions regarding discipline and competitions for posts. Moreover, features
common to all or most of the national staff regulations were incorporated along with
47j Views expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
474 Official Journal of the European Communities. Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11
(EAEC), Article 9. section la.
47" Coombes (1970) p. 135.
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the new ones.476 Another French aspect of the Staff Regulations was the division
of grades into separate "carrieres", which meant that within each "carriere" the
official could be promoted without having to take on any new functions.477
The Staff Regulations of the EEC had many similarities with the equivalent
Regulations of the ECSC and the High Authority which had been adopted in 1956.
Although the Commission operated for four years without its own Staff Regulations,
many of the rules and regulations of the High Authority were followed nevertheless.
This was done out of practical reasons as adopting a system that was too different
would have caused problems. As Emile Noel has pointed out, it was important to
compromise between the different delegations, with the two Commissions, and with
the staff. Therefore, the procedures followed up to 1962, and the regulations adopted
thereafter were very much "in the spirit of" the High Authority.478
In the Staff Regulations of the ECSC, Article 1, the word "supranational" was
used to characterise the civil servants of its institutions. In the process of creating
Staff Regulations for the EEC and Commission, the latter was unanimous in its wish
for using the first sentence of Article 1 from the ECSC Regulations: "The members
of the personnel of the European Coal and Steel Community are supranational civil
servants.1,479 The EEC Commission wanted this way to define the character of the
functions, and in consequence, the rights and obligations resulting from them.
Despite the fact that the EEC was not a supranational organisation, or at least had
omitted that word from its treaty, the Commission proposal stated: "La Commission
unanime souhaite expressement que la lere phrase de I 'article 1 du Statut CECA soit
maintenue, les termes de fonctionnaire supranational qui y figurent lui paraissant
476 Coombes (1970) p. 135.
477 Coombes (1970) p. 138.
478 View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
476 Index alphabetique des principaux termes et locutions figurant dans le Projet
de Statut de Bruxelles. CEAB 12/799. Statut CECA Article 1 "Les membres du
personnel de la Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de I'Acier sont des
fonctionnaires supranationaux." Own translation.
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essentiels pour definir le caractere des fonetions et, par voie de consequence, les
droits et obligations qui en resultent. "480 One difference, however, which seems
to be consistent, is the term used to describe the staff of the institutions. In the
ECSC Staff Regulations the French word "agent" is used. This is a general term and
means simply "official". In the EEC Regulations, however, they used the term
"fonctionnaire" which generally means "civil servant", but can also mean
"government official" or "state employee".
Article 206 of the Treaty of Rome stated: "The account of all revenues and
expenditures contained in the budget shall be examined by a supervisory committee
composed of auditors whose independence can be fully guaranteed [...]. Every year,
when the financial year has ended, the supervisory committee shall draw up a report,
by a majority vote of its members. The Council shall by qualified majority vote give
the Commission a discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget. It shall
communicate its decision to the Assembly." In a meeting of COREPER on 29-30
July 1958, the Committee acknowledged that the members of the supervisory
committee referred to in Article 206 ought to be independent personalities, both from
the Institutions and from the Member State Governments, and that they should form
a real Community body. Thus, the members of the committee would become
officials of the Community while exercising their functions.481
At an Intergovernmental Conference for the EEC and Euratom in Brussels on
48(1 "The Commission unanimously wishes especially for the first sentence of
Article 1 of the ECSC Staff Regulations to remain, as the expression supranational
civil servant seems essential in defining the charcteristics of functions and, as a
consequence, the rights and obligations resulting from these." Own translation.
Index alphabetique des principaux termes et locutions figurant dans le Projet de
Statut de Bruxelles. CEAB 12/799. This document has no date, but the document
following named "Note an Personnel. Concerne: Texte revise du Statut du
Personnel - Addendum //" was dated Luxembourg, 21 May 1962.
481 Communaute Economique Europeenne. Le Conseil, Communaute
Europeenne de l'Energie Atomique, Le Conseil. Bruxelles, le ler aout 1958,
789/58(extrait). Annexe I. Extrait du Proces-verbal de la vingtieme reunion du
Comite des Representants Permanentes tenue a Bruxelles. les 29 et 30 juillet 1958
approuve au cours de sa 22eme reunion le 3 septenrbre 1958. CEAB 1, No. 475.
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2 March 1957. the German delegation proposed that Staff Regulations should be
drawn up for the European Communities.4X2 The German delegation wished for the
Staff Regulations to be established by a common agreement between the
Governments of the member States. Further, a Staff Committee ought to be
established, which would approve all nominations of officials of the Community.
According to the German proposal the Staff Committee would consist of one
representative from each member state as well as one representative from each of the
institutions of the Community. Finally, the German delegation proposed that the Staff
Regulations should come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Rome. As this
took place shortly before the Treaties were signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, the
German timetable was revealed as too ambitious.483 During their session of 7-8
October 1958, the Councils of the EEC and Euratom gave the necessary instructions
conforming with orders given in Article 212 of the Treaty, which would be the
Regulations of the civil servants and a system applicable to other officials of the
Communities.
On 24 November 1958, the French delegation proposed that the establishment
of a mandate to be given to the Working Group "Statute" would first of all mean
deciding if the Group should take as a basis for its discussion a de facto situation,
which would be the ECSC, or to chose another basis. According to the French
delegation, the most important point would be to establish proper regulations for the
personnel of the new Communities, permitting at the same time a narrow, confined
contact between the national administrations and the Community administrations.
This would be a situation where a current and permanent exchange between them of
people and ideas would, not only be possible, but would be the basis of their
4X- Conference Intergouvernementale pour le Marche Commun et EEuratom,
Secretariat. Bruxelles. le 2 mars 1957. Ch. Del. 412. Comite des Chefs de
Delegation Statut des Fonctionnaires. CEAB 1/1328.
4X" The Staff Regulations of the EEC did not come into force until 1 January
1962. after having been signed on 18 December 1961. It got the name of "Staff
Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of
the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
Communitv".
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relationship. To the French delegation it was not seen as a necessity that the
Regulations of the two Communities should be identical.484
The Dutch delegation pointed out their favour in the use of the Staff
Regulations of the ECSC as the basis for the EEC and Euratom. They would also
prefer the study of the problems the European officials had in other organisations
such as the Council of Europe. During negotiations with the United Kingdom and
the other members of the OEEC, the Dutch Government wanted very much to keep
the connections and not make the Community too "closed". Although firm believers
in European integration, they were usually more on the side of the
intergovernmentalists and the supporters of a free-trade area. The Dutch delegation
was also, in this connection, interested in making the French delegation produce a
document with its opinion on the relations between the national administrations and
the Community administrations.485
Already before the Staff Regulations came into force, the French Government
had a system whereby officials served in the Commission on secondment from their
national administration. It was thought that this would do more to "Europeanize" the
officials than the creation of a career system separate for the Commission, by giving
a greater number of officials the experience of service in Brussels. Others were of
the opinion that the loyalties of the officials would remain with the national
administrations, rather than being transferred to the Brussels Commission. The
French continued its system of secondment of some officials after the Regulations
came into force, which also had regulations concerning these officials. Section 2,
Chapter 2 of the Staff Regulations deals with secondment, but only, however, of
officials from, or within the three European Communities. According to the Staff
Regulations, an official on secondment means an official who serves on a temporary
basis "in a post outside that institution or at his own request who has been placed at
484 Bruxelles, le 24 novembre 1958. 1233/58 (Extr.) 5. Echanges de vues au
sujet du Statut du Personnel des Communautes. CEAB 1/1328.
4S" Bruxelles. le 24 novembre 1958. 1233/58 (Extr.) 5. Echanges de vues au
sujet du Statut du Personnel des Communautes. CEAB 1/1328.
227
the disposal of another of the institutions of the three European Communities."486
The representatives of the Commission of the EEC were in favour of an inter-
Community cooperation in this field and were of the opinion that the Staff
Regulations of the ECSC ought to be used as a basis for the two new
Communities.487
COREPER agreed to set up a working group for the study of the Staff
Regulations. The group would be composed of three members from each delegation,
one would be the over-all expert, one the financial expert, and the third would be
a representative from COREPER. In addition, there would be representatives from
the two Commissions, the European Parliamentary Assembly, the European Court
of Justice, and one representative from the Committee of Presidents of the ECSC.
The Group was to use as the basis for its work the various documents issued to the
delegations by the Secretariat, and notably the report elaborated by the Interim
Committee for the EEC and Euratom. The first meeting of this Group of inter-
Community and inter-disciplinary cooperation took place on 28 November 1958.488
As the Staff Regulations had no firm basis of legal precedent on how to
interpret their provisions, they had to be seen in many respects "as a manifesto
rather than a legal ordinance". All they had to rely on were some cases in the Court
of Justice arising from the Regulations of the ECSC. As their implementation
"depended largely on the extent to which those who applied it shared the assumptions
486 Regulation No 31 (EEC). 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, Article 37.
Official Journal of the European Communities, 14.6.62. 1385/62.
487 The discussions on staff rule and regulations in the High Authority lasted
until 1955. Jean Monnet had won support for his idea of fixed-term contracts which
would make it easier to choose the best, and most qualified officials. In early days
there existed a need for a hard-core of administrators who already knew the
objectives of the Community.
488 Communaute' Economique Europeenne, Le Conseil; Communaute'
Europeenne de l'Energie Atomique. Le Conseil. Bruxelles, le 24 novembre 1958
1233/58 (Extr.). CEAB 2/1859.
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and aims of those who conceived it",489 its provisions were not always reliable
guides as to what was done in practice. A further difficulty was that, in its role as
a manifesto, it was more like a manifesto of a coalition of interests and opinions and
would therefore bear different interpretations and suit different aims. Even if the
Staff Regulations were to be considered as Community law, the members of the
Legal Service were guided in their interpretation mainly by the aims and intentions
of those who drafted them. Accounts were, however, also taken of law and practice
in the various member States, and attempts were made to merge this into a set of
"international laws" regarding administration of personnel.
On 28 January 1959 there came a question from Mr. A. Bertrand, a member
of the European Parliamentary Assembly, to the Council and the Commissions of the
two Communities on the issue of the Regulations of Officials of the Institutions of
the European Communities.49() The EEC Commission handed over to the Secretary
of the Councils of Ministers and the Euratom Commission a draft answer worked out
by President Hallstein. Other members of the same Commission were also invited
to present their observations on the matter by 3 February 1959.
While referring in his question to Article 212 of the EEC Treaty and Article
186 of the Euratom Treaty, Mr. Bertrand wished to know what stage the drafting of
the Staff Regulations had reached and if they would enter into force on a foreseeable
date.491 Mr. Bertrand pointed out that it would be of great advantage to those
officials who were only being made available by their national administrations for
a limited period of time. This group of officials had so far only rights and
obligations given by their national administrations. In the early period this often
489 Coombes (1970) pp. 135-136.
4911 Communaute' Economique Europeenne. Le Conseil. Communaute'
Europeenne de LEnergie Atomique. Le Conseil. Bruxelles. le 28 janvier 1959.
R/28/59. Note Introductive. CEAB 2/456.
491 Communaute' Economique Europeenne, Le Conseil. Communaute'
Europeenne de LEnergie Atomique. Le Conseil. Bruxelles, le 10 janvier 1959.
R/25/59. Annexe 1 au doc. R/82/59. Question Ecrite No. 29 du 29 decembre 1958.
De M. Bertrand. CEAB 2/456.
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meant as well that, while serving the Commission in Brussels, they would lose out
on important matters like pension rights in their home countries. Under the Staff
Regulations for the Communities they would get the equivalent rights and obligations
during their service for the European Communities.
In his draft answer to Mr. Bertrand, President Hallstein pointed out that the
Direction du Personnel - Division Statut were at that time about to work out a pilot
study of the Staff Regulations. They were expected to be able to hand over to the
Commission a first draft accompanied by a statement of grounds to obtain its
approval on the principle, and provoke a discussion consisting of the directives for
the pursuing of the continuing work. At that time, no one was involved in the
preparation of the Staff Regulations outside the Commission. The Working Group
"Statut", set up by COREPER, was only examining, in the first place, problems
related to payment. President Hallstein further stated that the Councils of Ministers
of the EEC and Euratom, in accordance with Article 212 of the Treaty, had foreseen
the date of 15 March 1959 to present the Staff Regulations and rules concerning
conditions of work of other agents of the Communities. The Councils of Ministers
also anticipated that COREPER ought to submit its proposal by that date.492
The way this matter was dealt with shows how the Treaty of Rome was
different from the Treaty of Paris in the sense that the national governments,
represented in the Council of Ministers, were given great powers in matters of "vital
interest". In the early period it was important for the member States to get as much
influence as possible in the organising of administrative structures. The Council also
relied on assistance from COREPER being national representatives, appointed by the
national governments, but which also, on the other hand, cooperated with the two
Commissions. COREPER derived no authority from the Treaty of Rome,493 apart
492 Annexe II an doc. R/82/59. CEAB 2/456.
49, COREPER was institutionalised through the Merger Treaty signed on 8
April 1965. coming into force on 1 July 1967. Article 4 states: "A committee
consisting of the Permanent Representatives of the Member States shall be
responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks
assigned to it by the Council."
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from as a possibility mentioned above in Article 151. COREPER was therefore not
to be considered as a Community institution, but was set up by the member States
as a means of influencing in the Community decision making process. However, it
also came to serve the purpose of informing and influencing both ways.
The elaboration of the proposals was worked out in November 1958 through
a cooperation of the Six, together with representatives of the two Communities and
observers from the ECSC. Apart from what concerns payment, however, it seemed
unlikely that a common proposal could be ready by the already fixed date of 15
March 1959. At that stage it was impossible to see when the Staff Regulations as a
whole could come into force. Nevertheless, what was seen as essential was to try to
obtain Staff Regulations that would be as uniform as possible for the whole of the
Communities of the Six.
In an answer from the EEC Commission of 5 February 1959, it was pointed
out the importance, in the end, of getting identical rules for recruitment and
classification of payment for all the civil servants of all the institutions of the
European Communities. The same point was also stressed by the Euratom
Commission in its answer of the same day.494
The Belgian delegation thought it appropriate that COREPER should be
assisted by an expert prior to the meeting of the working group proposed by the
French delegation. It wanted first of all a meeting set up, limited to representatives
of the two Commissions, to fix a common timetable. The Italian delegation, on the
other hand, underlined the urgency to define the general principles of the European
public function. COREPER thought, in line with the French delegation, that a
working group should be set up for the study of the Staff Regulations, composed of
three members from each delegation, as well as representatives from the two
Commissions. This working group would, taking into account the Staff Regulations
444 Extrait du Journal Offtciel des Communaute's Europeennes No 13 du 26
fevrier 1959. Reponse de la Commission de la Communaute Economique
Europeenne (5 fevrier 1959). CEAB 2/456.
231
the ECSC. use as a basis for its work various documents passed on to the delegations
by the Secretariat, and notably the report worked out by the interim Committee for
the EEC and Euratorn.495
The European Parliamentary Assembly (EPA) also gave its opinions on the
matter of the establishment of Staff Regulations for the EEC and Euratom. Within
the EPA there were experts opposing a scheme based upon a career system, meaning
the possibility to get promoted without changing the job. which was the same system
applied within the ECSC. These experts would prefer the adoption of the American
system where each job corresponded to one single rank. The Vice-President of the
EPA. Mr. Battaglia. expressed, in the Budgetary Session in April 1959, wishes for
the European institutions not to install this system. Not only, did he say, was this out
of moral political principles, but also to avoid arriving into difficulties as the
disruption of the political system could place the Six in a situation of too much
fluctuation.496
The President of the Committee on Administration and Budget, Mr. Francis
Vals,497 on the other hand, asked whether the concern, often expressed by
governmental experts, of establishing a system of payment similar to the ones in use
in the Community of Fifteen498 ought to be taken into consideration. He was of the
opinion that the success of the payment system in NATO and OEEC would not
necessarily correspond to the composition and necessities of the institutions of the
European Communities. He further found it necessary for the administrative
497 Communaute' Economique Europeenne. Le Conseil; Communaute
Europeenne de l'Energie Atomique. Le Conseil. Bruxelles, le 24 novembre 1958,
1233/58 (Extr.). CEAB 2/1859.
49,1
Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne. Session Budgetaire d'avril 1959. APE.
1787. Extrait de l'lntervention de M. Battaglia, Vice-President de EAssemblee
Parlementaire Europeenne. 10 avril 1959. CEAB 2/1859.
49' Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne, Session Budgetaire d'avril 1959.
Extrait de ITntervention de M. Vals, President de la Commission de
1'Administration et du Budget APE 1787. CEAB 2/1859.
49S OEEC and the Council of Europe.
committee to be unanimous on the subject, and that the working group for setting-up
the Staff Regulations had to take into account the only European Statute known,
which was that of the ECSC.
In a Resolution on the Staff Regulations, the EPA underlined the necessity to
elaborate and put into work the Staff Regulations foreseen by the Treaty of Rome
as early as possible, after having consulted the representatives of the personnel. The
matter was at the time being studied by the working group instituted by the
Commission. The EPA estimated that, given the similarities of the tasks of the
personnel of the three Communities, and in particular the payment system, the new
Staff Regulations ought to be similar along the general lines to the Regulations
applied in the ECSC.
After having the report made by the working group on the Staff Regulations,
COREPER found it necessary to set up a list of questions, issued on 17 July
1959.499 These were questions which to COREPER seemed to be of priority to a
decision by the Councils of Ministers for the following up of the work in establishing
a payment system for the personnel of the Communities. The main questions
concerned the choice of payment system. According to COREPER there were two
alternatives. The first alternative was the one in use in the European
intergovernmental institutions such as the Council of Europe, OEEC and WEU
which was set up by the "Serres" Report.500 On the other hand, there was the
system in use in the ECSC. The main difference between the two systems was the
494 Communaute Economique Europeenne. Le Conseil; Communaute'
Europeenne de l'Energie Atomique. Le Conseil, Bruxelles, le 17 juillet 1959.
R/514/1/59. Annexe I au doc. R/521/59. Statut du Personnel des Communautes,
Regime de Remuneration. CEAB 2/1859.
11
It has not been possible to trace the origin of the "Serres" Report, who wrote
it and when. It seems likely, however, that the name could come from the French
diplomat Jean Serres who worked for the United Nations, mainly on
intergovernmental issues. Mentioned in: Communaute Economique Europeenne, Le
Conseil. Communaute Europeenne de FEnergie Atomique, Le Conseil. Bruxelles,
le 17 juillet 1959. R/514/1/59 Annexe I au doc. R/521/59. Statut du Personnel des
Communaute's. Regime de Remuneration. CEAB 2/1859.
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geographical representation on the level of treatment. The national experts were on
this matter of the opinion that it would be desirable to treat the salaries of the
Community staff on a much broader scale than what was the practice of the ECSC.
The big question seemed to be whether to adopt the system of the ECSC or that of
the "Serres" Report.
6.2 Passes and Identity Cards
On 20 October 1958 a note was issued by the Secretariat of the Councils of
Ministers of the EEC and Euratom on passes and identity cards to be given to the
members and officials of the institutions of the European Communities.501
According to the President of the EEC Commission, Walter Hallstein, it had seemed
appropriate that the members and officials of the Commission in question should be
given passes and identity cards. The instituting of passes and identity cards would
be in accordance with Article 6 of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of
the European Economic Community which states:
"Passes in a form to be laid down by the Council and which shall be
recognised as valid for travel purposes by the authorities of the
Member States may be issued to members and servants of the
institutions of the Community by the presidents of these institutions.
Such passes shall be issued to officials and servants under conditions
laid down by the terms of service provided for in Article 212 of this
Treaty. The Commission may conclude agreements for these passes
to be recognised in the territory of third countries as valid travel
documents. "502
COREPER was inclined to choose the form adopted for the passes of the
members of the European Parliamentary Assembly, a matter which had been settled
by the Councils of the two Communities on 1 July 1958. This settlement was,
however, very different from the practice of the ECSC. Article 6 of the Protocol on
the Privileges and Immunities of the Treaty of Paris stated that "[T]he President of
MJI Communaute Economique Europeenne. Le Conseil. Communaute
Europeenne de PEnergie Atomique. le Conseil. Bruxelles. le 20 octobre 1958. 1 147
f/58. Note du Secretariat. CEAB 2/125.
Mi: Own emphases.
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the High Authority issues the passes to members of the High Authority and to higher
civil servants of the Institutions of the Community." In that case it was the President
of the High Authority who would issue the passes. In the case of the two new
European Communities, on the other hand, passes were to be issued by the
presidents of the various institutions after a decision by the Councils of Ministers.
Furthermore, "Agreement concerning passes" of 18 August 1953, between the
member States and the ECSC, excluded enforcement on members of the European
Parliamentary Assembly.
There was also discussions about whether members of the Economic and
Social Committee (ESC) were entitled to passes or not, as it was not mentioned in
Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome as being among the Community institutions. On the
other hand, in Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities
of the European Economic Community, it was stated that "[Tjhis Article shall also
apply to members of the consultative organs of the Community", of which the ESC
is one. The Council of Ministers settled the form of the passes on 1 July 1958. The
document had to be issued in the name of the President of the Institution or the
institutions concerned and of the President of the High Authority.503 In the same
note from the Secretariat of the Councils of the two Communities, there was
included a proposal from COREPER on the issue of passes and identity cards. The
Committee wished to propose to the Councils of the EEC and Euratom the adoption
of passes which would be given to members and civil servants of the two
Commissions. Secondly, they would propose to the member States of the ECSC and
to the High Authority to abandon the application of the "Agreement concerning
passes". If not in total, then at least what concerned the members of the European
Court of Justice and civil servants of the common institutions. In this proposal lay
the assumption that all the institutions of the Communities would adopt the same type
of passes and identity cards in a uniformed system.
Mb Communaute' Economique Europeenne. Le Conseil; Communaute
Europeenne de l'Energie Atomique. Le Conseil, Bruxelles. le 20 octobre 1958,
1147 f/58. Note du Secretariat. CEAB 2/125.
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Already from the very early days of the EEC and Euratom, there were wishes
for, and attempts made, for the three European Communities to have as many similar
features as possible. The national representatives in COREPER in particular pushed
hard for such a development.
6.3. The draft "Statut de Service" and the Regulations of 1962 compared with the
Regulations of the ECSC504
The Staff Regulations which were eventually adopted on 1 January 1962 by
the EEC and Euratom were divided into all together nine Titles and nine
Annexes.505 The Titles dealt with the rights and obligations of the officials, their
careers and working conditions as well as emoluments, social security and benefits.
In the Annexes one would find regulations concerning leave from a position,
remuneration and reimbursement of expenses, as well as a pension scheme. The fact
that these Staff Regulations were adopted gave the officials of the two new European
Communities much more security as well as career prospects than what had been the
case before, in particular in areas like pensions and social security.
In Article 1, one of the big differences between these two Communities and
that of the ECSC was already spelled out. This was the use of the word
"supranational" in the way of describing the Community. As it had been used
already in the Treaty of the ECSC. it should come as no surprise to see this word
used also in its Staff Regulations. By the time of the setting-up of the EEC and its
Staff Regulations, the member States were not very keen on the creation of another
supranational institution. Further, in Article 1 it was explained the criteria for being
classified as a Community civil servant, and the fact that the staff of the Economic
and Social Committee in this case were included. This Committee had not been
mentioned in the equivalent Article 1 of the ECSC Regulations. Further in the Staff
>l)4 Projet de Statut de Bruxelles. CEAB 12/799.
Nl> The Statut de Service was given the name "Staff regulations of officials of
the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy
Community".
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Regulations of the ECSC. Article 24 classified the officials into 13 ranks, which
again were grouped into categories corresponding to the similarities of the jobs. The
first category covers the ranks from 1 to 8, the second ranks 6 to 10. and the third
ranks 9 to 13. Within the first 4 ranks there were 5 levels at the maximum, whereas
the other ranks had all 6 levels. In Article 5 of the draft Regulations, the so-called
Projet de Statut de Bruxelles, the Commission would consist of 4 categories; A, B,
C, D. Category A would consist of 8 ranks, categories B and C of 5 each and D of
4 ranks.
The EEC Commission presented its proposal, in the Projet de Statut de
Bruxelles, where jobs which could be affected by civil servants relevant to the
present Regulations would be classified, following the nature of the functions to
which they correspond, into three different frames. There would be a general frame
which would cover the categories A, B and C. Then, both the linguistics frame as
well as the technical one would be divided into 8 ranks each.
A Staff Committee was proposed set up in the Projet de Statut de Bruxelles
for each of the institutions of the EEC, a decision which was to be found in Article
9 of the final version of the EEC Staff Regulations. These would be sub-divided into
sectors corresponding to each affected place. The Committees should represent the
interests of the staff to the institutions and assure a permanent contact between them.
An equivalent Committee had already been set up for the ECSC. Article 19 of the
Regulations of the ECSC stated that "[Ljes interets du personnel sont represents
aupres de I'Institution par un Comite du Personnel. "506 To assure a uniform
application of the arrangements of the Regulations and the study of all the
suggestions of revising them, the Commission considered that the Staff Regulations
Committee ought to be competent for all the Communities consisting of
representatives from each institution and their personnel.
Despite the above mentioned differences mentioned in the Articles 1, the
>06 "-pjie interests of the staff are represented to the institution by a Staff
Committee." Own translation.
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initial proposal from the European Commission over Article 10 stated that: "The
civil servants of the Community should under all circumstances model its conduct
on its Statute of supranational civil servants."507 As has been mentioned earlier,
certain forces within the Commission strongly wished to refer to the supranational
character of its civil servants, wanting this to be more in line with the High
Authority, and what it had been set out to be. Another theory might be that the
Commission felt the need to use the word supranational in order to try to create a
supranational institution, as the word had not been used in the Treaty. However, the
word was not, in the end, to be used in the final version of the Staff Regulations of
the EEC.
Both the Staff Regulations of the ECSC as well as the Staff Regulations of the
EEC made rules concerning who were qualified to become a civil servant of the
respective Communities. According to both Regulations a civil servant would have
to be a national of one of the member States, although with a few exceptions. Both
had reference to military service, character references, the passing of a competition,
and the "thorough knowledge of one of the languages of the Community and of a
satisfactory knowledge of another language of the Communities to the extent
necessary for the performance of his duties."508
7. CONCLUSION
With the setting-up of the European Commission in 1958, President Hallstein
had wanted to create what he often referred to as "a great administration". By that
he meant an administration whose expertise would be equal, if not superior, to that
7(17 Own translation and emphasis. "Le fonctionnaire de la Communaute doit en
tontes circonstances conformer sa conduite a son statut de fonctionnaire
supranational. "
M,s Regulation No 31 (EEC). 11 (EAEC). laying down the Staff Regulations of
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Statute of
Service), of 18 December 1961.
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of national civil services. The administration would be an independent administration
answerable to the institution alone.-"109 One should further bear in mind the fact that
the European Commission was a completely new kind of organisation when it was
set up, and that the people present were involved in building this new type of
administration, not knowing exactly what it would lead to. A great deal of idealism
existed among these people who came together from six different countries to build
a common future. In the beginning it operated very much as a political body.
Administrative structures were important but came nevertheless in second row after
the setting-up of the Common Market and the implementation of common policies.
A strong leadership was therefore essential, something which was provided by
President Walter Hallstein. The way he handled his team of eight other strong
personalities from six different countries made the European Commission of this
period into something unique in European administrative history.
It would seem careless to forget that the EEC had associated great countries
who had only a short time before been enemies, but who were conducted towards
a European Union for a price formerly paid by the defence of their prestige, and of
less powerful nations profoundly attached to their independence and their neutrality.
As said once by a Dutch Secretary of State to the Commissioner Robert Lemaignen:
"Quand vous, Frangais, vous vous jetez la vaisselle a la tete avec les
Allemands, nous en sommes desoles car nous savons bien que dans
tous les cas nous souffrirons des eclaboussures. Mais quand vous vous
entendez avec eux, nous nous demandons pour combien nous pouvons
esperer compter dans la politique europeenne. "51°
In his speech to the European Parliamentary Assembly in March 1958,
President Hallstein was in a rather optimistic spirit about both the present situation
Emile Noel. Crisis and Progress: The Bricks cmd Mortar of Europe, p. 56.
Emile Noel (1987) Crisis and Progress, driving forces for European construction
(Brussels: European Community Commission).
Lemaignen (1964) p. 93. Own translation. "When you. the French, throw
crockery at the Germans, we get upset because we know all too well that every
time we will be hit by the pieces. But when you agree with them we wonder for
how long we can hope to exert any influence on European policies."
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and about the future. Many plans were made about how the Community should and
would look like in the years to come. He wanted to express to the external world a
philosophy of freedom, of peaceful co-operation, of openmindedness and of
progress. He was also optimistic about the establishment in the near future of the
Social Fund and of a Common Agricultural Policy, which meant filling out the
prerogatives of the Treaty of Rome and creating common policies.
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CHAPTER V
THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ROLE OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
"Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The
attempt to play a separate power role - that is, a role apart from
Europe, a role based on a "special relationship" with the United
States, a role based on being the head of a "commonwealth" which
has no political structure, or unity, or strength and enjoys a fragile
and precarious economic relationship by means of the Sterling area
and preferences in the British market - this role is about played
out. "5n
1. INTRODUCTION
These are the words of the former American Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, speaking at a student conference in New York in 1963. The quote can be
seen as more or less typical for the United Kingdom of the post-war period. She had
not been hurt in the same way as the European countries on the continent had, and
was hence clinging on to a situation of Europe before the Second World War.
Something which was going to mark her behaviour in the Free Trade Area
negotiations of the mid- to late-1950s.
Since the very first steps of uniting Europe, the continental European States
have always made serious attempts to incorporate the United Kingdom. And even if
she has not always joined from the beginning, she was always thought to join "once
she knows that it works". However, the opposition has been very strong in this
country of old democratic traditions to surrender any part of her sovereignty to any
European supranational organisation. On the other hand, the United Kingdom was
not seen by most commentators as deliberately trying to damage or undermine the
integration process during this period. In the writings of Miriam Camps and in the
Ml Ball (1968) The Discipline of Power, p. 69.
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book by Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin it appears that the Association
Agreement between the United Kingdom and the High Authority, which was signed
only a few months after the collapse of the EDC. came about eventually because the
United Kingdom did not want to make any hindrances for a further European
integration.312
The United Kingdom was invited already in May 1950 to join the Schuman
Plan for a common market of coal and steel. However, as Prime Minister Clement
Attlee told the House of Commons: "We on this side are not prepared to accept the
principle that the most vital economic forces of this country should be handed over
to an authority that is utterly undemocratic and is responsible to nobody."513 The
British refusal to enter the negotiations with the Six over the setting-up of the ECSC
came on the grounds that the precondition for entering meant an acceptance of a
supranational authority, a presupposition later set by the Six in Messina in June
1955.
According to the so-called "Good Europeans", like Jean Monnet and Robert
Schuman, it was clear that substantial progress was unlikely to be made merely by
formal arrangements for consultation among governments. This was the solution the
British had insisted upon in drafting the final acts of the OEEC. Among the Six,
however, there was a common opinion that "[Ijntergovern-mental debating societies
are simply not good enough".514
Throughout the 1950s Germany's economy grew three times faster than that
of the United Kingdom, Italy's more than two times faster, and France's one and
one-half times more quickly than the British economy. Germany, France and Italy
312 Mr. Duncan Sandys to the House of Commons, 21 February 1955. In:
Camps (1964) p, 46. Also "London felt it should give the right signals when the
failure of the EDC threatened European integration" In: Spierenburg and Poidevin
(1994) p. 218.
3,3 Dennis Swann (1992) The Economics of the Common Market
(Harmondsworth: Penguin) p. 7. See also Palmer et al. (1968) p. 258.
S|J Ball (1968) p. 58.
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were all more or less destroyed after the war and needed a complete rebuilding of
their industries. United Kingdom, on the other hand, had in comparison suffered
only mild damage from the war, and did not to the same extent realize the need for
change. Other reasons for not wanting to commit herself too strongly to Europe were
the special relationship with the US as well as commitments to the Commonwealth
countries. European integration has always been seen as unfavourable to the main
lines of the United Kingdom's foreign and defence policy, mainly due to her many
other obligations in the world. As George Ball put it: "British policy rests on three
equally important and complementary 'legs'"; what Anthony Eden called the "three-
legged stool": the Commonwealth, Europe and America.515
During his period in opposition from 1945 to 1951, Winston Churchill argued
most favourably for European unification. In a speech at the University of Zurich
in September 1946 he argued for a Franco-German reconciliation as the first step
towards "a kind of United States of Europe".516 In 1950 he proposed the
"immediate creation of a European Army under a unified command in which we
should all bear a working and honorable part". In the House of Commons he pleaded
for building a united Europe on the three pillars of the United Kingdom, France and
Germany, saying it was time to forget about "ancient feuds and the horrible deeds
and tragedies of the past".517 Despite all grand words, however, the United
Kingdom of the 1950s was trying to "keep all the options open" while seeking to
pursue a wide variety and complexity of foreign roles. When asked to join the ECSC
in 1950 the answer was a straight "no", with one reason being that it was restricted
to Western Europe. Another reason was that the United Kingdom did not want to
commit herself to something that was still a mere idea which no one knew how
would turn out. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden said in a speech at Columbia
University on 11 January 1952 how it was frequently suggested "that the United
515 Ball (1968) p. 73.
516 By this statement, though, he must have meant a looser construction than
what was argued for among the federalists on the continent, something more like
a confederation.
517 Ball (1968) p. 74.
243
Kingdom should join a federation of the continent of Europe" while, he continued,
"[Tjhis is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do."518
The Free Trade Area Negotiations between the Six and the other members
of the OEEC started with the establishment of an OEEC special working party in
July 1956, until what we have chosen to call the first phase of the negotiations
collapsed two years later, in November 1958. One question that arises in this
connection is who were the negotiators. We know that the British were involved and
we know that the OEEC Council was involved. However, shortly before and just
after the establishment of the EEC and the European Commission it becomes less
clear which bodies were involved, and what role they might have played. One
question that one must try to answer is whether the national Governments and the
European Commission negotiated at the same time in the same negotiations during
1958. In the case of the European Commission it is also important to study what
kind of role it played, whether big or small. Further, if one finds out that the
Commission did play a part in the Free Trade Area negotiations one has to discuss
whether this was an active, political role, or merely a secondary administrative role,
carrying out instructions from the member States' Governments. During the
negotiations between the United Kingdom and the High Authority, the latter came
to play a role which looked very much like that of a sovereign State when the
Association Agreement was formed between the two parties. Later on, when the
Common Market became involved, the situation seemed more complicated as to who
were the negotiating parties. This was in particular so as the European Commission
of the EEC had not yet been set up when the Free Trade Area Negotiations were
initiated in 1956.
Although the Free Trade Area negotiations generated considerable ill will and
acrimony and ended as well in failure, it made an important contribution to both of
these developments: the forming of the European Community and the evolution of
a new British policy towards Europe. The Free Trade Area negotiations did see a
518 Bail (1968) p. 76.
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shift in the British Government's attitude towards Europe as well as a beginning of
a questioning of the priorities that had hitherto conditioned all official, and most
unofficial, thinking about the United Kingdom's external relations. Furthermore, the
two years of negotiations had created a much clearer commitment among the Six to
the goal of economic union.
The European Commission only played a role during the last part of these
negotiations, from around March 1958 until the collapse in November the same year.
We have seen from earlier chapters above that the main body of the Commission
administration was set up during March 1958. As it was not established at the start
it had not been designated a role and its position remained rather unclear, both from
a legal point of view as well as politically. In this chapter we will try to find out
when the European Commission joined the Free Trade Area negotiations, as well as
what role it then played. It will be particularly interesting to discover whether it
proved to be an independent, political body during these negotiations so soon after
it was set up. What is true is that it does seem to have made a considerable
contribution towards the end.519
There were many actors involved in the Free Trade Area negotiations during
the years they lasted. These were States as much as multilateral organisations. All
of these actors cannot be discussed in detail but one which will be dealt with more
than the others will be France. France was the country which changed its position
most during the negotiatons. It was the country that held the key to the result, and
M9 From the Free Trade Area negotiations of 1956-59 there can be drawn
certain analogies to the Schengen Agreement of the 1980s and 1990s. In both
examples the negotiations started out on an intergovernmental basis, only involving
representatives from the member States" governments. In the Free Trade Area
negotiations this was because the EEC and the Commission had not been set up at
its start. Once established, the Commission entered the negotiations together with
the national representatives. In the case of the Schengen Agreement the member
States did not wish to involve the Commission at the negotiating stage, and the
Treaty was negotiated among the national governments. The Schengen Agreement
partly started operating in March 1995. and more countries of the European Union
are interested in joining. It is therefore speculated that the whole operation will be
handed over to the European Commission sooner or later.
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the country which finally broke them off. This resulted in a determination to see a
successful setting-up of the Common Market and its institutions. The question
remains, however, whether the Free Trade Area could have been successfully
established too, had the Six of the Common Market managed to adopt a common
position.
2. THE UNITED KINGDOM VS THE HIGH AUTHORITY: THE AGREEMENT
OF ASSOCIATION
"We British will certainly be prepared to accept the merger of
sovereignty in practice if not in principle. "52°
The relationship between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe - in
particular that of the European Communities - has always been a difficult and
strenuous one. Due to her obligations and relations elsewhere, the United Kingdom
has never had more than one foot in Europe. Nevertheless, it is a fact that Europe
and the United Kingdom depend on each other, there are only differences as to how
this dependency has been viewed by the two parties.
Already from the launching of the Schuman Plan and the negotiations for
setting-up the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the United Kingdom
was invited to take part. However, the United Kingdom wanted a relationship with
the ECSC with, ideally, as much influence as possible and no responsibility. The
High Authority suggested to set up a formal association between the two parties
already in the autumn of 1952. and by the end of December 1954 an agreement was
reached. The way the British operated, and due to its role in Europe and the larger
world, it was important to get the United Kingdom on the "team" in one way or the
other. Nevertheless, it was generally assumed during the 1950s that she would not
join the Community as a full member.
>2° Quote by Harold Macmillan on the issue of European unity. In: Ball (1968)
p. 57. This quote shows the British attitude of the time towards new things and
concepts. They would want to see it in operation and working before committing
themselves.
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2.1 United Kingdom: "in" but not "taking part"
In August 1952, as the High Authority started its work in Luxembourg, it was
decided to set up a United Kingdom permanent delegation to the High Authority.
According to Spierenburg and Poidevin "the British Government signalled its
intention to co-operate"521 as soon as the High Authority took up office. Its
President, Jean Monnet, made a trip to London on 21-23 August 1952 where it was
agreed to set up this British Permanent Delegation to the ECSC. Sir Cecil Weir was
chosen as its Head, or Permanent Representative. This delegation had instructions
to "pave the way for a close and lasting association between the Community and the
United Kingdom and to deal with the day-to-day matters of common interest".522
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, was of the opinion that
this would in no way diminish the importance of the so-called Eden Plan, a plan
which suggested institutional links between the Council of Europe and the two
European Communities, ECSC and EDC. The Eden Plan was presented in
Strasbourg on 2 September 1952, and it was understood by members of the
Community as a proof of the British wish to be "in" but not "part of" the
parliamentary assemblies.523
One problem that arose was the United Kingdom's wish to have a say in the
High Authority decision-making process, without joining as a member. As an attempt
to solve the problematic situation Monnet proposed the setting-up of a "Joint
Committee" to work out a way of associating the United Kingdom with the High
Authority. This Committee first met on 17 November 1952. The reason for such an
association between the ECSC and the UK was, as Paul Reuter put it, the wish for
"une action en commun, des responsabilites, des droits et des obligations portages
"2I
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 202.
522 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 202.
523 Haas (1958) p. 440.
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sur un pied d'egalite",524 From February 1953 onwards there were secret talks
between Monnet, Spierenburg and Etzel from the High Authority, and Sir Cecil Weir
and Marjoribanks representing the United Kingdom, on a possible association. A
conclusion was reached in July 1953 where "an association would be possible by
means of an agreement setting-up a single market for steel together with a limited
association for coal".525 To Monnet the two most important aspects of European
integration were to keep Germany within the Communities, and to maintain peace.
In order to fulfill these goals he considered it of great importance to have the United
Kingdom in, taking into account its role in the development of Europe.
On 23 December 1953 the High Authority approved a draft letter inviting the
British Government to open negotiations with the aim of achieving an association.
It proposed the creation of a Council of Association with six members in total, three
from the High Authority and three appointed by the British Government. A few
months later a joint meeting was held between government representatives of the Six
and the High Authority.526 This meeting clarified the positions of all parties
concerned, and laid down conditions for negotiations. The French wanted to know
if the High Authority acted within its powers in trying to open negotiations with the
United Kingdom. In the view of Maurice Schumann, the French Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs, the High Authority would have needed a special mandate from
the Six. From a French point of view there existed a great fear of losing out in
competition with the British. A later meeting of the Council of Ministers on 9-10
April 1954 allowed the High Authority to continue the negotiations, although it was
decided that the governments had the right to be informed and to be involved.
Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty, Part II, further established what one might interpret
as strict instructions for entering into negotiations with the United Kingdom:
"~4 "A common action with legal responsibilities and obligations shared on an
equal footing." Own translation. Paul Reuter (1953) La Communaute europeenne
du charbon el de Lacier (Paris: Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence) pp.
129-130.
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 204-205.
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) pp. 206-208.
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"Once the High Authority has taken office, Member States shall open
negotiations with the Governments of third countries, and in particular
with the British Government, on the whole range of economic and
commercial relations concerning coal and steel between the
Community and these countries. In these negotiations the High
Authority shall act, upon instructions unanimously agreed by the
Council, for the Member States jointly. Representatives of Member
States may be present at the negotiations."527
After the failure of the EDC the High Authority was more interested in an
association than ever before. To the High Authority it was important that the
integration process did not come to a halt. This was a feeling which was, to a certain
degree, shared by the United Kingdom in hoping for it to be a situation she could
use to her advantage. As expressed by Spierenburg and Poidevin "it f...] was thought
that fear of failure would make the ECSC negotiators more flexible in their
discussions".528 As the negotiations proceeded the emphasis furthermore became
more political.
Dirk Spierenburg, the Dutch member of the High Authority, was opposed to
giving the United Kingdom the privilege of an equal footing with the Community.
With the possible association between the ECSC and the United Kingdom came also
the problem of representation. Was it going to be a one-to-one relationship where the
United Kingdom counted for one half and the Community of Six for the other half?
Or was the ECSC to count for six with the United Kingdom as the seventh member?
Prime Minister Mendes-France in France suggested to let the United Kingdom have
a seat in the High Authority as an observer, which would have given her one vote
in seven instead of one in two. Spierenburg, however, objected, as such a situation
would be in contradiction with the Treaty of Paris, which in the above mentioned
Article 14 gives the High Authority the right, and also the duty, to negotiate with
third countries on behalf of the member States. Germany also strongly opposed the
idea of a transfer of power to the High Authority concerning the negotiations with
727 ECSC Treaty. Part II. Relations between the Community and Third
Countries. Chapter I. Negotiations with Third Countries. Article 14. Own emphasis.
'2fi
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 211.
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the United Kingdom. Germany, further, supported the French wish for close links
between the British Government and the Council of Ministers, something which was
again opposed by the Dutch. According to the High Authority there was no such
thing as a Council of Ministers of seven, only joint meetings of three patterns: the
Council of Ministers, the High Authority, and the British Government. The British
Government was not interested in being one of seven, but in stead to deal with the
ECSC as one unit.
When it came to determining the situation of the United Kingdom within its
association with the ECSC, the French Government suggested to place the United
Kingdom on the same foot as the other government's in the construction of Europe.
Under such conditions it would mean that the United Kingdom would be associated
in a project of agreement of setting-up a body consisting of the British Government
on the one hand, and the High Authority, representing the Community, on the other.
There would further be held mixed meetings between the High Authority and the
Council of Ministers on the one hand, and the British Government on the other. As
institutional arrangement, however, the French Government would only accept an
enlargement of the Council of Ministers, with the British Government becoming the
seventh member. An association with the United Kingdom would neither mean an
enlargement, nor a diminishing, of the powers of the High Authority. Article 6 of
the ECSC Treaty was rather ambiguous about the role of the High Authority.
However, in the opinion of MM. Ophiils, De Rossi and Reuter, the High Authority
could not make agreements directly with the UK Government of the type like the
Association Agreement was foreseeing.529 With this is meant that the High
Authority, in negotiating with third countries, was to "represent all the member
states together", acting as a "joint representative of the member states".530 What
Article 6 said, however, was that "[T]he Community shall be represented by its
institutions, each within the limits of its powers".
ECSC. High Authority. 9 November 1954. Notes to the High Authority after
the meeting between M. Uri and M. Ulver (French Minister of Industry and
Commerce). CEAB 1/1537.
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 186.
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At noon on 23 September 1954 Sir Cecil Weir informed Jean Monnet by
phone that the project which had been established between the United Kingdom and
the High Authority had been approved in the United Kingdom. The following day
Monnet announced to the Secretariat for negotiations between the United Kingdom
and the ECSC that the "form and function of the institutions had not been finally
agreed upon". Nevertheless, it was clear that the institutions were not to be
supranational, and it was not a common market they had set up but an
association.''31
Jean Monnet, Franz Etzel and Dirk Spierenburg were, in their positions as
members of the High Authority, authorized on 18 December 1954 to sign the
Agreement of Association with the United Kingdom. Another member of the High
Authority, Albert Coppe, however, wanted at the same time to express his opposition
to the delegation of full powers to different members of the High Authority which
would enable them to negotiate with third countries.532 Only days later, on 21
December, an Agreement of Association was signed by the British Government and
the High Authority, setting-up a Council of Association between the two parties.
This act thus placed the High Authority in an equal position with the British, as a
sovereign state. The British, on the other hand, recognised the High Authority as an
international organisation, and not as a state. In April 1955 an Interministerial
Committee was set up in London to handle the British relations with the ECSC. The
House of Commons ratified the Agreement of Association on 21 February 1955 and
the whole ratification procedure had ended by June.533 The first meeting of the
Council of Association which was held in Luxembourg was called "le principal
evenement de I'annee 1955".534 In this meeting were four representatives from the
x>l 23 septembre 1954. 12 heures. CEAB 1/1537.
x,:
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 216.
The ratification of the "Agreement concerning the relations between the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the European Coal and
Steel Community" was deposited by the United Kingdom on 17 June 1955. Cmnd.
9346 (1954-55) and Cmnd. 13 (1956-57).
v'4 "the principal event of the year 1955". L'Annee Politique 1955, p. 559.
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United Kingdom and four representatives from the High Authority.
During the negotiations leading up to this association, the High Authority had,
in many ways, acted as a sovereign state entering into multilateral negotiations with
another sovereign state; the United Kingdom. The latter would naturally not have
seen it from that point of view but did, nevertheless, negotiate with the High
Authority representing the member States of the ECSC. This was possible for two
reasons in particular. Firstly, the setting-up of the High Authority and the ECSC was
the primary reason for such negotiations to take part. Secondly, the High Authority
had managed to present a common position of the Six from the start, much due to
its President Jean Monnet who put great importance in an association with the United
Kingdom, if he could not get them to join the ECSC as full members. Another point
which should be mentioned, and which might most certainly have had an impact,
was the generally favourable circumstances concerning supranationalism until the
rejection of the draft EDC Treaty in August 1954. The Schuman Plan and the
setting-up of the ECSC was still fresh in mind. This had shortly been followed by
the signing of the Treaties of the EPC and EDC, which developed an even stronger
optimism within "European" circles. A few years later, after the failure of the EDC
in particular, it was to prove much more difficult for the European Commission to
achieve anything similar.
3. THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE
SETTING-UP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
3.1 The British Free Trade Proposals
The Benelux Memorandum for the setting-up of a common market in 1955
proposed that the intergovernmental conference should include, apart from the six
member countries of the ECSC, and its representatives, also "those countries that
have signed a treaty of association with the ECSC", something only the United
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Kingdom had done.535 During most of 1955 the "dominant impression in the
United Kingdom was that European unity was developing fast enough and in a way
in which the United Kingdom could comfortably assist".536 Nevertheless, she
withdrew her negotiators from the Spaak Committee in November 1955.537
While the British governments turned down a series of invitations to join the
Common Market, they contented themselves with several weak counter-proposals
involving no derogation of national sovereignty. The United Kingdom used the
OEEC as an attempt to save itself from suffering disadvantages as a result of the
setting-up of the EEC and Euratom. However, it was doing so while seeking to
avoid participation in common policies, financial arrangements, a common external
tariff, and in the Community institutions. Instead, the United Kingdom proposed an
industrial free trade zone comprising all the seventeen OEEC countries.538
If the British Government had been ready to negotiate in terms of the customs
union at the time of the Spaak Committee negotiations, the chances are they would
have obtained extensive exceptions for its Commonwealth trade and for the British
agriculture. The British, on the other hand, were prepared to accept rules similar to
those in the Treaty of Rome concerning subsidies and other government actions on
discrimination and unfair competition. They were also prepared to consult the other
countries on most problems and policies, and to take part in the complaints
procedure. This meant that while the British were unwilling to accept arrangements
or commitments parallel to those of the Treaty of Rome, they would be prepared to
Camps (1964) Britain and the European Community 1955-1963, p. 27.
-~b Camps (1964) p. 46.
The Spaak Committee was set up in July 1955 as a consequence of the
Messina Conference in June the same year. It had its first meeting on 9 July 1955
in Brussels. See above Chapter III.
N 's Since the very start of the OEEC in 1948 it has promoted the idea of a free
trade system, with strong support from the USA. However, differences in view
about commitments from the various member States has existed all along, reflecting
the divisions later established with the EEC. Britain, as an example, objected to the
wish of most of the continental countries to set up a customs union.
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recognize the right of a country to bring a complaint if the absence of such a
provision should result in hardship or a demonstrably "unfair" situation.539
The British proposal came after several more or less successful efforts had
been made by Jean Monnet, Maurice Faure and Robert Marjolin to get the United
Kingdom to join the Six, at least in some form of association. As expressed by
George W. Ball, it was the general opinion that the British wanted "to have its
economic cake and eat it too".340 This seemed clear when, in June 1956, it
appeared to the British "reasonably certain"541 that the Treaty of Rome would be
signed and ratified. The British, therefore, proposed that the European Economic
Community should become part of a broader and looser Free Trade Area, including
all the countries of Western Europe. This, however, would be a commercial trading
bloc that would be discriminatory towards the United States and the rest of the
world, while offering the West none of the political benefits of true European
integration. After a year and a half of negotiations between the Six and the rest of
the OEEC countries, the proposal failed, first of all due to opposition from
France.542 The result was that the United Kingdom put together a loose
commercial arrangement of the so-called Outer Seven hoping to be able to merge the
Six and the Seven in a loose, non-political trading bloc.543
3.2 Launch of the Negotiations
On 19 July 1956, a resolution was produced by the OEEC Council initiating
the Free Trade Area negotiations. This resolution expressed a desire for an
association between the Six of the ECSC and the rest of the OEEC countries to be
as wide as possible, and a special working party was set up to produce a report on
3"9 Camps (1959) The Free Trade Area Negotiations, p. 8-9.
540 Ball (1968) p. 79.
'41 Ibidem.
342 See below 3.5.
543 Ball (1968) pp. 79-80.
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the matter by 31 December 1956. After this report had been produced, the OEEC
Council made its decision on 13 February 1957 to start negotiations "in order to
determine ways and means on the basis of which there could be brought into being
a European Free Trade Area, which would, on a multilateral basis, associate the
European Common Market with the other member countries of the
organization".544
The British proposal for a European industrial Free Trade Area was presented
by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in November 1956, shortly after the
outbreak of the Suez Crisis on 6 November. The proposal has in certain connections
been called a "counter-proposal" to the Beyen Plan,545 which would be the start of
a wider process of tariff-reductions across Europe, and thereby functioned as a
bridge between a more integrated Six and the rest of the continent. The proposal had
been completed and deposited by the British Government on 3 October 1956 and
became known as the Plan G. Although there had been a certain lack of enthusiastic
support, the Plan had obtained agreement in the Cabinet as well as of the
Conservative Party in the House of Commons. At the time the Common Market
project of the Six was still felt as rather doubtful by the British where there was
"hope that our formula for an association between the Six and the other countries of
Europe [...] would ensure a Free Trade Area for all goods other than foodstuffs" and
that this "might prove an acceptable and practical compromise".546 Macmillan
strongly believed that a Common Market of the Six without the industrial Free Trade
Area at the same time, as was proposed by the British, would lead to a
"disintegration of any large European policy, eventually involving the collapse of
NATO and the existing system of defence".547
In a Resolution of February 1957 the OEEC Council decided to "enter into
744 Introductory note. Confidential. 803 e/58 m. Stockholm, 15 July 1958.
CEAB 5/616. Also Crnnd. 641. p. 7-8.
747 Milward (1992) p. 195.
746 Macmillan (1971) Riding the Storm, p. 431.
M7 Macmillan (1971) p. 435.
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negotiations in order to determine ways and means on the basis of which there could
be brought into being a European free trade area, which would, on a multilateral
basis, associate the European Common Market with other member countries of the
Organisation, and to prepare the necessary instruments".548 This was the start of
what will be considered as the first phase of the Free Trade Area negotiations. Later,
in October of the same year, the OEEC Council "declared its determination to secure
the establishment of a European Free Trade Area which would comprise all Member
countries of the Organisation; which would associate, on a multilateral basis, the
European Economic Community with the other Member countries and which, taking
fully into consideration the objectives of the European Economic Community, would
in practice take effect parallel with the Treaty of Rome".549
3.3 The British Position
The so-called White Paper was submitted by the British Government as a
memorandum on 7 February 1957 in which was reaffirmed their view that "an
industrial free trade area could be established in Europe" and the same government
"proposed that negotiations should be undertaken in the OEEC".550 It was further
stressed how the negotiations would be based on a successful conclusion between the
Six. The White Paper had been given a warm welcome by the Six as well as the
other OEEC countries, and the French had shown none of the hostility that was later
going to be so apparent. When it came to the task of negotiating, Prime Minister
Macmillan was anxious that this should not be restricted to officials only. He
therefore proposed the setting-up of a Committee of Ministers which would represent
the national governments of all parties involved.551 The October 1957 session of
the OEEC Council also set up an intergovernmental committee at ministerial level
548 OEEC. Resolution of the Council. Paris, 14 February 1957. Negotiations for
a European Free Trade Area. Cmnd. 641, London, HMSO, December 1959.
549
Camps (1959) p. 4-5.
550 A European Free Trade Area. United Kingdom Memorandum to the
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. February 1957. Cmnd. 72.
551 Macmillan (1971) p. 433.
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to continue the negotiations on a treaty. This committee got the name "Maudling
Committee" after the British Paymaster-General552 who was appointed as special
coordinator on free trade area questions within the British Government.
After the Treaty of Rome had been signed by the Six on 25 March 1957 there
had been a certain concern that this would slow down the Free Trade Area
negotiations and possibly even turn the interest of the Six over to other areas.
According to Macmillan. however, "on the surface, at any rate, the Common Market
powers seemed still ready to proceed with the negotiations for the wider area of Free
Trade". During the ratification process of the Treaty of Rome, Macmillan and the
British Government foresaw two possible dangers. One would be that France should
not ratify the Treaty. The second that after all Six had ratified, they would turn their
backs on the Free Trade Area. Macmillan, on the other hand, was less worried about
the first situation, as he said, "because then we might be able to do an exercise as
we did after the E.D.C [...] to pick up the pieces".553
After having been pressed to participate in the ECSC in 1950, something she
refused, the United Kingdom was the only country in Europe to have established a
special association with the Community. The United Kingdom was also invited to
participate in the negotiations for the EEC and Euratom, and for a while this was
what she did. Flowever, it became increasingly clear during 1955 that the Spaak
Committee was in favour of a common market with common policies and not of the
sectoral approach of the ECSC and Euratom. The working group that was set up to
advise the Mutual Aid Committee on whether to participate or not reported in 1956,
after the disappearance of the United Kingdom from the Spaak Committee, that
participation in the long run would have been to the United Kingdom's
advantage.554 This advice was, however, not taken into consideration at that time
The British title of Paymaster-General refers to a Minister, or member of the
Cabinet, without a Portfolio.
553 Macmillan (1971) pp. 434-436.
554 The Mutual Aid Committee consisted of 16 members from the Treasury, the
Board of Trade, the Foreign Office and the Bank of England, as well as a
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as the result of the same study in the United Kingdom gave quite the opposite result.
Nevertheless, after the European Communities had been set up she was the first
additional country to seek full membership, in July 1961.
The United Kingdom never thought that France would be able, through the
mechanism of European integration, to bind Germany to the West, something they
believed only the US would be able to achieve. The United Kingdom was further
afraid that an integrated Germany in the Western Europe, without the US, would
lead to a German hegemony in Europe. At the seventh meeting of the Mutual Aid
Committee it was reported that "Ministers should be reminded that, should the
Messina powers achieve economic integration without the United Kingdom, this
would mean German hegemony in Europe".555 All through the 1950s, therefore,
the United Kingdom insisted on keeping an Atlantic framework.
The Plan G, which was later turned into the proposal for a European Free
Trade Area, was presented two days after the Venice meeting of the Foreign
Ministers of the Six, on 24 July 1956.556 It would have meant a multilateral
arrangement of all OEEC countries, including the Common Market, and proposed
the gradual elimination of industrial tariffs between the markets of Western Europe.
Further, it was designed to appeal to German opponents of the Common Market of
the Six, to Belgians and Dutch anxious about a Franco-German hegemony, and to
Secretariat of two people. At their seventh meeting, on 17 February 1956, the
Committee discussed in brief arrangements for the OEEC ministerial meeting on
24 February, and a visit made by the German Minister of Economics, Professor
Erhard. M.A.C.(56) 7th Meeting. Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room
"B" Cabinet Office. Great George Street. SW1, on Friday, 17 February 1956, at
10.15 am. PRO CAB 134/1282.
M.A.C.(56) 7th Meeting. Minutes of a Meeting held in Conference Room
'B' Cabinet Office. Great George Street, SW1, on Friday, 17th February 1956, at
10.15 am. PRO CAB 134/1282.
'56 Plan G originally sought, on an initiative from the British President of the
Board of Trade. Peter Thorneycroft. to find a solution as to how to approach the
creation of a "discriminatory trading bloc in western Europe dominated by
Germany". For Britain this became even more difficult as the 'bloc' would have the
support of the United States. Milward (1992) p. 428.
258
win American support by offering a larger framework for integration than the Six,
where the United Kingdom would be the leading member. The hope was that
negotiations with the Six over this proposal would take place before the conclusion
of the Treaties of Rome, something which was to prove impossible. However, when
the German Bundestag ratified the two Treaties it noted that it was on the condition
that the negotiations for the Free Trade Area should then be pursued.557 This was
due to political criticism over the high tariff proposed for the Common Market.558
At the OEEC Council meeting in July 1956 the Secretary-General formally proposed
the establishment of an OEEC working party to study possible forms and methods
of association between the customs union of the Six and the rest of the OEEC
countries, a proposal which was both supported and inspired by the British. The
main task would be on how to include the customs union as an element in the Free
Trade Area. In August 1956 the Head of the British delegation to the OEEC, Sir
Hugh Ellis-Rees, being no real supporter of European integration, expressed how
"the odds are heavily against their succeeding by themselves in forming the customs
union they have planned".559
The United Kingdom insisted that most, or even all, of what the Messina
Conference had set out to do could be done within the existing framework of the
OEEC, without creating new institutions. To men like Monnet, Spaak and Adenauer,
a united Europe could never be achieved, or at least not fast enough, through an
organisation like the OEEC. By such an attitude, they were convinced that the
United Kingdom wanted no part in Europe and that the Six would have to go ahead
without her. In the autumn of the same year two British ministers, Mr. Thorneycroft
w This was due to strong opposition coming mainly from the SPD. as well as
prominent figures within the CDU. like Ludwig Erhard, noting that "[T]he
collaboration of the Six, which must be extended to those European countries not
members of the EEC, rests on an economic basis. We must not concentrate our
efforts on the single idea that it is necessary to act in the sense of a political
community of the Six by the intermediary of the EEC". Lindberg (1963) p. 130-
131.
">8
Camps (1964) p. 88.
Milward (1992) p. 431.
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and Mr. Macmillan,560 issued a statement on a visit to Washington about which
products would be included in the proposed Free Trade Area, as well as the plan to
eliminate tariffs and quotas.
The British press, industry and public opinion was more than favourable to
the proposed Free Trade Area. Such was not the situation on the Continent where
there was a feeling that the British initiative might at worst delay the Six in coming
to an agreement on the Common Market. There was also some suspicion of the
British motives. Monnet's Committee for a United States of Europe nevertheless
welcomed the OEEC studies on a Free Trade Area, but made it plain in a declaration
of 20 September 1956 that they attached primary importance to a quick agreement
by the Six Governments on the Common Market and Euratom. Mr. Spaak expressed
similar attitudes on a visit to London in September 1956 where he preferred to push
ahead separately with the drafting of the Common Market Treaty. Spaak thought of
the Free Trade Area as a supplementary scheme which could best be worked out
after agreement had been reached on the Common Market. The British, on the other
hand, wanted the two plans to be worked out simultaneously, in order to get the best
deal.
3.4 Continental reactions and the British response
The OEEC negotiations were deliberately held up over the autumn of 1956.
It was feared that the French Assemblee Nationale could favour the Free Trade Area
project and instead either delay or refuse to ratify the Treaty of Rome. Spaak and
Monnet feared that the looser British arrangement might in fact have seemed more
attractive to many within the Six, in particular in France and Germany.561 At least
360 In January 1957 the British Government was reorganised following the
resignation of Sir Anthony Eden. This made Mr. Macmillan Prime Minister, and
Mr. Thorneycroft became Chancellor of the Exchequer. Before that Mr. Macmillan
had been the Chancellor of Exchequer and Mr. Thorneycroft the President of the
Board of Trade.
361 In Germany the Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Ludwig Erhard, was a
strong supporter of the Free Trade Area, calling it "one of the many brilliant
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it was clear that many "Europeans" felt the British plan might be a helpful
supplement to the plans of the Six. To forces among the Six in fear of German
domination, the prospect of a close link with the UK would give further welcoming
reassurance. This was indeed the case for the Benelux countries, traditionally more
economically liberal, favouring a wider European trading arrangement to the high
external tariff of the Treaty of Rome. The British initiative has also been seen as
contributing to the success of the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome, by giving
political and economic reassurance to those who felt the Common Market was too
limited, and by implicitly threatening to replace the Common Market. In Germany
most of the industry was against the protectionist trade of the Common Market. It
therefore welcomed all attempts to widen the area as an association through a free
trade area. Furthermore, Germany was happy to see the United Kingdom willing to
join such a free trade area."'62
During the autumn of 1956 it appeared that the Americans were rethinking
their military commitments in Europe, which saw a change in the attitude of
Adenauer in particular. Germany depended on the commitment of the US forces in
Europe and was reluctant to take any action that might lead to any reduction in the
US commitment. Adenauer, therefore, sought to tighten the ties between France,
Germany and the United Kingdom. On 25 September 1956 in Hamburg, Adenauer
publicly spoke of the need to strengthen the seven nation Western European Union
economic concepts of our time and the best way to draw Britain closer to the
Continent". Financial Times, 27 September 1956. (Camps (1964) p. 102.) France,
on the other hand, was more reserved towards the Common Market project for
other reasons. A common market seemed, at the time, too tight a system which had
lost its appeal after the failure of the EDC. Furthermore, she was more interested
in Euratom at this stage. During the negotiations for a Common Market, therefore,
the French had all the time held back, insisting on transitional periods for cutting
tariffs, divided into stages. Several escape clauses too had to be introduced.
Nevertheless, once the Treaty of Rome had been signed and ratified, the Free Trade
Area was going to lose all the appeal it once might have had.
Speech by Fritz Hellwig. The Establishment of a Common Market in
Europe. 18 February 1958. Archives of the European Commission. Brussels.
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(WEU),563 that "the seven-nation alliance should be revamped into something in
the order of a confederation". He further "made it clear that he would like to see the
Western European Union converted into a body able to set the broad lines of
international and defense policy for its member states".564 The federation "must
not suffer from the disease of our time - perfectionism" and "its institutions need not
always be supranational in nature. We want to choose ways so that nobody is scared
off".565 It seems clear from these speeches that the official German line was that
of a European system to include the United Kingdom. It was therefore important not
to frighten her but instead speak publicly about this wish. Few days later Adenauer
met with Guy Mollet when they called for the "active participation" of the United
Kingdom in the building of a united Europe. They also announced their intentions
of striving to give new meaning to such organisations as the OEEC, the Council of
Europe and the WEU.
Spaak warned Macmillan, the then Chancellor of Exchequer, in a private talk
in January 1957 that the British would never win acceptance of their plan from the
French, and hence neither from any other of the Six Common Market countries.
France was not interested in sharing her good deal with the United Kingdom, and
the latter, in return, wanted her manufacturers to get access to the European market
but not to give France any free market access in the United Kingdom for her
foodstuffs. As Spaak pointed out, the British plan would allow each country in the
Free Trade Area to go on charging its own individual tariffs. Maurice Faure,
France's principal spokesman in the Common Market negotiations, insisted that if
the United Kingdom rejected the Common Tariff principle then there would be no
Free Trade Area.
In Germany there was strong support for a Free Trade Area from the
'6j The Western European Union consisted of the Six of the ECSC plus the
United Kingdom.
M'4 "Adenauer urges stronger Union of West Europe", The New York Times,
2 October 1956.
565 L'Annee Politique 1956, p. 359. In: Camps (1964) p. 104.
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Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard in particular. Within German governmental
circles opinions were, however, highly polarized, typically between the Chancellor
and the Foreign Office on the one side, and the Ministry of Economics on the
other.566 Throughout the 1950s the relations between Adenauer and Erhard became
more and more difficult. One reason was their fight over the chancellorship when
Adenauer was re-elected for the third time in 1957.567 Another, and more far-
reaching reason was their differing views on European integration and trade
relations. Where Adenauer was concerned with the over-all political considerations,
Erhard was more concerned with economics.568 Where Adenauer saw the need for
a Franco-German cooperation within a European political framework, Erhard was
concerned about the needs of German industry. In his view this should be "global
rather than restricted to the original six members of the Communities".569 One
reason was his objection to the price which France was demanding and which
Germany had to pay in the negotiations for a common market, something which he
called "an economic nonsense".570 He also wanted to avoid the division of Western
Europe into the Common Market against the rest. "A closed trade area in Western
Europe", in Erhard's view, would encourage "regional protectionism".571 The
'6ft
Germany had in its early days a rather unstable administrative system which
made the power struggle over control over the European integration process all the
more difficult. Due to arrangements by Adenauer, all departments needed approval
from the Foreign Office to engage in foreign negotiations. Furthermore, the
"constant strife between Adenauer and Erhard [...] had a negative influence on the
development of structural and procedural solutions to the demands of
Europeanisation". J. J. Hesse and K. H. Goetz, Early Administrative Adjustment to
the European Communities: the Case of the Federal Republic of Germany. In:
Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 204.
As Adenauer was re-elected as Chancellor. Erhard was appointed Vice-
Chancellor and thereby strengthening his position in the Cabinet, despite "a
reluctant Adenauer". Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 190.
Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 184.
569 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 185.
'7n Ibidem.
7
Hanns Jtirgen Kusters, The Federal Republic of Germany and the EEC-
Treaty. In: Enrico Serra (1989) p. 497.
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French insisted firmly that a Free Trade Area must have a common external tariff,
and a common commercial policy towards all outside countries, including the
Commonwealth countries. The Free Trade Area institutions also had to be
supranational.572
During 1956 the British Government began to think about making
arrangements with the Six in case the latter group succeeded in establishing the EEC
and Euratom. However, at the time there were signs of more cooperative attitudes
towards Euratom rather than the Common Market. From the British side it was felt
that, due to the French interest in Euratom, this would seem like the best and most
credible option to support. In that connection the British felt there was a need to
make Euratom and the OEEC programs complementary. The British representative
who participated in the discussions during the early days of the Spaak Committee had
outlined the advantages of a free trade area to his colleagues from the Six. The Six
unanimously preferred a customs union among themselves, but the idea of some kind
of free trade link between the Six and the United Kingdom was still seen as a
possibility. Such a solution had also been mentioned in the Spaak Report as feasible
as well as even desirable. At the time around July 1956 the United Kingdom did not
appear to have considered participation in a full customs union. On the other hand,
she appears to have considered either full membership of a "customs union" based
on free trade and excluding agriculture, if the Six failed in forming their own
common market, or, in case they did succeed, a free trade area link between the
United Kingdom and the customs union.
The formal British Cabinet decision to seek to negotiate a Free Trade Area,
consisting of the Six, the United Kingdom, and any other OEEC country wishing to
participate, was taken during the autumn of 1956. Macmillan made it clear that he
envisaged the customs union of the Six to join the Free Trade Area as one unit, and
"7:
Up until the week before signing the Treaties of Rome, Erhard regarded
them as "an economic burden for Europe", claiming that France "cares little for true
freedom of trade". He was forced, however, by Adenauer, "to accept compromises
in France's favor", despite his belief that it would lead to "disintegration of the
worst kind". Willis (1965) p. 265.
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added that the British proposals were not intended to replace or lessen the customs
union itself, which was the greatest fear of the Six. The Council of Ministers of the
OEEC took its decision a few months later, on 13 February 1957, to start
negotiations for the setting-up of a Free Trade Area in which the Six would be
associated with the rest of the OEEC member States. Out of this meeting an
intergovernmental conference was set up at ministerial level as an attempt to reach
an early agreement. It started its meetings in October 1957 and became commonly
known as the Maudling Committee. (See below, 3.6)
One of the main reasons for the British decision to start negotiations for a
Free Trade Area was, in the view of Sir David Eccles, that "unless Britain joined
the European Free Trade Area, Germany would 'run the show' in the Common
Market".573
3.5 The Changing position of France
At the above mentioned meeting of the OEEC Council in February 1957, the
British stressed the importance of the Free Trade Area and the Common Market
coming into operation simultaneously, with the same timetable for trade
liberalisation, so that discrimination among OEEC countries would be avoided.
Spaak, speaking for the Six, resisted any suggestion that might have implied a
slowing-down of the Treaty of Rome negotiations or any changes in the draft treaty
in order to accommodate the needs of the Free Trade Area. His overriding priority
was to push ahead with the Treaty of Rome. The German Minister of Economics,
Dr. Erhard, was at this point displaying his personal preference for a free trade area
rather than the tighter and more far-reaching Common Market. The French, on the
other hand, were sceptical to the Free Trade Area. During the early months of 1957,
mistrust and suspicion of British motives flared up on the continent, particularly in
France, based on the belief that a strong, if not the primary, motive behind the
Sir David Eccles. President of the Board of Trade, in The Times, 28 May
1957. EUROPE 1944-1960, COP1E P Generalites (Questions Internationales),
VOL.: 193, VUES: 453. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.
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British proposal for a free trade area was the desire to undermine the plans of the
Six. This wave of suspicion was nourished by the British attempts to persuade Spaak
and others to keep the Six from agreeing on a system of tariff reduction and quota
removal and on procedures for invoking escape clauses before they could be
discussed within the wider group. The British were also strongly opposed to the
inclusion of the overseas territories.
In a note from the Services de Cooperation Economique of the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mendes-France, member of the Assemblee Nationale
representing the Radical Socialists, stressed the fact that, although a proposal for the
creation of a free trade area had come from the United Kingdom, it had happened
after she had turned down the offer of joining the Common Market of the Six.574
The Free Trade Area, according to the United Kingdom, was always assumed to be
created around the Common Market, never independent from it. Mendes-France
himself would favour a wider Free Trade Area of the Six plus the rest of the OEEC
as long as this would remain subordinate to the Common Market and that each state
would have its own external tariff. The same arguments were pointed out by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Pineau, to the Assemblee Nationale. It was only,
he said, when the Six had shown a willingness to set up a common market that the
United Kingdom had looked for a possibility to associate the other members of the
OEEC to this. Consequently, he pointed out:
"Si nous renoncions au marche commun, nous devrions done renoncer
aussi a la zone de libre echange, et, par consequence, a une
>74 19 janvier 1957, Services de Cooperation Economique. Note. DE.CE COPIE
P, VOL. 627-628. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. Pierre
Mendes-France (1907-1982) was the Vice-President of the Radical Socialist Party
1955-57. From June 1954 to February 1955 he served as the Prime Minister of
France. Between February and May 1956 he held the position as deputy premier
without portfolio in Guy Mollet's Government. He resigned in opposition to de
Gaulle's accession to power and in the elections of 1958 he failed to be elected to
the Assemblee Nationale. In January 1957 he was, however, still a parliamentary
member but not part of the Government.
266
association plus etroite de la Grande Bretagne avec I 'Europe":'h
During the spring of 1957 the British Prime Minister held meetings with his
French and German colleagues. He met the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet on
9 March in Paris, and the German Chancellor, Dr. Adenauer, in Bonn on 8 May.
The purpose was in to eliminate fears and suspicions that had arisen between the
three countries. At the same time, through a number of high level talks, the British
also sought to gain more positive French and German support for the Free Trade
Area. In London a meeting was held between Maurice Faure, the principal French
negotiator of the Treaty of Rome and the French delegate to the OEEC Council, Mr.
Thorneycroft, the then British Chancellor of Exchequer, and the President of the
Board of Trade, Mr. David Eccles. On the continent rumours were spreading that
the United Kingdom was seeking to "torpedo" the Common Market. At the same
time, in the United Kingdom, there was a suspicion "that France, having got what
it wanted in the Treaty of Rome, had lost interest in the free trade area".576
The meetings referred to above resulted in the French, with the support of the
Germans, requesting a postponement of the meeting of the OEEC Council scheduled
for July 1957. at which the British hoped to make a definitive progress on the Free
Trade Area. The French wanted the postponement of the meeting due to the fact that
the ratification debate in the Assemblee Nationale on the Treaties of Rome was
planned for that same July. They feared that if the Free Trade Area was attracting
attention at the same time the chances of ratification might be prejudiced, and used
by the group that was against any move towards freer trade. At the same time the
British received assurances from both the French and the Germans that once French
ratification had been completed the two Governments would be ready for serious
negotiations on a free trade area. However, France made it quite clear that she could
Assemblee Nationale, Compte Rendu Analytique Officiel, lere Seance 22
janvier 1957. DE.CE COPIE P. VOL. 627-628. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Paris. "If we renounce the Common Market, we should also renounce the
Free Trade Area and. as a consequence, a closer association between Great Britain
and Europe." Own translation.
slh
Camps (1964) p. 122.
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not accept fewer guarantees in the Free Trade Area than she had done in the
Common Market.
In May 1957, the President of the Board of Trade, Sir David Eccles,
expressed in a speech that "although it is not military or hostile in its intent - six
countries in Europe have signed a treaty to do exactly what, for hundreds of years,
we have always said we could not see done with safety to our own country. [...] If,
when the common market of the Six comes about, we were left outside and made no
effort to join it and liberalise it and make it look outward instead of inwards, the
Germans would run it [...] the present German Government under Dr. Adenauer
knows it and fears it and does not want to do it."577 These remarks, which were
meant to explain why a free trade area would be more important politically than
economically, sent off alarms to France with a confirmation of the British distrust
of the Six and a reaffirmation that the British still thought in terms of holding the
balance of power on the Continent. The fact that the British agreed to a
postponement of the OEEC meeting indicates a certain importance put into the
setting-up of the Common Market. In return it was agreed "that the two
Governments [ the French and the German] would do what they could to ensure that
the negotiations in the O.E.E.C. for the creation of the Free Trade Area should be
carried forward to a satisfactory conclusion".578
Eater the same year, on 7 June 1957, Sir David Eccles gave his support to
the Treaty of Rome in a speech at the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris by
saying: "My Government welcomes the initiatives of France and the other five
Powers who have agreed upon a revolutionary change in their commercial and
financial policies. [...] This is one of the masterpieces of history - something above
and beyond the ordinary scope of international arrangements. [...] When the experts
explain to us the Treaty of Rome in terms of economics we see beyond the tariffs
777 "German Trade Lead Danger", The Times, 28 May 1957, p. 4. Sir David
Eccles speaking at the inaugural ceremony of the nineteenth congress of the
Federation of the Commonwealth and British Empire Chambers of Commerce.
Camps (1964) p. 123. note 50. Also in Cmnd. 648.
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and the quotas, for we know that Europe is feeling its way to something much more
fundamental than the exchange of goods and money." However, he continued:
"granted that European solidarity and peace is the purpose of the Treaty of Rome,
how illusory might this be if the result were to divide Europe. [...] If the Common
Market came into existence without the Free Trade Area then Western Europe [...]
might again fly apart."579
The French Assemblee Nationale ratified the Treaties of Rome in July 1957
which was an event the British thought would give great hopes for the Free Trade
Area negotiations. What was, maybe, not quite understood in the United Kingdom
was the fact that most of the French, as well as the so-called "Europeans" of the Six
had, from then on, their attention turned towards the building of the institutions of
the EEC, and were thereby not so interested in the Free Trade Area. During the
autumn of 1957 the ministers and representatives of the Six met several times in the
form of the Interim Committee.580 Already at that time men like Hallstein and
Marjolin, appointed by their governments to the European Commission, were greatly
involved in the discussions.
The Interim Committee, which came into being after the signing of the Treaty
of Rome, consisting of the heads of delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference,
played a certain role in the preparation and coordination of the Six until the Treaty
came into force. One of its tasks, which was quite significant during the Free Trade
Area negotiations, was "the coordination of the attitude of the six governments in
other international organizations".581 Its first meeting was held in October 1957
",7"
Camps (1964) pp. 124-125.
The Interim Committee was set up after the Treaty of Rome had been signed
for the ministers from the six countries to meet before the Treaty entered into
effect. It became a forum for discussing questions concerning the new Community
as well as other questions like the position to be taken in the Free Trade Area
negotiations. In: Camps (1964) p. 130/7.
781 LTnstitut Royal des Relations Internationales (IRRI), "Le Marche Commun
et l'Euratom", Chronique de Politique Etrangere, X (July-November 1957), pp. 444-
445. In: Lindberg (1963) p. 141.
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when it also helped preparing the position of the Six in the Maudling Committee.
The French had. however, already proposed the Six to meet to discuss the position
to be adopted in the Free Trade Area.582 Although there has not been found too
much evidence of the work of the Interim Committee neither in the literature, apart
from briefly in Lindberg and Camps, nor in the archive material, it does seem clear
that it played a certain role in creating and maintaining a common front among the
Six. However, its work was conducted mainly behind the scenes but helped to keep
the Six united in the Free Trade Area negotiations during the autumn of 1957.583
In France much of industry had originally been opposed to the setting-up of
the Common Market, fearing the consequences of the Treaty of Rome coming into
effect. Furthermore, there was strong opposition among the Patronat as well as other
influential industrial groups to the creation of a free trade area around the Common
Market. In the United Kingdom the same groups gave such a project great support.
The French were faced with a problem of two aspects. Firstly, they feared for the
special concessions given to them in the EEC. Secondly, they thought the Free Trade
Area would be too advantageous to the United Kingdom. This would be particularly
so in the area of agriculture. After the signing of the Treaties of Rome a common
front was created between the Six, presumably through discussions by the national
delegations in the Interim Committee. Therefore, when the British presented their
White Paper, the lack of support was crystalised in all six countries, and the British
plan was thought to be too simplified.
582 Lindberg (1963) p. 141.
"8" Only twice in all the masses of archive material that we have had available
for this thesis has the Interim Committee been mentioned. One was concerning
Staff Regulations (Doc. MAE 1305/57. Bruxelles, 24 novembre 1958, 1233 f/58
mts.. CEAB 1/1328). the other had to do with the Free Trade Area negotiations
(Premier Memorandum de la Commission de la CEE au sujet des negotiations
relatives a la creation d'une zone de libre echange, 19 mars 1958, 74/58-F, CEAB
5/620). The latter was a confidential document from the European Commission to
the Council of Ministers concerning the Commission's views on the proposed Free
Trade Area, based upon a study by the Interim Committee. No more specific
reference was made, however, to this Committee or its views regarding the Free
Trade Area in this document.
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To the French one of the main issues of the Free Trade Area negotiations was
that, since the British could not accept the Treaty of Rome, one had to make sure
that the Free Trade Area became something different. Inevitably, it also had to
involve some sort of discrimination against the other countries of the OEEC. This
was, further, an issue which was brought forward during the first substantive
discussions in the Intergovernmental Committee, the so-called Maudling Committee,
in November 1957. The French delegate, Maurice Faure, was rather explicit about
the reservations of the French Government and stressed the importance of having a
"difference" between the two trade arrangements, the Free Trade Area and the
Common Market. It was also pointed out by the French that a free trade area would
not be fully satisfactory without a common external tariff. In Maurice Faure's view
"unless the Treaty of Association between the Six and the other OEEC countries was
roughly similar to the Treaty of Rome and like that treaty ensured an adequate
'balance' between commitments of different kinds, the trade advantages would have
to be different and more limited than those enjoyed by the members of the
Community".584 The question which would have to be answered to the French
people was why some countries should be able to enjoy the advantages of the Treaty
of Rome without accepting its obligations.
Contrary to certain negative attitudes towards the Free Trade Area from the
French during 1957, the Dutch Secretary of State for European integration, in a
debate in the Dutch Parliament on foreign policies, had identified the Free Trade
Area as one of the most urgent problems confronting the European Commission. The
Dutch Government had already underlined several times the importance of the
setting-up an area of free trade, both politically and economically. Another important
element would be to present the European Community as a single unit to its partners.
Furthermore, the EEC would have to be committed to an association with the OEEC
in the interest of Europe as a whole.585
584 Camps (1964) p. 137.
The French Embassy in the Netherlands. The Hague. 11 February 1958.
Report from M. de Beauverger, French Ambassador, to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, M. Pineau. EUROPE 1944-1960. COPIE P, Generalites [Questions
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The First General Report, of 17 September 1958, from the Commission made
it known how the French Government already in February 1958 informed the other
five Governments and the European Commission of the fact that they disagreed "as
regards the scope of the Association and its rhythm, with the original British
concepts which had served as basis for the work of the O.E.E.C".58'1 As a result
the Commission presented its First Memorandum in March the same year, attempting
to make the negotiations acceptable to all parties. (See below, 4.4)
In the beginning of 1958 the British modified the White Paper which,
however, still excluded the agricultural sector. As this was something which was
received rather coolly by the Six, the other OEEC countries started circulating
papers on agriculture. Nevertheless, it was only Denmark that was interested in
including this in the Free Trade Area.
In March 1958 there came a new proposal from the French, which brought
the Maudling Committee to a halt until the plan had been decided on by the Six. The
French suggested trade arrangements to be made product by product, and country
by country, and purely industry based. Hard pressed industries should further wait
for a harmonisation of tariffs to have been put into force. Moreover, the proposal
suggested a "decalage", or time gap where the "freeing of trade within the
Community [would] start three years before that in the wider group", a group which
was renamed the "Union for European Economic Co-operation".587 In its proposal,
France also accepted the British position of treating agriculture separately, but on the
other hand argued in return for some Continental access to the Commonwealth
markets. A proposal of this kind only made the chances for an agreement more
unlikely than ever. To the rest of the Six it was felt as if the French proposals would
take the process in a backwards direction.
Internationales], VOL. 193. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.
EEC - First General Report 1958, p. 115.
587 Camps (1964) p. 144.
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To the United Kingdom. France was the main obstacle for the Free Trade
Area to succeed. Her hope was to get Germany on her side to help bring France
around. In April 1958 the French Government fell. After that followed six weeks of
near civil war which meant that no decision of any importance affecting France could
be taken, and the whole process of the Free Trade Area, as well as most other
things, was brought to a halt. Before the collapse of the government, the French had
been busy working out their own free trade area proposal. As a result the British
started bilateral negotiations with the rest of the Six, which made France think that
the United Kingdom was trying to isolate her altogether. On 1 June 1958 General
de Gaulle came to power in France, shifting the priority of the French Government
away from the Free Trade Area. It was hoped in London that the chances of setting-
up a free trade area would increase. General de Gaulle, who was not deeply in
favour of the Treaty of Rome, was thought of as one who would rather favour a
looser and wider system, which the British though the Free Trade Area would be.
Nevertheless, the General was "more interested in political questions than in
economic matters, which he tended to leave to the Technicians'".588 Adenauer, on
his side, put all his efforts into strengthening the Franco-German relationship and the
proposed Free Trade Area suffered even more. As soon as de Gaulle had taken up
office, Harold Macmillan, by then Prime Minister, initiated contact between the two
governments, with the Free Trade Area in mind. In a letter to de Gaulle, Macmillan
made his views clear that "unless real progress can be made in the course of July
there is no hope of introducing a Free Trade Area in parallel with the Treaty of
Rome on January 1, 1959".589 In his reply, however, de Gaulle pointed out how
"we must find means of arriving there without destroying the equilibrium of France's
economy and finances".590 To de Gaulle the Free Trade Area was an economic
problem which meant he did not appreciate totally all the political implications.
588 Camps (1964) p. 152.
889 Letter from Macmillan to de Gaulle of 30 June 1958. Macmillan (1971) p.
449.
590 Letter from de Gaulle to Macmillan. received on 5 July 1958. Macmillan
(1971) p. 450.
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At the end of September 1958, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers of
the Six in Venice, it was agreed, during the discussions of the Ockrent Report,591
to accept the view of the French that all decisions in the Free Trade Area should be
taken unanimously. Agreement was reached on the Ockrent Report in October 1958,
which, up to that point, was "the most comprehensive exposition of the 'Community'
point of view made during the negotiations".592 The Six accepted the French view
that institutional arrangements in the Free Trade Area, or the European Economic
Association, as they preferred to call it, should be analogous to those of the OEEC,
with the Council acting on unanimity.593 The Linked Kingdom, in this case, was
in favour of majority voting.
During a visit by M. Wormser of the French delegation to London in October
1958 the problems of institutions and origin of goods had been on the agenda. M.
Wormser had been "struck by a certain abrupt change in the British attitude".594
The United Kingdom normally agreed to the idea that the establishment of the Free
Trade Area could only be done with a certain amount of harmonization of tariffs.
During this meeting the feeling came across that she wanted to "entrench herself
behind a sort of dogma of free tariffs".595 As seen by the French delegation, this
was a contradiction to the whole concept of the Free Trade Area. The French
delegation, further, felt that the British were taking a position which seemingly
The Ockrent Report was another name for the Memorandum from the
European Economic Community, which is to be found in the Blue Book or the
Negotiations for a European Free Trade Area. Cmnd. 648, January 1959. The
report was the result of a committee from the Six led by the Belgian permanent
delegate to the OEEC. Mr. Roger Ockrent.
'92 Camps (1964) p. 157.
-9' The name "European Economic Association" was chosen to indicate that the
arrangement under discussion at this stage was something different from the
original free trade area plan. Camps (1964) p. 158.
"94 "M. Wormser a ete frappe par un revirement qui lui a paru s'etre produit
dans I attitude hritannique". Own translation.
595 "se retrancher derriere line sorte de dogme de la liherte tariffaire"'. Own
translation.
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created a new situation. During the spring of 1958 the Commission had began to
play a coordinated role behind the scenes. This was a new situation as the Six had
earlier made very little attempt to speak with one voice, apart from a few attempts
of the Interim Committee during the autumn 1957.600 To the French there was a
conflict between "creating unity in Europe" and "encouraging the freeing of trade
on a world-wide basis". The British, on the other hand, believed these two ideas
could go hand in hand.601 Between the failure of the EDC in August 1954 and up
to the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the French were interested in a free trade area,
probably as a means to play down the supranational elements of the Community. As
soon as the Treaty of Rome had been signed, the Free Trade Area proposal had to
be played down somewhat in order to secure the French ratification. During this
period it became important to tell the French people how the Treaty of Rome created
something more than a free trade area, something more which would not apply to
the other countries of the OEEC. After the ratification of the Treaty of Rome the
French became more interested in the new Community, the setting-up of its
institutions and in making them work. The views on the Free Trade Area adopted
by the European Commission during 1959 were to a large extent shared by the
French Government.602
600 As Miriam Camps has put it "Until the spring of 1958, when the
Commission began to play a coordinating role behind the scenes, there was little
real attempt on the part of the Six to speak with one voice." Camps (1964) p. 169.
601
Camps (1964) pp. 168-170.
6,12 During the spring and summer of 1958, when to a large extent, the negative
position of the French towards the Free Trade Area appeared more strongly, the
idea seemed rather unpopular to the French people. The French were generally
rather sceptical towards the British, and were unwilling to give up or share the
number of concessions granted her in the Treaty of Rome. Furthermore, President
de Gaulle was in great need of domestic support in the forthcoming elections and
referendum. Hence, France had good reasons to promote the Common Market
strongly. The European Commission, loyal to the Treaty of Rome and lead by more
"European" ideals, realized the problems of linking the Common Market to a looser
and broader arrangement of free trade, something which could "undermine the
tighter construction of the Six". Camps (1964) p. 167. Although de Gaulle was to
enjoy stronger influence during the 1960s, it seems clear that he could not be
overlooked by the Commission even before that.
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"would create an ambiguity on the significance of the whole negotiations".59" It had
to be accepted, in the French view, that the European Economic Association had to
practice a "preference Europeenne" 797
On 14 November 1958 the Maudling Committee met to discuss the Ockrent
Report after which the French Minister of Information, Jacques Soustelle, announced
to the press:
"II est apparu a la France qu 'il n 'etait pas possible de creer la zone
de libre-echange, comme I 'avaient souhaite les Britanniques, c 'est-a-
dire par I'etablissement du libre-echange entre les six pays du Marche
commun et les onze autre pays de I 'O. E. C. E, et cela faute d 'un tarif
douanier unique a la lisiere des dix-sept pays et faute d'harmonisation
dans les domaines economique et social. "m
This statement broke off what we have called the first phase of the Free Trade Area
negotiations without, apparently, the French really meaning to. The problem had
been that France, mainly, had been opposed to linking the Common Market with
another arrangement that gave comparable trade benefits but with less far-reaching
commitments to common tariffs, common policies, and to common actions. "The
'European' case against the Free Trade Area was that, regardless of intent, the
existence of the Free Trade Area would tend to undermine the tighter construction
of the Six."599
The British, as Miriam Camps has written, had "misjudged the strength of
the movement towards greater unity among the Six in the autumn of 1955".
Furthermore, they had underrated the extent to which the Treaty of Rome in fact
"fait planer line equivoque sur la signification de I 'ensemble de la
negotiation". Own translation.
797 EEC, Commission. Service Juridique Commun. Section Archives. 29th
Meeting of Coreper, 17 October 1958 (doc. 1155). BAC 24/1967, No. 124.
798 L'Annee Politique 1958. p. 428. Translation from Camps (1964) p. 165: "it
was not possible to form a free trade area as had been wished by the British, that
is to say by having free trade between the six countries of the Common Market and
the eleven other countries of the OEEC. without a common external tariff and
without harmonization in the economic and social spheres."
599 Camps (1964) p. 167.
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3.6 The Maudling Committee
It was in the British hope and interest that the Common Market and the Free
Trade Area would come into force more or less simultaneously, preferably both on
1 January 1959. This was a wish which had already been established by the OEEC
Council in a Resolution of February 1957.603 To the British it was important to
be present from the very first day of the Common Market being in operation.
Otherwise, she could risk the Six making too many special arrangements among
themselves, or even deciding not to join the Free Trade Area after all. Rapid
progress would therefore have to be made after the French ratification of the Treaty
of Rome in July 1957. Before the French ratification, the Six had pushed the Free
Trade Area negotiations somewhat to the side. The reason for this was a fear that
the French would decide that with a free trade area of OEEC countries, a Common
Market would be neither necessary nor desirable.
There was a certain mood to be observed within the Six countries for an
agreement with the British to be reached for political reasons. This was in particular
important to the Benelux countries more than the others, who were anxious also to
"weaken the 'protectionist' colouration of the Common Market".604 However, by
autumn 1957 there was such a commitment to the Treaty of Rome that any
agreement with the British would have to come as second priority. There was the
basic principle of the Six that nothing should be done to weaken their cohesiveness,
or the integrity of the Treaty of Rome.
At the OEEC ministerial meeting in Paris on 16-17 October 1957, a meeting
which had been postponed from July earlier that year, the OEEC Council agreed to
60j "secure the establishment of a European Free Trade Area which would
comprise all Member countries of the Organisation; which would associate, on a
multi-lateral basis, the European Economic Community with the other Member
countries; and, which, taking fully into consideration the objectives of the European
Economic Community, would in practice take effect parallel with the Treaty of
Rome." Resolution by the OEEC Council, February 1957. In: Camps (1964) p. 135.
604 Camps (1964) p. 132.
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set up an Intergovernmental Committee at ministerial level to study the ways of
forming a free trade area. The representative and chief negotiator of the British
Government, Mr. Reginald Maudling, was elected chairman of this committee.605
Its first substantive discussions were held in November 1957, where Maurice Faure,
the French representative to the Intergovernmental Committee, started off by making
a statement about the French Government's reservations on the whole proposal. The
French Government felt strongly that the Free Trade Area agreement should be more
or less identical to the Treaty of Rome as it was believed that a free trade area
without a common external tariff would not be satisfactory. Another element was the
fact that the Free Trade Area lacked, according to the French people, the political
appeal of the Common Market. According to Maurice Faure, the French were
concerned with "the importance of having a 'difference' between the trade
arrangements in the free trade area and the Common Market". Further, he indicated
the fact that the former "would not be fully satisfactory unless it entailed [...] a
common external tariff with as small as possible a number of derogations from this
rule".606
The Resolution produced by the Council of the OEEC on 17 October 1957
once again expressed a determination to establish a Free Trade Area to take effect
parallel to the Treaty of Rome on 1 January 1959. Progress in the negotiations, it
said, seemed to indicate that a basis existed for a successful conclusion of the
negotiations.607 In a Draft Resolution it was suggested the establishment of a Free
Trade Area Commission, consisting of seven members. These would be appointed
by the OEEC Council, and the Free Trade Area Commission would "act as
coordinator of the negotiations for the European Free Trade Area Convention".608
607
Reginald Maudling was. before his appointment to the Intergovernmental
Committee in August 1957. the British Minister for European Affairs. To find such
a title in Britain as early as this should indicate a certain importance given to these
matters, despite the positions taken.
606
Camps (1964) pp. 136-137.
607
Introductory note. Confidential. 803 e/58 m. CEAB 5/616.
608 Draft Resolution. 803 e/58 nr. CEAB 5/616.
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The Mauclling Committee, as the OEEC Intergovernmental Committee came
to be called, was principally concerned with three problems. One was the lack of
harmonisation of internal social and economic policies. Secondly, institutional
questions, and thirdly, problems arising from the fact that in the Free Trade Area
there would not be a common external tariff nor a common commercial policy.
With the coming into force of the Treaty of Rome on 1 January 1958 the Six
wanted to make it clear that the Treaty created a new situation, and also to force the
other OEEC countries to accept this, as well as a difference in treatment. In
February 1958 Walter Hallstein, by then the President of the European Commission,
began attending the meetings of the Maudling Committee. Nevertheless, the role of
the Commission in the negotiations was still rather unclear, much due to the fact that
the negotiations had been initiated before the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome.
Under different circumstances the Commission would most likely have borne the
main responsibility of negotiating with the other OEEC countries on behalf of the
Community. Despite being mentioned in Article 228 EEC the fact that the
Commission had been given negotiating power, it was, however, never given the
responsibility for the Free Trade Area negotiations. On the other hand, it very early
in the process started formulating its own "Community" philosophy on the
negotiations, something which helped keep the Six together despite a number of
differences of opinion.609
In March 1958 the Maudling Committee went into recess while the Six
discussed among themselves some new proposals from the French. These proposals
had to be agreed to, modified, or rejected before the Maudling Committee could
meet again for further discussions. A month earlier, in February 1958, the French
Economic Council had unanimously rejected the Free Trade Area currently under
discussion in the Maudling Committee. These ideas were circulated to the rest of the
Six in a memorandum and Maurice Faure travelled to the capitals of the Common
Market explaining the proposal. The other countries, however, felt it was more like
609 Camps (1964) p. 148.
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going a step backwards. The problem in France, as the Government saw it, was to
explain to the people why most of the advantages that would derive from the Treaty
of Rome should be made available to the member countries of the OEEC who would
not accept the obligations of the Common Market.
On 28 March 1958 Mr. Maudling, in a speech to the House of Commons,
said: "People in Europe must not assume that if there is a Common Market but no
Free Trade Area, everything else - E.P.U., O.E.E.C., and so on - will go on as
before. It certainly will not."610
At the meeting of the Maudling Committee in March 1958, the Italian
Minister of Foreign Trade, Signor Guido Carli, came up with a comprehensive plan
based on the use of compensatory charges. According to this plan, goods would be
given free movement within the area as long as the external tariff applied by the area
countries would be within a specified margin. The British, however, objected to this
with the claim that it would only permit free trade within the area for goods for
which the external tariffs were either close together or the same. This would, in
turn, put pressure on a tariff harmonisation which the British opposed for various
reasons. They were determined to preserve their tariff autonomy, as well as their
preferences for the Commonwealth countries.611 The so-called Carli Plan was
presented as an attempt to "break the deadlock between the French and the British
with a proposal involving compensatory taxes".612
One of the main protagonists from the Commission, President Walter
Hallstein, has later had to be credited with much of the success of the Free Trade
Area negotiations. Earlier in the year, on 20 March 1958, he spoke at the first
session of the European Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg. His main theme was
the Community's external relations where he "flatly rejected the charge which was
6I" Hansard. House of Commons, 28 March 1958. In: Camps (1964) p. 146n.
611 Camps (1964) p. 142-143.
612 Lindberg (1963) p. 138.
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then being made with some fervour by the British, the Scandinavians, and the Swiss
that unless the free trade area was formed, the Six would have split Western Europe
and would be 'discriminating' against the other members of the OEEC".613 He
pointed out that "[W]e should state clearly that we reject this charge of
discrimination and that therefore the argument about division which has been built
up on it is invalid". He continued: "The European Economic Community represents
one situation. [...] It is the harmonization, co-ordination, even unification of major
aspects of economic policy and profoundly modifies the economic policy of the six
States."614 With this in mind he told the European Parliamentary Assembly that an
association with the other members of the OEEC would be tolerated only as long as
the Community would be left inviolate. With regards to discrimination he further
humorously compared the Community to a marriage in that "[LJorsque deux
personnes se marient, cela represente aussi une discrimination pour routes les
autres. "615
By the time the European Parliamentary Assembly met again in June 1958,
the Commission had made its views known actively in the negotiations. The
Commissioner responsible for external relations, Jean Rey, also outlined in detail the
Commission's view to the Parliamentary Assembly. Despite the timetable already set
out, the Commission did not see the possibility of the Free Trade Area negotiations
completed, and its Treaty ratified, by the end of 1958.
In France, General de Gaulle had taken over the power on 1 June 1958. His
"technicians", with whom he tended to leave economic questions, were more or less
opposed to the Free Trade Area plan presented by the British. The issue was as well
seen as politically too risky for the President at the time, as he had just taken over
613 Camps (1964) 149.
614 EEC Commission. Statement by the President of the Commission. Walter
Hallstein. to the European Parliamentary Assembly. 20 March 1958. Archives of
the European Commission, Brussels.
European Parliamentary Assembly Debates, 13 January 1959. A remark
which was followed by laughter. "When two people get married, this also
represents a discrimination towards all others." Own translation.
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that position. In Germany, on the other hand, the Free Trade Area plan had support
of the Finance Minister Dr. Erhard, and the majority of the representatives for
German business and financial interests. Nevertheless, on a visit to Germany,
Macmillan was "alarmed to find that the growing Franco-German rapprochement"
had led German officials urge Chancellor Adenauer to "take less friendly view
towards the plan".616
From 19 November 1958 a second Maudling Committee was proposed set up
to sit in a permanent session, receiving the sector reports on which the Six were
working. This Committee was further meant to have the power to take decisions that
would be binding on national governments, offering room for agreement and further
progress. By the end of 1958, the Six had accepted the French view that the
institutional arrangement of the Free Trade Area Association should be analogous to
those of the OEEC, with a Council acting only by unanimity. During the Maudling
Committee negotiations, however, the attitude of the French Government was
making an agreement on an OEEC-wide arrangement impossible. As Miriam Camps
has put it: "The French and some members of the Commission were coming to
believe that, with the recovery from the war and the return to de facto convertibility,
the 'Europe of the Seventeen' had little validity."617
The question of the institutional setting-of the Free Trade Area was a matter
of discussion as well in the Maudling Committee. What caused most concern in this
connection was, however, the voting procedures. According to the Ockrent Report,
which also was the position of the Six, all voting in an eventual Free Trade
Association should be unanimous. The British, on the other hand, changed their
position in favour of voting by qualified majority in certain areas. Their proposal
was that, assuming that all seventeen members of the OEEC was to become members
of the Free Trade Area, the qualified majority ought to be twelve. This would allow
the Six to veto any decision but impose none.
616 Macmillan (1971) p. 454.
617 Camps (1960) Division in Europe, p. 17.
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The Community members tried to play down the role of the institutions of an
eventual Free Trade Association. Further, there was a fear of the motives of the
British in creating a free trade area. It was not, it was felt, as a way "into Europe",
but more as a way of breaking down trade barriers.618
4. THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND ITS ROLE IN THE FREE TRADE
AREA NEGOTIATIONS
When discussing the role of the European Commission in the Free Trade
Area negotiations, one must bear in mind the fact that the EEC did not come into
operation until 1 January 1958. The Free Trade Area negotiations, however, had
started already in the autumn of 1956. The Commission as an established body,
therefore, only took part in the official negotiations during its last year.
Nevertheless, the role of the Commission in this type of negotiation was strongly
kept in mind while negotiating the Treaty of Rome, and, once set up, the institution
tried to make as big an impact as possible. The part of the negotiations for a free
trade area that will be discussed here was what will be referred to as the second
phase. The first phase broke down in November 1958 as a consequence of a
statement from France, cited above. In the second phase, however, the Commission
started playing a more important role, trying to present a common position of the
Six. It was initiated in the beginning of December 1958 with the Council of
Ministers charging the Commission to present a report by 1 March 1959, and lasted
until the Second Memorandum from the Commission was published in September
1959. This Memorandum quite clearly showed the Commission turning away from
the Free Trade Area solution.
618 Miriam Camps also pointed out the fear the European Commission had at
the time of the "mondialization" of the Community which many on the Continent
felt would be the result of British membership. Camps (1964) p. 160. A reasonable
translation of the word "mondialization" in this context will be a 'thinning out and
weakening", as well as extending the Community to apply to the rest of the world,
making it in fact less significant.
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4.1 Article 228 and Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome
The authors of the Treaty of Rome had foreseen, and made provision for, the
Community entering into various types and degrees of agreements and treaties with
third States and international organisations. These could range from mere
commercial agreements between the Community and one or more States, to a much
closer association of similar parties. According to the Commission President Walter
Hallstein, this would take the form of two different cases only. The first being when
the negotiations had been started as well as completed by the national Governments
before the Treaty of Rome had come into force. The other would be when
negotiations did not start until after the entering into force of the Treaty. In this
latter situation, he argued, it would no doubt be the Commission's task to conduct
the negotiations. The two articles of the Treaty of Rome covering such situations
were Article 228 and Article 238. No clause of the Treaty, however, covered the
situation of the Free Trade Area negotiations, which had started at an
intergovernmental level. Before the negotiations were concluded the situation
changed with the Treaty coming into being.619
Article 228 of the Treaty of Rome stated: "Where this Treaty provides for the
conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or an
international organisation, such agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission.
Subject to the powers conferred upon the Commission in this field, such agreements
shall be concluded by the Council after the Assembly has been consulted in the cases
provided for by this Treaty." According to the understanding of this article, it was
the Commission's role to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Community when the
latter entered into an agreement with one or more States, or an international
organisation.620 It was the Commission which was the international personality of
the Community. Article 228 covered all negotiations by the EEC vis-a-vis one or
619 Walter Hallstein in a Statement to the European Parliamentary Assembly,
Strasbourg, 20 March 1958. Archives of the European Commission, Brussels.
620
Megret et. al. (1981) Le Droit de la Communaute Economique Europeenne,
Volume 12 relations exterieures, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, pp. 20-63.
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more subjects of public international law, and the negotiating power had been given
to the Commission. The power to conclude the agreements however, which in
international law would be the ratification, was given to the Council of Ministers.
Furthermore, it was to be understood, in case of an above mentioned type of
agreement, that it was not the member States that would be the parties but the
Community itself as a single entity. This last point supports the fact that such
negotiations should be conducted by the Commission, in the name of the
Community.
Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome read: "The Community may conclude with
a third country, a union of States or an international organisation agreements creating
an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and
appropriate forms of procedure. Such agreements shall be concluded by the Council
by a unanimous decision and after consulting the Assembly." This article gave
specific roles to both the Council and to the Assembly but did not mention the
Commission. Neither did it specify which institution was supposed to carry out the
negotiations on behalf of the Community.
Where Article 228 talks about an international agreement of the more
commercial type, Article 238 deals with the Community entering an agreement
leading to a certain type of association. However, as Megret pointed out, the type
of association has not been very clearly defined. The way Walter Hallstein saw it,
"I'association, c'est I'adhesion moins un et 1'accord commercial plus nn ",621 There
are several ways of regarding an association and so also the Free Trade Area.
However, what is certain is that it would have been the juridical framework of the
economic relations between the Community and one or more third States, which
would remain external to the Community. In Article 238 it was already set out that
such an association was to be concluded by the Council of Ministers "by a
unanimous decision after consulting the Assembly". Nevertheless, the way Megret
understood this, it must be read with the meaning that the association has been
621
Megret (1981) p. 86. "association is membership minus one and a
commercial agreement plus one". Own translation.
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negotiated by the Commission.622
As the Free Trade Area negotiations started before the Commission had been
set up, the negotiations were carried out in the name of the national governments
where the Six of the ECSC negotiated mostly together as one group. This, at least,
was their aim. The OEEC carried the framework of the negotiations, and after the
Messina Conference, the Six would at times be represented by the Belgian Foreign
Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, who had been appointed to lead the intergovernmental
committee for the setting-up of the Common Market and Euratom. In the
negotiations with the British on the inclusion of agriculture in the Free Trade Area,
several meetings were held between the British and Mr. Spaak.
The Interim Committee had decided to classify the Free Trade Area
negotiations as an association of other countries to the Community, and not as an
accord with third States.623 This way the discussions fell under Article 238 which
did not specifically mention whose role it should be to conduct the negotiations. This
could possibly be a convenient way of excluding or including the Commission
according to the wishes of the Council of Ministers. It could also be possible to leave
it up to the Commission itself to take an initiative, which seems to be what
happened. The Commission, on its side, took an initiative already in March 1958
when President Hallstein addressed the EPA presenting the Commission's views on
a free trade area. This was in fact done already three days before important members
of the Commission staff, such as the Directors General and the Executive Secretary,
were appointed on 23 March.
The Spaak Report introduced a number of useful new ideas into the
institutional discussion. It emphasized the importance of establishing procedures and
the institutional means for arriving at later decisions and by ensuring that these
622 Megret (1981) pp. 84-93.
62~'
Lindberg (1963) p. 143. This decision must have been taken before or on
25 January 1958 after which the members of the Interim Committee called
themselves Permanent Representatives.
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procedures safeguarded both objectivity and national interests, and made it possible
for the treaty to be a framework treaty. The Spaak Report also left substantially
more of the details of action for later formulation by the Commission than did the
Treaty of Rome.
4.2 The Commission establishing its role in the Free Trade Area negotiations
Although the role of the European Commission was not clear either to itself
or to the member States during early 1958. opinions on the matter had been formed
for the most part already. The Secretary of State for European integration expressed
in a debate in the Dutch Parliament the importance of the European Commission and
its President taking part in the negotiations. In this case it would have to be up to the
Council of Ministers to get the Commission to acknowledge both the political and
the economic importance of a free trade area. Furthermore, it was stated:
"Nous estimons que la Commission devra jouer un role extremement
important dans les negotiations. II faudra mettre sur pied une
reglementation speciale pour determiner le role de cet organisme. La
Commission Europeenne peut contribuer a realiser I 'Accord entre les
Six sur le probleme de la zone de libre echange. "624
The Commission had been ready to participate in the Free Trade Area negotiations
as soon as it was set up. It had also, according to President Hallstein, felt warmly
welcomed by the other parties. This had been at a stage when the Commission
administration had not yet come into being. It had therefore, "in the absence of an
administration of its own [...] set up a small working staff by borrowing qualified
experts from the Governments".625
°24 French Embassy in the Netherlands. The Hague. 11 February 1958. Reported
by Ambassador de Beauverger to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pineau.
EUROPE 1944-1960. COPIE P. Generalites [Questions Internationales], Vol. 193.
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Paris. "We consider that the
Commission ought to play an extremely important role in the negotiations. Special
regulations should be set up to determine the role of this body. The European
Commission may contribute in realising an agreement between the Six on the
problem of a free trade area." Own translation.
62~ Walter Hallstein, Statement to the European Parliamentary Assembly,
Strasbourg. 20 March 1958. Archives of the European Commission. Brussels.
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Robert Marjolin. Commissioner for economic and financial matters, spoke
about the Free Trade Area in a speech in April 1958. He did not, however feel it
appropriate to discuss the ongoing OEEC negotiations in Paris in order not to
complicate the situation or to come with unsuitable comments. He did, nevertheless,
reassure his audience that it was not a wish of the Six to divide Europe. The
European Community was more an attempt to unite the continent by taking the lead,
he said.626
The Commission itself regarded it as its responsibility to mediate between the
various positions of the member States of the Community, as well as between the Six
and the OEEC. The primary concern of the Commission, however, was to watch
over the general interest of the Community as a whole. It further made it quite clear
that it would under no circumstances accept an association which would hinder the
development of a more stable organisation, according to the political aspects of the
Treaty of Rome. The Commission, therefore, stressed the fact that the Free Trade
Area Association had to be set up between the already existing Community of Six
and the eleven other member countries of the OEEC, the latter group wishing "to
associate themselves with the Community in the pursuit of common aims". To free
the negotiations from un-necessary stress and strain, the Commission proposed
certain provisional regulations which were explained at the Session of the Assembly
in June 1958.627
In June 1958, in a Commission Memorandum sent to the Council of
Ministers, it was reported that the governments of the Intergovernmental Conference
were "determined to set up a treaty associating the Community with the other non-
members in the OEEC on a multilateral basis". They had expressed the wish to
"abolir entre eux, dans toutes la mesure du possible, les obstacles aux
626 Robert Marjolin to the International Press Institute and the American Society
of Newspaper Editors. April 1958. Archives of the European Commission. Brussels.
627 EEC - First General Report 1958. pp. 121-122.
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echanges",628 and they also recognised the practical difficulties of concluding such
a treaty before 1 January 1959. In another memorandum the European Commission
dealt with more practical and institutional problems. One of its main principles was
the importance of the Community appearing as one single unit within the Free Trade
Area. It had to be an association, not of seventeen States, but of the Community of
Six plus of eleven States. As the Commission further pointed out, it had to be this
way so long as the reason for the setting-up of the Free Trade Area in the first place
was the existence of the Treaty of Rome. Therefore, the message went out both to
the other members of the OEEC. as well as to the Six themselves, that matters
concerning the Treaty of Rome could not be dealt with by the Six individually in
other bodies. Problems concerning the Community, it went on, should be dealt with
within the Community, by its own institutions, and not in a structure where third
States were made to judge on Community matters. A further principle set out by the
Commission was the importance of the Community never to end up in a minority
position within the Free Trade Area. Both the political and the economic importance
the Community would represent within the Free Trade Area would justify such a
position. In case of jeopardizing the realisation of the objectives of the Treaty of
Rome, the Commission recommended the Community rather to refuse membership
of the Free Trade Area.
"La Commission considere que la Communaute doit attribuer une
importance fondamentale au probleme des institutions de I 'Association
economique europeenne. Elle a deja exprime, dans son premier
memorandum, / 'avis qu'il faut veiller a ce qu'il ne soit porte aucune
atteinte au contenue, au fonctionnement et aux institutions du Traite
de Rome.
Elle estime que les six pays ne peuvent accepter qu 'une Zone de libre-
echange congue de maniere a ne gener ni la realisation du Traite de
"abolish all possible obstacles to exchange between themselves". Own
translation. EEC Commission. Directorate General for External Relations. Brussels,
12 June 1958. 452/58-F. Confidential. Memorandum No. 4 from the Commission
to the Council of Ministers. CEAB 5/624.
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Rome, ni le jeu de ses institutions. "<l3y
During the course of the negotiations the concern about discrimination corning
from the non-Community members of the OEEC became apparent. As Walter
Hallstein pointed out, however, in his statement to the European Parliamentary
Assembly in March 1958, "it is indeed true that the consequence of setting-up the
Community is that transactions within the Community are treated differently between
the Community or its Members and the outside world. There is therefore
differentiation. But differentiation is not always discrimination."630 He continued
by mentioning the fact that the Community had been made open to other States
wishing to join. As Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome stated: "Any European State
may apply to become a member of the Community." Such a clear statement,
according to Hallstein, could not be seen as anything but as a non-discrimination
clause. Hallstein also brought up the point of how "the other eleven member States
of OEEC wish to be treated in the same way as the six Member Countries of our
Community, but they do not, in return, wish to submit to the same community
rules".631 Furthermore, he stressed the importance of organising the external
relations of the Community in such a way as would satisfy its partners, in particular
those of the proposed Free Trade Area. Not, as he pointed out, "because we have
a guilty conscience, or that we are seeking to remedy an injustice we have brought
about by setting-up the Community, but purely for the sake of European progress".
The setting up of the Common Market, it had to be remembered, had been the main
639 "The Commission consideres that the Community ought to ascribe a
fundamental importance to the institutional problem of the European Economic
Association. The Commission has already expressed, in its first memorandum, its
advise not to make any changes to contents, functioning or institutions of the Treaty
of Rome. The Commission would estimate that the six countries could not accept
a free trade area to be set up in a way that would interfere with the coming into
effect of the Treaty of Rome, or its institutional setting." Own translation. EEC
Commission. Memorandum No. 3. Brussels, 13 June 1958. 456/58-F, Confidential.
CEAB 5/624.
6j0 Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne. Debats. Session de mars 1958.
Bulletin of the European Economic Community. No 1. Brussels, February
1959. p. 8
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reason for talks on the Free Trade Area in the first place.632 It was, furthermore,
fully justifiable according to Article 8 of the OEEC Code of Liberalisation that
"[T]wo or more Member countries forming part of a special customs union [...]
without extending them to the other Member countries".
The Commission, as well as the other institutions and the member State
Governments of the EEC were concerned that the provisions of the Treaty of Rome
should not end up in jeopardy within an association of seventeen States. As the
European Parliamentary Assembly declared on 27 June 1958: "While it is ready to
approve the conclusion of an economic association with the other European states,
it will not agree to the merging of the Communities in a larger whole in which they,
as well as the associated countries and territories, would lose the benefits of the
economic and political integration now being undertaken.1,633 The same resolution
stressed the point of the Community being represented as one entity in the Free
Trade Area, as well as agreed to the Commission proposal of setting-up transitional
regulations due to the impossibility of setting-up the Free Trade Area from 1 January
1959. These regulations should, however, be accompanied by a declaration of
intention to conclude the treaty instituting the Association.634 One way of reading
this resolution would be to say that it shows a more careful, if not pessimistic
attitude in the Commission, in line with that of the French Government at the time.
6j2 Walter Hallstein, Statement to the European Parliamentary Assembly,
Strasbourg. 20 March 1958. Archives of the European Commission, Brussels.
EEC - First General Report 1958, pp. 113-114. The original quote from the
"Proposition de Resolution sur un traite dAssociation economique europeenne" of
the Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne, 27 June 1958 says: "VAssemblee
Parlementaire Europeenne, Declare que elle est pret a approuver la conclusion
avec les autres partenaires europeens d'une association economique, elle ne
pourrait accepter de voir se dissoudre ces Communautes dans un ensemble qui leur
ferait perdre ainsi qu 'aux pays et territoires d'Outre-mer associes, les benefices de
I 'integration economique et politique actuellement entreprise. "
6j4 Declaration faite par M. Walter Hallstein, president de la Commission de la
Communaute Economique Europeenne devant FAssemblee Parlementaire
Europeenne a Strasbourg, 21 octobre 1958. Archives of the European Commission,
Brussels.
291
After the conference on the Free Trade Area in July 1958, the Commission
proposed the setting-up of provisional regulations for lowering of customs duties
between the countries taking part in the negotiations. This way the negotiations could
continue without there being too much difference between the treatment reserved for
the member States of the Community and the treatment reserved for non-Community
members.635
In September 1958. when the European Commission was well established and
had entered the negotiations for a free trade area, it produced a Memorandum to the
Council of Ministers concerning institutions of the future Free Trade Area. This was
the first time the EEC had taken any position concerning the institutional problem.
To the Community it was important that decisions taken under the Treaty of Rome
should not be contested or paralysed in any way by the Free Trade Area Association.
Furthermore, the Community would have to occupy a position which would
correspond to its real weight in the system, and never as a minority. Moreover, it
had to be settled whether it was the Community of Six that entered the Free Trade
Area as one unit, or the member States individually. The Commission took the
position that, as any matter covered by the Treaty of Rome had to be treated by the
Six as a community, the Six therefore ought to enter the Free Trade Area as a single
unit. This would also be to prevent the Six from disagreeing in the Council of
Association, something which would weaken the position of the Community. Already
in June 1958 the Commission had produced a confidential memorandum to the
Council of Ministers concerning the institutional setting of the Free Trade Area. The
Commission had adopted the view that its institutions ought to be of an OEEC type,
and not reflecting the structure of the Treaty of Rome. In concrete terms, it advised
the setting-up of a Council for the Free Trade Area, with twelve members. There
should be one member representing the Community of Six, and one each for the
eleven other member States. Furthermore, the Commission recommended this
Walter Hallstein to the European Parliamentary Assembly. Strasbourg, 21
October 1958. Archives of the European Commission. Brussels.
Council to operate on the basis of a unanimity rule.636
Within the structure of the Free Trade Area the Commission had also set up
certain guidelines for its own role. Firstly, in matters where the Commission had
been given decision-making powers by the Treaty of Rome, it would regard as its
duty to determine the position of the Community as a whole. Secondly, in all other
matters, the Commission would send proposals to the Council of Ministers which
would serve as a basis for the Community position in the Free Trade Area. Lastly,
the Commission suggested it should be given the task of spokesman for the
Community in the Free Trade Area Council.637
In October 1958, Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of
Europe issued a Joint Declaration stating the urgency "to arrange for the Commission
to negotiate in the name of the Six for the association of Great Britain and the other
European countries with the Common Market".638 The Joint Declaration further
pointed out the fact that the Commission was the symbol of the unity of the Common
Market and would therefore be the obvious representative of the Community as a
whole. It continued by saying that "it would be possible to reach agreement if the
Commission were empowered to define, with Great Britain and the other States,
those solutions which are acceptable on the one hand to the Community, and on the
other to the countries which are to be associated with the Community".639 This
view was also shared by the Commission itself, which would have liked to play a
more prominent role in the negotiations. It had by this time already taken an active
and initiating position in the negotiations, but still only secondary to the national
6,6 EEC Commission. Brussels, 5 September 1958. COM(58)178 rev.
Memorandum from the EEC Commission to the Council with regard to the
conference in Venice, 18-20 September 1958. CEAB 5/617.
EEC Commission Memorandum No. 3. Brussels, 13 June 1958. 456/58-F,
Confidential. CEAB 5/624.
638 Camps (1964) p. 148n.
6,9 Joint Declaration, Action Committee for the United States of Europe, 16-17
October 1958. Fifth Session. Paris. Action Committee for the United States of
Europe. Statements and Declarations 1955-67, p. 30-31.
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Governments.
4.3 The Second Phase of the Negotiations
On 26 November 1958. the first meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and
President de Gaulle took place at Bad Kreuznach in Germany. During this meeting
it was agreed between the two Heads of State not to reopen the Free Trade Area
negotiations within the OEEC. However, they would ask the President of the
Commission "to elaborate a plan for a 'multilateral association' between the
Community and the other OEEC countries".640 Agreement was also reached on the
measures that the Six might take to mitigate but not to eliminate the difference in
tariffs and quotas between the Six and the other OEEC countries that would arise
from 1 January 1959.
Inspired by the Bad Kreuznach meeting the Council of Ministers meeting on
3 December 1958 made clear its desire "to continue the efforts to establish a
multilateral association between the European Economic Community and the other
states of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation". The next day, on
4 December, Mr. Erhard met in London with Prime Minister Macmillan and several
of his ministers to explain the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers. Due to
the political situations of the other eleven OEEC countries, there could be no
meeting before Christmas. Maudling, on the other hand, was charged with producing
a report by 1 January 1959 on the state of the negotiations.641 This was where what
we have referred to as the second phase of the Free Trade Area negotiations was
launched. The Commission was in this connection to make "a detailed examination
of the problems and of the possibilities of resolving them" in a report before 1
March 1959. The other OEEC countries, however, would from then on only be
640 Camps (1964) p. 176.
641 EEC Council. Brussels. 9 December 1958. From Mr. Erhard to the
governments of the member States of the EEC after his visit to London on 4
December 1958. R/140 f/58-ams. CEAB 5/617.
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informed, with no power to negotiate or bargain.642 On the very same day
Adenauer told Macmillan that "[I] personally tend to the view that the European
Common Market Commission could make an even more useful contribution than
they have done in the past. I would in any case do all in my power to assist them,
in order to further the successful outcome of the negotiations".643 On 15 December
1958 the Council of Ministers of the OEEC met in order to find a way of associating
the rest of the OEEC with the Six. No proposal was put forward in the end. From
this point onwards the main discussions took place outside the OEEC. At official
level, nevertheless, the OEEC continued to discuss the quota problem.644
The de Gaulle Government, formally and constitutionally in power at the
time, presented itself as being against the Free Trade Area plan. Together with the
Commission, it was also opposed to the early resumption of negotiations on any
long-term plan. As a consequence, the resulting Memorandum produced by the
Commission in February 1959 proposed a course of action to moderate the effects
of the failure to reach a European-wide agreement. This came instead of a suggestion
as to how negotiations for the Free Trade Area could have been resumed.
In line with the Spaak Report, the Commission concluded that there were only
two entirely satisfactory systems of multilateral free trade: "the customs union (or,
more exactly, the economic union) which secures for all participants the same
conditions of supply, and world free trade, which ensures this same equality".
According to the Commission, a free trade area would be acceptable "only to the
extent that it is fitting into a setting of increasing liberalisation of world trade and
abandons any idea of strengthening European economic solidarity in the strict sense
of the word, or approximates to the type of the customs union".645 As President
642
Camps (1964) pp. 184. 176-77.
64"' Message from Adenauer to Macmillan, 3 November 1958. Macmillan (1971)
p. 455.
644
Camps (1964) p. 182.
645 First memorandum from the Commission of the European Economic
Community to the Council of Ministers of the Community, 26 February 1959. The
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Hallstein told the European Parliamentary Assembly on 13 January 1959, the
Community needed a common policy of external trade to prevent the breaking out
of internal competition between the Six. The Free Trade Area would not have a
common external tariff, nor a common trade policy, which were exactly why the Six
had set up the Community. Although the Commission in principle was favourable
to the setting-up of the Free Trade Area, President Hallstein pointed out the
difficulties of. not only uniting the eleven countries of the OEEC with the Six, but
also of the total number of seventeen states with different economies getting together.
Such a remark certainly carried considerable weight knowing the difficulties of the
Six to arrive at a common position among themselves only. The Commissioner for
external relations, Jean Rey, had been put in charge of this task and the Commission
expected more dealings with the national governments in the future.
Among the other speakers at the European Parliamentary Assembly Session
of 13 January 1959, there was a general feeling in favour of the Free Trade Area.
On the other hand, there was an equally common feeling of making sure the
Community would not be put in jeopardy. As it was still very much under
development it would be important to follow what had already been set out in the
Treaty. The fact that the Community which had been set up by the Six involved
common policies in addition to its common trade was further seen as an important
element of difference between this and a free trade area. In the event of the Free
Trade Area becoming a reality, the Dutch member of the Parliamentary Assembly,
Mr. Blaisse, expressed a desire to see the Commission as the central body of the
Free Trade Area, functioning more as the association 'spokesman' through an
extension of its mandate. It was the unity of the Community which was
characteristically expressed as coming before anything else. A second concern was
Spaak Report stated that '77 existe entre les pays du continent des raisons
economiques et techniques decisives de choisir la formule de I 'union douaniere,
elles n'excluent pas la possibility d'y superposer une zone de libre echange avec
tel autre pays...", "there exist between the countries on the continent economic and
technological reasons decisive to the choice of a customs union, but these do not
exclude the possibility of a free trade area with other countries to be
superimposed..." Own translation. "Rapport des Chefs de Delegation aux Ministres
des Affaires Etrangeres", Bruxelles, 21 Avril 1956. p. 22.
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that the Community should not be seen, or act in a protectionist, "closed" and
"dirigist" way towards the rest of Western Europe. As Hallstein had expressed, and
Mr. Birkelbach of Germany agreed to, the Community could not throw itself into
any adventure before other more complex problems had been taken care of.
The German Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard. expressed during
the same session his wish for the Community and the OEEC countries to give each
other equal access to the two markets, despite political aspects in the Community.
This, he declared, was more important than creating institutions. As expressed by
Jean Rey there was not so much a choice between two different policies, but rather
a continuing of the realisation of policies set out in the Treaty of Rome and, at the
same time, the pursuing of a liberal cooperation with the Community neighbours.
The result of this full-day session of the European Parliamentary Assembly on 13
January 1959 was the unanimous adoption of the following resolution declaring:
"L'Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne approuve les declarations du President
Hallstein concernant la creation d'une association economique europeenne. n646
Until 1958 the German Government was to have a divided line on European
integration policies, a result mainly due to the differences between Chancellor
Adenauer and his Minister of Economics, Ludwig Erhard. The year 1958, however,
was to see a number of changes, some of which lessened these divisions. At this
stage the Treaties of Rome were already signed and the two European Communities
set up. Furthermore, the Free Trade Area negotiations within the framework of the
Maudling Committee had failed to reach a solution. The latter was a result of the
Bad Kreuznach meeting between Adenauer and de Gaulle in November 1958. This
meant, in other words, that the hopes of setting-up a European Free Trade Area,
strongly advocated by Erhard, were more faint. The next step would be to see the
Common Market operate in the best way possible. Within Germany there had also
occurred a certain number of changes in relation to its focus on European
M6 „yjie £ur0pean Parliamentary Assembly approves the declarations of
President Hallstein concerning the creation of a European economic association."
Own translation.
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integration. The 1958 agreement saw a solution to the problem of administrative
competencies concerning the European institutions. The Ministry of Economics was
secured a greater influence through its representation in the Council of Ministers,
jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Economics was,
moreover, "put in overall charge of preparing the Federal Government's position and
took responsibility for interdepartmental coordination".647 The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, on the other hand, was "entrusted with 'day-to-day' European policy"648
The situation in Germany was, as has been shown, very different from that
of France which, at this stage, saw no opposition to the Treaty of Rome and the
Common Market. Furthermore, Germany had agreed to the many derogations
demanded by France in order to take part in the Common Market, due to its weak
economy of the time. This had been one of the difficult points to overcome in
Germany, but essential for France to take part. As put by Hanns Jiirgen Ktisters:
"The considerable finance concession, ADENAUER agreed to at the conference of
heads of government on February 20th [1957] in Paris, was the price for the French
joining the market".649 Another consideration of great importance to Germany was
to regain the trust of the Western powers to lift discrimination and make her an equal
partner. For this to happen she had to accept to give concessions to the French.650
Nevertheless, there were certain feelings within the industries that "[I]f it is a
question of rich and poor [...] then the Federal Republic ought to be on the receiving
end".651
The High Authority, which had in December 1954 signed an Agreement of
Association with the United Kingdom, made some attempts of becoming involved in
the Free Trade Area negotiations. As early as in November 1956 at a meeting
647 Yearbook of European Administrative History 1992, p. 191.
648 Bulmer and Paterson (1987) p. 31.
649 Enrico Serra (1989) p. 504. Capital letters in original.
650 Bulmer and Paterson (1987) p. 125.
651 Deutsche Zeitung. 2 March 1957. In: Willis (1965) p. 270.
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between the High Authority and the United Kingdom, the former intended to put on
the agenda the creation of a free trade area and problems related to it. It was, at this
point, thought there was a certain desire to cooperate detected among the British.
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom wanted to postpone this meeting, scheduled for
16 November 1956, until January 1957. The reason was the fact that the United
Kingdom was then taking part in discussions within the OEEC touching the issue of
British tariffs, only now with regard to the whole of the Western Europe.652 The
High Authority was highly interested in the Free Trade Area negotiations for two
reasons in particular. One was the very existence of the High Authority itself, which
somehow saw itself as dependent on the developments of the future. The other was
the Association Treaty between the United Kingdom and the ECSC, which would
surely have to suffer with the United Kingdom as a member of a free trade area
together with other OEEC countries.
4.4 "The Ockrent Report" and the Commission Memoranda
Before the European Commission had come to take an active and initiating
part in the Free Trade Area negotiations, negotiations on behalf of the Six had been
conducted by representatives of the national governments, as well as by the High
Authority of the ECSC on the basis of a mandate from the Council of Ministers. The
Commission, when it had come to operate, was merely to assist the national
governments in the negotiations. According to the Permanent Representatives in
January 1958, participation by the Commission "would be pragmatic and would be
developed empirically".653
By June 1958 the Commission had been set up and started operating with
most of its staff present. It was therefore felt appropriate to take a more active part
in the negotiations. Its own role it defined this way:
"The European Commission deems that its duty is to achieve a
compromise between the divergent positions which emerges
6:0
Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) p. 354.
653 Lindberg (1963) p. 144.
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manifesting themselves not only between the Member States but also
between these States and the eleven other states of the OEEC. The
Commission will be guided by its first duty, which is to watch over
the general interest of the Community as a whole. [...] it must
advocate a form of association which will not impede the realization
of the Community and the execution of its essential tasks. In order to
achieve this, the Commission believes it will have to play an
increasingly large role in the negotiations."654
The Memorandum from the EEC, named after Roger Ockrent, the Belgian
permanent delegate to the OEEC, was not a coherent plan of association but a
collection of the conditions which the Six felt any association arrangement must
meet.655 Nevertheless, it was the most comprehensive exposition of a collective
"Community" point of view made during the negotiations, something which possibly
could be seen as quite late. It argued for substantive arrangements as similar as
possible and, at the same time, for very dissimilar institutional and procedural
arrangements. As the Report set out, the Community was determined "both for
economic and political reasons, to arrive at an agreement which will make it possible
to associate with the Community on a multilateral basis the other Member States of
the OEEC".656 Further, the Report stressed a point which was frequently made at
the time, that an association with the other OEEC countries should not in any way
prejudice the Treaty of Rome. To the European Parliamentary Assembly on 13
January 1959 the Commission President, Walter Hallstein, expressed how the
Commission had been very pleased with the Report and had used it as a guide.
However, his main question was: "Pourquoi n'a-t-on pas pu allerplus loin?".651
1 January 1959 marked the date of the first cuts in tariffs and increases in
quotas as set out by the Treaty of Rome. The European Commission was hence
distracted from any further discussions about a free trade area for much of the first
654 EEC - First General Report 1958 p. 116.
655 OEEC, Paris, 20 October 1958, "Inter-Governmental Committee on the
establishment of a European Free Trade Area". Cmnd. 641, pp. 96-103.
656
Camps (1964) p. 158.
657 "Why have we not been able to get any further?" Own translation.
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half of 1959 to deal with something which seemed more important and pressing.
During the second half of 1959 there was a desire by so-called "Europeans" to speed
up the development to make the Common Market truly irreversible. This was also
supported and encouraged by the French industry, which had been opposed to the
Treaty of Rome from the start.
On 14 January 1959 the Council of Ministers held a meeting assessing the
current situation after the breakdown of the Free Trade Area negotiations and with
the coming into effect of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. There was expressed
a shared wish for the Community to enter into bilateral negotiations with the other
OEEC countries. The Free Trade Area negotiations were fairly high on the agenda
of the Council of Ministers during this period. Between December 1958 and
February 1959 two of its four meetings were devoted solely to problems of free trade
and the European Economic Association. It might seem like the Council of Ministers
were working in favour of the Free Trade Area, despite France, and its Minister of
Foreign Affairs M. Couve de Murville, holding the Presidency from 1 January 1959.
The First Memorandum from the European Commission was a study
instructed by the Council of Ministers on 3 December 1958, and had to be published
by 1 March 1959. Flowever, when it was submitted to the Council on 27 February
1959658 the Memorandum was not entirely positively received throughout the
Community. The French Government of de Gaulle was the only one which had
openly opposed the Free Trade Area and therefore the most in line with the
European Commission. The Benelux countries and Germany, on the other hand,
were more critical towards the First Memorandum. One reason for their criticism
was the fact that the Commission had come up with no suggestions of how to resume
the Free Trade Area negotiations, which was its original mandate given by the
Council of Ministers. To the French, the views of the Commission on trade had
seemed too liberal and the Benelux countries were hoping for a trade arrangement
which would include the OEEC countries. When the Commission's First
6:18 Bulletin of the European Economic Community No. 2, 1959, p. 21.
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Memorandum was discussed in the Council of Ministers in March 1959, almost all
the governments were favourable towards the establishment of a European Free
Trade Area. Only the French backed the Commission in its desire not to resume the
negotiations. The French were at this point interested in the setting-up of the
Common Market and wanted to give that first priority.
As a sign of the member States' general dissatisfaction with the First
Memorandum of the Commission, representatives of the national governments were
to work with the Commission in a Special Committee. With Jean Rey as the
Chairman, this Committee, whose real name was the "Special Committee for the
Study of European Economic Association", came to be known as the Rey
Committee. The Committee was set up at the 20th session of the Council of
Ministers on 15 March 1959. It met for the first time on 30 April 1959 to discuss
the First Memorandum of the European Commission. Apart from Jean Rey as its
Chairman, its members were Robert Marjolin, Giuseppe Petrilli and Hans von der
Groeben from the European Commission, Baron Snoy et d'Oppuers from Belgium,
Olivier Wormser from France, Alfred Muller-Armack from Germany, Ernst van der
Beugel from the Netherlands, and Attilio Cattani and Albert Borschette representing
Italy and Euxembourg, respectively. The latter two served also as their countries'
Permanent Representatives to the European Communities.659 Such a composition
of this Special Committee must in many ways be seen as a step backwards from the
original suggestion by the Council of Ministers that the Commission should be given
a larger role in the negotiations, a point which had been urged by Jean Monnet and
other strong "Europeans".
To the supporters of a wider European trade arrangement, the First
Memorandum of the European Commission was felt as negative and inadequate as
it did not contain any suggestions or signs for the Free Trade Area negotiations to
reopen. This was a feeling which was also representative of the Council of
Ministers, although not shared by France. The Commission, Jean Monnet and the
659 EEC Commission, Bulletin No. 2 (1959). pp. 21-22.
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French Government all made it clear to the Americans that they disliked the OEEC
as a forum for the discussions of European trade questions. It was feared that almost
any discussion on trade in that forum would soon be turned into a new round of
multilateral negotiations on something very similar to the old free trade area plan.
During meetings of the Rey Committee in April and May 1959 the position of
France towards a free trade area hardened more and more. It was for the first time
that the French openly questioned the "objective of ever seeking any form of wider
European association".660
Although the Free Trade Area negotiations had ended several months earlier,
there were still efforts to resume these during the spring of 1959. Jean Monnet,
however, was of the opinion that the Commission had adopted too negative an
attitude. Therefore, his Action Committee for a United States of Europe proposed
in May 1959 "that the Common Market Commission and the British Government
should meet in a round-table conference to define the bases of a multilateral
negotiation on the European Economic Association".661 Later that year the
emphasis, both of the Commission and of Jean Monnet, had shifted towards a more
global solution to the problems of European trade. In a Joint Declaration from the
Seventh Session of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe on 19-20
November 1959 it pointed out that it "does not consider it necessary to revert to the
difference between the Common Market, which is the embryo of a United Europe,
and a commercial Free Trade Area. It [the Action Committee] believes that every
effort should be made to find the closest possible form of relationship between the
Common Market, the Seven, and other parts of the world." It further continued,
saying that "[W]hat is at stake is no longer simply the question of how trade
problems should be settled between the Six and the Seven, or of how a European
economic association may be established, but rather of how to solve the economic
660 Camps (I960) pp. 15-17.
661 The sixth session on 11 May of the Action Committee for a United States
of Europe. Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Statements and
Declarations 1955-67. PEP Chatham House. European Series No. 9, March 1969,
p. 36.
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problems facing all the countries of the West - including the United States".662
Within the Rey Committee, however, the Benelux and German representatives
pressed for the negotiations to be renewed, being committed to the ultimate goal of
an OEEC-wide free trade arrangement. The French, on the other hand, adopted the
line of the European Commission of opposing the renewal of the negotiations.
As the above mentioned quotes by Jean Monnet's Action Committee make
clear, we are now talking about seven members of the OEEC as opposed to the
earlier eleven. The group of Seven became apparent around the end of 1958 and the
beginning of 1959. It had started out as what Miriam Camps referred to as "the
Other Six", meaning the United Kingdom, Austria. Switzerland and the three
Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Portugal, however,
expressed a wish to take part in this group as well. Iceland, Ireland, Greece and
Turkey were the remaining of the earlier eleven countries. They were less developed
and therefore not interested in the plans of the Seven.
The First Memorandum of the Commission had been requested by the
Council as a means to find "the joint position that could be taken up by the Member
States".663 Voices within the Community ended up quite disappointed with the
Commission as it did not suggest or define the ways for which negotiations could
have been reopened. In the First Memorandum the Commission had published the
view that external relations of the Community, including relations with other
European counties, would be easier to deal with once the Community was more
firmly based.
It was to be the French that were causing the problems also in the Rey
Committee. At its meetings of April and May 1959, the French representative began
openly questioning the very need for any sort of wider European association. As
662 Joint Declaration 19-20 November 1959, Seventh Session, Paris. Action
Committee for the United States of Europe. Statements and Declarations 1955-67,
p. 42.
66-' Camps (1960) p. 12.
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Miriam Camps has put it "the differences of view among the Six no longer revolved
around the nature of the wider association or the timing of the negotiations, but
centred on the fundamental question of whether or not a tariff-free area of the OEEC
countries was a desirable objective".664
The UK Government regarded it as quite clear that the negotiations should
have as their goal the establishment of a multilateral association of seventeen States
which would include the Common Market. This situation, as they saw it, would not
break this up but rather permit the Six to collect the advantages of their Treaty,
which were advantages that could not have been obtained in a divided Europe.665
While negotiating for the United Kingdom during the Free Trade Area negotiations,
Mr. Maudling had frequently chosen not to take into account the views of the
Commission, and in particular President Hallstein. Some years later, however,
during the negotiations for British accession to the European Community, the then
Prime Minister, Mr. Edward Eleath enjoyed much more cordial relations with the
Commission. By then the Commission also played a much more important role in
the negotiations than it had in the Free Trade Area negotiations.666 During the
negotiations of the Maudling Committee, on the other hand, it seems to have been
a fairly common feeling that "direct negotiations between the United Kingdom and
the Six offered the best chance of finding an acceptable arrangement",667 something
which would rule out the direct involvement of the European Commission.
In September 1959, the Second Memorandum of the Commission was
published. It was originally sent as a memorandum to the Rey Committee, but after
its main outline had been given to the European Parliamentary Assembly on 24
September, the Memorandum was released to the press. This Memorandum went
even further than the first in denying the need for a "European" solution of a free
664
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trade area. It was felt that priority had to be given to the process of making the
Community irreversible, something the Commission felt the Free Trade Area
negotiations were hindering, as well as stressing its role world wide. Due to its
recent experiences, the Commission pointed out how a free trade area solution could
only be an option as long as the latter would be understood as "an element of a
progressive economic policy of the Community vis-a-vis the external world".668 It
was regarded, from the Commission's point of view, as important for the
Community, as well as the rest of Europe, to adopt more liberal trade policies,
rather than continuing the search for a "European" solution. This was also something
which was actively supported by the Americans. The German and Benelux
Governments, on the other hand, were not very happy with the Second
Memorandum, feeling there should have been a "renewed commitment to the
ultimate objective of an OEEC-wide free trade arrangement". This was something
the Commission as well as the French strongly opposed. The French, at this stage,
opposed any OEEC solution which it thought was too influenced and controlled by
the British.669
The Commission quite clearly had turned away from the Free Trade Area as
the primary solution to trade and to its relations with the other European countries
and the rest of the world. It would have been only one sort of association possible
to a problem which, according to the Second Memorandum, could not be regulated
and decided on without more time and experience. The Commission, therefore, felt
the need to attempt a more pragmatic method where not only the rest of Europe, but
the rest of the world as well, would be important partners of trade. Contacts with the
USA and with developing countries were also put high on the list. The USA pointed
out that, although it had tolerated discrimination from European countries as a means
of reconstruction after the Second World War, it was high time it was treated as an
668 Second Memorandum of the Commission to the Special Committee, Bulletin
de la Communaute' Economique Europeenne, No. 4, 1959. p. 13. "un element d'une
politique economique progressive de la Communaute' vis-a-vis du monde exterieur".
Own translation.
669 Camps (1960) p. 22.
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equal partner. The Second Memorandum was not regarded as the final solution to
the problem of trade in Europe or the world, but more as suggestions and the proof
of the "good will of the Community".670 However, it was a fact that there had
occurred a shift towards a world wide liberal policy, as well as more stress on the
internal integration of the Community.
After the failure, in November-December 1958, of setting-up the Free Trade
Area between the Six and their partners in the OEEC, the governments of the latter
seven countries - Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom - began to explore the idea of a separate free trade arrangement
between themselves. The first meeting was held in Oslo in February 1959. Towards
the end of the year, on 20 November 1959, the Convention establishing the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was initialled at a Ministerial meeting in
Stockholm. After the Convention was signed on 4 January 1960, EFTA came into
force on 3 May of that year, after having been ratified in all seven parliaments.671
EFTA, as opposed to the EEC, was not set up as a customs union, but rather
as an association where the member States were contracted to remove obstacles to
trade among themselves. The institutions of this association were not set up to have
supranational powers, and decisions were to be taken unanimously at ministerial or
delegation level. Among "Europeans" within the Six, EFTA was seen as a set-back
to the European integration process, although the Free Trade Area had not been a
plan for a strict sense of integration, having involved no sharing of sovereignty nor
any higher authority. Nevertheless, it would have assumed an economic integration
of the whole of the Western Europe. Instead, Western Europe became divided into
two different trading associations.672
670 Memorandum de la Commission au Comite Special, Bulletin de la
Communaute' Economique Europeenne. No. 4. 1959. p. 16. "la bonne volonte de
la Communaute". Own translation.
h71 The European Free Trade Association (1987) EFTA, Geneva.
672 Graduate Institute of International Studies (1968) The European Free Trade
Association and the Crisis ofEuropean Integration (Geneva: Michael Joseph Ltd.).
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The breakdown of the Free Trade Area negotiations resulted in various and
different reactions among the actors concerned, as well as from the Americans. The
strongest reactions in a negative sense came from the Dutch and, although to a lesser
degree, from Belgium and Germany. The Italians, on the other hand, tended to go
along more with the French. Apart from being favourable towards a looser free trade
arrangement with the OEEC countries, the Dutch were also quite concerned about
the Franco-German dominance becoming too strong.
5. CONCLUSION
The European Commission had been set up with the Treaty of Rome coming
into force on 1 January 1958. Its administration was largely established by the end
of March of that year, and one of the first tasks on the agenda was the Free Trade
Area negotiations between the Six and the remaining countries of the OEEC. The
Commission had hardly been able to define its structures and working procedures
before it had to conduct negotiations with third States on behalf of the Community.
President Hallstein and Jean Rey, the European Commissioner for external relations,
were its two main protagonists, setting out the role of the Commission at an early
stage. Already on 20 March 1958 Hallstein spoke to the European Parliamentary
Assembly where he defined the Commission's position in the Free Trade Area
negotiations. He put great emphasis on the fact that "[I]t was only the introduction
of a Common Market that inspired the campaign for a Free Trade Area."
Nevertheless, a positive position was taken by the Commission towards the Free
Trade Area at this stage. Later on the same year, on 21 October 1958, he spoke
again to the same Assembly. This time stating that, as the Commission was complied
by the Treaty of Rome to conduct liberal relations with the external world, this was
why the Commission took such a constructive approach to the negotiations and the
setting-up of the Free Trade Area.
As we have stated above, the Free Trade Area negotiations had began before
the European Commission was set up. Therefore, by the time the Commission was
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in operation, ministers and officials of the Six Governments were too much involved
to want to transfer any considerable responsibility to the Commission. Jean Monnet,
on the other hand, argued for there to be a change in the negotiations to be
conducted by the Commission on one side, and the United Kingdom and the other
states on the other. A Joint Declaration published by Monnet's Action Committee for
the United States of Europe, urged "the Commission to negotiate in the name of the
Six for the association of Great Britain and the other European countries with the
Common Market".673 If the Commission had become the chief negotiator of the
European Communities it would most likely have strengthened its position as an
independent institution. Furthermore, and possibly even more importantly, it would
have shifted the French problem over to become a Community problem. To have one
negotiator instead of six from the European Communities could also have solved the
problem of too many delegations.
In the view of the first Executive Secretary of the European Commission,
Emile Noel, the Commission had, during 1958, a rather limited weight in the Free
Trade Area negotiations. It had, through Jean Rey, obtained to get involved in the
Maudling Committee at a ministerial level, and had attempted to define a common
position of the Six and the Commission. As even some of the governments had a
divided position, this was a rather difficult task, especially, as we have seen, in the
case of Germany. Emile Noel, on the other hand, pointed out the fact that the
Commission did play a role of political content towards the end of the negotiations,
although it did its best not to use the powers given to it through Articles 112-114 of
the Treaty of Rome.674
67' Joint Declaration. Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Paris,
16. 17 October 1958. In: Camps (1964) p. 148.
',74 Article 112: "harmonization" of aids granted by Member States for exports
to third countries. Article 113: general guidelines for the Community's
"commercial" (foreign trade) policy after the expiry of the transitional period.
Article 114: confers the authority to conclude agreements on behalf of the
Community on the Council. The latter article must be read in light of Article 228
about international agreements. In: Hans Smit and Peter E. Herzog (July 1982) The
Law of the European Economic Community. A Commentary on the EEC Treaty
(Columbia Law School. Project on European Legal Institutions). Views expressed
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Leon Lindberg, in his early analysis, divided the process of free trade into
three different stages. The first one would last from July 1956, when the British first
proposed a European Free Trade Area, until November 1958 when the French broke
off the discussions. This period was characterised by negotiations on a multilateral
level, within the framework of the OEEC, where the Maudling Committee was one
of the main actors. The second stage, which is the most interesting one from a
Commission point of view, lasted from November 1958 until January 1960. During
this period the Commission was invited to take over the task of trying to reach a
solution between the Community of Six and the other OEEC countries. It saw the
acceleration of the Treaty of Rome timetable and, with the failure of the Free Trade
Area, the creation of EFTA. The third and last stage, as Lindberg defined it, lasted
until the end of 1960 which saw the end to the idea of a free trade area between the
Community of Six and the other OEEC countries altogether. During the second
stage, however, as the Commission stepped into the Free Trade Area negotiations,
it gradually expanded its role, and "offered its own compromise which [...] was
ultimately accepted as the Community doctrine".675
In Walter Hallstein's view, the reasons for the failure of the Free Trade Area
negotiations were several. One was a fear of "discrimination", coming from the
United Kingdom in particular. Among the Six there was a fear that the Community
might have dissolved and ceased to be what was then a potentially political entity,
turning into a mere commercial arrangement more like the proposed Free Trade
Area itself. He further claimed that the Free Trade Area would have "constituted an
even greater area of 'discrimination' without the political guarantees and advantages
of the European Community".676 Jean Rey pointed out the problem for the
Common Market to join, or set up. the Free Trade Area, being such a new and
developing organisation itself. The Community had not yet set in operation its
common external tariff, nor had its commercial policy become Community-wide. In
by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December 1994.
675
Lindberg (1963) p. 117.
676 Hallstein (1962) pp. 72-73.
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Rey's words there was a certain "anxiety [that] the Treaty of Rome enterprise could
be dissolved quickly into a bigger organisation at a time when the Common Market
has not yet established a personality of its own."677 This was a fear not only
coming from within the Commission, however. As Miriam Camps expressed it, there
was a fear on the part of the "Europeans", particularly after the ratification of the
Treaty of Rome, that a broader, looser arrangement would replace a tighter, more
far-reaching plan set out for the Community. This in the end contributed to the
failure of the Free Trade Area negotiations.678
In the view of Reginald Maudling, a view which also reflected the British
attitude at the time, the breakdown of the negotiations was due not to difficulties in
certain areas, but to the lack of willingness from certain parties. In this case the
party referred to was France. Maudling further found the Common Market to be
discriminating on behalf of the Six, something which was against the principles of
the OEEC.679
Had the British Government taken the lead in the attempts to create a strong
and unified Europe, she could have played the determining role in shaping the new
Europe. She could have been there to define its scope, in setting its institutional
pattern and in defining its ideals. A leadership of Europe was there for the United
Kingdom, if she had wanted it, during the 1950s. The British, on the one hand, were
preoccupied with other urgent problems, such as the Suez Crisis, and on the other,
underestimated the revival power of continental Europe and misjudged the strength
of the post-war drive towards unity. As a consequence, the British missed the chance
to create the kind of Europe they later wanted. The result was that the concepts of
the Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of Rome, and the elaboration of a Community
doctrine, have been dominated by the work of Frenchmen such as Jean Monnet,
Robert Marjolin. Pierre Uri, Maurice Faure, and others. The Belgian Paul-Henri
677 EEC Commission. Bulletin No. 4 (1959), p. 6.
678
Camps (1964) p. 102.
679 EEC. Council. Brussels. 19 February 1959. 81/59. Note d'lnformation.
Maudling to the House of Commons. BAC 24/1967. No. 124.
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Spaak. Walter Hallstein from Germany, and Sicco Mansholt from the Netherlands
have also played important roles, but it has nevertheless been the French who have
been the innovators, as well as given a formal, logical content to the construction of
the early European Communities.
Despite the failure of the Free Trade Area negotiations between the Six of the
Common Market and the other countries of the OEEC, they marked a shift in
emphasis between the Six which was strongly needed for the two new European
Communities to be properly launched and established as separate units. This was a
shift which was noticeable from the ratification of the Treaty of Rome onwards,
when the attention of France in particular turned away from the Free Trade Area
over to the newly established Common Market. This was a procedure which the
European Commission itself took an active part in something the two Commission
Memoranda as well as several appearances of the relevant Commissioners in the
European Parliamentary Assembly during 1958 and 1959 bears evidence of.
For the Commission, as well as the Six to their national governments, there
was a great need to express the difference between the Common Market and the Free
Trade Area. It was important for the Community member States to tell their national
populations that by joining the Common Market they would get something more,
which the nationals of the rest of the Free Trade Area would not get a part in. At
the same time, this was the reason why it was important for the United Kingdom to
be present from the setting-up of the Community not to be excluded through too
many special arrangements created by the Six.
The European Free Trade Area negotiations were the first test for the
European Economic Community, as well as for the European Commission itself, of
working out a common position among the Six in international negotiations, and
presenting itself to the world community with one voice. It was also a good
opportunity, early on in its history, to work out and define its own identity, both for
the Commission as for the Community as a whole. Although the Free Trade Area
negotiations were disrupted before the Community was a year old it became clear
312
that a free trade area was not what it had been set up for. The Community was more
than just the result of economic forces. As Walter Hallstein has pointed out, the
means of European integration were economic, but the goals, on the other hand,
were "clearly, political".681' Furthermore, "the European Community could be seen
not only as a European response to political and economic challenges, but, what is
much more important, also as a new dynamic in its own right".681 Under such
circumstances a free trade area involving another seven countries at least, would be
far too broad for the Community to fulfill its treaty obligations. There was the
danger that the Community might dissolve all together "within such a wider, looser,
and much more partial scheme [...] ceasing to be what was a then potential political
entity [... ] becoming a mere commercial arrangement indistinguishable from the free-
trade area", and thereby "incapable of giving it the continued political impetus
necessary to achieve the benefits of free trade".682
As it became clear to the Community itself, and its member States, that a free
trade area was not the right solution, the question of identity had to a large extent
been decided. It became evident that the Commission sought a much more united and
strengthened Community. It could therefore begin to prioritise the provisions set out
in the Treaty. By April 1962 tariffs between member States had been reduced by up
to 40% in certain sectors, "the first moves toward the common external tariff were
made twelve months in advance", on 31 December 1960, and on 31 December 1961
practically all barriers to movement of industrial goods were abolished, eight years
earlier according to the original schedule.683 When the Community moved forward
into Stage Two of the Treaties of Rome, in January 1962, it "past the so-called
'point of no return'".684
680 Hallstein (1962) p. 62.
681 Hallstein (1962) p. 69.
682 Hallstein (1962) p. 73.
68j Hallstein (1962) pp. 48-49.
684 Hallstein (1962) p. 56.
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As the Free Trade Area negotiations failed, it was as if the Community was
given a boost and an even stronger incentive to make its own Treaty and the
Common Market work. It had defined its own identity as political before economic,
and made the two elements dependent on each other. Another important factor which
will explain the success of the Community in its early years was its support from the
French President de Gaulle. In 1958 he rejected the Free Trade Area and thereby
gave his full support to the EEC. Throughout the 1960s, however, this was going
to change quite dramatically. He turned more and more nationalistic and inward
looking, trying to make the EEC into an intergovernmental organisation as a "Europe
of States". This process culminated in the "empty-chair" crisis in 1965 when France
withdrew her representatives from the Community altogether. This was naturally
going to mark a change within the Community which took a long time to turn.
One of the main reasons for de Gaulle's "support" of the Community was the
Algerian War. He had most of his energies in this camp for the first four years of
his presidency, which also happened to be the first four years of the Treaties of
Rome in operation. Furthermore, as the Treaties already had been signed, ratified
and come into force, it seemed better for President de Gaulle "to let the
Communities find their feet, trusting his own ability eventually to shape them in
accordance with his own nationalist convictions".685 The United Kingdom, on the
other hand, was not regarded as "wholly European", due to her Atlantic
alliance.686 Therefore, as the United Kingdom attempted to set up a free trade area
in 1957-58. undermining the importance of the Community, de Gaulle and his
supporters became convinced that "Great Britain was seeking uniquely to further her
own interests, and that these were in conflict with those of the Six".687 It could be
argued that it would have been more sensible for de Gaulle "to try to align British
policies on his side". This, however, was not going to be possible as "Great Britain
hS5 Lord Gladwyn (1969) De Gaulle's Europe or Why the General Says No, p.
56.
Pickles (1966) The Uneasy Entente: French Foreign Policy and Franco-
British Misunderstandings, p. 22.
687 Pickles (1966) p. 35.
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would have been a more equal partner and, therefore, a less satisfactory one",688
as de Gaulle saw "in EEC a possible instrument of French power".089
688
Hartley (1972) Gaullism: The Rise and Fall ofa Political Movement, p. 209.




"Les hommes places dans une situation de fait nouvelle, ou dans un
systeme d'obligations different, adaptent leur comportement et
deviennent autres. lis deviennent meilleurs si le contexte est meilleur:
c'est I'histoire toute simple du progres des civilisations, et c'est
I'histoire de la Communaute Europeenne.
1. THE BUILDING OF ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES WITHIN AN
ORGANISATION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
1.1 Historical influences
As the quote above indicates, the history of the European Community is to
a large extent concerned about the changing of circumstances which again has led
to a changing of behaviour of the various actors at all levels. The latter will be better
if the former is good. By establishing firstly the ECSC in 1952 and later the EEC
and Euratom in 1958, the European States and their peoples were led into a
cooperation away from war and destruction, concentrating rather on relations built
on interdependence and peace. This had been the idea behind the Monnet Plan which
was later followed by statesmen and others of all the original six participating
countries. To secure these new relations, and make them last, the building of
institutions was regarded, both by Monnet and later by Hallstein, as a crucial
element. The institutional framework which was set up with the ECSC, and which
has survived for more than forty years, is part of what makes the European
Communities unique. Within the institutional framework of the EEC, it was the
Commission which was thought to be the driving force of the integration process.
To Monnet the Commission was seen as "an independent arbiter of the European
690 "People who are placed within new circumstances, or in a system of
different obligations, will adopt their behaviours and change. They will improve if
the context is good: that is simply the history of the progress of civilization, and
it is the history of the European Communities." Own translation. Jean Monnet Clefs
pour I'Action, p. 20.
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interest", while Hallstein regarded it as "the most original and unprecedented of
institutions". Edwards and Spence have later added their view of the Commission as
"the one permanent factor in an otherwise changing constellation of people and
coalitions".691 Maybe the most characteristic feature of the European Commission
has been its lack of predecessors, and together with its variation of tasks, the
difficulties with placing it in any previously known group of organisation. The many
different roles of the Commission have demanded different types of organisation to
be performed by one single administration. Indeed, one could say that "the history
of the Commission is one in which it has sought the means of reconciling the
different demands laid upon it, with the Member States and their representatives
rarely looking on with indifference".692 Hereby, we might have established one of
the main dilemmas of the European Commission, which, throughout its history, to
a large extent has determined its performance. It has been given a number of tasks
to perform, stated in the Treaty of Rome, but still depends on the good will and
general mood of the member States and their governments.
In this study on the establishment of the European Commission, and in
particular the building-up of its administrative structures, it has been necessary to
make a study of the only similar type of organisation that existed before it; the High
Authority of the ECSC. This was the first of the European Communities to be
established, and was motivated by a desire to reach a lasting peace between France
and Germany. There were a number of so-called "european movements" of more or
less federalist character during this immediate post-war period, and when the
Schuman Declaration was launched on 9 May 1950, it seemed only natural for the
six countries, France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux countries, to join
together in a common effort to seek prosperity and a higher standard of living. It
might have seemed like a highly dubious project but it must have appeared like a
better alternative to the future than a possible war on the European continent once
again. The same uncertainty was. on the other hand, the reason why a country like
691 Geoffrey Edwards and David Spence (1994) The European Commission, p.
1.
692 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 4.
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the United Kingdom did not see the possibility of joining from the start. They were
not willing to give up any sovereignty, however little, to a project, or rather an idea,
full of uncertainties concerning its success.
The man behind the Schuman Declaration, the Frenchman Jean Monnet, was
chosen to become the first President of the High Authority. His approach to the
establishment of this institution, as well as the Community as such, was a minimalist
one, focusing on flexibility, collegiality and supranationalism. For the administration
of the High Authority this was to mean an approach which would be developed
according to demand, when and if the demands appeared. Jean Monnet feared the
development of an administration that would become too big, bureaucratic and
"heavy", with few if any real results to be obtained. Communication both
horizontally and vertically was considered as essential with the smallest number of
levels possible during the decision-making process. The High Authority was instead
thought to be an institution taking political decisions at a supranational level,
something which has been shown was to be, at least partly, restrained by the six
national governments. The experiences of the High Authority, as we have seen, have
shown that it had to consult the Council of Ministers far more often than was
theoretically required, according to the Treaty of Paris. Considering the fact that the
original plan of Jean Monnet did not include any Council of Ministers at all, critics
will claim the ECSC project to have been far too ambitious in a federalist way.
Given its possibilities as well as its limitations, history has shown the High
Authority to have developed in different ways, at different times. This has to a great
extent depended on the nature of its various presidents. Jean Monnet served mostly
during favourable times characterised by real optimism and support for the federal
cause. During the first couple of years, as we have seen, it proved easier to get
acceptance for Monnet's minimalist approach, something which has been explained
above by the fact that the newly created Community also operated within a more
narrow field. The people involved were full of enthusiasm, being what we often have
referred to as "good Europeans". They functioned reasonably well together as a
collegiate body, taking at times decisions similar to that of a political leadership.
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During the negotiations between the High Authority and the United Kingdom for the
Agreement of Association, the former operated as something similar to a national
State. Later on, however, both the personality of the President, as well as the
general circumstances and demands, changed. This was going to change the
organisation of the High Authority too, focusing on more bureaucratic and technical
elements. We have noted how one such element was the establishment of Staff
Regulations in 1956.
The administrative apparatus surrounding the High Authority during its early
years appears to have been quite small, but still flexible. There were no strict
working procedures and its staff did not have the security they were used to from
their own national administrations. It was regarded as more important to be flexible,
to be able to give the best possible approach to any matter that might arise. This was
possible, as we have seen, as long as the staff was willing to work long, unfixed
hours, and as long as the work load was relatively small. It might have proved
beneficial to the High Authority to have such an administration at its disposal during
the initiating period where a certain amount of "trial and error" was necessary in
order to find the best possible working methods for this new type of organisation.
Nevertheless, it soon fell into a pattern where a more strongly organised structure
was demanded, where each office had been given its tasks, separate from each other.
During the autumn of 1952 the High Authority was divided into Working
Parties which each represented its own working area. Furthermore, twelve different
Divisions and Services were set up.693 With time these Working Parties and
Divisions, which could in certain ways be compared with the ministries of a national
government, grew in size and work load, and contact between them became
gradually more rigid. Later on, we have seen that the same trend appeared within
the DGs of the European Commission. As we have seen in Chapter IV above, the
Commission established a number of groups, similar to the working parties of the
High Authority, with one Commissioner as Chairman, and two to three other
693 Spierenburg and Poidevin (1994) pp. 70-74.
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Commissioners as members. However, as Emile Noel has recounted, these groups
existed more or less on paper only. They had been an attempt to keep the collegiate,
supranational nature of the Commission, where all its Commissioners would be
equally informed in all areas. With their responsibilities as overall head of a DG, as
well as the weekly meeting of the Commission, the work load became too heavy,
with a certain overlapping tendency.
The favourable circumstances that ruled during the setting-up of the ECSC
were to change dramatically with France's failure to ratify the EDC on 30 August
1954. Until that day the European integration process had moved gradually forward
with the cooperation becoming both closer and deeper. The development went
according to predictions of a "spill-over" effect which had been made earlier by the
American scholar Ernst B. Haas. However, with the planned integration of the
defence sectors of the six member States, accompanied by a Political Community,
one seemed to have touched upon certain sensitive strings of national feelings of
sovereignty, in France more than anywhere. The period that followed, which has
been referred to as the "relance europeenne", proved, nevertheless, that integration
among the six European States was desired, but within sectors where a loss of
national sovereignty would be less controversial.
1.2 The Independent role of the European Commission
As we now have identified and analysed the influences of the setting-up of the
European Commission, and how this became organised, we will analyse the ways
in which the Commission has played an independent role. Furthermore, we will
discuss how certain elements have increased the chances of the Commission playing
such an independent role. These elements were, firstly, the position taken by the
member States towards the Commission as an independent body and their general
feeling towards further European integration through the Treaty of Rome. Secondly,
the position taken by the Commissioners as a college, along with staff appointed, has
to a certain extent determined whether the Commission has been able to act in an
independent way or not. A third element has been the roles given to the Commission
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in the Treaty of Rome, and how these have been regarded and used by the
Commission itself. Last, but not least, there was the role played by the first
President of the European Commission, the only President of the EEC Commission
in fact, Walter Hallstein. Not only because he was the first one, and the one to
determine in many ways the actual organising of the Commission, but also becuase
of his own personality, regarded as a charismatic leader, did he play a considerable
role in the attempts of setting up an independent European executive body.
We have argued throughout this thesis that both the High Authority as well
as the European Commission were set out to be, and operated as political bodies
taking initiatives of real political character. Nevertheless, another argument has been
that this has only, to a large extent, been possible with the consent, even if a silent
one, of the member State Governments. The High Authority was, according to its
Treaty, independent of national considerations, with powers normally only enjoyed
by national governments. Decisions were taken by majority vote, and these were
directly binding on the enterprises concerned. It even went as far as having powers
to raise money by placing levies on production of coal and steel to be paid directly
to the High Authority. Its experience, however, was that no integration would
happen against the will of the member States and therefore these came to be
consulted in the Council of Ministers before the High Authority made its decisions.
Jean Monnet's vision of the High Authority had been that the political role
was to be played by the institution itself, whereas the administration surrounding it
would play a preparatory and supporting role. This was to work more efficiently
with a small administrative apparatus, which in turn would ease the decision-making
process. When the European Commission was set up a few years later it shared
many similarities with the High Authority. In one area, however, there was a marked
difference between the two. In the Treaty of Rome the European Commission and
the Council of Ministers had been given a shared responsibility over the executive
duties. Hereby, the already strong position of the member States in the ECSC had
been formalised.
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The European Commission had been set up as a new type of organisation with
various different functions to fulfil, normally not seen done by one single
organisation before. Its administration, as we have seen, would have to be organised
accordingly already from the start, as a contrast to that of the High Authority. One
role of the European Commission was that of a political leadership, which it could
play through its right and duty to initiate legislation to the Council of Ministers. Also
during the Free Trade Area negotiations, which the Commission only entered
towards the end, it managed to show real political initiative, during 1959 in
particular. As early as June 1958, however, we have found evidence of the
Commission having entered the negotiations with its opinions. On 13 June the
Commission had sent a Memorandum to the six governments urging these to discuss
the institutional problems of the EEC entering into the Free Trade Area. According
to the Commission it would be important to establish ways of dealing with the
possibility of the EEC and the Free Trade Area having different views. To the
Commission it was important that answers to these problems were found at an early
stage so as not to put the future of the Community in jeopardy.694 It was also the
Commission which put the final end to these negotiations, after France had broken
them off almost one year earlier. To the Commission it was considered as more
important properly to establish the Common Market and to implement the Treaty
before entering into associations with third countries, or groups of third countries.
Nevertheless, it has been shown, both for the Commission as well as the High
Authority before it, that they were always more or less in the hands of the member
States. Over the Free Trade Area negotiations the Commission had the full backing
of France, which has always been one of the decisive players in this integration
process.
Despite the dependence of the European Commission on the member States
and their governments, we have shown that it has nevertheless managed to operate
694 The document referred to of 13 June 1958 was Memorandum No. 3, Doc.
456/58-F, from the Commission to the six governments. Mentioned in Commission
Document COM(58) 178 rev. of 5 September 1958. This was sent in confidentiality
to the Council of Ministers before their scheduled meeting in Venice on 18-20
September 1958. CEAB 11/5111.
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in an independent and political way on many occasions. One explanation for this has
been the fact that the people involved in the beginning had almost all been involved
in the negotiations of the Treaties. This way they were all highly committed
"Europeans", eager to see some real progress. To explain why the Commission
functioned in a rather less political fashion during the late 1960s and 1970s,
however, it would be far too general to say that new people were less committed,
or committed more to a career than a cause. It has seemed throughout the thesis that
the general attitudes of the member States, and possibly some more than others, have
mattered more to the functioning of the Commission, and which roles that have been
given the most importance.
The independence of the European Commission was furthermore well
established during the Free Trade Area negotiations. The Commission started out as
being generally favourable to the idea of a free trade area between the EEC and the
rest of the OEEC. However, as the so-called "guardian of the Treaty" and "engine
of the Community", its general interest above all had to be directed towards the
Community as a whole, before entering into associations with third countries.
Therefore, the Commission recommended to refuse the Free Trade Area if the
objectives of the Treaty were put in jeopardy. Furthermore, it demanded that the Six
should enter as one entity, not as six separate countries, with the Commission as the
spokesman of the Community. Such strong views, showing a clear vision of a
desired future, must show the signs of a body of political initiatives, already during
the first few months of 1958. During 1959 the Commission produced two
Memoranda where its views of highly political character on a potential free trade
area were set out. The dilemma facing the Commission in its daily work was, on the
one side, its right and duty to initiate policies, and on the other, its lack of powers
to take decisions in the most important areas. To find the right balance, as well as
to make the most impact on the situation, it had to be innovative and flexible, in
addition to being skilled at improvisation. Innovation and flexibility were certainly
good qualities to possess during the initial years without fixed Staff Regulations.
What this has meant to the performance of the Commission will never be quite clear,
although from personal accounts by Emile Noel, it seems that it made the
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Commission more able to establish itself as an independent, political Community
institution without being "tied" to too many strict regulations concerning its staff.
This again seems to have been possible as the people seeking work in this institution
at the time were more concerned about the overall, political goals to be reached.
President Hallstein, as we have established, considered the political elements
of the Commission to be of the greatest importance. This was why he believed in
building up the administrative structures as soon as possible in order to concentrate
on policies later on. What was also important for the Commission to settle as quickly
as possible was its independence from the national governments. One example of
how this was done was its use of the European Parliamentary Assembly. President
Hallstein, in particular, frequently addressed the Assembly with the views and
actions to be taken by the Commission, something which gave the Commission a
certain supranational element, even if there was a constant balance between satisfying
the Assembly, on the one hand, and the member States on the other. As Edwards
and Spence have put it: "[I]t would be a misreading of the Commission's role to see
it as wholly dependent on the Member States. But clearly, Commission Presidents,
even when they have sought to provide leadership, have not always been given the
opportunity to do so."695 This is a statement which can, to a large extent, be
supported, and which, to a certain degree, sums up the conditions under which the
Commission operates. It has to be added, nevertheless, the fact that some presidents
have had the ability of providing a stronger leadership than others. President
Hallstein remains as a particularly strong and charismatic leader of the European
Commission in its early days, setting a trend for the future.
The Free Trade Area negotiations were to prove the first opportunity for
Hallstein to establish his leadership style and abilities. Already as early as in
February 1958 he began, along with the Commissioner for External Relations, Jean
Rey, to attend the meetings of the Maudling Committee. At this stage most of the
administrative staff of the Commission had not even been appointed. Furthermore,
69' Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 5.
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the Commission, which entered these negotiations only towards the end, had not
been given any particular negotiating powers by the member States. The role it
assumed was identified by its president and his team more or less singlehandedly.
On 20 March 1958 President Hallstein addressed the European Parliamentary
Assembly, announcing the position taken by the Commission on the establishment
of the Free Trade Area. It was clear that, although it did not rule out the possibility
totally, it had to put the Community and the Common Market first. It seems quite
clear that, as the Commission made attempts to establish its independence, it also
assumed its role as the "guardian of the Treaty" where the interests of the
Community as a whole must come first. Throughout 1958 the Commission President
addressed the European Parliamentary Assembly on several occasions, indicating also
the views he had on the importance of that institution and of the two working
together.
1.3 The competencies of the High Authority and the European Commission from the
Treaty of Paris to the Treaty of Maastricht
Under the Treaty of Paris of 18 April 1951, the High Authority, as the first
of the European Executives, was given extensive powers, touching directly upon the
industries and producers of coal and steel. In the same way, however, one could say
that its competencies were restricted by the narrow area in which it could operate.
Article 8 of the Treaty of Paris sets out the overall duty of the High Authority
which was to "ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained in
accordance with the provisions thereof". More specific powers were given further
down in the Treaty. One of the most direct powers, which has made the High
Authority unique ever since, was its right to impose fines and periodic penalty
payments (Article 47). Another was its right to impose levies on the production of
coal and steel, and to contract loans (Article 49). Although restricted to the
industries of coal and steel, these were much stronger and of a more direct character
than was given to the European Commission a few years later.
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When the Treaty of Rome was signed on 25 March 1957, new relationships
were created between the Community and the member States, as well as between
these and the executive body, the European Commission. As the name of the
Community, the European Economic Community, already indicates, its scope was
much broader than that of the ECSC. On the other hand, the competencies of the
European Commission were not as "deep" as those of the High Authority. For the
administration of the European Commission, compared to that of the High Authority,
the former was to need a bigger and possibly more hierarchical structure to be able
to administer the envisaged customs union as well as the agricultural policy that was
to come.
We have already established as one of the main differences between the
ECSC and the EEC the scope of their treaties. Furthermore, one must also point out
another difference in the two treaties which has had a great influence on the two
executive bodies and their roles. Briefly, one could say that the High Authority
enjoyed strong powers in a limited area, whereas the European Commission had
weaker powers within a larger area. The Treaty of Paris is what we have called a
"traite loi". Lindberg has described this as being "a precise statement of rules and
a machinery for their application".696 The Treaty of Rome, on the other hand, has
been characterised as a "traite cadre", or a framework treaty. The Treaty of Rome
is thus a "general statement of goals with a set of institutions and a procedure for
their attainement" which "set forth the general basis of economic unification, leaving
much of the content vague, but establishing an institutional system with the power
to define the future order of things".697 One of the main powers granted the
European Commission was its right and duty to propose legislation to the Council.
Contrary to the High Authority, which could take decisions directly binding on all
legal subjects concerning the coal and steel industry, the powers of the Commission
were laid down in its ability to influence on the deliberations and decisions of the
Council. This aspect is what we earlier have referred to as 'the driving force of the
696
Lindberg (1963) p. 27. Italic in original.
69'
Lindberg (1963) p. 27.
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Community'. Another power, of more general character, has been set down in
Article 155 of the Treaty of Rome as the duty to "ensure the proper functioning and
development of the common market". Several of the various roles and functions of
the Commission as discussed under Coombes and Lindberg have derived from this
particular article.
Despite the fact that all major decisions were to be taken by the Council
based on a proposal from the Commission, there were certain areas in which the
Commission could act alone. These were within strictly technical areas concerning
safeguard clauses, competition policy, calculation of customs duties, tariff quotas and
the administration of the European Social Fund. Furthermore, it had the duty to
adopt its own rules of procedure with the view of ensuring its own functioning,
according to Article 162 of tne Treaty of Rome.698 The European Commission, and
the EEC as such, had no powers within the fields of foreign policy or defence, and
the Commission had "no power to raise revenue from an independent source of
finance".699
With the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht on 17 February 1992, the
European Community took another step forward in the integration process. In
addition to the already existing areas covered in the Treaty of Rome, new areas like
culture, education and public health have been added, and the Economic and
Monetary Union has been introduced. Furthermore, and despite the more
intergovernmental character, the Commission was given the non-exclusive right of
initiative in Common Foreign and Security Policy, and cooperation rights in Justice
and Home Affairs.700 The scope of the Commission's functions has thereby been
broadly expanded. Nevertheless, its main characteristics, being the monopoly of
initiative, guardian of the Treaty and Community law and its supranational
administration, are still as important and unique as always. Another aspect of the
698 Lindberg (1963) pp. 307-310.
699 Coombes (1970) p. 84.
7"° Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen (1996) The European Union: How
Democratic Is It? (London: SAGE Publications) p. 131.
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Maastricht Treaty, pointed out by Edwards and Spence, has been the Commission's
role in relation to the Council, which has become more of a co-player in the
decision-making procedure.701 Furthermore, it seems that "the provisions of the
Maastrict Treaty as well as the developments of the last years indicate that the role
of a promotional broker is being reinforced. The Commission is thus likely to remain
a unique body in a unique institutional set-up."702 It was with the knowledge of the
elaboration of the European Communities and the coming into force of the
Maastricht Treaty that the book by Edwards and Spence was written. We will see
below how this has influenced their views on the European Commission, its
administration and roles.
2. LITERATURE
2.1 Early literature on the European Commission
The fact that the European Commission can be said to have played so many
different roles, executing them all more or less constantly, has inspired a number of
studies of many different opinions regarding the roles and functions of this
institution. On the whole, however, the main functions of the Commission have been
identified by all, although sometimes under different names, or according to a
difference of importance. Authors like David Coombes, Jean Siotis, Sabino Cassese
and Giacinto della Cananea, as well as Leon N. Lindberg, and the very first
Commission President, Walter Hallstein, have all pointed out such roles as initiating
and proposing policies and legislation, implementing legislation, and the role as the
"guardian of the Treaty", as some of the main characteristics of the European
Commission. Jean Siotis, on the other hand, was the one who most strongly stressed
the political importance of the diplomatic role of the Commission, whereas Walter
Hallstein placed the greatest importance in its role as "honest broker". The latter one
could assume would speak from a personal experience as President of the
111 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 221. See also Treaty of Maastricht, Articles
189 a-c. 113, 115 and 130. among others.
702 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 221.
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Commission during nine years. There was a constant battle between, on the one side,
proposing legislation in order to make the Community move forward, and, on the
other side, to propose legislation which would have a chance to pass through the
Council of Ministers. As someone who was highly involved in this process, Walter
Hallstein must, more than any. have felt this battle in his daily work. The following
quote may serve as an indicator of this complex situation:
"If the Commissions advance only proposals that the Council may
wish to hear, they may in their subservience to the Council forfeit
their independence, betray the protection and promotion of
Community interests, and become mere traditional governmental
commissions. If, on the other hand, the Commission pursue bold yet
realistic policies, they may succeed in coaxing the Council along to
take such and such action, particularly if they are supported by the
Assembly.1,703
The power of the European Commission to negotiate with third countries, or
groups of countries, on behalf of the member States of the Community, established
in Articles 228 and 238 of the Treaty of Rome, gave it certain characteristics similar
to that of a nation State. The fact that it had been given the sole right and duty to
propose and initiate policies and Community legislation gave it, in turn, features
similar to those of a national government. Why the Commission has been compared
with a national civil service, on the other hand, has been due to its many
administrative elements and the way the Commission administration took shape with
its DGs and their subdivisions. In a similar structure to that of the High Authority,
each DG represented one area of the work executed by the Commission where each
Commissioner was given the overall responsibility of one DG. Even if the
Commission, according to the Treaty of Rome, was a collegiate body which was to
be responsible towards the other institutions and the member States as such, it was
considered as more practical to divide the workload into different areas.
Consequently, each Commissioner did not have to be constantly up-to-date in all
areas but would be informed at the weekly meeting of the Commission every
Wednesday. Another element of keeping up with the constantly increasing workload
7lb Gerhard Bebr The balance ofpower in the European Communities. Annuaire
Europeen. V. 53-79. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1959. In: Lindberg (1963) p. 36.
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was the use of personal "Cabinets". As the independence of the Commission as a
body, as well as that of the individual Commissioner, had been an established factor
in the Treaty of Rome, the use of "Cabinets" has been criticized for keeping the
Commissioners too much in line with their home governments. More important,
however, seems to have been the way the "Cabinets" managed to communicate on
a horizontal level between themselves as a significant aid in the daily work of the
Commission.
The literature on the European Commission, by the authors Lindberg,
Coombes and Siotis in particular, which has been studied throughout this thesis, has
played a considerable role in the development of the Commission itself, as well as
being of vital importance to any student of this institution during forty years. What
we need to establish now is whether their conclusions, different though they are, can
still today be said to have some value, and what kind of impact they have had on the
development of the Commission. Furthermore, we will contrast this with the more
recent book by Edwards and Spence and their findings.
When Lindberg conducted his study of the European Commission, the
European integration process of the European Communities was still in its early
days, giving him very little experience to lean on. He had observed the development
from the Schuman Declaration of 1950 and the setting-up of the High Authority of
the ECSC, via the failure of the EDC and EPC and the "relance europeenne", to the
setting-up of the EEC and Euratom in 1958. The cooperation seemed only to become
deeper and more wide-ranging for each step, and even given a boost from a near
crisis. In an attempt to explain and to predict the future development of European
integration, the neofunctionalist theory was developed. This was a theory which
seemed to fit well with the events since the Schuman Declaration. Given what we
know today about what has happened since the mid-1960s onwards, there are few
scholars who would give new life to the neofunctionalist theory, even if the
cooperation has indeed become even more deep and more wide-ranging over the
years. Nevertheless, as the European Commission was a new phenomenon and in an
early stage of its development, there might have been a greater need for explanations
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and predictions.
The importance placed by Lindberg on the political role played by the
European Commission during the years covered in his study can possibly be
explained by the favourable and optimistic environment provided by the member
State Governments. On the other hand, it has been argued that without the
personalities involved in the Commission at the start, the same degree of political
leadership could not have been possible. This is why we have devoted considerable
space in Chapter IV above to a study of the background of the original
Commissioners of 1958. Their strong belief in the European integration process as
the most important qualification which they all shared, has made this particular
College of Commissioners unique. Authors of this period, as well as key
personalities like Emile Noel, have all pointed towards the political leadership of this
collegiate body which seems to have functioned as a real team. Noel in particular has
given considerable amount of credit to the President Walter Hallstein. Coombes,
nevertheless, held the view that the Commission could only have been regarded as
a political body if it had had its own politically elected leaders.
When discussing the writings of Leon Lindberg and David Coombes one must
bear in mind the times at which they wrote. No one can be completely free of
surrounding elements in their assessment, and important events had occurred in the
period between the writings of Lindberg and of Coombes. When Lindberg produced
his study on the European Commission in 1963, times were optimistic and the EEC
still a novelty. The latter wrote at a later stage in 1970, after the "empty chair" crisis
and the establishment of a Common Agricultural Policy. The first element showed
the large role played by the member State Governments in the integration process,
the latter must have clearly shown the need for more hierarchical structures within
the European Commission. The more "pessimistic" views on the European
Commission as held by Coombes have, nevertheless, not proved to be totally correct.
Since the mid-1980s the Community has taken remarkable steps forward towards a
more integrated, "supranational" Community.
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Not only has it been important to this study to establish the roles and
functions of the European Commission, whether this has been given directly by the
Treaty, or delegated by the Council of Ministers. Another, and equally important
aspect has been to establish whether these roles and functions have been of a political
character or merely of a character traditionally found in an international organisation
or even in a bureaucracy. In the study made by Coombes, he described the first two
functions, the initiative function and the normative function, as the ones giving the
Commission its political features, without which he claimed the Commission would
turn into an international organisation of the traditional type. Lindberg gave the
initiating role a political content where it would have a choice over the direction and
speed of the Community as a whole. We have argued that this was what the
Commission did when it recommended to break off the Free Trade Area negotiations
and instead concentrate on Community policies. During the period of these
negotiations when the Commission took part, from the period when it was set up
early in 1958 until the end in September 1959, the role as "guardian of the Treaty"
was strongly stressed by the Commission. The need to establish an independent
position towards the member States, together with its role to speak for the
Community as a whole, seems to have made the Free Trade Area negotiations into
a perfect opportunity for the European Commission at such an early stage. Through
personalities such as President Hallstein and the Commissioner for External
Relations. Jean Rey, the Commission seized this opportunity without having been
given any particular role to play either by the Council of Ministers or by the national
governments.
From Siotis' point of view the Commission would only be able to act in a
political way in times of political consensus among the member States. In times of
crisis it would turn into a multilateral organisation where each member State would
claim for its own national interests first and foremost. Although the two points of
view cannot be compared, Emile Noel seems to be in line with Siotis to the extent
that he claimed the Commission has turned more multinational in times of crisis.
The fact that Siotis more or less refused to regard the European Communities
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and the European Commission as a product of already existing bonds of solidarity
between the Six. made him also question the the way in which the Commission could
operate as a "supranational" executive, or to what extent the Commission could
operate independently of the member States. We have seen, during the Free Trade
Area negotiations and even to a greater extent after, that in the end the views of the
national governments have been decisive to the final actions of the European
Communities and thereby to those of the Commission. Nevertheless, throughout the
discussions above one must hope that it has been shown that the Commission can,
and has, influenced the Council of Ministers to take actions according to what the
Commission has regarded as to the best of the Community as a whole. President
Hallstein has called this the role as "honest broker" between the interests of the
Community and those of the member States. In Coombes' terminology it would be
the mediative function. Clearly, it has been a role which the European Commission
has had to fulfil with great care to find the right balance between what would be
politically accepted by the member States and what would be accepted by the Treaty
of Rome.
Coombes criticized what he called the "Lindberg Thesis" with the following
question: "[I]s it [the "Lindberg Thesis"] justified in assuming that it was only the
antagonism of the contemporary French government which prevented the
Commission from acting as a political leadership?" What was clear to Coombes was
that to be able to act as political leaders in relation to the organisation of the
Commission, the Commissioners needed to be able to "act as political leaders of the
Community itself". Therefore, as "the political legitimacy of the Community must
come from the member governments", any failure could not be blamed on the
French President de Gaulle alone.704 Lindberg, on the other hand, seems to have
placed a great deal of importance in the role of the Commission during the period
of his study. In his discussion on the acceleration debate of 1960 he claimed that "a
decision would not have been achieved without the Commission. The inability of the
governments to agree on a precise formula forced them to delegate the task of
704 Coombes (1970) pp. 272-273.
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formulation to the Commission. None was willing to accept the possibility of a
deadlock. "™5
2.2 Recent literature on the European Commission
Between David Coombes' book in 1970 and the present time, very little
material has been published devoted solely to the study of the European Commission.
The Community underwent a period of low popularity during the late 1960s and the
1970s with the French President de Gaulle showing a less than positive attitude
towards the Commission as an independent, political body. The Community was
thereby gradually turned more towards intergovernmentalism, making the theories
of supranationalism and neofunctionalism seem inadequate. Another important aspect
was the fact that its "honeymoon" period now seemed to be over and the main
policies of the Treaty of Rome had already been set out. A period of so-called
negative integration followed where nothing new needed to be created, only existing
elements, such as trade barriers, removed.706 The year 1975 saw, furthermore, an
agreement on the creation of the European Council,707 which has been considered
as another step towards intergovernmentalism. Academic interest was now turned
towards the Council of Ministers and the European Council, as well as the European
Parliament which held direct elections for the first time in 1979. While the late
1950s and early 1960s saw a high degree of academic interest in the Commission in
particular, this interest had turned towards the less "supranational" institutions of the
7(b Lindberg (1963) p. 202. The acceleration debate mentioned above refers to
the implementation of the Treaty of Rome which, on 12 May 1960, was decided
by the Council of Ministers to be speeded up.
By "negative integration" is understood "the part of economic integration
which consists of the removal of discrimination", in this case removal of barriers
that hamper the free flow of goods, capital and labour. In other words, the creation
of a common market. With "positive integration", on the other hand, we understand
"the formulation and application of coordinated common policies designed to fulfil
broad economic and welfare objectives". Coombes (1970) pp. 54-55.
'"7
Agreement was made in December 1974 in Paris, but was not formally
constituted until March 1975 in Dublin. Nevertheless, the European Council did not
appear in legal texts until the Single European Act of 1986.
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Community during the 1970s. From the early 1980s, on the other hand, and the
signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. interest has once again turned
towards the European Commission as a result of the Internal Market and the
Maastricht Treaty on European LTnion of 1992.
The latest book, written in the English language, exclusively about the
European Commission, was The European Commission in 1994. Its editors were
Geoffrey Edwards, from the University of Cambridge, and David Spence who is the
Head of Training, DG1A in the European Commission. Of a total of 14 contributors
to this book, eight were employed by the European Commission itself, enabling them
to give an account of the organisation from the inside. As a valid justification for the
book, its editors claim in the preface that it is the first "full-length book" since
David Coombes published his thorough study in 1970. With so many changes within
the European Communities since then, both of deepening as well as widening
character, a new study scarcely requires any justification. Nevertheless, as Edwards
and Spence point out in Chapter 1 "The Commission in perspective": "Given its
importance in the integration process and the controversy that has often surrounded
its role, there has been a surprising dearth of academic or other study of the
European Commission."708 Their purpose was to "explain and guide one through
the comitological maze and [...] look at the implications of it all so that one can
better understand how the policy-making process is likely to develop".709 With the
White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market of 1985, the Single European
Act of 1986, and the Commission Presidency of Jacques Delors between 1985 and
1995, a new dynamism seemed to have been created within the Community which
resulted in a new academic interest in integration theory and the role of the European
Commission within this process.
In a discussion about the various roles of the Commission, Edwards and
Spence gave the independence of the Commission, together with its formal and
708 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 1.
709 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. x.
informal right of initiative, the greatest significance. This has been the case since the
setting-up of the EEC in 1958. In 1988. as the Community celebrated its thirty
years, the then Commission President Jacques Delors said in his speech that "the
Commission was a 'strategic authority' established [...] to 'guarantee the continuity
of the [integration] project despite the political or geopolitical hazards'". It was the
role of the Commission, he claimed, "to point 'the way to the goal ahead'".710
Having this in mind one must point out the dramatic expansion of the Community
spheres of action and competencies to include, firstly, areas like environment, health
and education. Later on, areas like foreign policy, security and defence, and
monetary policy have been included, something which would have been unthinkable
even to suggest in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, if one makes a distinction
between the Commission's formal right of initiative, given through Article 155 of
the Treaty of Rome, and the power of initiative, it s^ems clear that the latter has
moved towards the Council of Ministers after 1966 and to the European Council
from 1975. This was a trend typical of the political mood of the 1970s, which
greatly affected the performance of the European Commission. As the editor of
Agence Europe, Emanuel Gazzo, argued in 1972: "The Commission [was] ... no
longer a place where policies were conceived, but an executive secretariat for
policies conceived and elaborated elsewhere."711
Apart from the Commission's power of initiative, Edwards and Spence
identified several other roles of great importance, corresponding largely to the roles
identified by earlier authors. These included its role as the "guardian of the Treaty"
and its right and duty to "formulate recommendations or deliver opinions" on Treaty
issues at its own discretion. As they said: "Together these clauses provide a
justification of the Commission's role as an initiator of policy with responsibilities
going beyond those of a secretariat to the Council of Ministers." Other powers were,
on the one hand, the Commission's power of decision-making as an organisation,
negotiations with other institutions, and, on the other hand, being "the executive of
710 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 15.
" Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 9.
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the Community" in implementing rules laid down by the Council, in legislative or
other form.
Two opposing views on the role of the Commission were presented by
Edwards and Spence. One was where "[T]he Commission is seen as the dynamic
engine of the Community's legislation and action, the real symbol of supranational
or even federal Community, representing the common interest of the European
people." In this case the Council would be the blocking institution, representing
national interests and slowing down the integration process. Another view was, in
the words of General de Gaulle, "[T]he Commission as the 'areopage technocratique
apatride et irresponsable'",in By this he referred to the centralisation of political
power "in a European bureaucracy away from the direct immediate interests of the
citizens of Europe". This would be where the Council was seen to represent "the
common will of the European peoples since their political position is made legitimate
through national elections.1,713 Whichever view one regards as the "right" or the
most plausible, one has to acknowledge the close interaction of the Commission and
the member States, represented in the Council of Ministers, especially via
COREPER. This was a relationship which had already been recognised by Robert
Marjolin and Altiero Spinelli, among others, from the setting-up of the
Community.714
In the view of Edwards and Spence the European Commission has, over the
years, evolved to become more of a co-player in relation to the Council ofMinisters,
by which they mean that the Commission "has acted more and more like a
promotional broker".715 The Commission and the Council, they continued, have
a unique relationship of mutual dependence, where "neither institution can act
"a technocratic, stateless Areopagus responsible to nobody". Translation from
Bond. Smith and Wallace (1996) p. 115.
Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 203.
714 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 5.
7,7 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 221.
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without the other".™ When it comes to the many different roles of the
Commission, Edwards and Spence agreed largely with David Coombes in that this
would require several different types of organisation within the one. However, the
extensive study by David Coombes of the European Commission has only rather
briefly been mentioned twice in the book by Edwards and Spence. Despite his more
"pessimistic" predictions for the future in a bureaucratic way, what seems like a
more likely explanation must be the fact that so many contributors to the book
belong inside the Commission. One could possibly expect those to be less interested
in academic analysis of their daily work place from 25 years ago.
At the time when Coombes wrote his study on the Commission, there existed
several predictions as to how it would develop in the future. In the analysis edited
by Edwards and Spence, however, such developments have been possible to study
at close hand. As they concluded, the Commission has not "developed into a body
which fits the image of a dominating technocracy nor has it been reduced to an
expert secretariat". Nevertheless, it has "played such roles in certain policy areas and
on particular political occasions".717
Discussions about the European Commission have tended to concentrate on
the balance between political and bureaucratic elements. The two different elements
are not normally found side by side within the same organisation as the one would
often be considered as contradictory to the other. It has been this characteristic,
however, which has made the Commission into such a unique, as well as
controversial organisation. These tensions developed already with the High Authority
in 1952. It is the nature of the organisation itself, with its many diverse functions,
that has been the reason for this. It is also for this reason that the Commission has
been able to emphasize different aspects of its organisation throughout its history,
corresponding with the general political mood of the member States. Different
aspects and functions have been more strongly played out at various times depending
716 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 202.
717 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 221.
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on the surrounding circumstances. During the Free Trade Area negotiations, for
example, one could mention the role as "guardian of the Treaty" as one playing a
decisive role to the outcome of the negotiations. This was an example where the
Commission clearly put the Treaty before associations with other countries, making
sure that the provisions of the Treaty would be set out first. In times of more
political leadership, however, one might see the value of distinguishing between the
College of the Commissioners, where such political leadership has been found, and
the more bureaucratic Directorates General and Services of the administration. On
the other hand, if one by political leadership understands directly politically elected
leaders as we know from the national systems of government, one must conclude that
this has never existed in the European Commission. Apart from this, Edwards and
Spence argues that in many other respects "the EC bureaucracy [...] resembles any
other administration".718
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The approach of this thesis has been a study of whether earlier roles and
functions that have been thought of in connection with the European Commission are
still valid given the information acquired from "new" material at the Historical
Archives of the European Commission, as well as from a personal interview with
former Secretary General, Emile Noel. The impression he has given has been that
the Commission of 1958-60 acted, more than anything, as an independent body of
political initiative. This was, in large, due to the strong leadership executed by its
President, Walter Hallstein, with complete support and cooperation received from
the rest of the Commission members.
Emile Noel objected, to a certain extent, to many of the definitions and
descriptions of the European Commission set out by David Coombes and Jean Siotis
in their publications. For someone who has worked and seen the operation daily
718 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 175.
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from the inside, one could to a certain extent expect him not to be too concerned
about this type of academic writing, important though it has been to the development
of the Commission. Noel, however, was of the opinion that the European
Commission was both a multinational body as well as a political leadership,
depending on the surrounding circumstances. A crisis, he claimed, could more easily
bring out the multinational aspects. Although agreeing to the existence of largely the
same functions, Noel would be more careful in separating one from the other to the
same extent as particularly Coombes did in his study. This because one function
would never exist separate from the others, operating, as they did, constantly side
by side. Siotis. on the other hand, accused the Commission of consisting of national
enclaves which would be a hindrance to the Europeanization process. According to
Emile Noel such national enclaves hardly existed, and certainly not to a degree
which would have turned it into a problem. Nevertheless, accusations did occur
towards Hallstein appointing too many Germans among the staff.719 This, however,
is not something to which Emile Noel will agree or which he considers to have been
a problem.
Despite his view that the Commission acted highly independently of national
governments, very often taking a political initiative, Emile Noel was of the opinion
that the Commission administration developed early into a rather "closed" and
vertical pattern. The dividing of the Commission into Portfolios, Directorates-
General and Divisions, he claimed, might have proved an efficient solution at the
start but has not necessarily been the best in all situations later on. This, however,
was a decision taken by Hallstein, and the structures were established already during
the first three months of 1958, before Emile Noel, the Directors General and other
higher officials were appointed. Nevertheless, Emile Noel was able to make a great
deal of impact on the openness of the Commission and its administration by
establishing weekly meetings between Directors General and between their assistants,
in addition to the Wednesday meeting of the Commissioners.720
714 View expressed by Emile Noel in a conversation in Paris on 12 December
1994.
720 See Chapter IV, 3.3 The Executive Secretary.
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The European Commission started out as a rather small group working in a
team. As the system with DGs and Directorates became more and more established
and staff were appointed, the Commission seems to have developed into a line
system where each DG functioned more as a kind of fortress with less contact
between them. According to Noel, Hallstein assumed a natural and clear leadership
role from the first day. He took charge of the managing and development of the
organisation, according to his choice. This was, however, in full agreement with the
other members of the Commission and not disputed to any degree by the member
States. In Noel's view, it was quite clear that the officials appointed to work in the
Commission during 1958 were appointed as "European officials", not as German,
French or Dutch. These officials also mostly stayed on in the European Commission
without going back to their national administrations.
As we have seen above, the European Commission became to a large extent
a copy of the High Authority in the way it was built up, at least at first glance.
Going deeper in the research one will find several important differences between the
two executive bodies, but one vital element they both shared was the right, and duty,
to initiate policies. This, one could argue, has been the element which has separated
the European Commission the most from turning into an international organisation
or bureaucracy as we traditionally know them. It has also been this which Lindberg,
and many with him, has regarded as the driving force of the Community as a whole.
Emile Noel once called the European Commission " 'une administration
engagee', motivated by a commitment to European integration".721 This
commitment was seen strongly during the Free Trade Area negotiations between the
Six of the EEC and the other members of the OEEC. As we have observed above
in Chapter V, the European Commission had always the European integration
process of the Six and the setting-up of the Common Market as its overall aim, and
therefore recommended to end the negotiations in September 1959. A Free Trade
Area where the EEC was to be no more than a member among others could have
7-1 Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 175. "An administration with a commitment."
Own translation.
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placed this process in jeopardy, turning the Community into a looser, less integrated
free trade cooperation. As the discussion in Chapter V has shown, the Free Trade
Area negotiations served as a means for the Commission to define itself as an
independent political institution, as well as to define its field of priority being the
irreversibility of the Treaty of Rome and the fulfillment of its policies. This is a role
we have often referred to as the "guardian of the Treaty", set down in Article 155
of the Treaty of Rome. Entering into associations with third countries was
necessarily a less important priority at a time when the Community was in its first
year of existence.
One could argue that the Commission, during the Free Trade Area
negotiations between the Six and the rest of the OEEC (the Seven as they were in
the end) managed to play an independent role, taking initiatives and executing,
through its President Walter Hallstein, a real political leadership. Evidence of this
has been found in the actions of the Commission already from early on in 1958 when
it barely had its own staff. By addressing the EPA it stressed the federal and
supranational elements, as well as its independence from the national governments.
Its independence was demonstrated once again when the Commission
produced a report on the Free Trade Area, ordered by the Council in December
1958. Except for France, the other five member States of the EEC were positive
towards this association being set up. Nevertheless, the Commission produced a
report which was not altogether in favour. It could be argued that this was a good
example of the Commission taking a position on its own, as well as executing the
role identified by both Lindberg and Coombes as the "guardian of the Treaty". The
Commission had to regard the interests of the Community as a whole as more
important than to enter into a broader association with other states, even if some saw
this as a possible dividing of Europe. The Six Community States had agreed on the
Treaty of Rome and it was therefore to fulfil the provisions set out in that Treaty.
It is dangerous to believe that only when the opinion of the Commission varies from
that of the Council and the member States has the Commission acted in an
independent way, taking a position of its own. In the case of the Free Trade Area
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negotiations, however, we have seen how the Commission acted on its own
initiative, before having been given a role to play. When, in December 1958, the
Council charged the Commission with writing a report on the way in which the
negotiations could best be resumed, the Commission quite clearly produced a report
seen from its own point of view.
The Commission's role as Mediator, which has been particularly identified
by David Coombes, came out quite clearly during the Free Trade Area negotiations.
On the one hand it made attempts to reach a common agreement between the Six of
the EEC, to be able to speak with one voice as one unit. One the other hand, it also
mediated within the intergovernmental setting of the Maudling Committee between
the Six and the OEEC countries. As the Commission constantly had to regard the
interests of the Community as a whole and the Treaty provisions as more important
than any association agreement with third states, another of the Commission roles
identified by Coombes appears which was the normative role. Expressions such as
"guardian of the Treaty" and "conscience of the Community" have often been
applied to the Commission, indicating how the Commission always had to consider
the Treaty and the Community before other matters. One result of the Commission's
role in the Free Trade Area negotiations seems to have been to make the Six more
united and more committed towards the Common Market as their common cause.
A role of the Commission, explicitly spelled out in the Treaty, is the initiating
role. The Commission was given the privilege as the only Community institution to
be able to propose legislation to the Council of Ministers. This means that the
Commission has been given a certain amount of power to determine the direction of
the Community, despite the fact that it is the Council taking the decision in the end.
Another way of taking initiatives on the policies of the Community was during the
Free Trade Area negotiations. Although on a request from the Council, the
Commission produced two Memoranda and several reports during 1958, clearly
spelling out its own views on the matter. It was furthermore the Second
Memorandum from the Commission in September 1959 which finally put an end to
the whole plan of a Free Trade Area between the Community of Six and the Seven
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of the OEEC. In the First Memorandum the Commission had raised the question
about the need for the Free Trade Area rather than suggesting ways and means of
resuming the negotiations. In the Second Memorandum it took this one step further
by totally denying the need for a free trade area. The Commission had in this case
the support of France, whereas the other five member States were all in favour of
reaching a positive agreement with the Seven.
When analysing the role played by the European Commission during the Free
Trade Area negotiations one must also remember the fact that for the first part of
1958 it did not even have its own administrative staff but was busy setting-up and
appointing this. The few people there, however, have been characterised by a total
devotion and loyalty to the institution and cause of European integration. At the same
time it was able to take active part in negotiations with third States, taking political
initiatives and even determine the outcome in the end. The way the member States
in the Council of Ministers charged the Commission with the task of producing the
reports on the Free Trade Area negotiations can be interpreted as a way of
acknowledging the independence of the Commission, and also encouraging it to take
an independent position towards the rest of the Community, the member States and
the outside world. On the other hand, it must be remembered, as we have discussed
above in Chapter V, the fact that the Council itself was internally divided on this
issue between France and the other Five. As the Council could not agree on a
unanimous policy to pursue towards the OEEC, it seems that the Commission was
able to take advantage of this situation to put forward its initiative.
This thesis has aimed at revealing how the European Commission, both as a
College of Commissioners and as an administrative organisation, has been able to
perform several different roles and functions within the same organisation, more or
less at the same time. Through a thorough study of the many elements of the
Commission, its original College of Commissioners and the President, its
administrative structures with DGs and Directorates, to the establishing of Staff
Regulations, we have followed the development of an entirely new type of
organisation which has almost all other known types of organisations within it. It has
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often been referred to as the "Brussels bureaucracy", with the understanding that it
was too big and hierarchical. Compared to the national bureaucracies of the member
States, however, it has always been rather small. 22
Another aim of this thesis has been the hope that it will make a contribution
to the understanding of the organisational and administrative developments that have
taken place within the European Commission from the day it was set up, throughout
its history. The study of the material from the Historical Archives of the European
Commission has given evidence of the Commission's role and engagement, not only
at a technical level, but as much in a political way. It produced numerous letters,
memoranda and working papers concerning every aspect of the Community's
activities. Its attempt was constantly to argue for the unity of the Six, both within the
Community as well as towards third countries. One example, which has been well
documented among the archive material was the Free Trade Area negotiations
between the Six of the EEC and the rest of the OEEC. Here, the Commission argued
for the position of the Community within the new European Economic Association
to be as strong and united as possible. This Association should not be among
seventeen countries, but rather between eleven states and the Community of six. It
was further important to the Commission that the Community would never represent
a minority position, but occupy a position corresponding to its weight in the Free
Trade Area, which was 57% of the total budget of the OEEC. Another important
matter argued by the Commission was that, to give the Six a united front, they
should never individually discuss matters of Community concern within the
Association. Differences, therefore, ought to be dealt with by the institutions set up
by the Treaty of Rome.'2-' When it was no longer seen as feasible to safeguard the
position of the Community within the Free Trade Area in a way which the European
722 In 1961 there were 1,846 staff positions authorized for the Commission
(3.031 in all institutions together). Lindberg (1963) p. 54. In 1992 13,200 officials
were employed by the Commission (20,120 totally in the Community) with twice
as many member States and a Treaty that had expanded into many new areas.
Edwards and Spence (1994) p. 66.
7"' CEE. Commission. Bruxelles, le 5 septembre 1958. COM (58) 178 rev.
Confidentiel. CEAB 11/5111.
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Commission could defend, the negotiations ended.
The material from the Historical Archives has provided valuable information
on the activities of all the Community institutions, their dealings with each other, and
with outside organisations and States. By being clear in its messages, the European
Commission managed to influence a great deal the development of the Free Trade
Area. Despite being the institution which effectively put an end to the negotiations
in September 1959, it provided its influence on how it ought to have looked like and
operated had it come into being, in particular during September 1958. Several
memoranda were circulated by the Commission during this month concerning the
institutions of the Association, the transitional stages, and the globalization of
quotas.724 Through the many statements provided by the Commission concerning
the Community matters, its political line was constantly known by the participating
parties as well as the member States. In this way the Commission could try to
influence these in the best way possible in its attempt to fulfil the role as "conscience
of the Community", "guardian of the Treaty" and a political leadership of the
Community as a whole. The direction of the European Economic Community could,
in this way, to a large extent, be pointed out by the European Commission. Another
element of the greatest importance to the Commission, which we have been able to
study among the archive material, was the forming and setting-up of the Commission
administration, as well as appointing its staff members.725 Furthermore, documents
from the Historical Archives have shown the importance of making the
organisational and administrative structures of the three European Communities as
identical as possible. This was the case both for the actual dividing of tasks among
staff members, as well as for staff regulations. Despite the fact that Staff Regulations
724 Memoranda from the Commission of the EEC: 9 September 1958, COM
(58) 187 rev.; 9 September 1958, COM (58) 176 rev.; 9 September 1958, COM
(58) 184 rev.; 11 September 1958, COM (58) 186 (rev. 2); 12 September 1958,
COM (58) 189 rev.. CEAB 11/5111.
72' See for example "Communaute Economique Europeenne, Commission,
Secretariat. Bruxelles. le 5 mars 1958. Confidentiel. Repartition et Composition des
Groupes." (40/58-F), (Chapter IV. 3.1). or "Communaute Economique Europeenne.
Commission. Plan Provisoire de Repartition des Taches." (1652/2/58-F), (Chapter
IV. 3.2).
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only came into effect on 1 January 1962, these discussions had been going on since
before the European Commission coming into being.726 Only few years into the
future, the Merger of the Executives of 1967 was thereby made possible.727
As an illustration of how Entile Noel, during his years as Secretary General
of the European Commission, has viewed the operation of this specific Community
institution, we have found the following quote. It shows how the Commission is, and
has always been, an independent and political body, having at all times to deal with
the support, or lack of such, from the national governments.
"Over the years I have become increasingly convinced that this
institution is irreplaceable and its role vital. A strong Commission
may sometimes annoy one government or other, or even the entire
Council but, all things considered, it will be that Commission which
best serves both the Community and its Member States. The
Commission must be a living force; it must assert itself politically; it
must know how to say no so that it can listen more freely; and it must
know how to oppose shabby compromises, so that it can subsequently
put forward solutions based on agreement within the
Community.1,728
726 See for example "Conference Intergouvernementale pour le Marche Commun
et EEuratom, Secretariat. Bruxelles. le 2 mars 1957. Ch. Del. 412. Comite des
Chefs de Delegation Statut des Fonctionnaires." CEAB 1/1328. (Chapter IV, 6.1)
7-7 The so-called Merger Treaty establishing a single Council and a single
Commission of the European Communities was signed on 8 April 1965 and came
into force on 1 July 1967.
72s From the Special Synopsis to mark the departure of Emile Noel from the




As the final work has just been done on this thesis, the news has come of the
death of M. Emile Noel. He served as the Executive Secretary of the European
Commission of the EEC from 1958 until 1967, and the Secretary General of the
Commission of the European Communities between 1967 and 1987, which made him
the longest serving "member" of the Commission in all its history. As the Secretary
General he was able to influence considerably on the work of the Commission from
when he was appointed by President Walter Hallstein in March 1958, until his
retirement. After he retired, he served as Principal of the European University
Institute in Florence, as well as publishing a number of publications and articles on
the European Communities and its institutions in particular. All his adult life was
dedicated to the cause of European integration. Being one of the most "European"
of all his contemporaries, his death will therefore be a great loss.
Personally, I am deeply grateful and indebted to all the help I received
through his personal account of the early period of the European Commission. As
he was there at the beginning, his contribution is what has made this thesis into what
it is. I can only be thankful that I reached him in time to be able to take advantage
of such an important source of information on the establishment of the European
Commission. All statements and opinions dedicated Emile Noel throughout the thesis
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